In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Classical Art: A Life History DAVID CAST This is a wonderful book, rich in its purposes, wide in its range and, thanks to the author’s home institution, Christ’s College, Cambridge, lavishly illustrated with images of objects, many familiar, some less so. And it is written with an elegance and clarity that belies the depths of scholarship in its history. The first letter of the subtitle suggests (...) the tenor of Vout’s account, that since every age has conjured up a different idea of the classical, what is here is yet one more such history, a modest if particular account of what was and is still there in the records made of the Greek and Roman past. The basic metaphor Vout uses to define the focus of this history is that of conversation, whether such conversing is seen to exist between the objects themselves or between the past and the present, between those objects that have outgrown their intended functions to become part of a canon that has dictated taste over the ages, as she puts it, shaping culture and culture’s questions. Thus conversation is here, plus also what Vout is not afraid, when necessary, to call the misappropriations and translocations of the Greek and Roman objects she takes note of. Yet another contribution she adds to the idea of the classical comes from what she calls, perhaps a little awkwardly, the long durée approach to its subjects, seen first when these objects were produced, then as they survived Christianity and the fall of Rome and Byzantium, the French Revolution, modernism and fascism, to live Caroline Vout, Classical Art: A Life History from Antiquity to the Present, Princeton University Press, 2018. xi + 376 pages; 80 color + 132 b/w illustrations. $39.50. ISBN 9780691177038; E-book ISBN9781400890279. arion 27.1 spring/summer 2019 on in galleries and auction rooms, making the heart soar and the blood boil, as Vout claims, even today. It is a complex story she has to tell, difficult yet valuable, and its method is nicely exemplified by the first example considered, the two statues, known as the Tyrannicides, dated to 477–476 BCE, and located now in the National Archaeological Museum in Naples, attributed on the museum caption to the sculptors Kritios and Nesiotes, and dated to 477–476 BCE. The details here are crucial for, on investigation, it is clear these are not the statues that were erected in the Athenian agora to honor the men, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who, by tradition, had killed the tyrant’s brother Hipparchus. Yet even this second group, as she notes, had been a stand-in, since the first piece to honor these men, made by the sculptor Antenor, had been stolen by the Persians in the sack of Athens in 480–479 BCE. Nor is this group here the actual second group but rather a copy, made by an unknown copyist working under the Roman Empire. What we have here are what might be called pretenders—yet ones, despite doubts about their authenticity, that have long been taken to mark a particular moment in the formal history of Greek art, the advent of the so-called Severe style in Athens and the birth of the classical moment of sculpture. Any full account of these statues depends then on a rich history, plus a range of other events; the existence of ancient casts of the Tyrannicides during the Roman Empire, marking out such statues as art, rather than having still their first meaning; the prior history in the Renaissance of the acquisition of ancient sculpture as a sign of power; the sight of the figure of Aristogeiton, then in the Palazzo Farnese in Rome, by Johann Joachim Winckelmann; the building up of these statues from fragments of other statues; in 1859 the identification of these figures as the Tyrannicides; and finally a reading of classical texts, those of Pausanias, Pliny and Lucian, that spoke, even if in contradictory ways, of all the actors here, Antenor, Kritios and Aristogeiton. To which should be added the recent accounts of these pieces, provided by schol172 classical art: a life history ars of classical art like Brunilde Ridgway, R. T... (shrink)

Most of our best scientific descriptions of the world employ rates of change of some continuous quantity with respect to some other continuous quantity. For instance, in classical physics we arrive at a particle’s velocity by taking the time-derivative of its position, and we arrive at a particle’s acceleration by taking the time-derivative of its velocity. Because rates of change are defined in terms of other continuous quantities, most think that facts about some rate of change obtain in virtue of (...) facts about those other continuous quantities. For example, on this view facts about a particle’s velocity at a time obtain in virtue of facts about how that particle’s position is changing at that time. In this paper we raise a puzzle for this orthodox reductionist account of rate of change quantities and evaluate some possible replies. We don’t decisively come down in favour of one reply over the others, though we say some things to support taking our puzzle to cast doubt on the standard view that spacetime is continuous. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy is a dominant paradigm in normative political philosophy. Deliberative democrats want politics to be more than a clash of contending interests, and they believe political decisions should emerge from reasoned dialogue among citizens. But can these ideals be realized in complex and unjust societies? Deliberative Democracy in Practice brings together leading scholars who explore debates in deliberative democratic theory in four areas of practice: education, constitutions and state boundaries, indigenous-settler relations, and citizen participation and public consultation. This dynamic (...) volume casts new light on the strengths and limitations of deliberative democratic theory, offering guidance to policy makers and to students and scholars interested in democratic justice. Contributors inlcude James Bohman, Harry Brighouse, Simone Chambers, Glen Coulthard, James Fishkin, John Forester, Duncan Ivison, Micheline Milot, Henry S. Richardson, Jorge M. Valadez, and Paul Weithman. (shrink)

