Locke: Philosophy of Mind, Misc

I show that Locke anticipates key features of Hume’s more celebrated analysis of convention. I do so by developing Lenz’s account of Lockean (linguistic) convention and its normativity as presented in Socializing Minds. Locke’s account of linguistic convention shares structural features also visible in Locke’s treatment of the convention money and property. I show that Locke’s ‘Humean’ account of convention responds to a lacuna in Pufendorf’s treatment of linguistic convention that Lenz argues is significant to Locke.

Quelles sont les opinions spéculatives de John Locke sur la nature de l’esprit et des idées et sur les conditions métaphysiques de la pensée et de la conscience? Faut-il en rester à la vision traditionnelle d’un Locke qui reste agnostique à propos de telles questions, au prétexte que leur traitement excède la méthode adoptée dans l’ Essai? Philippe Hamou a affronté ce problème et a entrepris de réévaluer la philosophie de l’esprit lockienne, dans une série de travaux qui illustrent l’intérêt (...) contemporain pour la métaphysique qui convient à cette épistémologie. La présente discussion situe la contribution de P. Hamou au sein des études récentes et propose quelques objections. (shrink)

John Locke has been widely understood to hold that belief is under one's direct control. This doxastic voluntarism appears to be implicit in his evidentialism, his doxastic moralism, and his postulation of an ability to suspend assent. I argue, first, that interpreting Locke as a doxastic voluntarist is untenable—at odds with his conception of knowledge, probable assent, and religious belief. I also claim that interpreting Locke as a voluntarist fails to cohere with his understanding of the intellect's relation to the (...) will. Although Passmore's voluntarist interpretation does not capture Locke's conception of doxastic control, there is a narrow sense in which Locke allows room for direct control of belief. (shrink)

This article deals with an argument reported by Razi (d. 1210) that attempted to undermine the immaterialist position about human nature. After some introductory remarks and explanation of the conceptual background, the article analyses the structure of the argument, with special attention to the idea of soul-switching.’ Some comparisons are made between the argument reported by Razi and a number of arguments from modern and contemporary eras of philosophy. One section is devoted to the critique of the argument and its (...) conceptual basis. This article shows that the argument reported by Razi is a methodological antecedent of a family of contemporary epistemological arguments against substance dualism. It is also shown that discussion of the argument could be useful to highlight a weakness in some, but not all, versions of immaterialism about human nature. (shrink)

This chapter charts Locke's commitments about memory and remembering through observing a range of phenomena of memory that Locke relies on in his discussion of the human mind. This chapter investigates Locke's notions of contemplation and implicit memory, the role of the first-person perspective, and conditions of possibility for veridical remembering.

This book begins with a survey of various readings of Locke as a materialist, as a substance dualist, and as a property dualist, and demonstrates that these inconsistent interpretations result from a general failure of modern commentators to notice the significance of Locke’s ‘mind-body nominalism’. By illuminating this largely overlooked aspect of Locke’s philosophy, this book reveals a common mistake of previous interpretations: that of treating what Locke conceives to be ‘nominal’ as real. The nominal symmetry that Locke posits between (...) mind and body is distinct from any form of metaphysical dualism, whether substance dualism or property dualism. It is a brand of naturalism, but does not insist that the material is ontologically more basic than the mental or that the former determines the latter. On this view, the material and the mental both relate solely to a certain set of functional roles, rather than to an intrinsic property that plays these roles. The term ‘matter’ is thus rendered vague, and materialism is conceived as a precariously grounded ontological doctrine. Elaborating on this interpretation of Locke’s Essay, this book examines the insightful readings of Locke developed by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers such as Richard Burthogge, William Carroll, and Joseph Priestley. This book also seeks to clarify what Locke’s position would look like in a modern setting by noting some significant parallels with the ideas of leading contemporary philosophers such as Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and Colin McGinn. (shrink)

Philippe Hamou claims that Locke played a decisive but underappreciated role in inventing the current notion of mind, and in setting the agenda for contemporary philosophy of mind. These provocative theses, even when qualified as Hamou does, strike me as strained. It is hard, for example, to imagine the convoluted route by which one might identify Locke's secondary qualities with contemporary qualia, as Hamou does ; surely, there must be qualia associated with primary qualities too.However, for most of his book, (...) Hamou is concerned to advance his own intriguing interpretation of Locke himself, rather than engaging with contemporary philosophy of mind. The first and larger half of the book deals with Locke's... (shrink)

