The early Brentano identifies intentionality with intentional inexistence, i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian—Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of being (to on legetai pollachos). The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference or directedness (...) to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano. (shrink)
Das Buch behandelt in seinen 3 Kapiteln die wichtigsten Grundströmungen innerhalb der analytischen Philosophie, die grundlegenden ontologischen Fragen und die zentralen Themen einer kategorischen Ontologie. Literaturverzeichnis, Namenregister und Sachregister. - Als Einführung zum Thema für philosophische Anfangssemester.
Spatiotemporal and qualitative continuity are not sufficient to trace the career or path of one and the same object through its history. One needs sortal continuity, guaranteed by the form-token of the object. In this paper I concentrate on the question of sortal continuity linked to the problem of the cohabitation of objects. I intend to test whether it is possible to stick to the belief in continuants or endurers as well as the sortal dependence of identity and at the (...) same time avoid an undesirable multiplication of spatially coinciding objects, i.e., avoid the thesis of cohabitation. I abandon the philosophical view – this is the price to be paid – that the set of the material constituents making up an object is an object proper. The basic units of reality are the objects falling under sortals and not the ultimate components thereof. That a determinate piece of copper is not identical with the statue made from it, therefore, does not imply that we have a cohabitation of two numerically different objects. (shrink)
The contributions to this collection deal with the fundamental problem of unity, which plays a decisive role in many contemporary debates (even when this role ...
Should we interpret God’s eternity as mere everlastingness or as timelessness? We are still confronted with an ongoing debate between the two positions. That God is timeless or completely outside time might be called ”the classical view of divine eternity’. But this view can be interpreted in various ways. In reverting to some of Aquinas’ texts I want to focus on the account of God’s timelessness as a perfection. In trying to defend this view I will not offer any new (...) arguments; I simply adopt the classical assessment of the meaning of the predicates we use when we speak about God. That God lives, loves, thinks, acts, etc., are claims which cannot be understood in the same way as when they are made of human persons. (shrink)
Autoren Johannes Brachtendorf, Professor für Philosophie am Institut für philosophische Grundfragen der Theologie an der Katholisch-Theologischen Fakultät ...
This volume collects work from contemporary philosophers and theologians regarding justifications for the existence of God. Both classical and new proofs of God s existence are presented and critically discussed. The contributions also deal with questions regarding what sense such justifications have and what sort of meaning can come from arguing for the rationality of religious belief. ".
Wie soll die Unsterlichkeitshoffnung gedeutet werden, um überhaupt konsistent sein zu können? Um die Frage zu klären, bezieht sich der Artikel auf den Substanzdualismus von R. Swinburne, die Constitution Theory von L. R. Baker, die christlichen Materialisten, den aristotelischen Hylemorphismus sowie die Seelen-Lehre von Thomas v. Aquin. Die thomanischen Prämissen legen nahe, Unsterblichkeit weder präsentistisch - als ständige Gegenwart - noch äternalistisch - als unendliche Erstreckung in der Zeit - zu verstehen, sondern als endgültige participatio an der Ewigkeit Gottes, die (...) totum simul - zeitlos alles zugleich - ist. Da für Thomas das vom Körper trennbare intellektuell-geistige Prinzip der menschlichen Seele Garant der personalen Identität ist, muss er weder eine Unterbrechung der diachronen Identität noch eine per se Koinzidenz zwischen dem biologischen Tod und der individuellen Auferstehung annehmen.How should we account for the hope of immortality in order to make it consistent? The article refers to R. Swinburne's substance dualism, L. R. Baker's Constitution Theory, views of Christian materialists, Aristotelian hylemorphism, and Thomas Aquinas' teachings. The Thomistic premises suggest that we understand immortality neither presentistic nor eternalistic but rather as definite participatio in God's eternity that is timeless and totum simul, all at once. According to Thomas Aquinas, the intellectual principle of the human soul, separable from the body, guarantees diachronic personal identity. Therefore, he neither has to assume that biological death entails an interruption of the diachronic identity, nor does he have to assume that the resurrection of the individual coincides per se with biological death. (shrink)
