Sartre and Nizan, politique of words The aim of this article is to discuss and compare the main points of Nizan’s and Sartre’s views of committed literature. Discarding the claim to be objective and neutral, Nizan states that to abstain is to make a choice. Therefore, he critiques the intellectuals to be guilty of an abdication of responsibility. In his writings Nizan posed some questions, which became crucial for the postwar debates on the engagement of the intellectual. These questions constitute (...) a central aspect of Sartre’s writings after World War II, where Sartre criticizes writers who had not taken a stance against oppression and delineates the axes of a theory of committed literature. As a result of the comparative analysis between the two authors, it is shown that Sartre articulates an important point that Nizan have missed, namely that there is a praxis, which is specific to literature and that we should part from it in order to understand commitment. Thus, at the difference of Nizan, Sartre points out that the liberating dimension of literary criticism should not be too quickly confused with armed criticism. (shrink)

The supporter of vague objects has been long challenged by the following ‘Argument from Identity’: 1) if there are vague objects, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3) there are no vague objects. Some supporters of vague objects have argued that 1) is false. Noonan (Analysis 68: 174–176, 2008) grants that 1) does not hold in general, but claims that ontically indeterminate identity is indeed implied by the assumption that there are vague (...) objects of a certain special kind (i.e. vague objects*). One can therefore formulate a ‘New Argument from Identity’: 1′) if there are vague objects*, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3′) there are no vague objects*. Noonan’s strategy is to argue that premiss 1′) is inescapable, and, as a consequence, that Evans’s alleged defence of 2) is a real challenge for any supporter of vague objects. I object that a supporter of vague objects who grants the validity of Evans’s argument allegedly in favour of 2) should reject premiss 1′). The threat of the New Argument from Identity is thus avoided. (shrink)

Most moral theorists agree that it is one thing to believe that someone has slighted you and another to resent her for the insult; one thing to believe that someone did you a favor and another to feel gratitude toward her for her kindness. While all of these ways of responding to another's conduct are forms of moral appraisal, the reactive attitudes are said to 'go beyond' beliefs in some way. We think this claim is adequately explained only when we (...) take seriously the fact that reactive attitudes are emotions. In this paper, we appeal to insights of the emotions literature to highlight one key way in which reactive attitudes go beyond beliefs: beliefs about a person and her morally significant conduct merely ascribe to the person the property of having performed a morally significant action, while reactive attitudes are ways of experiencing that person as having performed a morally significant action. We then suggest that appreciating this is a crucial first step toward understanding why reactive emotions play roles in our practices around responsibility that beliefs do not. (shrink)

In this paper, we look at installation art through the lens provided by the notion of “affective artifact” (Piredda 2019). We argue that affective character is central to some works of installation art and that some of those works can expand our knowledge of our affective lives, while others can contribute to the construction of our identities. Sections (2), (3), and (4) set the stage for our discussion of affective installation artworks by, respectively, situating it within the debate on affective (...) artifacts, looking at some general issues concerning the affective character of artworks, and sketching out a view of the ontology of installation art. In section (5), we discuss the affective character of six works of installation art. In section (6), we show how those artworks can reveal aspects of who we are. Section (7) concludes. (shrink)

Social sensitivity is a crucial aspect of interpersonal relationships, as it is intrinsic to the understanding of other selves as subjects situated in a social world. In revitalizing such a concept in the philosophical literature, this article examines the relation between habit, attention, and critical self‐awareness that lies at the core of social sensitivity. On the one hand, I reconsider the so‐called “passivity” of habit and tackle the role of attention as the power of varying point of view. On the (...) other hand, I contrast Husserl's view of attentiveness with Murdoch's account of loving attention, arguing that social sensitivity centers on a type of striving that is closer to Husserl's methodology than Murdoch's approach to moral perfectionism. (shrink)

