Weinberg's 1972 work, in his description, had two purposes. The first was practical to bring together and assess the wealth of data provided over the previous decade while realizing that newer data would come in even as the book was being printed. He hoped the comprehensive picture would prepare the reader and himself to that new data as it emerged. The second was to produce a textbook about general relativity in which geometric ideas were not given a starring role (...) for (in his words) too great an emphasis on geometry can only obscure the deep connections between gravitation and the rest of physics. (shrink)

This Special Issue of Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres contains papers based on the contributions presented at the Conference "Defining Life" held in Paris (France) on 4-5 February, 2008. The main objective of this Conference was to confront speakers from several disciplines--chemists, biochemists, biologists, exo/astrobiologists, computer scientists, philosophers and historians of science--on the topic of the definition of life. Different viewpoints of the problem approached from different perspectives have been expounded and, as a result, common grounds as well (...) as remaining diverging arguments have been identified. In addition to individual talks, two large roundtables gave ample room for speakers to discuss their diverging viewpoints. This volume collects almost all the contributions presented during the Conference and provides a rich spectrum of renewed answers to the ever-standing question "What is Life?". Besides the arguments directly regarding this question, more philosophical or historical reflections are also proposed in this issue that were not presented during the Conference. This volume also offers a synthesis written by J. Gayon taking each contribution into account. To conclude this foreword, we would like to thank all the participants and speakers who made this Conference a most stimulating event. Each provided novel ideas to "Defining Life" while highlighting the extreme difficulty to reach a consensus on this topic. We are also very grateful to the French CNRS Interdisciplinary Program Origines des Planètes et de la Vie (Origins of Planets and Life) for its generous support, as well as to the National Museum of Natural History in Paris for hosting the Conference. We also thank Alan W. Schwartz for generously offering this space for publishing the Proceedings of the Conference. (shrink)

In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition – would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is (...) still out, there is now a substantial body of evidence suggesting that some of those empirical hypotheses are true. Much of this evidence derives from an ongoing series of experimental studies of epistemic intuitions that we have been conducting. A preliminary report on these studies will be presented in Section 3. In light of these studies, we think it is incumbent on those who pursue the epistemological projects in question to either explain why the truth of the hypotheses does not undermine their projects, or to say why, in light of the evidence we will present, they nonetheless assume that the hypotheses are false. In Section 4, which is devoted to Objections and Replies, we’ll consider some of the ways in which defenders of the projects we are criticizing might reply to our challenge. Our goal, in all of this, is not to offer a conclusive argument demonstrating that the epistemological projects we will be criticizing are untenable. Rather, our aim is to shift the burden of argument. (shrink)

The coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic has strongly affected oncology patients. Many screening and treatment programs have been postponed or canceled, and such patients also experience fear of increased risk of exposure to the virus. In many cases, locus of control, coping flexibility, and perception of a supportive environment, specifically family resilience, can allow for positive emotional outcomes for individuals managing complex health conditions like cancer. This study aims to determine if family resilience, coping flexibility, and locus of control can mitigate (...) the negative affect caused by the pandemic and enhance positive affect in breast cancer patients. One hundred and fifty-four female patients with breast cancer completed the Walsh’s Family Resilience Questionnaire, the Perceived Ability to Cope With Trauma Scale, the Positive-Negative Affect Schedule, and the Mini Locus of Control Scale. Family resilience and internality of locus of control contribute significantly to positive affective responses. Family resilience is responsible for mitigating the negative affect perceived during the pandemic and is enhanced by external locus of control. Evidence suggests that clinical psychologists should develop and propose programs to support oncology patients’ family resilience, coping flexibility, and internal locus of control, allowing for decreased stress and improved adaptability for effectively managing cancer treatment during the pandemic. (shrink)

Cet article interroge la manière dont les idéologies de la guerre froide ont participé à la construction d’un discours public sur la place sociale des femmes dans la Tanzanie nouvellement indépendante, qui se proclame socialiste et non-alignée. Pour ce faire, il retrace les références explicites et implicites au capitalisme, au socialisme et au marxisme dans les discours sur les femmes publiés dans la presse nationale swahiliphone. Ces imaginaires sont mobilisés avant tout pour construire des modèles et contre-modèles féminins, notamment les (...) figures de la paysanne travailleuse et de la séductrice urbaine. Toutefois, alors que l’Année de la femme des Nations unies (1975) encourage le gouvernement tanzanien à préciser ses politiques d’émancipation des femmes, des articles viennent repenser les liens entre cette ambition et les socialismes, mondiaux et tanzanien. (shrink)