This book presents an interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as a priori psychologism. It groups Kant's philosophy together with those of the British empiricists--Locke, Berkeley, and Hume--in a single line of psychologistic succession and offers a clear explanation of how Kant's psychologism differs from psychology and idealism. The book reconciles Kant's philosophy with subsequent developments in science and mathematics, including post-Fregean mathematical logic, non-Euclidean geometry, and both relativity and quantum theory. Finally, the author reveals the ways in which (...) Kant's philosophy dovetails with contemporary scientific theorizing about the natural phenomenon of consciousness and its place in nature. This book will be of interest to Kant scholars and historians of philosophy working on the British empiricists. (shrink)

L'objet de ce livre est de rendre à John Locke et à son Essai sur l'entendement humain (1689), la place centrale qui leur revient dans l'invention de "l'esprit" moderne. Mettant de côté la spéculation métaphysique et religieuse, Locke s'est proposé d'appliquer aux pouvoirs et aux opérations de l'esprit une forme d'analyse expérimentale, fondée sur les données factuelles du sens interne (ou " réflexion "). Sous son concept d'idée, il identifie, peut-être pour la première fois, des états mentaux, états conscients, dont (...) le flux, ou le "train" constitue l'élément dans lequel se déploie une forme de vie intérieure, une vie mentale. A travers ces descriptions, Locke ouvre à ses lecteurs une nouvelle manière de penser l'esprit ou le "mind", dont la philosophie contemporaine a largement hérité, en interrogeant la nature de la conscience, le rapport entre les sens perceptifs, ou encore de la "question de l'identité personnelle" dans son rapport au flux de conscience. Ecrit dans une langue claire, nourri par une connaissance précise des débats classiques et contemporains, mais ne présupposant du lecteur aucune connaissance préalable de Locke, cet ouvrage propose une lecture originale et par moment intempestive de l'Essai, qui le dépouille de son habit austère de "grand monument de l'âge classique", en montrant qu'il offre des réponses toujours stimulantes aux questions vives et disputées d'aujourd'hui, en même temps qu'il permet une meilleure compréhension de l'histoire qui leur a donné naissance. (shrink)

There is an exegetical quandary when it comes to interpreting Locke's relation to logic.On the one hand, over the last few decades a substantive amount of literature has been dedicated to explaining Locke's crucial role in the development of a new logic in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John Yolton names this new logic the "logic of ideas," while James Buickerood calls it "facultative logic."1 Either way, Locke's Essay is supposedly its "most outspoken specimen" or "culmination."2 Call this reading the (...) 'New Logic interpretation.'On the other hand, from the typical standpoint of a philosopher accustomed to the modern conception of logic, whatever Locke—indeed, whatever most of the... (shrink)

My topic is the materialist appropriation of empiricism—as conveyed in the ‘minimal credo’ nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu. That is, canonical empiricists like Locke go out of their way to state that their project to investigate and articulate the ‘logic of ideas’ is not a scientific project: “I shall not at present meddle with the Physical consideration of the Mind”. Indeed, I have suggested elsewhere, contrary to a prevalent reading of Locke, that the Essay is not (...) the extension to the study of the mind of the methods of natural philosophy; that he is actually not the “underlabourer” of Newton and Boyle he claims politely to be in the Epistle to the Reader. Rather, Locke says quite directly if we pay heed to such passages, “Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct”. There would be more to say here about what this implies for our understanding of empiricism, but instead I shall focus on a different aspect of this episode: how a non-naturalistic claim which falls under what we now call epistemology becomes an ontology—materialism. That is, how an empiricist claim could shift from being about the sources of knowledge to being about the nature of reality.. Put differently, I want to examine the shift from the logic of ideas in the seventeenth century to an eighteenth-century focus on what kind of ‘world’ the senses give us, to an assertion that there is only one substance in the universe, and that we need an account of the material substrate of mental life. This is neither a ‘scientific empiricism’ nor a linear developmental process from philosophical empiricism to natural science, but something else again: the unpredictable emergence of an ontology on empiricist grounds. (shrink)

Shelley Weinberg’s Consciousness in Locke builds on her previous journal articles and makes significant contributions to John Locke scholarship by offering the first systematic study of consciousness throughout Locke’s Essay. According to Weinberg, consciousness for Locke is self-referential, non-evaluative awareness internal to every thought or perception. She argues that once we realize the complexity of any perception—namely that every perception involves, “at the very least, an act of perception, an idea perceived, and consciousness ” —we can see that Locke’s conception (...) of consciousness connects important themes in his philosophical psychology, namely his theory of... (shrink)