Contemporary literature includes a wide variety of definitions of empathy. At the same time, the revival of sentimentalism has proposed that empathy serves as a necessary criterion of moral agency. The paper explores four common definitions in order to map out which of them best serves such agency. Historical figures are used as the backdrop against which contemporary literature is analysed. David Hume’s philosophy is linked to contemporary notions of affective and cognitive empathy, Adam Smith’s philosophy to projective empathy, and (...) Max Scheler’s account to embodied empathy. Whereas cognitive and projective empathy suffer from detachment and atomism, thereby providing poor support for the type of other-directedness and openness entailed by moral agency, embodied and affective empathy intrinsically facilitate these factors, and hence are viewed as fruitful candidates. However, the theory of affective empathy struggles to explain why the experience of empathy includes more than pure affective mimicry, whilst embodied empathy fails to take into account forms of empathy that do not include contextual, narrative information. In order to navigate through these difficulties, Edith Stein’s take on non-primordial experience is used as a base upon which a definition of affective empathy, inclusive of an embodied dimension, and founded on a movement between resonation and response, is sketched. It is argued that, of the four candidates, this new definition best facilitates moral agency. (shrink)

The modern understanding of radiation got its start in 1895 with X-rays discovered by Wilhelm Röntgen, followed in 1896 by Henri Becquerel’s discovery of radioactivity. The development of the study of radiation opened a vast field of research concerning various disciplines: chemistry, physics, biology, geology, sociology, ethics, etc. Additionally, new branches of knowledge were created, such as atomic and nuclear physics that enabled an in-depth knowledge of the matter. Moreover, during the historical evolution of this body of knowledge a wide (...) variety of new technologies was emerging. This article seeks to analyze the characteristics of experimental research in radioactivity and microphysics, in particular the relationship experience-theory. It will also be emphasized that for more than two decades, since the discovery of radioactivity, experiments took place without the theory being able to follow experimental dynamics. Some aspects identified as structural features of scientific research in the area of radiation and matter will be addressed through historical examples. The inventiveness of experiments in parallel with the emergence of quantum mechanics, the formation of teams and their relationship with technology developed from the experiments, as well as the evolution of microphysics in the sense of “Big Science” will be the main structural characteristics here focused. The case study of research in radioactivity in Portugal that assumes a certain importance and has structural characteristics similar to those of Europe will be presented. (shrink)

Neste e-book, apresentamos parte deste desenvolvimento, organizado conforme as três áreas de investigação do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Linguísticos (PosLin), da Faculdade de Letras (FALE), na Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG). Os 23 textos que compõem este volume são resultado de pesquisas de mestrado e de doutorado desenvolvidas no PosLin e são apresentados por textos breves de professores-pesquisadores convidados e/ou que atuaram como debatedores no XII SETED.

In Arendt’s proposal, Eichmann is the perfect performer: he does not think of the consequences of his actions and obeys orders without questioning the correctness of the values on which they are based. Eichmann and Socrates are perfect opposites. The latter is depicted as a model not only for the ancient but also for the contemporary political life too: unlike Plato’s philosopher who focuses only on speculation, Socrates succeeds in harmonizing the two conflicting passions of thinking and acting. Arendt maintains (...) that only a thinking activity based on the two principles of the Gorgias could prevent people from obeying impositions without questioning rulers’ proposals: those are ‘living without contradicting oneself’ and ‘to suffer an injustice rather than to commit’. Consequently, Socrates is the perfect thinker and the correct citizen: he does not want to damage his fellows and tries to improve their shared values to achieve the common good. He examines his fellow citizens' opinions to rebuke them for scorning what is worthless and to exhort them to look after justice and values useful for the civil life. On the contrary, Eichmann is the perfect a-political person, since he only executes orders without inquiring the correctness of the values which found them. Keywords: thinking, Socrates, Eichmann, dialogue, values. (shrink)