En el artículo se hace la presentación de las ideas que san Agustín destaca sobre la Virgen María en sus sermones de Navidad. Se hace en primer lugar una presentación de dichos sermones, para posteriormente abordar el tema de los dos nacimientos de Cristo, que es usado para explicar las dos naturalezas en Cristo (divina y humana). Se destacan asimismo los sermones navideños en los que san Agustín señala el paralelismo entre la Virgen María y la Iglesia, ya ambas son (...) vírgenes y madres. Como un tema central de los sermones de Navidad de san Agustín, el artículo destaca la virginidad perpetua de María. Finalmente se ofrecen unas conclusiones en las que se pone de manifiesto que los sermones de Navidad de san Agustín que tratan sobre la Virgen María son parte de su “teología predicada”. Así como sus grandes tratados desarrollan la Mariología, sus sermones son la popularización de dicho pensamiento mariano. (shrink)

Having children is probably as old as the first successful organism. It is often done thoughtlessly. This book is an argument for giving procreating some serious thought, and a theory of how, when, and why procreation may be permissible.Rivka Weinberg begins with an analysis of the kind of act procreativity is and why we might be justifiably motivated to engage in it. She then proceeds to argue that, by virtue of our ownership and control of the hazardous material that (...) is our gametes, we are parentally responsible for the risks we take with our gametes and for the persons that develop when we engage in activity that allows our gametes to unite with others and develop into persons. Further argument establishes that when done respectfully, and in cases where the child's chances of leading a life of human flourishing are high, procreation may be permissible. Along the way, Weinberg argues that the non-identity problem is a curiously common mistake. Arguments intending to show that procreation is impermissible because life is bad for people and imposed on them without their consent are shown to have serious flaws. Yet because they leave us with lingering concerns, Weinberg argues that although procreation is permissible under certain conditions, it is not only a welfare risk but also a moral risk. Still, it is a risk that is often permissible for us to take and impose, given our high level of legitimate interest in procreativity. In order to ascertain when the procreative risk is permissible to impose, contractualist principles are proposed to fairly attend to the interests prospective parents have in procreating and the interests future people have in a life of human flourishing. The principles are assessed on their own merits and in comparison with rival principles. They are then applied to a wide variety of procreative cases. (shrink)

Shelley Weinberg argues that the idea of consciousness as a form of non-evaluative self-awareness helps solve some of the thorniest issues in Locke's philosophy: in his philosophical psychology, and his theories of knowledge, personal identity, and moral agency. The model of consciousness set forth here binds these key issues with a common thread.

The article focuses on stories and storytelling practices as explanatory resources in standardization processes. It draws upon an ethnographic study of the development of a technical standard for data sharing in an ecological research community, where participants struggle to articulate the difficulties encountered in implementing the standard. Building from C. Wright Mills’ classic distinction between private troubles and public issues, the authors follow the development of a story as it comes to assist in transforming individual troubles in standard implementation into (...) an institutional issue for the ecological scientific community. The authors present the “hands-on” social science collaboration in this study as an example of a mechanism for supporting institutionalization of issues. Finally, the authors argue that narratives can serve as effective organizing principles within institutional settings, thereby providing an approach to understand the practical, substantive difficulties that occur in work with data in the sciences. (shrink)

Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers' reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there's no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers' training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people (...) are not generally very good at reckoning who will develop expertise under what circumstances. We consider three promising hypotheses concerning what philosophical expertise might consist in: (i) better conceptual schemata; (ii) mastery of entrenched theories; and (iii) general practical know-how with the entertaining of hypotheticals. On inspection, none seem to provide us with good reason to endorse this key empirical premise of the expertise defense. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The demand for basic research ethics training has grown considerably in the past few years. Research and education organizations face the challenge of providing this training with limited resources and training tools available. To meet this need, Family Health International (FHI), a U.S.‐based international research organization, recently developed a Research Ethics Training Curriculum (RETC). It was designed as a practical, user‐friendly tool that provides basic, up‐to‐date, standardized training on the ethics of human research. The curriculum can easily be adapted (...) to different audiences and training requirements. The RETC was reviewed by a group of international experts and field tested in five countries. It is available in English, French, and Spanish as a three‐ring binder and CD‐ROM, as well as on the Web. It may be used as either an interactive self‐study program or for group training. (shrink)

