What makes an external whistleblower effective? Whistleblowers represent an important conduit for dissensus, providing valuable information about ethical breaches and organizational wrongdoing. They often speak out about injustice from a relatively weak position of power, with the aim of changing the status quo. But many external whistleblowers fail in this attempt to make their claims heard and thus secure change. Some can experience severe retaliation and public blacklisting, while others are ignored. This article examines how whistleblowers can succeed in (...) bringing their claims to the public’s attention. We draw on analyses of political struggle by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Specifically, we propose that through the raising of a demand, the whistleblowing subject can emerge as part of a chain of equivalences, in a counter-hegemonic movement that challenges the status quo. An analysis of a high-profile case of tax justice whistleblowing-that of Rudolf Elmer-illustrates our argument. Our proposed theoretical framing builds upon and contributes to literature on whistleblowing as organizational parrhesia by demonstrating how parrhesiastic demand might lead to change in public perception through the formation of alliances with other disparate interests—albeit that the process is precarious and complex. Practically, our article illuminates a persistent concern for those engaged in dissensus via whistleblowing, and whose actions are frequently ignored or silenced. We demonstrate how such actions can move towards securing public support in order to make a difference and achieve change. (shrink)

For W. E. B. Du Bois, the tragedy of Reconstruction was that its achievements were overthrown and erased from collective memory. Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction corrects this, claiming enslaved people who fled plantations self-emancipated, thus enacting a “general strike against the slave system.” Yet Du Bois contravenes his general strike thesis when he quotes without rebuttal several Union officials who spoke of the formerly enslaved in degrading, nonagentic terms. I turn to Jacques Rancière’s politics of dissensus to understand why (...) Du Bois quoted such racist views without comment. In Rancière, political actors “stage a scene” of equality that is shared, even among parties in conflict. Recording conflicting perceptions of the strike, highlighting divisions that persist despite momentary advances of equality, Du Bois’s reading of the general strike is dissensual in Rancière’s sense, I argue. But Du Bois also offers a valuable corrective to Rancière, whose account of the first plebeian secession erases a different general strike from memory. Rancière reads the Aventine as an event of confrontation unconnected to the collective action that Du Bois summoned from the archive and named “general strike.”. (shrink)

One of the traditional ways in which we manage dissensus is by argumentation, which may be construed as the attempt of the proponent to persuade rationally the other party of the truth of some thesis. To achieve this, the arguer will often anticipate a possible objection. In this paper, I attempt to shed light on the normative aspect of the task of anticipating objections. I deal with such questions as: How is the arguer to anticipate objections? Which of the (...) anticipated objections are to be dealt with? What is required to deal successfully with an objection? (shrink)

In this article, I critically evaluate the positions of Professors Jeremy Waldron and W.J. Waluchow on the right-based merits of entrenched constitutions and strong judicial review. I support Waluchow in arguing that (i) prohibitions on the constitutional entrenchment of rights and resultant prohibitions of strong judicial review may be only superficially fair or democratic, since fair procedure alone can neither eliminate pre-existing inequalities nor ultimately take the autonomy vital to self-governance seriously (whether individual or collective). Secondly, (ii) if deep (...) class='Hi'>dissensus fails to exist on all substantive matters of rights, the constitutional entrenchment of rights combined with strong judicial review can indeed be achieved fairly. I then propose that (iii) the anti-constitutionalist concern about being governed by the ‘dead hand of the past’ is self-refuting, for the alternative is simply another constraint on autonomy. While this is largely consistent with Waluchow's position vis-à-vis Waldron's majoritarianism, I end by expressing serious concerns regarding whether the common law (and the ‘constitutional morality’ that Waluchow claims can be derived from it) can act as a sufficiently robust basis for the protection of liberal and egalitarian rights. (shrink)

Virtue epistemology was modeled on virtue ethics theories to transfer their ethical insights to epistemology. VE has had great success: broadening our perspective, providing new answers to traditional questions, and raising exciting new questions. I offer a new argument for VE based on the concept of cognitive achievements, a broader notion than purely epistemic achievements. The argument is then extended to cognitive transformations, especially the cognitive transformations brought about by argumentation.