To date, 1.7 million US military service personnel have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Of those, one in five are suffering from diagnosable combat-stress related psychological injuries including Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). All indications are that the mental health toll of the current conflicts on US troops and the medical systems that care for them will only increase. Against this backdrop, research suggesting that the common class of drugs known as beta-blockers might prevent the onset of PTSD is drawing (...) much interest. I urge caution against accepting too quickly the use of beta-blockers for dealing with the psychological injuries that combat experiences can wreak. Beta-blockers are thought to work by disrupting the formation of emotionally disturbing memories that typically occur in the wake of traumatic events and that in some people manifest as PTSD. Focusing on a single dimension of soldiers' experience in combat, namely, their perpetration of other-directed violence, I argue that some of the emotional memories blunted by beta-blockers play important roles in the recovery of moral aspects of soldiers' selves damaged by experiences of combat violence — specifically, in the achievement of a state of grace— and, therefore, that the use of beta-blockers may come with distinct moral costs. (shrink)

Can one have an aesthetically valuable experience of fiction that takes an immoral perspective? Some have argued that one can. However, some important objections have been raised against this idea. Two objections are: that the immorality involved is confined to fictional reality, and that the aesthetic value of immoral fiction is dictated by a pluralistic attitude that not everyone accepts. My aim is to respond to these challenges and to argue, on the basis of two examples, that even an unlimited (...) immoral perspective can enhance a widespread aesthetic value. (shrink)

The suffering of nonhuman animals has become a noted factor in deciding public policy and legislative change. Yet, despite this growing concern, skepticism toward such suffering is still surprisingly common. This paper analyzes the merits of the skeptical approach, both in its moderate and extreme forms. In the first part it is claimed that the type of criterion for verification concerning the mental states of other animals posed by skepticism is overly (and, in the case of extreme skepticism, illogically) demanding. (...) Resting on Wittgenstein and Husserl, it is argued that skepticism relies on a misguided epistemology and, thus, that key questions posed by it face the risk of absurdity. In the second part of the paper it is suggested that, instead of skepticism, empathy together with intersubjectivity be adopted. Edith Stein’s take on empathy, along with contemporary findings, are explored, and the claim is made that it is only via these two methods of understanding that the suffering of nonhuman animals can be perceived. (shrink)

Empathy is a term used increasingly both in moral theory and animal ethics. Yet, its precise meaning is often left unexplored. The book aims to tackle this by clarifying the different and even contradictory ways in which “empathy” can be defined.

The Mīmāṃsā school of Indian philosophy has for its main purpose the interpretation of injunctions that are found in a set of sacred texts, the Vedas. In their works, Mīmāṃsā authors provide some of the most detailed and systematic examinations available anywhere of statements with a deontic force; however, their considerations have generally not been registered outside of Indological scholarship. In the present article we analyze the Mīmāṃsā theory of Vedic injunctions from a logical and philosophical point of view. The (...) theory at issue can be regarded as a system of reasoning based on certain fundamental principles, such as the distinction between strong and weak duties, and on a taxonomy of ritual actions. We start by reconstructing the conceptual framework of the theory and then move to a formalization of its core aspects. Our contribution represents a new perspective to study Mīmāṃsā and outlines its relevance, in general, for deontic reasoning. (shrink)