How ought we to go about forming and revising our beliefs, arguing and debating our reasons, and investigating our world? If those questions constitute normative epistemology, then I am interested here in normative metaepistemology: the investigation into how we ought to go about forming and revising our beliefs about how we ought to go about forming and revising our beliefs -- how we ought to argue about how we ought to argue. Such investigations have become urgent of late, for the (...) methodology of epistemology has reached something of a crisis. For analytic epistemology of the last half-century has relied overwhelmingly on intuitions,1 and a growing set of arguments and data has begun to call this reliance on intuition seriously into question (e.g., Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich 2001; Nichols, Stich, and Weinberg 2003; Cummins 1998). Although that method has not been entirely without defenders (BonJour 1998; Bealer 1996; Jackson 1998; Sosa forthcoming; Weatherson 2003), these defenses have not generally risen to the specific challenges leveled by the anti-intuitionist critics. In particular, the critics have attacked specific ways of deploying intuitions, and the defenders have overwhelmingly responded with in-principle defenses of the cogency of appealing to intuition. An analogy here would be someone’s responding to arguments alleging systematic.. (shrink)

In order for Herman Cappelen to argue in his Philosophy Without Intuitions that philosophers have been on the whole mistaken in thinking that we actually use intuitions much at all in our first-order philosophizing, he must attempt the task of characterizing what something must be, in order to be an intuition.My discussion here is focused on the latter half of the book concerning the “argument from philosophical practice. I am in wholehearted agreement with the first half’s thesis that the usage (...) of the term “intuition” is highly motley and of no methodological use. I truly sympathize with the frustration he evidently feels at wrangling with that task, because I’ve felt the same in my own project critiquing what I do take to be a fairly common practice in contemporary philosophy that we often gesture at when we speak of intuitions. For the literature on intuitions can be a total mess on even the most basic questions about what intuitions are: beliefs, or sui generis seemings? Special in .. (shrink)

Daylight is the primary cue used by circadian clocks to entrain to the day/night cycle so as to synchronize physiological processes with periodic environmental changes induced by Earth rotation.However, the temporal daylight pattern is not the same every day due to erratic weather fluctuations or regular seasonal changes. Then, how do circadian clocks operate properly in varying weather and seasons? In this paper, we discuss the strategy unveiled by recent studies of the circadian clock of Ostreococcus tauri, the smallest free‐living (...) eukaryotic organism. It combines mechanisms controlling light inputs and clock sensitivity, shaping both the dynamics of the core circadian oscillator and its forcing by light so as to ensure stable and precise synchronization in all weather and seasons.Editor's suggested further reading in BioEssays: Another place, another timer: Marine species and the rhythms of life Abstract. (shrink)

Life stinks. Mel Brooks knew it, David Benatar knows it,1 and so do I. Even when life does not stink so badly, there’s always the chance that it will begin to do so. Nonexistence, on the other hand, is odor free. Whereas being brought into existence can be harmful, or at least bad, nonexistence cannot be harmful or bad. Even if life is not clearly bad, it is at the very least extremely risky. David Benatar argues, somewhat notoriously, that since (...) it is better never to exist, one is harmed by being brought into existence and, therefore, procreation is likely always wrong and certainly always morally problematic. (shrink)

Human life is absurd because it is too short relative to reasonable human purposes. In contrast to our absurd relationship to time, our relationship to space is not absurd. Although our lives are way too short for reasonable human purposes, we are adapted to our size and the space we have to live in relative to the space of the universe and relative to reasonable human purposes. Because the human lifespan is so short as to render human life absurd, human (...) life is also meaningless because absurdity presents an obstacle to meaningfulness. (shrink)

