Epistemoloji alanında bilginin iki temel düşünce üzerinden günümüze kadar geldiği bilinen bir husustur. Bu düşüncelerden ilkini ve en önemlisini oluşturan Platon felsefesi, mutlakçı kanadı temsil edenken Protagoras felsefesi rölativist bir yapıyı dillendirir. Her iki yapı arasındaki karşılaştırmanın birbirinden bağımsız kaynaklardan hareketle yapılamaması, Protagoras felsefesinin açık bir şekilde anlaşılmasını engellemektedir. Çünkü bu felsefenin anlaşılması, muhalif kanatta yer alan Platon’un eserlerinden hareketle gerçekleştirilmektedir. Bu durum, Platon’un hangi Protagoras’ı eserlerinde işlediği sorusunu gündeme getirir. Bu sorunun yanlış anlama veya yanlış aktarma şeklinde iki temel (...) problem üzerinden işlenmesi her iki düşüncenin hem Platon’un eserlerinde hem de söz konusu aktarımların dışında nasıl bir çerçeveye sahip olduğunu tartışmaya açar. Bu çalışmamızın amacı da Platon’un Theaetetus diyalogunda ele aldığı Protagoras felsefesinin tarihsel açıdan gerçek Protagoras’ın düşüncelerine karşılık gelip gelmediğini incelemek ve her iki filozofun ayrıştığı noktaları ön plana çıkarmaktır. Bu noktada temel ayrımın bilgi ve algı kavramları üzerinden ortaya çıktığı ve bu durumun mutlakçı ve rölativist yaklaşımlarla doğrudan ilişkili olduğu belirtilmelidir. (shrink)

The author shows how Protagoras's notion that justice is teachable because it is behavioral conditioning (punishment) in cities that are gangsterism incarnate.

Der Dialog Protagoras gehort zu den "kunstlerisch vollendetsten und sorgfaltigst gearbeiteten Dialogen," so Rudolf Hirzel. Von den Werken Platons hat Protagoras neben Der Staat am starksten die staatspolitische Theorie seit der Antike beeinflusst.".

We have far less evidence for Aristotle’s reception of Protagoras than we like to think, and the evidence we do have is somewhere we hardly ever look. With one exception, every reference Aristotle makes to the Measure Doctrine—Protagoras’ claim that humans are the ‘measure of all things —concerns the Doctrine as amplified in Plato’s Theaetetus, and the ‘Protagoras’ in question is Plato’s fictional character as fictional. Metaph. I 1, 1053a35–b3 provides the only exception, where Aristotle offers an anomalous reading of (...) the Doctrine incompatible with the others. The chapter interprets I 1, 1053a35–b3 and concludes that Aristotle attributes the anomalous reading to Protagoras himself. The chapter argues further that every other reference to the Doctrine derives from the Theaetetus. Aristotle formulates ‘the theory of Protagoras’ according to Plato’s self-refutation argument, and his argument that it denies the Principle of Non-contradiction includes premisses from Plato’s argument that are out of place in Aristotle’s own. He moreover attributes to ‘Protagoras’ arguments and dialectical demands that the fictional Protagoras makes in his so-called ‘apology’, so his target is specifically a Platonic invention and not the historical person. This leaves only Metaph. I 1 1053a35–b3 to join his six other references to the historical Protagoras, which makes it Aristotle’s only engagement with the Measure Doctrine as the actual view of his predecessor. (shrink)