Le politiche di sicurezza hanno assunto nel corso degli ultimi decenni un ruolo centrale all’interno dell’Unione Europea (UE) e ne costituiscono attualmente uno dei settori più controversi. Nel porsi come attore in grado di garantire sicurezza, l’Unione assume da un lato sempre più compiti e funzioni che sin dall’inizio dell’età moderna sono stati prerogativa del potere statale, senza poter direttamente avvalersi, dall’altro lato, dei principi di legittimazione propri dello Stato. Gli sviluppi recenti delle politiche di sicurezza UE, inoltre, sono fortemente (...) condizionati dai processi di digitalizzazione. Questi favoriscono l’emergere di nuovi modi di intenderle, caratterizzati da un approccio “preemptivo”. Questo denota un modo di affrontare la criminalità che si concentra sugli effetti piuttosto che sulle cause e, attraverso la formulazione di prognosi, mira a intervenire prima che determinati avvenimenti si manifestino al fine di evitarli. Il libro esplora questi sviluppi e discute se, alla luce di essi, i principi fondamentali di legittimità dell’UE siano in grado di esercitare effettivamente la propria funzione di limitazione del potere e tutela dei diritti fondamentali. Attraverso analisi di pratiche concrete quali l’utilizzo e il potenziamento di grosse banche dati, tra cui il sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS), l’analisi dei codici di prenotazione recentemente introdotti dalla Direttiva PNR e l’incremento dell’interoperabilità tra le banche dati europee, il volume mette in atto un approccio filosofico “critico-realistico”, che si ancora nella realtà ma non rinuncia alla normatività e all’elaborazione di proposte alternative. Nel far ciò, le ricerche qui esposte intendono offrire un contributo agli ambiti disciplinari della filosofia politica e della filosofia del diritto, e, più specificamente, dei Security Studies e degli European Studies. (shrink)

Olympe de Gouges (Montauban 1748 – Parigi 1793) è generalmente nota come autrice della Dichiarazione dei diritti della donna e della cittadina. Il documento, scritto nel 1791 in risposta alla Dichiarazione dei diritti dell’uomo e del cittadino, mette in luce la parzialità di quest’ultima, che, nonostante le rivendicazioni formalmente universalistiche, fu proclamata esclusivamente “da” e “per” esseri umani di sesso maschile. Nella sua dichiarazione, de Gouges rivendica il riconoscimento dei diritti civili e politici delle donne e anticipa così alcune delle (...) istanze centrali del femminismo. L’approccio di de Gouges, inoltre, pur aderendo al paradigma teorico del giusnaturalismo, si distingue all’interno di quest’ultimo per modernità e coerenza. L’impegno politico e intellettuale di de Gouges non rimase confinato alla rivendicazione dei diritti delle donne. Ella si espresse infatti su molti dei temi centrali del dibattito pubblico francese negli anni della Rivoluzione, tra cui la sanità pubblica e le politiche sociali, la questione del voto per testa o per ordine, l’esecuzione di Luigi Capeto, il divorzio, la schiavitù e la tratta degli schiavi. De Gouges denunciò inoltre le ingiustizie che caratterizzavano la situazione delle donne, degli schiavi, dei meno abbienti, dei malati, delle partorienti, dei figli illegittimi, mostrando le cause strutturali e sociali della loro vulnerabilità. Alcune delle sue proposte furono fatte proprie e realizzate dal governo rivoluzionario, come quella riguardante l’introduzione di una tassa volontaria per risanare le casse statali. La produzione intellettuale di de Gouges include romanzi e racconti, opere teatrali, saggi filosofici, pamphlet, lettere aperte e altri scritti brevi, e consta di circa 150 opere. Il suo impegno politico, che in lei si saldò sempre strettamente al lavoro intellettuale, le costò infine la vita. Nell’estate del 1793 fu arrestata mentre cercava di affiggere un manifesto dal titolo Le Tre Urne, in cui suggeriva di far decidere al popolo francese quale fosse la forma migliore di governo per la Francia. Dopo alcuni mesi di prigionia e un processo sommario, fu condannata a morte. La sentenza fu eseguita il 3 novembre del 1793. (shrink)

