Ein Argument gegen die ärztliche Beihilfe zum Suizid lautet, Patienten könnten sich um Suizidassistenz bemühen, weil sie sich als Belastung empfinden. Dabei wird die Selbstbestimmtheit eines so motivierten Todeswunsches in Frage gestellt. Ist dieses Argument überzeugungskräftig? Empirische Daten zeigen, dass die ärztliche Beihilfe zum Suizid auf der Grundlage dieses Motivs den ethischen Prinzipien der Sorge um das Patientenwohl und des Respekts vor der Autonomie des Patienten nicht widersprechen muss. Denn das Empfinden, anderen zur Last zu fallen, kann trotz adäquater palliativmedizinischer (...) Betreuung wesentlich zu einem Leidensdruck am Lebensende beitragen. Zudem ist dieses Motiv eng verknüpft mit der Sorge um das Wohl der Angehörigen, die einer erheblichen Belastungssituation ausgesetzt sein können. Da aber das Wohlergehen der Familie zu den elementaren Werten von schwerstkranken Patienten am Lebensende gehört, kann der Wunsch nach ärztlicher Beihilfe zum Suizid auch auf der Basis dieses Motivs Ausdruck eines selbstbestimmten Patientenwillens sein. Andererseits korreliert das Empfinden, anderen zur Last zu fallen, mit einer depressiven Verstimmung. Dieser Zusammenhang ist deshalb relevant, da bei depressiven Störungen eine Einschränkung der Selbstbestimmungsfähigkeit vorliegen kann. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind Zweifel an der Selbstbestimmtheit eines so motivierten Sterbewunsches durchaus begründet. Aufgrund des bestehenden Wissensdefizits bei der Feststellung der Selbstbestimmungsfähigkeit ist die Mitwirkung des Arztes bei einem so motivierten Todeswunsch daher ethisch fragwürdig. (shrink)

Ein Argument gegen die ärztliche Beihilfe zum Suizid lautet, Patienten könnten sich um Suizidassistenz bemühen, weil sie sich als Belastung empfinden. Dabei wird die Selbstbestimmtheit eines so motivierten Todeswunsches in Frage gestellt. Ist dieses Argument überzeugungskräftig? Empirische Daten zeigen, dass die ärztliche Beihilfe zum Suizid auf der Grundlage dieses Motivs den ethischen Prinzipien der Sorge um das Patientenwohl und des Respekts vor der Autonomie des Patienten nicht widersprechen muss. Denn das Empfinden, anderen zur Last zu fallen, kann trotz adäquater palliativmedizinischer (...) Betreuung wesentlich zu einem Leidensdruck am Lebensende beitragen. Zudem ist dieses Motiv eng verknüpft mit der Sorge um das Wohl der Angehörigen, die einer erheblichen Belastungssituation ausgesetzt sein können. Da aber das Wohlergehen der Familie zu den elementaren Werten von schwerstkranken Patienten am Lebensende gehört, kann der Wunsch nach ärztlicher Beihilfe zum Suizid auch auf der Basis dieses Motivs Ausdruck eines selbstbestimmten Patientenwillens sein. Andererseits korreliert das Empfinden, anderen zur Last zu fallen, mit einer depressiven Verstimmung. Dieser Zusammenhang ist deshalb relevant, da bei depressiven Störungen eine Einschränkung der Selbstbestimmungsfähigkeit vorliegen kann. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind Zweifel an der Selbstbestimmtheit eines so motivierten Sterbewunsches durchaus begründet. Aufgrund des bestehenden Wissensdefizits bei der Feststellung der Selbstbestimmungsfähigkeit ist die Mitwirkung des Arztes bei einem so motivierten Todeswunsch daher ethisch fragwürdig. (shrink)