As austerity measures are put into place the world over and global restructuring is acknowledged by all as an attempt to bolster the economic system that lead to the crash, there is a great need to come to grips with the economic, political and philosophical legacy of Marx. Of particular interest are Marx's analyses of alienation and the cycles of boom and bust thought to be integral to the functioning of capitalism. Moreover, as the Cold War drifts into the history (...) books, it is possible to reconsider the lasting impact of Marx's analyses without the shadows cast by the Soviet version of communism. Equally, though, scholars are increasingly turning to Marx for insight into the rise of religion and the corresponding demise of political ideologies that seems to mark the contemporary age. Are we witnessing 'the return of Marx'? Few scholars have done as much to tease out the intricacies of Marx, ideology and religion and their overlapping concerns as the eminent writer and Marx biographer, Professor David McLellan. This book brings together a group of internationally renowned academics to reflect upon, develop and criticise McLellan's analyses of these three themes with a view to contributing more broadly to scholarly debates in these fields. This exciting and timely analysis will be of interest to scholars of political theory, the history of political thought, Marx and Marxism, sociology of knowledge, religion and theology more widely. (shrink)

This paper explores Ilyenkov’s conception of imagination as it is expressed in his writings on aesthetics and in his 1968 book Ob idolakh i idealakh (Of Idols and Ideals). Ilyenkov deemed imagination and creativity to be central to the character of distinctively human forms of mental activity. After examining the many different contexts in which Ilyenkov sees imagination at work—from the most basic operations of perception to the expression of artistic and scientific genius—I bring his ideas into dialogue with the (...) account of imagination developed in Vygotsky’s writings. I argue that, though there are significant differences, their respective approaches are complementary. Both see imagination not simply as a vehicle of fantasy, but as intimately involved in disclosing reality. Moreover, both thinkers are reluctant to cast imagination as a discrete mental function on a par with reason, memory, will, etc. Imagination, rather, is critical to the way in which mental functions express themselves. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of whether children can be taught to be creative and imaginative. (shrink)

Consider the following examples of behavior by Smith: 1. Smith, seated at her restaurant table, gives an order to the waiter; 2. Smith gets into a cab and names a destination; 3. Smith agrees to Jones's suggestion that they go back to Jones's apartment for a few drinks; 4. Smith casts her vote in some election. In each of these instances what can Smith be understood as consenting to? Is she consenting to pay the bill for whatever meal she orders; (...) pay the fare for the journey to her named destination; sexual intimacy with Jones; and accept the authority of whatever individual or political part is elected? The fact that Smith does not actually express her consent to each of these states of affairs or outcomes need not mean that she is not giving her consent to them. The idea that individuals can give their consent in ways other than by means of a formal verbal expression of agreement is a familiar, if controversial, one. (shrink)

While the Enlightenment promoted thinking for oneself independent of religious authority, the ‘Endarkenment’ (Millgram 2015) concerns deference to a new authority: the specialist, a hyperspecializer. Non-specialists need to defer to such authorities as they are unable to understand their reasoning. Millgram describes how humans are capable of being serial hyperspecializers, able to move from one specialism to another. We support the basic thrust of Millgram’s position, and seek to articulate how the core idea is deployed in very different ways in (...) relation to extremely different philosophical areas. We attend to the issue of the degree of isolation of different specialists and we urge greater emphasis on parallel hyperspecialization, which describes how different specialisms can be embodied in one person at one time. (shrink)

Drawing on ten years of research on the unpublished Wittgenstein papers, Stern investigates what motivated Wittgenstein's philosophical writing and casts new light on the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. The book is an exposition of Wittgenstein's early conception of the nature of representation and how his later revision and criticism of that work led to a radically different way of looking at mind and language. It also explains how the unpublished manuscripts and typescripts were put together and why they often provide (...) better evidence of the development of his ideas than can be found in his published writing. In doing so, the book traces the development of a number of central themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy, including his conception of philosophical method, the picture theory of meaning, the limits of language, the application of language to experience, his treatment of private language, and what he called the "flow of life." Arguing that Wittgenstein's views are often much more simple (and more radical) than we have been led to believe, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language provides an overview of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy and brings to light aspects of his philosophy that have been almost universally neglected. (shrink)

W.V. Quine’s article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is one of the most influential works in 20thcentury philosophy. The article is cast most explicitly as an argument against logical empiricists such as Carnap, arguing against the analytic/synthetic distinction that they appeal to along with their verificationism. But the article has been read much more broadly as an attack on the notion..

The central topic for this book is the ethics of treating individuals as though they are members of groups. The book raises many interesting questions, including: Why do we feel so much more strongly about discrimination on certain grounds – e.g. of race and sex - than discrimination on other grounds? Are we right to think that discrimination based on these characteristics is especially invidious? What should we think about ‘rational discrimination’ – ‘discrimination’ which is based on sound statistics? To (...) take just one of dozens of examples from the book. Suppose a landlord turns away a prospective tenant, because this prospective tenant is of a particular ethnicity – arguing that statistics show that one in four of this group have been shown in the past to default on their rent. That seems clearly unfair to people of this ethnicity. But we are routinely being judged in this way – not just on the basis of our ethnicity, but assumptions are made about us and decisions taken about us based on our gender, religion, job, post-code, hobbies, blood-group, nationality, etc. Now suppose that another landlord turns away a convicted criminal, arguing that one in four of convicted criminals have been shown to be unreliable rent payers. Is our intuition the same as before? Should it be? This book is suitable for all students of philosophy, especially those with an interest in applied ethics. (shrink)

Kagan argues that human beings who are neither persons nor even potential persons — if their impairment is independent of genetic constitution — are modal persons: individuals who might have been persons. Moreover, he proposes a view according to which both personhood and modal personhood are sufficient for counting more, morally, than nonhuman animals. In response to this proposal, I raise one relatively minor concern about Kagan's reasoning — that he judges too quickly that insentient beings can have interests — (...) before engaging the appeal to modal personhood. I challenge the thesis that modal personhood is relevant to one's moral status, first, by way of analogy to a kicker who misses a field goal though he might have made it; second, by casting doubt on implications for two impaired infants ; and, finally, by examining implications for dogs who would count as modal persons when genetic enhancements are capable of transforming them into persons. (shrink)

A study of the possibility of casting plausible matheamtical inference in Bayesian terms.