This paper examines parents experiences of medical decision-making and coping with having a critically ill baby in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) from a cross-cultural perspective (France vs. U.S.A.). Though parents experiences in the NICU were very similar despite cultural and institutional differences, each system addresses their needs in a different way. Interviews with parents show that French parents expressed overall higher satisfaction with the care of their babies and were better able to cope with the loss of their (...) child than American parents. Central to the French parents perception of autonomy and their sense of satisfaction were the strong doctor–patient relationship, the emphasis on medical certainty in prognosis versus uncertainty in the American context, and the sentimental work" provided by the team. The American setting, characterized by respect for parental autonomy, did not necessarily translate into full parental involvement in decision-making, and it limited the rapport between doctors and parents to the extent of parental isolation. This empirical comparative approach fosters a much-needed critique of philosophical principles by underscoring, from the parents perspective, the lack of emotional work" involved in the practice of autonomy in the American unit compared to the paternalistic European context. Beyond theoretical and ethical arguments, we must reconsider the practice of autonomy in particularly stressful situations by providing more specific means to cope, translating the impersonal language of rights" and decision-making into trusting, caring relationships, and sharing the responsibility for making tragic choices. (shrink)

Before 1800 nothing was irrelevant. So argues Elisa Tamarkin's sweeping cultural history of a key shift in consciousness: the arrival, around 1800, of "relevance" as the means to grasp how something previously disregarded becomes important and interesting. At a time when so much makes claims to attention every day, how does one decide what is most valuable right now? This is not only a contemporary problem. For Ralph Waldo Emerson, the question for the nineteenth century was how, in the (...) immensity and "succession" of objects, anything becomes a proper object of experience. How that question was finally defined as one of relevance is the story of Apropos of Nothing. Relevance, Tamarkin shows, was primarily an Anglo-American concept. It engaged major intellectual figures, centrally the pragmatists-William James, Alain Locke, and John Dewey-and before them thinkers including Emerson and Alfred North Whitehead. Most of all, relevance was a problem for the worlds of art, literature, education, and criticism. These were fascinated by how old, boring, distant, or unfamiliar things get taken in; how they are admitted as meaningful; how they come home to us like the ludicrous raven comes to Edgar Allan Poe's student in the middle of the night in some obscure connection with himself. Many nineteenth-century American artists saw their paintings as pragmatic works that make relevance-that suggest versions of events that feel apropos of our world the moment we see them. (Tamarkin's book is richly illustrated, in color, with works by Winslow Homer, Abbott Handerson Thayer, Edgar Degas, and others.) Relevance remains a conundrum, especially for the humanities. It obliges us to say why we admit Poe's poem-or, say, a line of Emerson's-is interesting enough to study it, to dedicate ourselves to understanding it, to affirming that this effort is, in Emerson's words, "relevant to me and mine, to nature, and the hour that now passes.". (shrink)

El concepto de gobierno es inseparable del de opinión pública en la medida en que la supervivencia de todos los gobiernos depende críticamente de la conformidad de la opinión pública. Pero las democracias protegen mejor a sus gobernantes de la amenaza que encierra la opinión pública que las dictaduras. Por una parte, las elecciones confieren a los gobernantes democráticos una legitimidad de origen de la que carecen muchos dictadores por haber alcanzado el poder a través de métodos considerados ilegítimos. Por (...) otra parte, mientras la receptividad ante las demandas de la opinión pública suele reforzar la legitimidad de ejercicio de los gobiernos democráticos, se interpreta generalmente como signo de debilidad de las dictaduras. La vulnerabilidad de las dictaduras ante la opinión pública les lleva a adoptar inmediatamente medidas para defenderse de ella, combinando actuaciones represivas que inhiben a la población de expresar sus preferencias auténticas con otras que controlan los flujos de información que circulan en la sociedad. En un régimen de opinión pública cerrada no puede emerger una sociedad civil capaz de desafiar seriamente al poder. Pero si repentinamente la población comienza a acceder a información innegable que pone en evidencia la mendacidad de los gobernantes, la opinión pública cerrada puede derrumbarse rápidamente y precipitar la caída del gobierno. (shrink)