O anthropos de Protágoras: do singular ao comum Resumo: Com base no Teeteto de Platão, busca-se compreender a dimensão do termo ánthropos na famosa sentença de Protágoras. Segundo a crítica platônica, Protágoras parece entender corpo e alma como diferentes tipos de percipientes: os órgãos sensoriais corporais percebem a aparência imediata de algo que provoca a sensibilidade; a alma, por sua vez, ‘percebe’ por ter julgamentos admitidos pela aprendizagem e experiência. O homem-medida protagórico, do tema da realidade sensível, conduz-nos à formulação (...) do problema em termos de julgamento e opinião, e a medida, que inicialmente é atribuída a cada indivíduo, para além de cada ser humano, é reputada a cada cidade. Palavras-chave: Homem-medida; Protágoras; Paideia; Democracia; Teeteto. The ánthropos of Protagoras: from singular to common Abstract: Based on Plato's Theaetetus, we seek to understand the dimension of the term ánthropos in the famous sentence of Protagoras. According to Platonic criticism, Protagoras seems to understand body and soul as different types of percipients: the bodily sensory organs perceive the immediate appearance of something that provokes sensitivity; the soul 'perceives' by having judgments admitted by learning and experience. The protagorical measure-man, from the theme of sensible reality, leads us to formulate the problem in terms of judgment and opinion, and the measure, which is initially attributed to each individual, in addition to each human being, is reputed to each city. Keywords: Man-measure; Protagoras; Paideia; Democracy; Theaetetus. El antropos de Protágoras: del singular al común Resumen: Con base en el Teeteto de Platón, buscamos comprender la dimensión del término ánthropos en la famosa oración de Protágoras. Según la crítica platónica, Protágoras parece entender el cuerpo y el alma como diferentes tipos de perceptores: los órganos sensoriales corporales perciben la aparición inmediata de algo que provoca la sensibilidad; el alma, a su vez, "percibe" al admitir juicios mediante el aprendizaje y la experiencia. El hombre-medida protagórico, desde el tema de la realidad sensible, nos lleva a formular el problema en términos de juicio y opinión, y la medida, que inicialmente se atribuye a cada individuo, además de cada persona, se le atribuye a cada ciudad. Palabras clave: Hombre medida; Protágoras; Paideia; Democracia; Teeteto. Data de registro: 15/07/2021 Data de aceite: 15/03/2022. (shrink)

In this contribution, I aim to show how locating the Platonic dialogues in the intellectual context of their own time can illuminate their philosophical content. I seek to show, with reference to a specific dialogue (the Theaetetus), how Plato responds to other thinkers of his time, and also to bring out how, by reconstructing Plato’s response, we can gain deeper insight into the way that Plato shapes the structure and form of his argument in the dialogue. In particular, I argue (...) that the subtler thinkers (hoi kompsoteroi) discussed by Plato’s Socrates at Tht. 156a3 are Aristippus and the early Cyrenaics. (Recent scholars, such as Giannantoni and Tsouna, have rejected this identification, which was earlier defended by Schleiermacher, Grote, Zeller and Mondolfo.) Further, I claim that, once we recognise that the subtler thinkers are most likely to be the early Cyrenaics, we can make better sense of the scope and content of the arguments Plato puts forward at Tht. 156a - 160e (especially 156a - 157c). Also, I suggest that this identification helps us to understand a crucial part of Tht. 184b - 186e. Here Plato, in exploring the account of perception offered at 156a - 157c, uses the metaphor of the Wooden Horse to illustrate the conception of perception that he attributes to thinkers such as Protagoras and, in my view, the early Cyrenaics, who maintain that knowledge is a form of perception. (shrink)

The digression of Plato’s Theaetetus (172c2–177c2) is as celebrated as it is controversial. A particularly knotty question has been what status we should ascribe to the ideal of philosophy it presents, an ideal centered on the conception that true virtue consists in assimilating oneself as much as possible to god. For the ideal may seem difficult to reconcile with a Socratic conception of philosophy, and several scholars have accordingly suggested that it should be read as ironic and directed only at (...) the dramatic character Theodorus. When interpreted with due attention to its dramatic context, however, the digression reveals that the ideal of godlikeness, while being directed at Theodorus, is essentially Socratic. The function of the passage is to introduce a contemplative aspect of the life of philosophy into the dialogue that contrasts radically with the political-practical orientation characteristic of Protagoras, an aspect Socrates is able to isolate as such precisely because he is conversing with the mathematician Theodorus. (shrink)