Kant’s Inferentialism draws on a wide range of sources to present a reading of Kant’s theory of mental representation as a direct response to the challenges issued by Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature. Kant rejects the conclusions that Hume draws on the grounds that these are predicated on Hume’s theory of mental representation, which Kant refutes by presenting objections to Hume’s treatment of representations of complex states of affairs and the nature of judgment. In its place, Kant combines (...) an account of concepts as rules of inference with a detailed account of perception and of the self as the locus of conceptual norms to form a complete theory of human experience as an essentially rule-governed enterprise aimed at producing a representation of the world as a system of objects necessarily connected to one another via causal laws. This interpretation of the historical dialectic enriches our understanding of both Hume and Kant and brings to bear Kant’s insights into mental representation on contemporary debates in philosophy of mind. Kant’s version of inferentialism is both resistant to objections to contemporary accounts that cast these as forms of linguistic idealism, and serves as a remedy to misplaced Humean scientism about representation. (shrink)

The void is deadly. If you were cast into a void, it would cause you to die in just a few minutes. It would suck the air from your lungs. It would boil your blood. It would drain the warmth from your body. And it would inflate enclosures in your body until they burst}.

This article investigates the concept of time as it is laid forth in the Daoist text, the Zhuangzi 莊子. Arguing that authentic time lies with cosmogony and not reality as envisioned by humanity, the Zhuangzi casts off the ontology of the present-now in favor of the existentially creative negativity of Dao 道. As the pivot of Dao, nothingness not only allows us to side-step the issue of temporal directionality, it reflects the meontological nature of Daoist cosmology in general. Framing time (...) in terms of the motion of nothingness, this paper concludes that the authentic time of Dao reveals itself through the principle of creation qua rest. Experiencing such temporal self-grounding, the sage becomes existentially awakened such that temporal ekstases becomes unfathomable. (shrink)

E.H. Carr's What is History?, published in 1961, was a runaway bestseller and the most influential book to examine writing and thinking about history this century. To commemorate the book's forthieth anniversary, David Cannadine has gathered an all-star cast of contributors to ask and seek answers to E.H. Carr's classic question for a new generation of historians: what does it mean to study history at the start of the twenty-first century? The contributors pose this question anew for the (...) most important and lively subfields of history writing today. For example, Alice Kessler-Harris ponders "what is gender history now?" while Paul Cartledge asks "what is social history now?" This volume stands along E.H. Carr's classic, paying tribute to his seminal inquiry while moving the debate into new territory, ensuring its freshness and relevance for a new century of historical study. (shrink)

Richard Jeffrey’s radical probabilism (‘probability all the way down’) is augmented by the claim that probability cannot be turned into certainty, except by data that logically exclude all alternatives. Once we start being uncertain, no amount of updating will free us from the treadmill of uncertainty. This claim is cast first in objectivist and then in subjectivist terms.

Consider the following examples of behavior by Smith: 1. Smith, seated at her restaurant table, gives an order to the waiter; 2. Smith gets into a cab and names a destination; 3. Smith agrees to Jones's suggestion that they go back to Jones's apartment for a few drinks; 4. Smith casts her vote in some election. In each of these instances what can Smith be understood as consenting to? Is she consenting to pay the bill for whatever meal she orders; (...) pay the fare for the journey to her named destination; sexual intimacy with Jones; and accept the authority of whatever individual or political part is elected? The fact that Smith does not actually express her consent to each of these states of affairs or outcomes need not mean that she is not giving her consent to them. The idea that individuals can give their consent in ways other than by means of a formal verbal expression of agreement is a familiar, if controversial, one. (shrink)

This book differs from others by rejecting the dualist approach associated in particular with Descartes. It also casts serious doubt on the forms of materialism that now dominate English language philosophy. Drawing in particular on the work of Wittgenstein, a central place is given to the importance of the notion of a human being in our thought about ourselves and others.

This article investigates waymaking, the use of language to dedicate space to the traffic of animals, goods, fuel, waste, and people. It argues that the rhetorical creation of traversable clearances anticipates and services the formation of infrastructure. Through a close reading of Daniel Defoe’s A Journal of the Plague Year (1722), I show how literary critics can analyze the words that create the emptiness that allows conduits to happen and claim this emptiness as an analytical object in itself. By tracing (...) modern conceptions of infrastructure as assemblage, occasion, and patterning to the fray of early modern waymaking, I claim that criticism can supplement social-scientific research by casting as poetic event and autopoietic phenomenon the human practice of reserving space for utilities. (shrink)