Hegel’s account of action in the Encyclopedia defies the standard belief–desire model of action in that he holds that having beliefs is not in itself normative, nor having desires or wishes. At the same time, he argues that our actions are expressive of our reasons to act, including beliefs and practical feelings. By drawing attention on the dialectic between deeds and practical feelings as well as on the role of interest, the author distinguishes two orders of moral motivation in Hegel’s (...) theory of practical spirit: a first-order motivation concerned with self-realization, and a second-order motivation that expresses interest in shared commitments and obligations. Taken together, both types of interest delineate Hegel’s theory of responsive conduct. One upshot of this view is the reevaluation of moral action in terms of processes rather than events, which also makes room for a noncognitivist appraisal of action in Hegel. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Visual Aesthetic ExperienceElisa Steenberg, Independent ScholarMan can shift his attitude to the surrounding world into an experience of its visual appearance. He perceives colors, lines, shapes, etc.—at times denoted as form. Furthermore, these phenomena may be experienced as having various properties. A color may be experienced as warm or cold, as cheerful or somber; a line as soft or hard, as merry or aggressive; a shape as light or (...) heavy. Moreover, such experiences may include pleasure or displeasure, implying that what is experienced is liked or disliked. The individual has a preference value experience. This should not be confounded with an evaluation, a value judgment, which requires cognitive activity and a comparison. The experience described I designate a visual aesthetic experience.Research into processes in the brain may offer explanations of the neurological antecedents to the visual aesthetic experience. To see a color as cold or warm may depend on sense-interrelating processes. To experience a color or line as cheerful, somber, etc., might be explained as due to simultaneous processes in the regions of the brain that are the mainsprings of emotions. The preference valuations might be due to processes in the brain's so-called primary reward-aversion center. It seems most likely that future brain research, with the help of such techniques as PET scanning (Positron Emission Tomography) or MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging)—what has been called "windows into the human brain"—may offer explanations regarding the physiological and biochemical processes that happen when our attitude to the world around us is shifted into what is here designated a visual aesthetic experience.1When did man first evince visual aesthetic experiences and when do they first occur in an individual's life? Certain anthropologists assert that positive visual aesthetic experiences first occurred when man was able to experience form as symmetrical and balanced, colors as bright and possibly shiny. This they claim is due to balance and order being a fundamental condition in man's life, and preferences for bright colors they consider due to man being a daylight creature who feels insecure in darkness.2 We know that so-called primitive people and young children like symmetric patterns and bright colors. The child reaches out for light red and yellow objects rather than for dark and black ones. With increasing age, though, the child's [End Page 89] visual preferences usually change, and this occurs mainly within the framework of his or her manmade surroundings. The child becomes accustomed to seeing certain objects while feeling pleasure and thus comes to appreciate their appearance. However, such experiences are rather vague before the child reaches the age when its personality is formed. Then especially girls often develop a keen interest in the appearance of objects around them.A general survey among adults shows that there are considerable varieties in individuals' inclinations for visual aesthetic experiences. There are those who have them rather seldom. Their attitudes to the surrounding world are primarily cognitive. Their attentions are focused on meanings, the "what" not the "how," in order to understand and to cope with what they see. On the other hand, there are individuals who most frequently hold an aesthetic attitude to their surroundings. They pay attention to shapes, colors, and color combinations of all kinds of objects, natural or manmade. They choose their clothes and their home furnishings under careful aesthetic considerations. This inclination may possibly be claimed to be due to an innate disposition for holding visual aesthetic attitudes, to be compared with, for example, an individual's innate musicality. However, it is undoubtedly also due to certain social circumstances.Visual aesthetic experiences are denoted taste manifestations. As such they may be investigated not only as to their occurrences and changes in an individual's life but also as a changing sociocultural phenomenon.3Verbalizing the Visual Aesthetic ExperienceThe psychic content of a visual aesthetic experience may be revealed to other individuals by application of aesthetic property terms to the appearance of objects. The terms are either what is here called descriptive or they are value terms. Examples of descriptive aesthetic terms are graceful, garish, gaudy, clumsy, elegant, dainty, vivid, flamboyant, etc. These terms may... (shrink)