Kant defines enlightenment of the individual as emergence of the individual from a self-imposed immaturity. In this definition, individuals who are not enlightened are held responsible for their failures. This is because Kant, in this text, implies that the only thing we need in order to be enlightened as individuals is to be able to use our capacity to think, which is present in every mentally fit individual. One can infer that Kant has an egalitarian understanding of enlightenment, since anyone (...) who has the courage and determination to use their mind can be enlightened. However, when the text is examined more closely and Kant's other writings are consulted, it becomes clear that another factor beyond the individual's control plays a role in whether an individual is enlightened. This factor is the individual's upbringing and education. If Kant admits that the education one receives plays a role in one’s state of being enlightened, and if not everyone is exposed to the education necessary to become an enlightened individual, then Kant would have an elitist approach to enlightenment. In this article, I will first point out the visible tension in Kant’s texts about the enlightenment of the individual. This apparent tension, however, will be resolved by showing that Kant stands in opposition to the Platonic account of enlightenment and the elitist attitude attached to it, and instead adopts a Stoic account of enlightenment and thereby develops an egalitarian approach to enlightenment. __________________ -/- Kant bireyin aydınlanmasını insanın kendi suçu ile düşmüş olduğu bir ergin olmama durumundan kurtulması olarak tanımlar. Bu tanımda aydın olamayan bireyler başarısızlıklarından kendileri sorumlu tutulur. Zira bu metinde Kant, aydın bireyler olabilmemiz için gereken tek şeyin –mental olarak sağlıklı her bireyde var olan- düşünme kapasitesini kullanabilmek olduğunu ima eder. Aklını kullanma cesareti ve azmi gösteren herkesin aydın olabileceğini iddia etmesi sebebiyle Kant’ın eşitlikçi bir aydınlanma anlayışını olduğu düşünülebilir. Ancak bu metne daha yakından baktığımızda ve Kant’ın diğer metinlerine danıştığımızda, bireyin aydın olup olmamasında bireyin kontrolü dışındaki başka bir faktörün daha rol oynadığını görüyoruz. Bu faktör de bireyin yetiştirilme tarzı ve aldığı eğitimdir. Eğer aydın olmamızda aldığımız eğitimin rolü varsa ve aydın bireyler olabilmek için herkes gerekli olan eğitimi alamıyorsa, Kant’ın aydınlanma konusunda elitist bir yaklaşıma sahip olduğunu düşünebiliriz. Bu çalışmada bireyin aydınlanması konusunda Kant’ın metinlerinde görünür bir gerilim olduğuna işaret edilecektir. Kant’ın aydınlanma konusunda kendi dönemine hâkim olan Platoncu aydınlanma anlayışından ve buna bağlı olarak gelişen elitist tavırdan farklı olarak Stoacı aydınlanma anlayışını benimsediği ve dolayısıyla da eşitlikçi bir tutum sergilediği gösterilerek bu gerilim çözümlenecektir. (shrink)

Dans Les Nuées, Aristophane adresse des critiques à Socrate auxquelles Platon répond philosophiquement dans l’Apologie. Or le Socrate des Nuées porte des traits de Protagoras, et certains reproches attribués à l’un valent pour l’autre. Comme pour Socrate, Platon a composé pour Protagoras une apologie, dans le Théétète. Si nous comparons les accusations de la pièce à ce que Platon prête à Protagoras, nous constatons qu’il se fait son défenseur. Mais pour quelle raison et à quel point de vue? Par une (...) analyse des concepts de geloion et de mimèsis comique, on montre comment Platon déploie une stratégie de réappropriation de la pensée de Protagoras – pour lui donner un tour philosophique qui constitue en même temps une réflexion critique sur le statut de l’objet comique.In the Apology, Plato gives a philosophical answer to critics contained in Aristophanes’ Clouds. However, through Socrates, The Clouds target Protagoras too. As a matter of fact, Plato composed an apology for him, as well in the Theaetetus, that answers the charges in the comedy against Protagoras, becoming in a certain way his « lawyer ». But why and what for? Analysing the concepts of geloion and comic mimesis, we show how Plato undertakes to give a philosophical reading of Protagoras’ thought, which, in the same time, constitutes a critical thinking about the object of comedy. (shrink)

This is the review of L. Regner's translation of Protagoras by Plato.

Felsefe tarihi, Heidegger’e göre, varlık sorusu etrafında inşa edilmiştir. Büyük filozofların neredeyse tamamı yüzeydeki tüm farklılıklara rağmen esasında bu ontolojik soruyla ilgilenmişlerdir. Bununla birlikte özellikle özgün düşünce geleneğinde bir kırılmanın yaşandığı Platon’la birlikte “varlık sorusu”, gitgide sahihliğinden uzaklaşmış ve Descartes’ın modern felsefenin de başlangıcı olmak bakımından tepe noktasını oluşturduğu bir çizgide, özne ile nesnenin karşılıklı konumlandırılarak yorumlandığı bir epistemolojik soru haline dönüşmüştür. Epistemolojik yaklaşımın öne çıkan özelliği, özne-nesne ilişkisinde bilginin koşullarını belirleyerek öznenin bilme sınırlarını saptamaya çalışmaktır. Bu yaklaşımda nesne (...) özneye aşkındır; dolayısıyla öznenin nesneyi bilmesi ancak kendinden yola çıkmasıyla olanaklıdır; çünkü öznenin kendisine ilişkin bilgisi doğrudan gerçekleşen, içkin bir bilgidir. Dolayısıyla bu yaklaşımdaki temel varsayım, özne ile nesnenin birbirini dışladığı, nesnenin özneye tâbi kılındığı ikili bir dünya varsayımıdır ve bu varsayımda ortaya çıkan karakteristik sorun, dış dünyanın varlığının kanıtlanması/bilinmesi sorunudur. Sonuç olarak bu makalede Heidegger’in bu problemi “varlık sorusu” bağlamında nasıl bir çözüme kavuşturduğu gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with the medical and the biological sources of Protagoras' views.