Lincoln's First Inaugural Address was not designed to coax the seceded states back into the Union, because he never conceded that they had left. Rather, he sought to define the situation so that, if war broke out, the seceders would be cast as the aggressors and the federal government as acting in self-defense. To this end, he presented a principled case against the legitimacy or even possibility of secession while applying the arguments to the exigence at hand. He identifies (...) the cause of the trouble as “unwarranted apprehension” among the southern states, announces his policy as a minimalist assertion of national sovereignty, and urges that disaffected southerners not act in haste to threaten that sovereignty further. Not only does he explicitly call for slowing down the push to war but the speech itself enacts a slowing of time. In sum, the First Inaugural illustrates both Lincoln's philosophical grounding and his rhetorical dexterity. (shrink)

Ther is no evidence that the character of Zarathustra is modeled upon the life and reforming religious activities of the historical Zoroaster/Zarathustra. Religious history casts no interperative light on the identity of Nietzsche's Zarathustra; likewise, it is apparent that Zarathustra and the Zoroaster of history are incompatible in their metaphysical visions of the world. It would therefore seem that the reader of Also sprach Zarathustra is at liberty to understand that Zarthustra is a new, antihistorical, and entirely literary dramatis personae, (...) which brings up a new question altogether. What, precisely, does the name Zarathustra mean in Nietzsche's mouth?Dass Nietzsches Zarathustra irgendetwas mit dem Leben und dem religiös-reformatorischen Wirken der historischen Person Zoroaster/Zarathustra zu tun hat, ist nicht erwiesen. Religiongeschichtlich deutet nichts auf Nietzches Zarathust hin. Auch ist offensichtlich, dass die metaphysische Weltsicht von Nietzsches Zarathustra völlig von der des historischen Zoaraster abweicht. Aus diesen Gründen muss der Leser von Also spruch Zarathustra Zarathustra als eine neue, ahistorische und ganz und gar literarische Figur auffassen, was die gänzlich neue Frage aufwirft: Was bedeutet der Name Zarathustra genau für Nietzsche? (shrink)

The existence of conflicting interpretations in literature, history, and art history casts doubt on the ability of any interpretation to be true to the facts. The role of the art historian is complicated by this reconsideration of what is valuable in interpretation. Progress in the history of art is difficult to ascertain. The scope and diversity of twentieth-century criticism of Piero della Francesca's Renaissance frescoes is difficult to compare to his less extensive Renaissance criticism by Vasari. While the antirelativist would (...) be comfortable setting individual interpretations against a set of ahistorical standards, the relativist avoids evaluating differing interpretations as more or less valuable. Both relativism and antirelativism steer evaluations away from the notion of truth in interpretation. The marginalization of truth is furthered by the lack of "facts" in art. The flexibility of the data in art history makes multiple interpretations unavoidable. Only by acknowledging the inevitable coupling of form with content and the meaninglessness of searching for truth outside of the limiting structures of form, can truthful representations occur in pictures and in narratives. (shrink)

This essay contributes to our understanding of the relation between the philosophies of Hegel and Sellars. While most treatments of this relation have focused on metaphysics or epistemology, I focus on ethics, and in particular on the formulation of moral agency. I argue that Hegel and Sellars arrive at a similar metaphilosophical rejection of individual moral agency in favor of conceptions of moral agency as the outcome of social mediation. To demonstrate this, I trace how Hegel and Sellars offer parallel (...) resolutions of the ‘Kantian paradox’: the apparent problem that, in Kantian ethics, moral agents must both freely self-legislate the moral law unto themselves and stand in a dutiful relation to the moral law as a necessary function of practical reason. Drawing Hegel and Sellars together in this way casts new light on Sellars’s understudied ethical theory and further evidences the contemporary relevance of Hegel’s moral philosophy. (shrink)

With the demise of socialism in Eastern Europe, the Western welfare state is treated as the unquestionable alternative by most intellectuals. They have yet to come to terms with what Claus Offe, the German sociologist, describes as the contradictions of the welfare state and the persistent crises of crisis management. This paper critically assesses Offe's contribution in light of the recent reforms in ?really existing socialism.?; The author contends that although Offe's neo?Schumpeterian argument goes a long way toward explaining the (...) present instability of the welfare state and the contradictions of state intervention in general, including that of the socialist?interventionist state, Offe does not realize that his analysis casts into serious doubt the claim that the welfare state is a viable corrective to either unbridled markets or state socialism. (shrink)

Tippett is often cast as a composer with a strong visionary streak, but what does that mean for a twentieth-century artist? In this multi-faceted study, David Clarke explores Tippett's complex creative imagination - its dialogue between a romantic's aspirations to the ideal and absolute, and a modernist's sceptical realism. He shows how the musical formations of works such as The Midsummer Marriage, King Priam, and The Vision of Saint Augustine resonate with the aesthetic and theoretical ideas of key (...) figures in modern Western culture - some known to have been influential to the composer, others not usually associated with him. Analyses of late works such as the Triple Concerto and Byzantium also speculate on Tippett's sexuality as a critical element in his creative and political consciousness. (shrink)