Dans cet article, j’examine la nature et le rôle de l’attention dans le cadre du parallélisme que Locke établit entre la sensation et la réflexion en tant qu’origines des idées. Je montre que le caractère volontaire n’est pas un élément nécessaire de l’attention pour Locke, et que porter attention à quelque chose n’est pas la même chose qu’en être conscient puisque la conscience d’une idée doit en précéder l’attention. Afin de pouvoir rendre compte des manières différentes dont les idées internes (...) et externes sont formées et conservées dans l’esprit, Locke distingue entre deux types d’attention : involontaire et volontaire. L’attention involontaire ne suffit pas à rendre compte de la permanence des idées des objets internes. Cette doctrine de l’attention est enfin mise en rapport à la nature même de l’entreprise philosophique de l’ Essai dans son ensemble, que Locke décrit dans l’ Introduction en disant que l’entendement nous fait voir et percevoir toutes les autres choses, mais qu’il faut un effort particulier pour le mettre à distance et en faire un objet pour lui-même. (shrink)

Shelley Weinberg argues that the idea of consciousness as a form of non-evaluative self-awareness helps solve some of the thorniest issues in Locke's philosophy: in his philosophical psychology, and his theories of knowledge, personal identity, and moral agency. The model of consciousness set forth here binds these key issues with a common thread.

This paper argues that, while Locke’s unstable usage of the term ‘mind’ prevents us from claiming that he had a theory of mind, it can still be said that he made a contribution to the philosophy of mind in its contemporary sense. After establishing that it was the term ‘soul’ that predominated in early modern British philosophy, the paper turns to Locke’s three central notions of the soul, the understanding, and the person. It is argued that there are two stages (...) to the development of Locke’s view of the soul: a first philosophical stage and a later theological stage. The first stage is characterized by the application of the material/immaterial distinction. The second stage rejects the utility of this distinction. The two stages are not, however, incompatible, for the bridge between them is found in Locke’s conceptions of the understanding and personhood. While the latter theological stage was, in the end, of the greatest concern to Locke, it is in the earlier philosophical stage that we find his real contribution to what we now call the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate two interesting parallels between views discussed in John Wilkins’ Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion and positions developed by John Locke in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The first parallel pertains to a faculty of inner sense. Both authors carve out a central role for this introspective perceptual modality. The second parallel pertains to volition and free will. Both authors employ an investigative methodology which privileges first-personal experiences of choosing and (...) willing. I also discuss the relationship between these two parallels and speculate about their significance. (shrink)

The chapter examines the views of John Locke on the study of human understanding, focusing on his work entitled An Essay concerning Human Understanding and Of the Conduct of the Understanding. It highlights Locke's use of the Stoic tripartite division of knowledge into natural philosophy, ethics, and logic, and his emphasis on the importance of the senses in the acquisition of sensitive knowledge of the natural world. The chapter also discusses the normative aims for the study of the understanding, and (...) the relation between understanding and the will. (shrink)

John Locke’s foundational place in the history of British empiricism and liberal political thought is well established. So, in what sense can Locke be considered a modern European philosopher? Identity and Difference argues for reassessing this canonical figure. Closely examining the "treatise on identity" added to the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Étienne Balibar demonstrates Locke’s role in the formation of two concepts central to the metaphysics of the subject—consciousness and the self—and the complex philosophical, legal, moral (...) and political nature of his terms. With an accompanying essay by Stella Sandford, situating Balibar’s reading of Locke in the history of the reception of the Essay and within Balibar’s other writings on "the subject," Identity and Difference rethinks a crucial moment in the history of Western philosophy. (shrink)

This is the Introduction to Etienne Balibar's book Identity and Difference: John Locke and the Invention of Consciousness. It begins with a brief reprise of Balibar’s main argument concerning Locke’s role in the ‘invention of consciousness’ and draws out the most important aspects of Balibar’s multi-faceted interpretation of Locke on personal identity. After a condensed overview of the main trends in the mainstream interpretation and criticism of Locke’s argument, focusing in particular on the two major objections that continue to be (...) leveled against Locke’s account, it then relocates Locke’s argument and Balibar’s interpretation of it within the context of recent work on the philosophical history of the concept of the subject. This new context for the interpretation of Locke allows us both to understand the dogged persistence of the main criticisms of Locke – from the earliest to some of his most recent ‘analytical’ critics – in a new way and to form of a connection between this part of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Locke’s political philosophy. (shrink)