Ein Argument gegen die ärztliche Beihilfe zum Suizid lautet, Patienten könnten sich um Suizidassistenz bemühen, weil sie sich als Belastung empfinden. Dabei wird die Selbstbestimmtheit eines so motivierten Todeswunsches in Frage gestellt. Ist dieses Argument überzeugungskräftig? Empirische Daten zeigen, dass die ärztliche Beihilfe zum Suizid auf der Grundlage dieses Motivs den ethischen Prinzipien der Sorge um das Patientenwohl und des Respekts vor der Autonomie des Patienten nicht widersprechen muss. Denn das Empfinden, anderen zur Last zu fallen, kann trotz adäquater palliativmedizinischer (...) Betreuung wesentlich zu einem Leidensdruck am Lebensende beitragen. Zudem ist dieses Motiv eng verknüpft mit der Sorge um das Wohl der Angehörigen, die einer erheblichen Belastungssituation ausgesetzt sein können. Da aber das Wohlergehen der Familie zu den elementaren Werten von schwerstkranken Patienten am Lebensende gehört, kann der Wunsch nach ärztlicher Beihilfe zum Suizid auch auf der Basis dieses Motivs Ausdruck eines selbstbestimmten Patientenwillens sein. Andererseits korreliert das Empfinden, anderen zur Last zu fallen, mit einer depressiven Verstimmung. Dieser Zusammenhang ist deshalb relevant, da bei depressiven Störungen eine Einschränkung der Selbstbestimmungsfähigkeit vorliegen kann. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind Zweifel an der Selbstbestimmtheit eines so motivierten Sterbewunsches durchaus begründet. Aufgrund des bestehenden Wissensdefizits bei der Feststellung der Selbstbestimmungsfähigkeit ist die Mitwirkung des Arztes bei einem so motivierten Todeswunsch daher ethisch fragwürdig. (shrink)

Thought experiments are ubiquitous in science and especially prominent in domains in which experimental and observational evidence is scarce. One such domain is the causal analysis of singular events in history. A long‐standing tradition that goes back to Max Weber addresses the issue by means of ‘what‐if’ counterfactuals. In this paper I give a descriptive account of this widely used method and argue that historians following it examine difference makers rather than causes in the philosopher’s sense. While difference making is (...) neither necessary nor sufficient for causation, to establish difference makers is more consistent with the historians’ more ultimate purposes. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Should people be assisted to die or be given euthanasia when they are suffering from terminal medical conditions? Should they be assisted to die when they are suffering but do not have a ‘diagnosable medical illness?’ What about assisted dying for psychiatric conditions? And is there a difference morally between assisted suicide, voluntary active euthanasia and voluntary passive euthanasia?These are deep questions directly addressed or in the background of the productive discussion between Varelius and Young.1 ,2 Their focus is whether (...) doctors should assist people to die who are ‘tired of life’ and experiencing ‘existential suffering’. An example was Edward Brongersma, an 86-year-old man, who was tired of life but with no serious medical condition, who was assisted by Dr Philip Sutorius to commit suicide in 1998. In the Netherlands, where euthanasia is legal, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled in 2002 that this was wrong because "edical expertise, by its nature, does not extend to questions and complaints that do not have a sick- ness or ailment—mental or physical—as their source.3"Sutorius was convicted, but not punished.Robert Young, considering this case, concurs, concluding, "a physician may justifiably consider that an individual who is ‘tired of life’ should consult a non-medical, professional counsellor, and if that produces no change in outlook, choose suicide. Outside Switzerland, an individual who makes that choice has to then be determined enough to do so unassisted .2"I will argue that there is, within current medical ethics and human rights, a method of assisted suicide which could fall within the limits of the law. But first I will review some recent cases involving requests for dying. I will then discuss an alternative which some may argue addresses these cases, and those of …. (shrink)

In this article, the authors take up the historical figure of Dr Betty Paërl, who has surprisingly turned up in very different kinds of specialised archives. The white mathematics professor was located in IHLIA LGBT+ Heritage, the largest queer heritage collection in Europe, as a notable SM sexpert and spokesperson on transgender politics, and also found during archival research into the anti-(neo)colonial struggles of Suriname against the Dutch. Upon closer inspection of the materials, the authors find the recurrent image/item of (...) the whip that presses them to carefully think through how the archive of Dr Paërl casts light on a history that Katherine McKittrick calls being ‘in the shadow of the whip’. The article aims to combine an analysis of these versions of the whip in different visual and discursive registers to detect the liberatory politics underlying her activisms. To do so, the authors develop the intersectional model of the kaleidoscope employed by Dutch Black, migrant and refugee (BMR) feminist theorists to grasp the shifting patterns of power that Paërl battled and embodied as an activist of the anticolonial struggle, for sex workers’ rights, for kinky sex and for transgender people. This is all the more important in the historical study of transgender visual materials that most often arrive in archives via medical and police photography or pornographic materials. The historical researcher, the article argues, should be wary of (re)producing a static vision that would reduce transgender figures to sex and gender politics, or eclipse a vision of trans politics that dilates beyond sexuality. (shrink)