In the beginning was the night. All light, shapes, language, and subjective consciousness, as well as the world and art depicting them, emerged from this formless chaos. In fantasy, we seek to return to this original darkness. Particularly in literature, visual representations, and film, the night resiliently resurfaces from the margins of the knowable, acting as a stage and state of mind in which exceptional perceptions, discoveries, and decisions play out. Elisabeth Bronfen investigates the nocturnal spaces in which extraordinary events (...) unfold, and casts a critical eye into the darkness that enables the irrational exploration of desire, transformation, ecstasy, transgression, spiritual illumination, and moral choice. She begins with an analysis of classical myths depicting the creation of the world and then moves through night scenes in Shakespeare and Milton, Gothic novels and novellas, Hegel's romantic philosophy, and Freud's psychoanalysis. Bronfen also demonstrates how modern works of literature and film, particularly film noir, can convey that piece of night the modern subject carries within. From Mozart's "Queen of the Night" to Virginia Woolf 's oscillation between day and night, life and death, and chaos and aesthetic form, Bronfen renders something visible, conceivable, and comprehensible from the dark realms of the unknown. (shrink)

The recent posthumous publication of John Rawls's undergraduate thesis 'A Brief Inquiry Into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation Based on the Concept of Community' constitutes a welcome opportunity to examine the relationships between Rawls's religious commitments and his political philosophy. In this essay, informed by a complete examination of Rawls's archived papers at Harvard, I set out some of these commitments, trace their development over time, and indicate some of the ways they find expression in Rawls's political (...) thought. In the 1990s Rawls characterized his life's work as addressed to a question 'essentially religious in nature': Can human nature be redeemed? It is perhaps, then, no surprise that reading his work against the background of his, eventually non-theistic, religious commitments and concerns helpfully casts it in a new light. (shrink)

For centuries, the processes of social differentiation associated with Modernity have often been thought to intensify the need for site-specific forms of role training and knowledge production, threatening the university’s survival either through fragmentation or through failure to adapt. Other lines of argument emphasize the extent to which the Modern system creates and relies on an integrated knowledge system, but most of the literature stresses functional differentiation and putative threats to the university. And yet over this period the university has (...) flourished. In our view, this seeming paradox is explained by the fact that modern society rests as much on universalistic cosmological bases as it does on differentiation. The university expands over recent centuries because – as it has from its religious origins – it casts cultural and human materials in universalistic terms. Our view helps explain empirical phenomena that confound standard accounts: the university’s extraordinary expansion and global diffusion, its curricular and structural isomorphism, and its relatively unified structure. All of this holds increasingly true after World War II, as national state societies made up of citizens are increasingly embedded in a world society constituted of empowered individuals. The redefinition of society in global and individual terms reduces nationally bounded models of nature and culture, extends the pool of university beneficiaries and investigators, and empowers the human persons who are understood to root it all. The changes intensify universalization and the university’s rate of worldwide growth. For the university’s knowledge and “knowers,” and for the pedagogy that joins them together, the implications are many. The emerging societal context intensifies longstanding processes of cultural rationalization and ontological elaboration, yielding great expansions in what can and should be known, and in who can and should know. These changes in turn alter the menu of approved techniques for joining knowledge and knower as one. The “knowledge society” that results is distinguished by the extraordinary degree to which the university is linked to society. But it is also distinguished by the degree to which society is organized around the university’s abstracted and universalized understandings of the world and its degree-certified graduates. (shrink)

Advocates of gentrification regard it as a strategy of urban rehabilitation. Critics see in it the displacement of people from old neighborhoods, the polarizing of communities and both the expression and exacerbation of existing inequalities. Within political theory, assessments of gentrification have engaged primarily in evaluating gentrification’s benefits (rehabilitation) and burdens (displacements). In this paper, I argue gentrification is best understood as a relationship of domination between, on the one hand, the producers and consumers of gentrification, connected to one another (...) by a state-administered legislative apparatus that both commodifies land and makes it available as a consumable product, and on the other, all those individuals who are outside of that relationship, but who must nevertheless live in the shadows it casts. Focusing on how the boons of rehabilitated urban space can be weighed against the burdens assumed by displaced people is thus beside the point: domination is baked into gentrification as a strategy of capitalist urban development and should therefore be rejected. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Beyond EngelClinical Pragmatism as the Foundation of Psychiatric PracticeDavid H. Brendel (bio)Keywordsbiopsychosocial model, pluralism, pragmatism, psychiatryFor many years now, there has been growing recognition of the powerful role of pragmatic reasoning in numerous disciplines, including bioethics, medicine, law, political science, and philosophy (Dickstein 1998; Rosenthal, Hausman, and Anderson 1999). But until recently, philosophical pragmatism was neglected by scholars exploring the clinical challenges and theoretical underpinnings of psychiatry. In his (...) noteworthy article The Biopsychosocial Model and Philosophic Pragmatism: Is George Engel a Pragmatist?, Bradley Lewis offers a significant contribution to the small but gradually increasing literature in this area. Lewis appropriately presents Engel as a major figure in twentieth-century American medicine and psychiatry, a critic and a visionary who dared to question the dominant paradigm of biomedical reductionism (Engel 1977)—a paradigm that led to important scientific advances, but also restricted the physician’s understanding of the patient as a complex individual with an inner world and interpersonal relationships. Lewis argues that medicine and psychiatry a generation after Engel’s seminal 1977 paper can be revitalized by reinterpreting Engel in the intellectual tradition of classical American pragmatism and neo-pragmatism. Placing Engel in the pragmatic tradition, Lewis suggests, could enhance the biopsychosocial model and have substantial benefits for both individual patients and society as a whole.There is no disputing Lewis’s argument that a pragmatic philosophy of medicine and psychiatry is a noble goal. In fact, in my book Healing Psychiatry: Bridging the Science/Humanism Divide (Brendel 2006), I present philosophical pragmatism as the most compelling theoretical approach to clinical psychiatry in the twenty-first century—the approach that is most likely to empower the clinician and the patient to collaboratively develop a treatment plan that heeds the multidimensional complexity of the patient’s life, recognizes the confusion and uncertainty that grows out of this complexity, and aims for a favorable therapeutic outcome. Drawing on work of the classical American pragmatists and contemporary pragmatic bioethicists, I identify four dimensions of philosophical pragmatism that provide a sound foundation for clinical work, which I call the “four ps”: (1) diagnostic formulations and treatment plans in psychiatry are practical insofar as they focus on results rather than a commitment to any particular theory; (2) they are pluralistic [End Page 311] insofar as they incorporate explanatory concepts that span the biopsychosocial spectrum; (3) they are participatory and collaborative, not imposed authoritatively by the clinician; and (4) they are provisional, open-ended, and malleable to newly acquired information and evolution of the patient’s condition.Lewis casts Engel as a philosophical pragmatist who battled the Goliath of biomedical reductionism that had come to dominate American medicine and psychiatry in the latter half of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, however, regardless of how elegantly Lewis reinterprets Engel, he cannot render him a full-blown pragmatist for the medicine and psychiatry of the twenty-first century. Lewis provides quotations to suggest that Engel valued a results-oriented clinical sensibility, for example “the value of a scientific model is measured not by whether it is right or wrong but by how useful it is” (Engel 1980). But Engel was not fully committed to clinical outcome as the supreme judge of theory in medicine and psychiatry. Lewis notes that Engel understood the biopsychosocial model as less “a matter of compassion and humanity” and more a matter of “rigorous application of the principles and practices of science”; he was a man of his time who could not fully escape the scientism of the day. Working within this scientistic world, he distinguished himself by reintroducing psychological, sociological, and humanistic concepts into clinical medicine, which had become obsessed with the power and robustness of the natural sciences but had neglected the suffering human subject and the social context of illness. Engel undoubtedly hoped the biopsychosocial model would lead to better clinical results but, unlike the classical American pragmatists and contemporary pragmatic bioethicists, he did not make a systematic case for privileging clinical outcome above strict adherence to scientific theory.In fact, Engel’s biopsychosocial model runs the risk of becoming a reified end in itself; those who unquestioningly espouse its basic tenets are in danger of... (shrink)