Translator's introduction -- Preface -- Part I: The aesthetics of politics -- Ten theses on politics -- Does democracy mean something? -- Who is the subject of the rights of man? -- Communism : from actuality to inactuality -- The people or the multitudes -- Bio-politics or politics -- September 11 and afterwards : a rupture in the symbolic order -- Of war as the supreme form of advanced plutocratic consensus -- Part II: The politics of aesthetics -- The aesthetic (...) revolution and its outcomes -- The paradoxes of political art -- The politics of literature -- The monument and its confidences or Deleuze and Art's capacity for resistance -- The ethical turn of aesthetics and politics -- Part III: Response to critics -- The usage of distinctions. (shrink)

In this introductory essay, we outline the relationship between political dissensus and radical democracy, focusing especially on how such a politics might inform the study of business ethics. This politics is located historically in the failure of liberal democracy to live up to its promise, as well as the deleterious response to that from reactionary populism, strong-man authoritarianism, and exploitative capitalism. In the context of these political vicissitudes, we turn to radical democracy as a form of contestation that offers (...) hope in an affirmative, inclusive and sustainable alternative. On this basis we introduce the papers in the special issue as a collective exploration of the ethics and politics of radical democracy as manifesting in dissensus and the subversion of corporate and elite power by alternative democratic practices and realities. (shrink)

The paper calls for argumentation theory to learn from moral and political philosophy. Several thinkers in these fields help understand the occurrence of what we may call legitimate dissensus: enduring disagreement even between reasonable people arguing reasonably. It inevitably occurs over practical issues, e.g., issues of action rather than truth, because there will normally be legitimate arguments on both sides, and these will be incommensurable, i.e., they cannot be objectively weighed against each other. Accordingly, ‘inference,’ ‘validity,’ and ‘sufficiency’ are (...) inapplicable notions. Further distinctive features of pro and con arguments in practical argumentation are explored, and some corollaries are drawn regarding evaluative norms of legitimate dissensus. Examples from immigrationrelated public debates in Denmark are given. (shrink)

If feminists argue for the irreducibility of the social dimensions of science, then they ought to embrace the idea that feminist and non-feminist scientists are not in collaboration, but in fact defend different interests. Instead, however, contemporary feminist science studies literature argues that feminist research improves particular, existing scientific enterprises, both epistemically (truer claims) and politically (more democratic methodologies and applications). I argue that the concepts of empirical success and democracy at work in this literature from Longino (1994) and Harding (...) (1996), to Longino (2002), Gilbert and Rader (2001), and Keller (2001) are not sufficiently critical, and fail to do justice to the truly revolutionary work done by feminist scientists. I offer the beginnings of an epistemology of dissensus (as opposed to consensus), using the work of Haraway (1978), Lyotard (1984), and Ziarek (2001). How would such an epistemology relate to feminist discussions of the possibility of democratic, responsible knowledge? (shrink)

This paper examines the UK’s response to a recent European Clinical Trials Directive, namely the Department of Health, Central Office for Research Ethics Committee guidance, Governance Arrangements for NHS Research Ethics Committees. The revisions have been long awaited by researchers and research ethics committee members alike. They substantially reform the ethical review system in the UK. We examine the new arrangements and argue that though they go a long way toward addressing the uncertainty surrounding ethics committee function, the system favours (...) the facilitation of research over the protection of the dignity and welfare of research participants. (shrink)

This paper will initially explore the assumptions about dissensus and consensus embedded in the values of cultures such as the dimension of individualism/collectivism. This will lead into an examination of how the emerging ideas about cultural forms of argument relate to dissensus and consensus in cultural practices. Finally, the paper will explore the ways that argument as dissensus can bridge the gap between cultural values and practice.