Women have played an undeniable part in shaping the history of philosophy and philosophy of education for at least 1,000 years. Yet, current anthologies, encyclopedias, and textbooks in the field rarely recognize large numbers of women's works as consequential to our understanding of the development of educational topics and debates. This article, using the work of Herrad of Hohenbourg (1100s), Julian of Norwich (1342-c.1429), Christine de Pisan (c.1364-c.1430), and Mary Astell (1666-1731) traces women's early philosophical arguments concerning their own (...) nature and the purposes of education. The author argue that having access to this tradition will help to remediate false perceptions of women's thought and serve as an empowering legacy for all teachers and students. (shrink)

Compiles the photographs taken by Leonard Freed of the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, during which Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his "I Have a Dream" speech.

In previous Ethics briefings 1 we have highlighted the developments in the case of Bell & Another v the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust. The case concerned a judicial review of the practice of prescribing puberty blocking treatment to children and young people at the Gender Identity Development Service managed by the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust. The Court of Appeal in its judgement2 found the Trust’s practices to be lawful, and overturned previous guidance given by the High (...) Court which had contradicted the 'Gillick principle' regarding whether a child or young person could consent to medical treatment, without the consent of its parent. Despite this legal success, concerns over the GIDS continued. In September, NHS England commissioned an independent and wide-ranging review of gender identity services for children and young people led by Dr Hilary Cass, past president of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. Dr Cass’s Interim review, published in March,3 has resulted in a decision by NHS England to close the GIDS at the Trust by Spring 2023, and replace it with regional centres at existing children’s hospitals offering more 'holistic care' with ’strong links to mental health services’. It is proposed that regional centres will be established at Great Ormond Street Hospital, and Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust. Dr Cass was critical of the clinic’s failure to collect sufficient data on the impact of puberty blockers in under-16s. …. (shrink)

In a recent article, Dr. A. F. Norman has attributed to Eunapius the authorship of a fragment in Suidas , which clearly relates to the siege of Maiozamalcha. His arguments are cogent and must, I think, be accepted. Some slight additional support for the attribution is provided by the fact that it contains the adverb of which, as Vollebregt pointed out, Eunapius was particularly fond. Norman compares this fragment with the relevant passages in Ammianus Marcellinus and Zosimus and points out (...) that if the attribution is correct, ‘now, and for the first time, we have a reference to the same incident of this campaign from the narratives of Ammianus, Eunapius, and Zosimus’. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung In dankbarer Erinnerung an Carsten Colpes Forschungen untersucht der Artikel Tradition und Translation an den als „heidnische Bibel“ oder „Weisheit Zoroasters“ sowie als kosmisch-mystisches Kritikpotential in Christentum und Islam bedeutsam gewordenen Chaldäischen Orakeln. Ich kann wechselseitige Anregungen zwischen den Chaldäischen Orakeln und der mittelplatonischen Religionsphilosophie des Numenios von Apameia um 180 n. Chr. zeigen: durch Möglichkeiten iranischen und griechischen Verständnisses von Dualismus sowie einerseits Orientalismus bei Numenios und andererseits Affinität zu Platon und Homer beim Theurgen Julian. Die Fragmente (...) der Chaldäischen Orakel sind keine Originalzeugnisse aus Chaldäa oder des Zoroastrismus – aber Abwandlungen. Es gab die mesopotamische Priesterwissenschaft mit Divination um Ištar, die von zoroastrischen Priestern mit der gleichfalls Himmel und Erde verbindenden Wassergöttin Anâhitâ und im Römerreich mit Hekate als Zaubergöttin und beseelendem Prinzip identifiziert wurde. (shrink)