There are a variety of interpretations of Manet's Un Bar auxFolies Bergères, but there is no genuinely neutral standpoint from which to judge their seemingly opposed accounts. T. J. Clark's analysis involves placing the work in the context of critical commentary by the artist's contemporaries, and examining the exact place and role of the mirror. Just as Manet painted two versions of the picture, so Clark has published two analyses of it; and just as we can ask whether the artist (...) thus resolved the ambiguities of his first image, so an analogous question can be asked about Clark's commentaries. When we have two such pictures or texts, how do we understand their relationship? Perhaps the best way is to find a further commentary. A Lacanian interpretation is proposed. We may see in the picture a triangular structure of perception; between the gaze and the subject stands the screen on which the image is cast. This view, even more speculative than Clark's, offers a new suggestive way of grasping the relation between picture and texts interpreting it. (shrink)

Consider an election in which each of the n voters casts a vote consisting of a strict preference ranking of the three candidates A, B, and C. In the limit as n→∞, which scoring rule maximizes, under the assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (uniform probability distribution over profiles), the probability that the Condorcet candidate wins the election, given that a Condorcet candidate exists? We produce an analytic solution, which is not the Borda Count. Our result agrees with recent numerical results (...) from two independent studies, and contradicts a published result of Van Newenhizen (Economic Theory 2, 69–83. (1992)). (shrink)

This fifth and final installment from the author's book‐length study of Ralph Wendell Burhoe's life and thought covers the period 1966–1987, and it concludes with a summary of his thought. Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science began publication in March 1966, the same year in which the Center for Advanced Study in Theology and the Sciences (CASTS) was founded. Both the journal and the center were made possible by Meadville/Lombard Theological School. After a brief period of flourishing, CASTS was succeeded (...) in 1972 by the Center for Advanced Study in Religion and Science (CASIRAS). Burhoe married Calla Butler in 1969, two years after his first wife, Frances, had died. He retired from Mead‐ville in 1974. The Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion was awarded to Burhoe in 1980. His thought is summarized under the topics of values, thermodynamics, the evolution of religion, the concept of soul, God, enculturation and freedom, and the Lord of History. (shrink)

This fifth and final installment from the author's book‐length study of Ralph Wendell Burhoe's life and thought covers the period 1966–1987, and it concludes with a summary of his thought. Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science began publication in March 1966, the same year in which the Center for Advanced Study in Theology and the Sciences (CASTS) was founded. Both the journal and the center were made possible by Meadville/Lombard Theological School. After a brief period of flourishing, CASTS was succeeded (...) in 1972 by the Center for Advanced Study in Religion and Science (CASIRAS). Burhoe married Calla Butler in 1969, two years after his first wife, Frances, had died. He retired from Mead‐ville in 1974. The Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion was awarded to Burhoe in 1980. His thought is summarized under the topics of values, thermodynamics, the evolution of religion, the concept of soul, God, enculturation and freedom, and the Lord of History. (shrink)

Donald Davidson's argument that non-linguistic creatures lack beliefs rests on two premises: (1) to be a believer, one must have the concept of belief, and (2) to have the concept of belief, one must interpret the utterances of others. However, Davidson's defense of these premises is overly compressed and unconvincing. In a recent issue of Philosophy, Roger Fellows provides new arguments for these premises. In this paper, I explain why I'm not persuaded by Fellows' attempt to bolster Davidson's line of (...) reasoning and cast doubt on Davidson's and Fellows' overall strategy of attaching special significance to the concept of belief. (shrink)

By casting a wide net for his interviews - from tiny hamlets to bustling Guatemala City - Carey gained insight into more than a single community or a single group of Maya."--BOOK JACKET.