Locke’s account of personal identity has been highly influential because of its emphasis on a psychological criterion. The same consciousness is required for being the same person. It is not so clear, however, exactly what Locke meant by ‘consciousness’ or by ‘having the same consciousness’. Interpretations vary: consciousness is seen as identical to memory, as identical to a first personal appropriation of mental states, and as identical to a first personal distinctive experience of the qualitative features of one’s own thinking. (...) There is wide agreement, however, that Locke’s theory of personal identity is meant to complement his moral and theological commitments to a system of divine punishment and reward in an afterlife. But these commitments seem to require also a metaphysical criterion, and Locke is insistent that it cannot be substance. The difficulty reconciling the psychological and metaphysical requirements of the theory has led, at worst, to charges of incoherence and, at best, to a slew of interpretations, none of which is widely accepted. (shrink)

In this paper we present an interdisciplinary approach that concerns the problem of argument acceptance in an agronomy setting. We propose a computational cognitive model for argument acceptance based on the dual model system in cognitive psychology. We apply it in an agronomy setting within a French national project on durum wheat.

It is widely agreed that Parmenides invented extended deductive argumentation and the practice of demonstration, a transformative event in the history of thought. But how did he manage this seminal accomplishment? In this book, Benjamin Folit-Weinberg finally provides an answer. At the heart of this story is the image of the hodos, the road and the journey. Brilliantly deploying the tools and insights of literary criticism, conceptual history, and archaeology, Folit-Weinberg illuminates how Parmenides adopts and adapts this image (...) from Homer, especially the Odyssey, forging from it his pioneering intellectual approaches. Reinserting Parmenides into the physical world and poetic culture of archaic Greece, Folit-Weinberg reveals both how deeply traditional and how radical was Parmenides' new way of thinking and speaking. By taking this first step toward providing a history of the concept method, this volume uncovers the genealogy of philosophy in poetry and poetic imagery. (shrink)

Machine learning (ML) trains itself by discovering patterns of correlations that can be applied to new inputs. That is a very powerful form of generalization, but it is also very different from the sort of generalization that the west has valorized as the highest form of truth, such as universal laws in some of the sciences, or ethical principles and frameworks in moral reasoning. Machine learning’s generalizations synthesize the general and the particular in a new way, creating a multidimensional model (...) that often retains more of the complex differentiating patterns it has uncovered in the training process than the human mind can grasp. Particulars speak louder in these models than they do in traditional generalizing frameworks. This creates an odd analogy with recent movements in moral philosophy, particularly the feminist ethics of care which rejects the application of general moral frameworks in favor of caring responses to the particular needs and interests of those affected by a moral decision. This paper suggests that our current wide-spread and justified worries about ML’s inexplicability—primarily arising from its reliance on staggeringly complex patterns of particulars—may be preparing our culture more broadly for a valorizing of particulars as at least as determinative as generalizations, and that this might help further advance the importance of particulars in ideas such as those put forward by the ethics of care. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The practice of appealing to esoteric intuitions, long standard in analytic philosophy, has recently fallen on hard times. Various recent empirical results have suggested that philosophers are not currently able to distinguish good intuitions from bad. This paper evaluates one possible type of approach to this problematic methodological situation: calibration. Both critiquing and building on an argument from Robert Cummins, the paper explores what possible avenues may exist for the calibration of philosophical intuitions. It is argued that no good options (...) are currently available, but leaves open the real possibility of such a calibration in the future. (shrink)

Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition. Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self. Thus, many have attributed to Locke either a memory theory or an appropriation theory of personal identity. But the former (...) stumble on circularity and the latter is insufficient for Locke’s moral theory insofar as he is committed to a theory of divine rectification. The common problem is that Locke’s theory seems to demand an objective, or metaphysical, fact of a continuing consciousness that does not appeal to a traditional notion of substance for the continuity. I’m suggesting something new. In II.xxvii of the Essay, we see an ambiguity in Locke’s use of the term ‘consciousness’. Locke seems to see consciousness as both a mental state by means of which we are aware of ourselves as perceiving and as the ongoing self we are aware of in these conscious states. First, I make the textual argument why we should read Locke as having a conception of a metaphysical fact of a continuing consciousness that does not appeal to thinking or bodily substance to establish its continuity. I then argue that the metaphysical fact of an enduring consciousness is revealed to us as a phenomenological fact of experience. Due to the nature of certain kinds of perceptual situations we have an experience of ourselves as temporally extended. Although the text bears out that Locke seemed to think there is a fact of an ongoing consciousness, I argue that it is consistent with his reluctance elsewhere that he makes no further epistemological or ontological claims about it. Finally, I provide an account of Locke’s understanding of memory and its relation to consciousness that supports the claim that consciousness is something ontologically distinct from either thinking or bodily substance. (shrink)