I AM glad that Dr. Fotheringham in the interesting paper which appeared in the Classical Quarterly adhered to the view that ‘Caesar calculated the new moon for January 1 [45 B.C]…and that this calculation determined the inaugural day of the Julian calendar.’ As the object of my brief note, on which he commented, was merely to show that Groebe had failed to prove that the day in question was January 2, I have only a few questions to ask. But (...) first, in justice to Judeich, I ought to say that his calculations, which Dr. Fotheringham notices, were made with the help of the assistant-astronomer attached to the observatory of the University of Strassburg. While Dr. Fotheringham admits that I was right in maintaining that the new moon of January 2, 45 B.C. was not visible on the evening of that day, he holds that Groebe was ‘fairly entitled to say’ that the new moon of March 24, 58 B.C. , was visible on March 25. Dr. Fotheringham may be justified in saying that it ought ‘in normal [or abnormally fine ?] weather to have been visible that evening’; but, as I observed in my note, Groebe affirmed that in calculating the time of visibility of the crescent we should accept the mean of the Babylonian estimates, 36 hours—less, I should have added, in the early spring and the winter, more in the summer and autumn. Was he entitled to deduct 9 hours from the mean for an observation made not in the clear atmosphere of the East, but in Switzerland? Dr. Fotheringham tells us that ‘the shortest interval between a new moon and the observation of the moon by Schmidt's naked eye comes’ not, as Groebe said, to 29, but ‘to 25.7 hours.’ But forty-eight of Schmidt's forty-nine observations were made at Athens, where the atmosphere is clearer than in Switzerland. The great difference in visibility which a clear atmosphere makes must strike everyone who goes from this country or from Switzerland to the East or to Northern Africa. I realized it for the first time when I was exploring in Tunisia before the war. Has Dr. Fotheringham or any other trustworthy observer ever seen with the naked eye in an atmosphere no clearer than that of Geneva a moon not more than 27 hours old? If so, is it not remarkable that, as Dr. Fotheringham has said, ‘Hitherto it has been the practice to assume that [in the early spring or the winter and in favourable weather ?] the moon becomes visible on the first evening when she is more than 30 hours old at sunset’? (shrink)

Radical empiricists at the turn of the twentieth century described organisms as experiencing the relations they maintain with their surroundings prior to any analytic separation from their environment. They notably avoided separating perception of the material environment from social life. This perspective on perceptual experience was to prove the inspiration for Gibson’s ecological approach to perceptual psychology. Gibson provided a theory of how the direct perception of the organism-environment relation is possible. Central to his account was the notion of a (...) medium for direct perception. However Gibson provided two mutually inconsistent accounts of the medium leading to problems for his radical empiricism. We develop an account of the medium that does justice to ecological psychology’s radical empiricist roots. To complement this account of the medium we detail a usage-based account of information. Together they allow us to propose a novel radical empiricist view of direct perception. We then return to the notion of medium and expand it to include sociomaterial practices. We show how direct perception happens in the midst of social life, and is made possible by an active achieving and maintaining of a pragmatic relation with the environment. (shrink)

In a highly original and provocative essay entitled “Behavior, Purpose and Teleology”, published a few years ago, Professors Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow attempt to indicate the scientific importance and usefulness of the concepts of purpose and teleology. Since this essay appeared the suggestions it contains seem to have acquired a significance which was not wholly apparent at that time. This is due primarily to the fact that a somewhat novel and, it appears to some, revolutionary approach (...) to certain problems has arisen in the sciences, an approach which is more or less loosely referred to as “cybernetics,” and among whose outstanding spokesmen are to be found the very authors of this essay—particularly Professor Wiener, whose recently published Cybernetics has been claiming the attention of an increasing number of scientists and non-scientists alike. In his book, it may be noted, Professor Wiener, in tracing the development of cybernetics over the past few years, gives a good indication of the importance he attaches to the earlier essay. He writes, with reference to it: “The three of us [Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow] felt that this new point of view merited a paper, which we wrote up and published. Dr. Rosenblueth and I foresaw that the paper could only be a statement of program for a large body of experimental work, and we decided that if we could ever bring our plan for an interscientific institute to fruition, this topic would furnish an almost ideal center for our activity”. It would seem, then, that an examination of the contents of this essay should not be without interest at this time. (shrink)