What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...) that will concern me in this paper is that the story fails to include an agent-or, more precisely, fails to cast the agent in his proper role. (shrink)

Reasoning is naturally understood as something which we actively do—as a kind of action. However, reflection on the supposed limits to the extent to which it is up to us how our reasoning unfolds is often taken to cast doubt on this idea. I argue that, once articulated with care, challenges to the idea that reasoning is a kind of action can be seen to trade on problematic assumptions. In particular, they trade on assumptions which could be used to (...) rule out paradigmatic actions from qualifying as such. Accordingly, no distinctive challenge to the idea that reasoning is a kind of action can trade on such assumptions. I suggest that it is a mistaken atomistic way of thinking about action which is the source of the relevant assumptions. Reasoning can unproblematically be maintained to be a kind of action. It is the atomistic way of thinking about action which ought to be rejected. (shrink)

This essay that takes up Rawls's journey from philosophical theology through moral philosophy to democratic theory and political philosophy and pauses at, to reflect on, a few significant points early in the journey. It aims to provide a sense of some of Rawls's important early concerns and commitments that structure or at least cast significant shadows over his later work in political philosophy, A Theory of Justice and subsequent works. According to Rawl, moral philosophers construct theoretical models to explain (...) and predict familiar, everyday, noncontroversially competent moral judgments. Rawls refers to this work as “explication” and “ethics as science.” Rawls distinguishes between two tasks essential to moral philosophy. Ethical theory or moral theory starts with but takes us beyond ethics as science by helping us to refine and deepen our understanding of plausible candidate explications. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Authorship ofthe Abstract Revisited David Raynor In a recent issue ofHume Studies, J. 0¿ Nelson challenges the received view that Hume himself composed the Abstract, and argues instead that we know that Adam Smith wrote it.1 But his main argument is so blatantly fallacious that charity requires that we interpret his intervention as ajeu d'esprit. I have no idea why he wishes to tease Hume scholars so (...) mercilessly. Most probably he wishes to keep the issue of the authorship of the Abstract alive until either someone disproves his belief that Smith wrote the pamphlet, or the scholarly community comes round to accepting Smith as the real author. Whatever his motive, I intend here to squelch his mischievous conjecture once and for all. Nelson first sought to cast doubt on Hume's authorship of the Abstract in an article published in The Philosophical Quarterly for 1976. In the fifteen years since that paper appeared, he has become convinced that Smith wrote the pamphlet. It was not always so. Here is how he judiciously concluded his earlier article: "According to the external evidence it is most improbable that Hume was the author of the Abstract and it is plausible to suppose that Adam Smith was; but according to the internal evidence, it is most improbable that Adam Smith was its author and almost certain that Hume was. How these incompatible conclusions are to be resolved I have no idea." 2 Nelson now has no doubt that any such discomfort should be resolved by allowing the external evidence tooutweigh the internal, becausehehas come to regard the external evidence as showing that it is not simply improbable that Hume wrote the work, but downright impossible. Nelson'sentire case rests on theidentityofthe "Mr Smith"referred to in a letter of 4 March, 1740 from Hume at Ninewells to Professor Francis Hutcheson at Glasgow. The crucial passage reads: My Bookseller has sent toMr Smith aCopy ofmy Book, which I hope he has received, as well as your Letter. I have not yet heard whathe has done with the Abstract. Perhaps you have. I have got it printed in London; but not in the WOrAe ofthe Learned; therehavingbeen an article with regard to my Book, somewhat abusive, printed in that Work, before I sent up the Abstract.3 Volume XTX Number 1 213 DAVID RAYNOR Until Keynes and Sraffa argued otherwise in their 1938 edition of the Abstract, some scholars believed that Adam Smith was the "Mr Smith" referred to in H, and that he wrote theAbstract at Hutcheson's suggestion. Keynes and Sraffainstead argued that the "MrSmith"was John Smith, Hutcheson's Dublin pubUsher, and that Hume himself wrote the Abstract (as all the internal evidence suggests). Norman Kemp Smith, in a review ofKeynes and Sraffa's edition, accepted their interpretation.4 Now Nelson seeks to prove all of them wrong. He argues thus: the "Mr Smith" in His eitherJohn Smith or Adam Smith; itcan'tbeJohn Smith;thereforeitmustbeAdamSmith.We canreadily agree with Nelson that the "Mr Smith" was notJohn Smith the Dublin publisher. But it will not follow—as Nelson supposes—that the man referred to must have been Adam Smith who, at the time, was still an undergraduate at Glasgow. "But ifthe Mr Smith ofH was not John Smith... who could he be excepttheAdam Smithofthe traditional theory?" asks Nelson.6 1have elsewhere suggested that the man in question was William Smith, one ofthepublishers oftheAmsterdam periodicalBibliothèqueraisonnée.6 Hutcheson'sInquiry had been pubUshed in Dublin by John Smith andWilliam Smith. The latter subsequently moved to Amsterdam and married into the Wetstein pubhshing family. William Smith was responsible for directing the firm's periodical, the Bibliothèque raisonnée, which employed Pierre Desmaizeaux as its London correspondent. The issue of this periodical for April-June, 1735, published aletterfrom Hutcheson tohis "ancien & intimeAmi"William Smith concerning Robert Simson's book on conic sections. In light ofH, it is probable that copies of the first two books of the Treatise, a manuscript copy oftheAbstract, and aletterfrom Hutcheson were sent to WilUam Smith in early 1740. The April-May-June issue of the Bibliothèqueraisonnée for 1740 published a largely favourable review of the first... (shrink)