En suspendant la violence de ses passions et de ses désirs, l'homme se montre capable d'une relation harmonieuse et respectueuse avec lui-même, les êtres et les choses, dans un dialogue avec la douceur de la vérité et la beauté de l'art qui la recrée. On étudiera comment, à l'âge humaniste et classique, les modernes ont pensé la douceur à partir de la relecture des sources antiques et chrétiennes dans les divers champs du savoir de la poétique à l'éthique, de la (...) métaphysique à l'esthétique et dessiné un idéal difficilement définissable et aisément rompu."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Silence et sagesse montre combien les innombrables expériences et ascèses du silence, à travers la littérature ou les arts aussi bien que la philosophie ou la théologie, ont contribué à la constitution de la culture des hommes et de leur hominisation, au-delà ou en deça du logos et de son primat.

Le but de cet article est double. Il s’agit d’abord d’introduire un nouveau corpus de français oral numérisé, accessible sans restriction sur le web. CFPP2000 (Corpus du français parlé parisien des années 2000), qui comporte actuellement 500 000 mots alignés à l’oral au tour de parole, est constitué par un ensemble d’interviews conversationnelles sur les quartiers de Paris d’une à deux heures qui ont été réalisées en dyades ou le plus souvent en triades. L’article envisage l’influence pour la constitution du (...) corpus du but que nous nous étions fixé au départ, faciliter l’étude de la variation à l’oral pour le français parisien « commun ». Il aborde le choix des informateurs qui découle de cet objectif, les conduites d’entretien qui ont été adoptées. Il envisage ce qu’apporte la transcription d’entretiens relativement longs qui permet d’atténuer l’opposition entre analyse quantitative et analyse qualitative, ainsi que les précautions à prendre dans l’interprétation des résultats. Dans un deuxième temps, l’article présente les métadonnées, les concordanciers et les outils statistiques qui viennent enrichir le corpus et mentionne quelques travaux qu’il a permis de mener, tantôt en syntaxe de l’oral, tantôt autour de problèmes de variation morphologique. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est double. Il s’agit d’abord d’introduire un nouveau corpus de français oral numérisé, accessible sans restriction sur le web. CFPP2000 (Corpus du français parlé parisien des années 2000), qui comporte actuellement 500 000 mots alignés à l’oral au tour de parole, est constitué par un ensemble d’interviews conversationnelles sur les quartiers de Paris d’une à deux heures qui ont été réalisées en dyades ou le plus souvent en triades. L’article envisage l’influence pour la constitution du (...) corpus du but que nous nous étions fixé au départ, faciliter l’étude de la variation à l’oral pour le français parisien « commun ». Il aborde le choix des informateurs qui découle de cet objectif, les conduites d’entretien qui ont été adoptées. Il envisage ce qu’apporte la transcription d’entretiens relativement longs qui permet d’atténuer l’opposition entre analyse quantitative et analyse qualitative, ainsi que les précautions à prendre dans l’interprétation des résultats. Dans un deuxième temps, l’article présente les métadonnées, les concordanciers et les outils statistiques qui viennent enrichir le corpus et mentionne quelques travaux qu’il a permis de mener, tantôt en syntaxe de l’oral, tantôt autour de problèmes de variation morphologique. (shrink)

M. Buber, figure majeure de l'intelligentsia juive et européenne, a entretenu sa vie durant une immense correspondance. Propose une sélection de près de 200 lettres, des premiers échanges du jeune Buber avec Theodore Herzl, le fondateur du sionisme, jusqu'à l'année de sa mort en 1965. Sa correspondance montre qu'il a toujours souhaité un retour de la diaspora juive en Palestine.