_Abstract:_ This paper poses the following questions: What is pluralistic hegemony? What are its defining features? Can populism be seen to possess them? We draw on Laclau’s thought to examine whether antagonism and “the name of the leader” as an empty signifier are incompatible with pluralism. With reference to various different perspectives regarding the relationship between pluralism, hegemony and populism, we present our own particular understanding. Our conceptualization distances itself from the notion that pluralism involves an endless proliferation of difference (...) and the agonistic view that seeks to sublimate antagonism, and also from Laclau’s “the name of the leader” as an archetypal signifier of populism. Rather than the political frontier being the antithesis of pluralism, we see it as its precondition, with the empty signifier not representing a problem in itself, except when its name is pre-given. We perceive pluralism as being open to contingency, as a logic of the production and flow of differences. (shrink)

If a doctor is trying to decide whether or not to provide a medical treatment, does it matter ethically whether that treatment has already been started? Health professionals sometimes find it harder to stop a treatment (withdraw) than to refrain from starting the treatment (withhold). But does that feeling correspond to an ethical difference? In this article, we defend equivalence—the view that withholding and withdrawal of treatment are ethically equivalent when all other factors are equal. We argue that preference for (...) withholding over withdrawal could represent a form of cognitive bias—withdrawal aversion. Nevertheless, we consider whether there could be circumstances in which there is a moral difference. We identify four examples of conditional nonequivalence. Finally, we reflect on the moral significance of diverging intuitions and the implications for policy. We propose a set of practical strategies for helping to reduce bias in end-of-life decision making, including the equivalence test. (shrink)

Deflationists about truth hold that the function of the truth predicate is to enable us to make certain assertions we could not otherwise make. Pragmatists claim that the utility of negation lies in its role in registering incompatibility. The pragmatist insight about negation has been successfully incorporated into bilateral theories of content, which take the meaning of negation to be inferentially explained in terms of the speech act of rejection. We implement the deflationist insight in a bilateral theory by taking (...) the meaning of the truth predicate to be explained by its inferential relation to assertion. We combine this account of the meaning of the truth predicate with a new diagnosis of the liar paradox: its derivation requires the truth rules to preserve evidence, but these rules only preserve commitment. The result is a novel inferential deflationist theory of truth, which solves the liar paradox in a principled manner. We end by showing that our theory and simple extensions thereof have the resources to axiomatize the internal logic of several supervaluational hierarchies, including Cantini’s. This solves open problems of Halbach (2011) and Horsten (2011). (shrink)

ABSTRACTTaking some controversial claims philosopher Jason Brennan makes in his book Against Democracy as a starting point, this paper argues in favour of two theses: There is No Such Thing as Superior Political Judgement; There Is No Such Thing as Uncontroversial Social Scientific Knowledge. I conclude that social science experts need to be kept in check, not given more power.

Francesco Guala once wrote that ‘The problem of extrapolation is a minor scandal in the philosophy of science’. This paper agrees with the statement, but for reasons different from Guala’s. The scandal is not, or not any longer, that the problem has been ignored in the philosophy of science. The scandal is that framing the problem as one of external validity encourages poor evidential reasoning. The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative—an alternative which constitutes much better evidential (...) reasoning about target systems of interest, and which makes do without consideration of external validity. (shrink)

There are ethical obligations to conduct research that contributes to generalisable knowledge and improves reproductive health, and this should include embryo research in jurisdictions where it is permitted. Often, the controversial nature of embryo research can alarm ethics committee members, which can unnecessarily delay important research that can potentially improve fertility for patients and society. Such delay is ethically unjustified. Moreover, countries such as the UK, Australia and Singapore have legislation which unnecessarily captures low-risk research, such as observational research, in (...) an often cumbersome and protracted review process. Such countries should revise such legislation to better facilitate low-risk embryo research.We introduce a philosophical distinction to help decision-makers more efficiently identify higher risk embryo research from that which presents no more risks to persons than other types of tissue research. That distinction is between future person embryo research and non-future person embryo research. We apply this distinction to four examples of embryo research that might be presented to ethics committees.Embryo research is most controversial and deserving of detailed scrutiny when it potentially affects a future person. Where it does not, it should generally require less ethical scrutiny. We explore a variety of ways in which research can affect a future person, including by deriving information about that person, and manipulating eggs or sperm before an embryo is created. (shrink)

This paper presents arguments that challenge what I call the fact/value separability thesis: the idea, roughly, that factual judgements can be made independently of judgements of value. I will look at arguments to the effect that facts and values are entangled in the following areas of the scientific process in economics: theory development, economic concept formation, economic modelling, hypothesis testing, and hypothesis acceptance.