Protagoras u Sekstusa Empiryka (PH I 216) a platoński Teajtet Dzieła Sekstusa Empiryka stanowią ważne źródło doksograficzne, zawierając m. in. fragmenty i przekazy poświęcone sofistyce. Są wśród nich omówienia poglądów Protagorasa. W świetle problemów, jakie stwarza rekonstrukcja myśli tego sofisty, warto poddać badaniu źródła i perspektywę Sekstusa, zwracając szczególną uwagę na krótkie przedstawienie tez Protagorasa zawarte w Zarysach Pyrrońskich (PH I 216). Porównując omówienie Sekstusa i przedstawienie Platona w Teajtecie, dostrzec możemy podobieństwo prezentowanych poglądów. W przekazie Seksusa podobnie jak w (...) Teajtecie główny akcent położony jest na tezę homo-mensura, z którą wiąże się dwa inne podstawowe dla platońskiego dialogu wątki: zmienności rzeczy oraz "prywatności" spostrzeżeń. Mimo charakterystycznej dla sceptycyzmu modyfikacji strony pojęciowej, nadinterpretacji oraz wyrwania tez z dialogowego kontekstu przedstawienia obu wątków wykazują daleko idące paralele z Teajtetem. Bez względu na to, czy omówienie to jest dziełem samego Sekstusa, czy zaczerpnięte zostało z jakiegoś wcześniejszego źródła mającego charakter sceptycznej "ściągawki", możemy na jego podstawie wnioskować, że dialog Teajtet uważany był w późnej starożytności za wiarygodne źródło informacji na temat poglądów Protagorasa. Należy jednak podkreślić, że przekaz Sekstusa stanowi jedynie interpretację treści zawartych w platońskim Teajtecie i – wbrew praktyce wielu uczonych - nie może być brany pod uwagę jako niezależne źródło wiedzy o myśli Protagorasa. (shrink)

Se discuten dos argumentos del diálogo Protágoras sobre la relación entre las virtudes individuales. En primer lugar se defiende -frente a Terry Penner- la tesis de Vlastos de que cuando Sócrates dice que "la justicia es justa", "la justicia es piadosa", etc., está destacando la mutua implicación entre las virtudes, y no su identidad; y se formula una hipótesis para explicar la razón de tal reciprocidad. En segundo lugar, se examina el argumento de que, puesto que la insensatez se opone (...) tanto a la moderación como a la sabiduría, y un término contrario no puede tener más de un contrario, moderación y sabiduría serían "una sola cosa". Se asevera que Platón quiere que rechacemos esta última conclusión, basada en el fondo en la idea de que las distintas virtudes se relacionan entre sí como las partes de un mismo rostro. Se concluye que los argumentos analizados no implican realmente la idea contraintuitiva de la identifi cación mutua de las virtudes.Two arguments from the Protagoras on the unity of the virtues are here dwelt with. First, it is claimed - with G. Vlastos and contra T. Penner - that when Socrates says that “justice is just”, “justice is pious”, etc. he wants to highlight the reciprocity of the individual virtues, not their mutual identity . Second, it is argued that Plato does not really want us to infer from folly’s opposition to both temperance and wisdom the need to identify these two virtues . He is only drawing our attention to their close relationship. This is enough to reject the hypothesis initially defended by Protagoras, i.e. that the different virtues relate to each other as the parts of a face. I conclude that the two aforesaid arguments do not really support the mutual identity of the virtues. (shrink)