Les articles de ce recueil, réunis par des membres du Centre de Recherche en Poétique, Histoire Littéraire et Linguistique (EA 3003) de l'Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, explorent les notions de perception, perspective et perspicacité dans plusieurs champs de recherche (linguistique, littérature, histoire des idées, philosophie et arts) et à diverses époques, du Moyen Age à la modernité. De l'univers sonore médiéval à l'esthétique de Debussy, de la linguistique populaire à l'étude linguistique des relations entre perception, cognition (...) et syntaxe, de Prévost à Proust en passant par Mark Twain ou Virginia Woolf, de la peinture américaine de Thomas Cole aux oeuvres vidéographiques contemporaines, cet ouvrage, tel un kaléidoscope, offre une myriade de perspectives sur la façon dont de simples locuteurs, des écrivains, des artistes ou des philosophes s'efforcent d'appréhender le monde. Les auteurs mettent en évidence les multiples stratégies rhétoriques, narratives ou esthétiques, entre autres, destinées à combler les failles d'une vision trop empirique ou à briser ou brouiller de façon perverse les écrans qui font obstacle à notre perception. Celle-ci survient parfois au terme d'une longue initiation, ou elle ne survient pas, tant il paraît difficile de jeter un regard surplombant sur un monde labile et opaque. La perception n'en demeure pas moins un catalyseur de la création, et aussi de la réception, voire de la re-création par un lecteur / spectateur perspicace qui aime être surpris de voir plus loin que son horizon d'attente. (shrink)

in their famous correspondence, Stillingfleet objects that Locke's definition of knowledge, by limiting certainty to the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, lessens the credibility of faith. Locke replies that his definition of knowledge does not affect the credibility of an article of faith at all, for faith and knowledge are entirely different cognitive acts: The truth of the matter of fact is in short this, that I have placed knowledge in the perception of the agreement or disagreement (...) of ideas. This definition of knowledge, your lordship said, "might be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith, which you have endeavored to defend." This I denied, and gave this reason for it, viz.... (shrink)

Must principles of justice be practical? Some political philosophers, the “implementers,” say yes. Others, the “idealists,” say no. Despite this disagreement, the implementers and idealists agree on what “practical” means, subscribing to the “implementation-prediction” conception of practicality. They also seem to agree that principles of so-called “ideal theory” need not be IP-practical. The implementers take this as a reason to reject ideal theory as an approach to principles of justice, while the idealists do not. In this paper, I argue that (...) we should reject the IP conception of practicality. The implementers make a mistake, then, by requiring principles of justice to be IP-practical. But the idealists make a mistake, too, by rejecting in general the requirement that principles of justice be practical. For there is a plausible alternative conception of practicality that political philosophers should accept: the “experimentation-learning” conception. EL-practicality makes for a more realistic and epistemically accessible standard of practicality, and thus should be welcomed by the realistically-inclined implementers. It also preserves a crucial role for ideal theory, so should be welcomed by the idealists, too. (shrink)

Übereinstimmend mit Körner versteht der Autor unter 'praktischer Philosophie' die Gesamtheit der handlungsbezogenen Disziplinen. 'Handlung' ist informationsgelenktes Verhalten eines Subjektes. Der Handlungsbegriff wird durch den handlungsbestimmenden Informationsverarbeitungsprozeß charakterisiert. Handlungstheoretische Analysen erfordern eine erkenntnismäßig differenzierte Semantik. Der Begriff der Handlung setzt die Existenz von Handlungsspielräumen voraus. Der Autor kritisiert die Unterscheidung von kognitivem und präskriptivem Sollen und zeigt, daß Normsätze einer gegebenen Bedeutung in verschiedenen pragmatischen Funktionen verwendet werden können. Es werden die Begriffe 'Normenlogik' und 'deontische Logik' einander gegenübergestellt. Die Standardsysteme (...) der deontischen Logik sind keine geeignete Basis für die normativen Disziplinen. Der Autor fordert die Ausarbeitung einer genuinen Normenlogik, in der Sollsätzen eine primäre und Darfsätzen nur eine sekundäre Rolle zukommt. (shrink)