In recent years, tech evangelists have made headlines predicting that in the future manual driving will be outlawed. This essay will investigate the question whether a ban of human driven cars can be defended on moral grounds in a future scenario in which autonomous cars are going to be significantly safer than manually driven cars. This article will argue that in such a future scenario manually driven cars, for moral reasons, indeed should be banned from participating in regular traffic. Since (...) the moral argument for outlawing manually driven cars will likely be met by resistance by car-aficionados, in the final part of the paper, we are devising a proposal for reconciling the strong moral case for a ban of manually driven cars with the widespread fondness of manual driving. (shrink)

In this paper we make a proposal for reforming biomedical research that is aimed to align re-search more closely with the so-called fair-share principle according to which the proportions of global resources as-signed to different diseases should agree with the ratios of human suffering associated with those diseases.

This essay criticizes the current approach to epistemic democracy. Epistemic democrats are preoccupied with the question of how a society can best exploit a given stock of knowledge. This article argues that the problem-solving capability of a society depends on two factors rather than one. The quality of decision-making depends both on how a democracy is able to make use of its stock of knowledge and on the size of the knowledge stock. Society’s problem-solving capability over time is therefore a (...) function of its ability to develop its knowledge exploitation mechanisms and the growth rate of its knowledge stock. Based on this enhanced model of social problem-solving, this essay compares two different political ideal types: experimental democracy, as commonly defended by epistemic democrats; and polycentric democracy, a model defended most commonly by political economists. (shrink)

In this book, Reiss argues in favor of a tight fit between evidence, concept and purpose in our causal investigations in the sciences. There is no doubt that the sciences employ a vast array of techniques to address causal questions such as controlled experiments, randomized trials, statistical and econometric tools, causal modeling and thought experiments. But how do these different methods relate to each other and to the causal inquiry at hand? Reiss argues that there is no "gold standard" in (...) settling causal issues against which other methods can be measured. Rather, the various methods of inference tend to be good only relative to certain interpretations of the word "cause", and each interpretation, in turn, helps to address some salient purpose but not others. The main objective of this book is to explore the metaphysical and methodological consequences of this view in the context of numerous cases studies from the natural and social sciences. (shrink)

On the mainstream view, consciences are valuable because they promote moral unity. However, conscience, so defined, will systematically prevent moral growth that threatens unity, even when unity has formed around oppressive moral values. This motivates Carolyn McLeod's alternative ‘Dynamic View’ whereby consciences are valuable to the extent that they are dynamic. Consciences are dynamic when they interact with our best moral judgements to shape or ‘retool’ the moral values underpinning conscience, sometimes at an initial cost to unity. We modify and (...) extend McLeod's account in two ways: (1) We object to her claim that conscience encourages its own retooling. We argue that the opposite is true – conscience creates a motivational barrier to change that moral judgement must overcome to successfully retool conscience. The task of ensuring dynamism, therefore, falls to moral judgement. (2) However, this motivational barrier enables conscience to play a valuable role that McLeod overlooks – compensating for the limitations of moral judgement. On our Balanced View, the value of conscience depends on it being sufficiently open to being shaped by our best moral judgements but inert enough to compensate for distorted moral judgements and to guide action when under cognitive load. (shrink)

Philosophie ist der Versuch, durch überzeugendes und durchsichtiges Argumentieren bestimmte Fragen zu lösen. Philosophische Grundthemen sind Fragen nach dem Verständnis der Welt im Ganzen und unserer Stellung in ihr. Diese Fragen können prinzipiell nur kontrovers beantwortet werden. Die Reihe Grundthemen Philosophie möchte der Diskussion solcher philosophischen Grundthemen einen Ort geben. Anstelle einer umfassenden einführenden Darstellung werden in den einzelnen Bänden in Auseinandersetzung mit ausgewählten historischen Positionen die jeweiligen Probleme analysiert und Lösungsmöglichkeiten diskutiert. Dabei setzt der Verfasser/die Verfasserin eigene Akzente und (...) bezieht Stellung, so dass sich nicht bloß ein Blick auf die Geschichte der Philosophie, sondern zugleich auch ein systematischer Beitrag zur Problemdiskussion ergibt. Zur Zeit sind weitere Bände zu den Themen Beziehungen, Kultur, Wissenschaft und Moralbegründung geplant. Die Bände der Reihe richten sich gleichermaßen an Studierende der Philosophie und anderer Fächer sowie an professionelle Philosophen. Außerdem wendet sich die Reihe an alle, die an Grundthemen der Philosophie interessiert sind. (shrink)