Francis Bacon and the art of direction -- An art of tempering the mind -- The distempered mind and the tree of knowledge -- A comprehensive culture of the mind -- The end of knowledge -- The study of nature as regimen -- Cultura and medicina animi: an early modern tradition -- The physician of the soul -- Sources -- Genres -- Utility: practical versus speculative knowledge -- Self-love and the fallen/uncultured mind -- The office of reason -- Passions, errors, (...) and assent -- The discipline, the virtues, and habituation -- Virtuoso discipline -- The cure of the mind and Solomon's house -- Passions, errors, and method -- Idols and diseases of the mind -- Epistemic modesty -- The way of inquiry -- A 'union of eyes and hands': the community and objectivity revisited -- Robert Boyle: experience as paideia -- The limits and the 'perfection' of reason -- The weak mind and the virtues of a free inquiry -- Reason and experience -- The Christian philosopher -- John Locke and the education of the mind -- Limits of reason, useful knowledge, and the duty to search for truth -- A natural history of the distempered mind -- The regulation of assent: a perfecting exercise -- The discourse with a friend -- Studying nature -- Lived physics -- The appropriateness of disproportion -- Experience, history, and speculation -- Affective cognition -- Studying 'God's contrivances' -- The study of theology and the growth of the mind -- Worlds and angels -- Reading scripture -- Conclusion. (shrink)

In _Regimens of the Mind_, Sorana Corneanu proposes a new approach to the epistemological and methodological doctrines of the leading experimental philosophers of seventeenth-century England, an approach that considers their often overlooked moral, psychological, and theological elements. Corneanu focuses on the views about the pursuit of knowledge in the writings of Robert Boyle and John Locke, as well as in those of several of their influences, including Francis Bacon and the early Royal Society virtuosi. She argues that their experimental programs (...) of inquiry fulfill the role of regimens for curing, ordering, and educating the mind toward an ethical purpose, an idea she tracks back to the ancient tradition of _cultura animi_. Corneanu traces this idea through its early modern revival and illustrates how it organizes the experimental philosophers’ reflections on the discipline of judgment, the study of nature, and the study of Scripture. _ _ _ _ It is through this lens, the author suggests, that the core features of the early modern English experimental philosophy—including its defense of experience, its epistemic modesty, its communal nature, and its pursuit of “objectivity”—are best understood. (shrink)

O texto pretende fazer uma exposição panorâmica das principais concepções de história do espírito dos filósofos britânicos, desde Locke até os autores do final do século XVIII. A partir daí pretende-se mostrar que a unidade entre esses filósofos é apenas aparente. Pois, apesar das semelhanças, as diferenças que há entre as concepções e orientações metodológicas destes autores são suficientes para atestar que estamos diante projetos filosóficos muito distintos. The aim of this paper is to present a comprehensive outlook of the (...) conceptions of history of mind proposed by the british philosophers from Locke to the end of the XVIII century. It aims to show that, despite the seeming resemblances, the differences among those conceptions are sufficient to enable us to identify different philosophical projects. (shrink)

As Locke claims that consciousness of our being is involved in all thought and perception, he treats all consciousness as some type of self-consciousness. I examine how consciousness relates to what it is about by inquiring into the intimate relations between consciousness and mental acts and consciousness and the self.

1. The restless mind[1] Like us, early modern philosophers, both natural and moral, didn’t always understand the springs of their own actions. They didn’t want to feel everything they felt, and couldn’t trace the sources of all their thoughts and imaginings. Events from past experience come to mind again unwilled: abstract thought is interrupted by fantastical images, like the ‘winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants’ by which Hume exemplified ‘the liberty of the imagination’[2]. Then, as now, a failure to (...) keep a train of thought on track could be blamed for both personal and social ills, for wasted lives and erratic policies. The ongoing struggle to distinguish the deliverances of reason from what Hume called ‘the loose and indolent reveries of a castle-builder’ (1739/ 1978, p.624) thus required scrutiny of daydream and fancy as much as belief and knowledge (see also Tierney- Hynes 2007 on the ‘castle-builder’). The mind’s tendencies to float and to roam were of great interest to early modern philosophers as well as to others concerned with medicine, mental health, morals, education, and taste. This paper sketches one local line of thinking and theorizing about ‘mind-wandering’ and its bodily causes in British philosophy over the first decades of the 18th century, as a small exemplar of a form of cognitive history intended to illuminate independent historical and contemporary concerns about our understanding of mental life. The dual aim is to see problems in our historical material that we might otherwise miss, and to use history to explore phenomena more or less marginalized by modern psychology[3]. (shrink)