Kant’s argument in the First Analogy for the permanence of substance has been cast as consisting of a simple quantifierscope mistake. Kant is portrayed as illicitly moving from a premise such as (1) at all times, there must exist some substance, to a conclusion such as (2) some particular substance must exist at all times. Examples meant to show that Kant makes this mistake feature substances coming into and out of existence, but doing so at overlapping times. I argue (...) that Kant offers an argument against this kind of example in the following passage. Kant’s claim is that, were substances to be created and destroyed as in the example, the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another (A188–9/B231–32). (shrink)

The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let's face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some anticipated outcome; and in desiring that outcome, he must regard it as having some value. All of his intentional actions are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie boni: under the guise of the good. This agent (...) is conceived as being capable of intentional action—and hence as being an agent—only by virtue of being a pursuer of value. I want to question whether this conception of agency can be correct. Surely, so general a capacity as agency cannot entail so narrow a cast of mind. Our moral psychology has characterized, not the generic agent, but a particular species of agent, and a particularly bland species of agent, at that. It has characterized the earnest agent while ignoring those agents who are disaffected, refractory, silly, satanic, or punk. I hope for a moral psychology that has room for the whole motley crew. I shall begin by examining why some philosophers have thought that the attitudes motivating intentional actions involve judgments of value. I shall then argue that their conception of these attitudes is incorrect. Finally, I shall argue that practical reason should not be conceived as a faculty for pursuing value. (shrink)

In the quest and search for a physical theory of everything from the macroscopic large body matter to the microscopic elementary particles, with strange and weird concepts springing from quantum physics discovery, irreconcilable positions and inconvenient facts complicated physics – from Newtonian physics to quantum science, the question is- how do we close the gap? Indeed, there is a scientific and mathematical fireworks when the issue of quantum uncertainties and entanglements cannot be explained with classical physics. The Copenhagen interpretation is (...) an expression of few wise men on quantum physics that was largely formulated from 1925 to 1927 namely by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg. From this point on, there is a divergence of quantum science into the realms of indeterminacy, complementarity and entanglement which are principles expounded in Yijing, an ancient Chinese knowledge constructed on symbols, with a vintage of at least 3 millennia, with broken and unbroken lines to form stacked 6-line structure called the hexagram. It is premised on probability development of the hexagram in a space-time continuum. The discovery of the quantization of action meant that quantum physics could not convincingly explain the principles of classical physics. This paper will draw the great departure from classical physics into the realm of probabilistic realities. The probabilistic nature and reality interpretation had a significant influence on Bohr’s line of thought. Apparently, Bohr realized that speaking of disturbance seemed to indicate that atomic objects were classical particles with definite inherent kinematic and dynamic properties (Hanson, 1959). Disturbances, energy excitation and entanglements are processual evolutionary phases in Yijing. This paper will explore the similarities in quantum physics and the methodological ways where Yijing is pivoted to interpret observable realities involving interactions which are uncontrollable and probabilistic and forms an inseparable unity due to the entanglement, superposition Transgressing disciplinary boundaries in the discussion of Yijing, originally from the Western Zhou period (1000-750 BC), over a period of warring states and the early imperial period (500-200 BC) which was compiled, transcribed and transformed into a cosmological texts with philosophical commentaries known as the “Ten Wings” and closely associated with Confucius (551- 479 BC) with the Copenhagen Interpretation (1925-1927) by the few wise men including Niel Bohr and Werner Heisensberg would seem like a subversive undertaking. Subversive as the interpretations from Yijing is based on wisdom derived from thousands of years from ancient China to recently discovered quantum concepts. The subversive undertaking does seem to violate the sanctuaries of accepted ways in looking at Yijing principles, classical physics and quantum science because of the fortified boundaries that have been erected between Yijing and the sciences. Subversive as this paper may be, it is an attempt to re-cast an ancient framework where indeterminism, complementarity, non-linearity entanglement, superposition and probability interpretation is seen in today quantum’s realities. (shrink)

Standard histories of mathematics and of analytic philosophy contend that work on the foundations of mathematics was motivated by a crisis such as the discovery of paradoxes in set theory or the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. Recent scholarship, however, casts doubt on the standard histories, opening the way for consideration of an alternative motive for the study of the foundations of mathematics—unification. Work on foundations has shown that diverse mathematical practices could be integrated into a single framework of axiomatic systems (...) and that much of mathematics could be expressed in a single language. The new framework was the product of an interdisciplinary coalition whose ideas resemble those later adopted by the Vienna Circle and logical empiricists. (shrink)