Anti-realism is plagued by Fitch’s paradox: the remarkable result that if one accepts that all truths are knowable, minimal assumptions about the nature of knowledge entail that every truth is known. Dorothy Edgington suggests to address this problem by understanding p is knowable to be a counterfactual claim, but her proposal must contend with a forceful objection by Timothy Williamson. I revisit Edgington’s basic idea and find that Williamson’s objection is obviated by a refined understanding of counterfactual knowability that is (...) grounded in possible courses of inquiry. I arrive at a precise definition of knowability that is not just a technical avoidance of paradox, but is metaphysically sound and does justice to the anti-realist idea. (shrink)

The past few years have brought significant breakthroughs in understanding human genetics. This knowledge has been used to develop ‘polygenic scores’ which provide probabilistic information about the development of polygenic conditions such as diabetes or schizophrenia. They are already being used in reproduction to select for embryos at lower risk of developing disease. Currently, the use of polygenic scores for embryo selection is subject to existing regulations concerning embryo testing and selection. Existing regulatory approaches include ‘disease-based' models which limit embryo (...) selection to avoiding disease characteristics, and 'laissez-faire' or 'libertarian' models, under which embryo testing and selection remain unregulated. We introduce a novel 'Welfarist Model' which limits embryo selection according to the impact of the predicted trait on well-being. We compare the strengths and weaknesses of each model as a way of regulating polygenic scores. Polygenic scores create the potential for existing embryo selection technologies to be used to select for a wider range of predicted genetically influenced characteristics including continuous traits. Indeed, polygenic scores exist to predict future intelligence, and there have been suggestions that they will be used to make predictions within the normal range in the USA in embryo selection. We examine how these three models would apply to the prediction of non-disease traits such as intelligence. The genetics of intelligence remains controversial both scientifically and ethically. This paper does not attempt to resolve these issues. However, as with many biomedical advances, an effective regulatory regime must be in place as soon as the technology is available. If there is no regulation in place, then the market effectively decides ethical issues. (shrink)

Public health policies often require individuals to make personal sacrifices for the sake of protecting other individuals or the community at large. Such requirements can be more or less demanding for individuals. This paper examines the implications of demandingness for public health ethics and policy. It focuses on three possible public health policies that pose requirements that are differently demanding: vaccination policies, policy to contain antimicrobial resistance, and quarantine and isolation policies. Assuming the validity of the ‘demandingness objection’ in ethics, (...) we argue that states should try to pose requirements that individuals would have an independent moral obligation to fulfil, and therefore that are not too demanding. In such cases, coercive measures are ethically justified, especially if the interventions also entail some benefits to the individuals; this is, for example, the case of vaccination policies. When public health policies need to require individuals to do something that is too demanding to constitute an independent moral obligation, states have an obligation to either provide incentives to give individuals non-moral reasons to fulfil a certain requirement – as in the case of policies that limit antibiotic prescriptions – or to compensate individuals for being forced to do something that is too demanding to constitute an independent moral obligation – as in the case of quarantine and isolation policies. (shrink)

The recent tragic and widely publicised death of Jesse Gelsinger in a gene therapy trial has many important lessons for those engaged in the ethical review of research. One of the most important lessons is that ethics committees can give too much weight to ensuring informed consent and not enough attention to minimising the harm associated with participation in research. The first responsibility of ethics committees should be to ensure that the expected harm associated with participation is reasonable. Jesse was (...) an 18-year-old man with a mild form of ornithine transcarbamylase (OTC) deficiency, a disorder of nitrogen metabolism. His form of the disease could be controlled by diet and drug treatment. On September 13 1999 a team of researchers lead by James Wilson at the University of Pennsylvania's Institute for Human Gene Therapy (IHGT) injected 3.8 X 1013 adenovirus vector particles containing a gene to correct the genetic defect. He was the eighteenth and final patient in the trial. The virus particles were injected directly into the liver. He received the largest number of virus particles in a gene therapy trial.1 Four days later he was dead from what was probably an immune reaction to the virus vector. This was the first death directly attributed to gene therapy. It resulted in worldwide publicity, an independent investigation, the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) suspending all trials at the IHGT, an FDA, and a senate subcommittee investigation. At a special public meeting at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in December 1999, James Wilson, also the director of the IHGT, said they still did not understand fully what had gone wrong.2 Even though a massive dose had been used, only 1% of transferred genes reached the target cells. (None of the patients in the trial showed significant gene expression. Art …. (shrink)