What kind of challenge does sexual and racial difference pose for postmodern ethics? What is the relation between ethical obligation and feminist interpretations of embodiment, passion, and eros? How can we negotiate between ethical responsibility for the Other and democratic struggles against domination, injustice, and equality, on the one hand, and internal conflicts within the subject, on the other? We cannot address such questions, Ziarek argues, without putting into dialogue discourses that have hitherto been segregated: postmodern ethics, feminism, race theory, (...) and the idea of radical democracy. Addressing a constellation of diverse thinkers - including Emmanuel Levinas, Patricia Williams, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Frantz Fanon, Julia Kristeva, and Luce Irigaray - the author proposes a new conception of ethics, an ethics of dissensus that rethinks the relation between freedom and obligation in a double context of embodiment and antagonism. (shrink)

An overlooked element in dealing with dissensus is humour. Humor has two vital rhetorical functions here: 1) it dilutes or diffuses volatility, and 2) it elucidates and constructs shared conditions of reasonableness. I will suggest that the rhetorical character of humour, as a productive, creative capacity, is an essential feature of its role in helping to generate and substantiate the ‘common sense’ needed for effective communication in general.

Moral dissensus may arise first because persons may disagree over the warrants licensing inferring an evaluative conclusion from premises asserting that properties alleged evaluatively relevant hold. This results in seeing different properties as evaluatively relevant. Secondly, such properties will frequently not be descriptive but interpretive, asserting some nomic connection. Persons may disagree over what evaluatively relevant properties hold in a given case. We explore the possibilities for argumentation to resolve these two types of disagreement.

Political theorists have traditionally grappled with laughter by posing a simple, normative question: ‘What role, if any, should laughter play in the polis?’ However, the outsized presence of laughter in contemporary politics has rendered this question increasingly obsolete. What good does determining laughter’s role in the polis do when the polis itself is to a large extent shaped by laughter? The present essay argues that Kant’s aesthetic investigations of laughter in the Critique of Judgment and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point (...) of View offer a much needed alternative to the normative discourse. Kant theorizes laughter as an intensely dialectical experience — at once an aesthetic judgment and an affect. Laughter in Kant enacts dissensus: it disrupts and transforms sensus communis, or the ways subjects see and hear the world in common that organize and structure a political community. The essay illustrates the advantages of a Kantian conception of the politics of laughter over the normative discourse by examining Dave Chappelle’s controversial 2019 stand-up comedy special Sticks & Stones. It concludes that the dissensus enacted by laughter, while not necessarily democratic, provides a privileged opening for democratic politics. (shrink)

This book reflects on the problematic relation of ethics to politics in our 'democratic' era.

An emerging branch of political theory, ‘the politics of dissensus’, starts out from the premise that in order to understand the politics of constitutional democracies, one needs to focus on parliamentary politics, which compromises both institutional settings and debates. Politics takes place among adversaries, and dissensus and argumentation pro et contra is the rule. The focus on the conditions for consensus in contemporary democratic theory accordingly misses the essence of politics. The politics of dissensus tends to think (...) that the political philosophy inaugurated by John Rawls, political liberalism in particular, is too idealistic and utopian to capture real parliamentary politics. I argue that this basic objection against political liberalism is misconceived. To the contrary, the politics of dissensus and political liberalism supplement each other. The impact of my argument is that research in these disparate fields of political studies ought to enlighten each of them. (shrink)

The history of the luminiferous ether is sketched with a view to ascertaining what factors may have kept this idea alive until 1905, when Einstein declared it superfluous.

Gwen Bradford presents the first systematic account of what achievements are, and why they are worth the effort. She argues that more things count as achievements than we might have thought, and offers a new perfectionist theory of value in which difficulty, perhaps surprisingly, plays a central part in characterizing achievements.

Many philosophers hold that the achievement of one's goals can contribute to one's welfare apart from whatever independent contributions that the objects of those goals or the processes by which they are achieved make. Call this the Achievement View, and call those who accept it achievementists. In this paper, I argue that achievementists should accept both that one factor that affects how much the achievement of a goal contributes to one’s welfare is the amount that one has invested in (...) that goal and that the amount that one has invested in a goal is a function of how much one has personally sacrificed for its sake, not a function of how much effort one has put into achieving it. So I will, contrary to at least one achievementist, be arguing against the view that the greater the amount of productive effort that goes into achieving a goal, the more its achievement contributes to one's welfare. Furthermore, I argue that the reason that the achievement of those goals for which one has personally sacrificed matters more to one’s welfare is that, in general, the redemption of one's self-sacrifices in itself contributes to one’s welfare. Lastly, I argue that the view that the redemption of one's self-sacrifices in itself contributes to one's welfare is plausible independent of whether or not we find the Achievement View plausible. We should accept this view so as to account both for the Shape of a Life Phenomenon and for the rationality of honoring "sunk costs.". (shrink)

This paper couples the variation and selection analogy utilized in evolutionary epistemology with the hermeneutical insight that novel data and theoretical texts are obscure in meaning. Dissensus must be valued as a distancing mechanism of variation on the space of possible meanings while argumentation attacks the initial obscurity. The objection that evolutionary accounts can only describe practice is countered by indicating how dissensus has normative purchase wherever science is producing novel text.