Locke’s theory of consciousness is often appropriated as a forerunner of present-day Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories, but not much is said about it beyond that. We offer an interpretation of Locke’s account of consciousness that portrays it as crucially different from current-day HOP theory, both in detail and in spirit. In this paper, it is argued that there are good historical and philosophical reasons to attribute to Locke the view not that conscious states are accompanied by higher-order perceptions, but rather (...) that conscious states constitute perceptions of themselves. (shrink)

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine Locke's theory of mind and the role consciousness plays therein. It is Locke's belief that consciousness is a necessary condition of all mental phenomena, of everything we experience, and that the notion of an unconscious mental state or experience is absurd. Consequently, we find that all of what Locke says the mind is capable of knowing and doing starts and stops in consciousness. ;It will be my contention that Locke's theory of consciousness (...) is problematic not only because of the inconsistent ways in which he explains how consciousness informs our theories of the world and functions in both sensation and reflection, the two sources from which he says all of the mind's contents are derived, but also because, as we will see, there is no way to provide a successful theory of mind without including the unconscious. That is, what I will argue is that it is not simply because Locke is careless in formulating his empiricist theory of mind and his belief about the role consciousness plays therein that it must be rejected, but because it is impossible to provide a theory of mind without somehow accounting for unconscious mental states, as even Locke sometimes is forced to do. By opening the door for unconsciousness to be included in our theories of mind, I argue, we not only allow for complete and coherent explanations of how the mind functions, but we allow for the possibility of defending a rationalist theory of mind. I will have the opportunity to examine the thesis of rationalism, at least as it exists in an historical context, throughout this treatment, as it is the existence of rationalism that motivates Locke to expound his empiricist views in the Essay. I will also have the opportunity to explain some of the rationalist perspective found in Leibniz's theory of mind, as in the final chapter I will examine Leibniz's criticism of Locke's theory. In the end I will argue that Leibniz's theory of mind wins over Locke's as we find that Leibniz is not only able to account for a wider range of experiences than Locke, but because by virtue of allowing for unconsciousness, Leibniz is able to provide a more coherent view of how the mind functions. (shrink)

Philosophy and Memory Traces defends two theories of autobiographical memory. One is a bewildering historical view of memories as dynamic patterns in fleeting animal spirits, nervous fluids which rummaged through the pores of brain and body. The other is new connectionism, in which memories are 'stored' only superpositionally, and reconstructed rather than reproduced. Both models, argues John Sutton, depart from static archival metaphors by employing distributed representation, which brings interference and confusion between memory traces. Both raise urgent issues about control (...) of the personal past, and about relations between self and body. Sutton demonstrates the role of bizarre body fluids in moral physiology, as philosophers from Descartes and Locke to Coleridge struggled to control their own innards and impose cognitive discipline on 'the phantasmal chaos of association'. Going on to defend connectionism against Fodor and critics of passive mental representations, he shows how problems of the self are implicated in cognitive science. (shrink)

The paper argues against the claim held, e.g., by Leibniz, that Locke employs a double standard for determining whether an object before the mind (i.e., an idea) is real. Using Locke's ectype-archetype distinction it is shown that this charge is the result of confusing Locke's criterion of reality with its application. Depending on whether it applies to a simple, substance or mode idea, the criterion works out differently. Next it is argued that although Locke maintains only a single criterion, this (...) criterion is untenable, since it fails to properly distinguish real from fantastical ideas. (shrink)

This book is the continuation of a project begun by the author in his Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain. In that work Yolton showed that Locke's suggestion that God might have given the power of thought to matter itself had significant effects in Britain. The present work makes clear that Locke's passing comment also had significant and quite varied effects in France. Yolton himself characterizes this book as telling the story of "the adventures of Locke's suggestion in France." These (...) adventures are for him "picaresque because of the way this suggestion appears, reappears, is attacked and defended in so many places and in such different contexts". (shrink)