This article aims at reconstructing the logic and assessing the force of Socrates' argument against Protagoras' 'Measure Doctrine' at Theaetetus 171a–c. I examine and criticise some influential interpretations of the passage, according to which, e.g., Socrates is guilty of ignoratio elenchi by dropping the essential Protagorean qualifiers or successfully proves that md is self-refuting provided the missing qualifiers are restored by the attentive reader. Having clarified the meaning of MD, I analyse in detail the broader section 170a–171d and argue, against (...) an extensive scholarly consensus, that it contains two slightly different formulations of the same argument, and not two distinct arguments, that Socrates does not highlight his own strategy at 171a–c as especially clever, and that his argument successfully shows that md turns out to be untenable for Protagoras himself when submitted to scrutiny in dialectical contexts, without aiming at proving its absolute falsehood. Finally, I clarify the philosophical import of the final image of Protagoras' momentary return from the underworld. (shrink)

This article will contrast two portrayals of Protagoras: one in the "Theaetetus," where Socrates discusses Protagorean theory and even comes to his defense by imitating the deceased sophist; and another in the "Protagoras," where Socrates recounts his encounter with the sophist. I suggest that Plato wants listeners and readers of the dialogues to hear the dissonance between the two portraits and to wonder why Socrates so distorts Protagoras in the "Theaetetus." Protagoras in the "Protagoras" behaves and speaks in ways that (...) are incompatible with the Protagorean position presented in the "Theaetetus.". (shrink)

En el Gran Discurso de Protágoras, en el diálogo platónico que lleva su nombre, Platón pone en boca de Protágoras un mito acerca del origen, desarrollo y naturaleza del ser humano, que es de gran relevancia filosófica. Se expresa que los dioses crearon a los seres mortales desde dos elementos: la tierra y el fuego. A su vez, también asignaron dos titanes, Epimeteo y Prometeo, para que proveyeran a los mortales de sus facultades. ¿Acaso esto implica que la creación no (...) fue terminada por los dioses? ¿Hasta qué punto los dioses crearon enteramente al ser humano? ¿Podría afirmarse que este es un mito creacionista? El desarrollo de los seres vivientes puede dividirse en cuatro instancias. A lo largo de este artículo, se proponen distintos modelos hermenéuticos para responder los interrogantes mencionados anteriormente. (shrink)

The complete, or almost complete, absence from the Theaetetus of any unequivocal reference to Platonic Forms is a problem, the solution of which appeared to many scholars to have been found and convincingly presented in the late Professor Gornford's book Plato's Theory of Knowledge, published in 1935. Put briefly, his contention was that the main purpose of the dialogue is to show that no acceptable definition of knowledge can be reached if the Forms are left out of account, that there (...) are a number of passages in which any reader of the middle dialogues would see that they were deliberately being left out of account, and one or two, namely in the famous digression on the philosophic life, and in the discussion of ‘common terms’ , where they are actually brought in, though not indeed under the name of. (shrink)

Der Beitrag untersucht die Bedeutung des Protagoras für die Entwicklung von Platons politischer Philosophie und Ethik anhand des gleichnamigen Dialogs. Im Mittelpunkt steht zunächst die epideiktische Rede des Protagoras, die die Fragen nach dem Wesen und der Lehrbarkeit der Tugend, nach der besten Erziehung sowie der besten politischen Verfassung aufwirft. Konkret werden in diesem Kontext die Auseinandersetzung um die Bewertung der Demokratie, das Verständnis der politischen Technik, das Verhältnis von Natur und Satzung und die Antizipation der späteren Aristotelischen Differenzierung zwischen (...) ethischen und dianoetischen Tugenden im _Protagoras_ analysiert. Durch all diese Punkte läßt sich schließlich nachdrücklich belegen, wie stark Platons eigener Weg von Protagoras bestimmt worden ist, sofern dieser für ihn auf anerkanntermaßen höchstem Niveau und auf eine geradezu paradigmatische Weise all die Irrwege beschreitet, die ihn zu einem idealen Antipoden von Platons eigenen Intentionen werden lassen konnten. (shrink)

In the passage 179c-183b, Plato rejects the extreme Heraclitean explanation of perception by showing that it cannot comply with condition (I): if while perceiving x, x moves, but does not change, it will be possible to describe x as something qualified. This paper intends to show that, for Plato, in order to comply with (I), there must be an explanation of perception in which the perception process is performed by an agent who undertakes other cognitive processes different from perception, such (...) as judging. This is a process through which, for every sensible object x, it is possible to have knowledge of x. (shrink)