End-of-life decision-making is controversial. There are different views about when it is appropriate to limit life-sustaining treatment, and about what palliative options are permissible. One approach to decisions of this nature sees consensus as crucial. Decisions to limit treatment are made only if all or a majority of caregivers agree. We argue, however, that it is a mistake to require professional consensus in end-of-life decisions. In the first part of the article we explore practical, ethical, and legal factors that support (...) agreement. We analyse subjective and objective accounts of moral reasoning: accord is neither necessary nor sufficient for decisions. We propose an alternative norm for decisions – that of ‘professional dissensus’. In the final part of the article we address the role of agreement in end-of-life policy. Such guidelines can ethically be based on dissensus rather than consensus. Disagreement is not always a bad thing. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to introduce the concept of dissensus as an important perspective for making current organizational discourses of environmental sustainability more radically democratic. It presents the Anthropocene as a force for social naturalization—one that paradoxically acknowledges humanity’s role in negatively impacting the environment while restricting their agency to address this problem to those compatible with a market ideology. Radical democratic theories of agonism help to denaturalize the relation of organizations to the environment yet risk reproducing (...) values of anthropocentrism and patriarchy in doing so. Dissensus, by contrast, emphasizes the need to ‘redistribute the sensible’, treating organizations as a space for continually denaturalizing and renaturalizing our socio-material relation with the world. Yet it also puts forward a radically democratic political ethics demanding that firms ecologically preserve the environment to allow for positive dissensus while internally resisting institutional power structures that naturalize these organizational environments. This paper, thus, seeks to show the significance of dissensus for enhancing radical democracy both in regards to discourses of environmental sustainability specifically and more generally within organizations. (shrink)

1960년대와 1970년대 펑크를 비롯한 하위문화subculture는 주로 백인 룸펜 노동자 계급을 중심으로 이루어지고 퍼져나가면서도 그것은 어디까지나 남성중심 밴드의 음악과 남성적 저항이었다. 여성이 처음으로 락문화와 하위문화에 진입하게 되면서, 펑크여성들은 지배문화와 부모세대분화로부터의 일탈이라는 남성적 저항에서 한 발 더 나아가 남성 중심적 성폭력과 성희롱에 대해 포르노그래피적 배드걸bad-girl 스타일을 구성하였다.BR 하위문화 연구자 딕 헵디지는 여성문화라는 이유로, 여성주의는 1960년대 반포르노 페미니즘은 포르노적 여성펑크에 대해서 적절한 관심을 기울일 수가 없었다. 이에 이 논문은 랑시에르의 ‘불화(不和, dissensus)로서의 정치’라는 사유를 여성주의적으로 전유하여, 계급적으로나 성적으로 사회에서 있으나마나한 존재로 여겨져온 여성펑크의 (...) 스타일을 분석하며 그 의미를 재구성하고자 한다. 즉 기존사회의 남성적 로고스인 남성/여성, 정숙녀/타락녀, 가정/거리street의 이분법적 분할과 경계, 지배시스템을 조롱하며 파괴하는 배드걸 스타일을 통해 여성펑크의 거리 위 불화에 주목하고자 한다. 그리하여 역사적인 여성 복식운동이 주로 여성의 성적대상화에 대한 반대로서 비성적인 의복운동 - 현재의 탈코르셋을 포함 - 이었던 것과 달리, 여성펑크의 몸의 저항, 아래로부터의 저항은 드물게 남성의 성적 대상화 자체를 정면에서 공격하며 조롱하던 저항으로서, 비록 이론적으로 체계화한 논리적 전략은 아니지만, 일종의 생존전략적 불화로서 사회 내 여성성/남성성, 정숙녀/타락녀라는 몸 감각의 재구성을 시도한 정치적인 저항이었다고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