Dementia affects millions of people throughout the world. Thinking through Dementia offers a critique of the main models used to understand dementia-the biomedical, neuropsychological, and social constructionist. It discusses clinical issues and cases, together with philosophical work that might help us to better understand and treat this illness.

This paper aims (a) to provide characterizations of realism and instrumentalism that are philosophically interesting and applicable to economics; and (b) to defend instrumentalism against realism as a methodological stance in economics. Starting point is the observation that ‘all models are false’, which, or so I argue, is difficult to square with the realist's aim of truth, even if the latter is understood as ‘partial’ or ‘approximate’. The three cheers in favour of instrumentalism are: (1) Once we have usefulness, truth (...) is redundant. (2) There is something disturbing about causal structure. (3) It's better to do what one can than to chase rainbows. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

I discuss a puzzle that shows there is a need to develop a new metaphysical interpretation of mathematical theories, because all well-known interpretations conflict with important aspects of mathematical activities. The new interpretation, I argue, must authenticate the ontological commitments of mathematical theories without curtailing mathematicians' freedom and authority to creatively introduce mathematical ontology during mathematical problem-solving. Further, I argue that these two constraints are best met by a metaphysical interpretation of mathematics that takes mathematical entities to be constitutively constructed (...) by human activity in a manner similar to the constitutive construction of the US Supreme Court by certain legal and political activities. Finally, I outline some of the philosophical merits of metaphysical interpretations of mathematical theories of this type. (shrink)

We examine the philosophical and ethical issues associated with conjoined twins and their surgical separation. In cases in which there is an extensive sharing of organs, but nevertheless two distinguishable functioning brains, there are a number of philosophical and ethical challenges. This is because such conjoined twins: 1. give rise to puzzles concerning our identity, about whether we are identical to something psychological or biological;2. force us to decide whether what matters from an ethical point of view is the biological (...) life of our organisms or the existence of our consciousness or mind; 3. raise questions concerning when, if ever, it is morally acceptable to sacrifice one of us to save another;4. force us to reflect on the conditions for ownership of organs and the justification of removal of organs for transplantation which causes the death of the donor; 5. raise questions about who should take decisions about life-risking treatments when this cannot be decided by patients themselves.We examine and suggest answers to these questions. (shrink)

Duas formulações oferecidas por Leibniz de seu princípio de causalidade são examinadas, e a incompatibilidade, segundo Leibniz, do princípio com a possibilidade de causas indiferentes com respeito a seus efeitos é considerada. Acompanhamos o desenvolvimento de sua teoria da escolha a partir de suas teses sobre causalidade e indiferença. Por fim, procuramos explicar por que Leibniz sustentava que sua teoria de escolha não exclui a liberdade. Some remarks about causality, choice and freedom in Leibniz Abstract Two statements of Leibniz’ principle (...) of causality are discussed, and their alleged incompatibility with there being causes which are indifferent with respect to their effects is considered. We follow the development of his theory of choice on the basis of his views on causality and indifference. Finally, we attempt to explain why Leibniz maintained that his theory of choice does not rule out freedom. (shrink)

Regulations surrounding laboratory animal care have tried to address aspects of an image of laboratory animal cruelty publicized by animal rights activists. This image of cruelty, however, is not consistent with the experiences of those charged with the day-to-day care of laboratory animals. This article examines the incongruities between the public image of cruelty to animals in laboratories as promoted by animal rights activists, and the experiences of laboratory animal care staff who apply and enforce laboratory animal care regulations. In (...) doing so, the article illuminates why regulations surrounding laboratory animal care are difficult to comply with on the part of the policy enforcers, and are continuously contested by both animal rights activists and animal research personnel. (shrink)