Expertise, Agreement, and the Nature of Social Scientific Facts or: Against Epistocracy

Social Epistemology 33 (2):183-192 (2019)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTTaking some controversial claims philosopher Jason Brennan makes in his book Against Democracy as a starting point, this paper argues in favour of two theses: There is No Such Thing as Superior Political Judgement; There Is No Such Thing as Uncontroversial Social Scientific Knowledge. I conclude that social science experts need to be kept in check, not given more power.

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Citations of this work

Political Disagreement and Minimal Epistocracy.Adam F. Gibbons - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (2).
Epistocracy and Public Interests.Finlay Malcolm - 2021 - Res Publica 28 (1):173-192.
What Does Good Science-Based Advice to Politics Look Like?Martin Carrier - 2021 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (1):5-21.
An Epistemic Problem for Epistocracy.María Pía Méndez - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (2):153-166.

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