A predominant assumption in studies of deliberative democracy is that stakeholder engagements will lead to rational consensus and to a common discourse on corporate social and environmental responsibilities. Challenging this assumption, we show that conflict is ineradicable and important and that affects constitute the dynamics of change of the discourses of responsibilities. On the basis of an analysis of social media engagements in the context of the grand challenge of plastic pollution, we argue that civil society actors use mobilization strategies (...) with their peers and inclusive-dissensus strategies with corporations to convert them to a new discourse. These strategies use moral affects to blame and shame corporations and solidarity affects to create feelings of identification with the group and to avoid disengagement and polarization. Our research contributes to the literature on deliberative democracy and stakeholder engagement in social media in the collective constructions of discourses on grand challenges. (shrink)

The history of the luminiferous ether is sketched with a view to ascertaining what factors may have kept this idea alive until 1905, when Einstein declared it superfluous.

Global supply chains (GSCs) present the International Labour Organization (ILO) with a challenge that goes to the heart of its founding mandate and structure, one built on the prominence of nation states and national representatives of employers and workers. In February 2020, discussions in the ILO on the rise of GSCs reached deadlock. To fully understand why the ILO has been unable to address decent work deficits in GSCs greater attention needs to be paid to contestation, power and legitimacy in (...) the deliberation of labour governance. Drawing on the concept of agonistic pluralism we examine the evolution of the ILO’s attempt to establish a new labour standard on GSCs under three empirical phases between 2002 and 2020. We argue that shifting power asymmetries between the tripartite constituents of governments, employers and workers, increased counter-hegemonic contestation, and intensified questioning of the deliberative legitimacy of the adversaries, explain the dissensual relations at the ILO. This article contributes to the literature on labour standards in GSCs in demonstrating how and why contestation underpins the evolution of labour governance over time. (shrink)

When we affirm that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its central focus. John Greco argues that knowledge is a kind (...) of achievement, as opposed to mere lucky success. This locates knowledge within a broader, familiar normative domain. By reflecting on our thinking and practices in this domain, it is argued, we gain insight into what knowledge is and what kind of value it has for us. (shrink)

An important challenge that many South African organisations face, is to find a way of dealing with difference that allows for unity amidst diversity. To make this possible, institutional frameworks should function as guiding and unifying forces without becoming repressing, totalising structures. Part of this process entails recognising that difference and dissensus need not result in fragmentation and a loss of organisational identity. In fact, when harnessed effectively, difference and dissensus can be come valuable resources for renewal and (...) realignment within organisations. When one looks at the contemporary tertiary environment, these insights can prove valuable in creating an intellectual environment within which the full potential of the intellectuals working there can be realized, and within which the intellectual activities that should be pursued there can flourish. This paper develops a framework for dealing with diversity that connects intellectuals and the University as an organisation while respecting individual value-configurations and input. Institutional guidelines should neither become totalising structures that repress difference, nor oppositional differences that exclude commonality and ongoing connectedness between individual members and organisational structures. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.21(2) 2002: 113-121. (shrink)

Mechanisms of visual prediction based on spatial extrapolation work only for targets moving at constant speed, but do not easily accommodate accelerating or decelerating motion. We argue that mechanisms based on temporal extrapolation deal with both uniform and non-uniform motion. We provide behavioural examples from interception of falling objects and suggest possible neurophysiological substrates of time extrapolation.

Achievements are clearly something that we care about. We want a life rich in achievements, and we value the achievements of others. To be appointed to the job of one's dreams as a result of one's hard work and raw talent, such that it constitutes an achievement on one's part, is far more satisfying and worthy than getting it through other means where no achievement is involved . Similarly, the Olympic goal medal winner who gets her award by being the (...) best in a strong field exhibits an achievement and is lauded for it, but her counterpart who attains the same result through, say, mere good luck , and who thus does not exhibit an achievement, is not gifted nearly as much praise. But what is an achievement, and what is it about achievements that makes us care about them so much? (shrink)