La pandemia del SARS-CoV-2 ha creado un desafío sin precedentes para la educación. En 2020, como resultado de las medidas para reducir la propagación del SARS-CoV-2, muchas instituciones educativas pasaron del aprendizaje presencial al aprendizaje remoto. Sin embargo, este modelo educativo puede generar estrés y ansiedad adicionales a la ansiedad provocada por la pandemia. Los objetivos del presente estudio fueron: 1) comparar las perspectivas de estudiantes y docentes sobre el número de horas dedicadas a las clases, y 2) determinar las (...) principales dificultades que enfrentan docentes y estudiantes, respectivamente, al pasar al sistema de educación en línea. Para realizar esta investigación se realizó una encuesta online en países de habla hispana, utilizando una muestra de 1.048 participantes anónimos. A través de los datos recopilados. Se analizaron el uso de plataformas, los tipos de equipos, los niveles de angustia y las posibles razones de esta angustia. Esta pandemia es una de las amenazas de salud pública más importantes de la historia reciente y ha afectado nuestras vidas de manera significativa, siendo una de las más importantes la futura adaptación de escuelas, estudiantes y docentes a una nueva forma de aprender. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende describir el espacio desértico del norte de Chile en el que seconstruye el poblado minero del cerro de Carnalavaca, localidad ficticia que emulael cerro de Chuquicamata, mediante las herramientas teóricas desarrolladas por laacadémica mexicana Luz Aurora Pimentel en el primer capítulo de su libro El relatoen perspectiva, estudio de teoría narrativa y así ofrecer una propuesta de análisis parafuturos estudios respecto al espacio narrativo.

El libro de Osvaldo Torres Gutiérrez, es un trabajo descriptivo, bien documentado y fundamentado en el uso de fuentes y bibliografía general y específica sobre el tema en cuestión, siendo uno de los aspectos más importantes las entrevistas realizadas a dirigentes de las dos organizaciones político revolucionarias que son el centro de su análisis.En las primeras líneas, el autor deja establecida la pregunta sobre la cual girará su trabajo, “por qué dos organizaciones de la izquierda revolucion..

Is it justified to hold that an agent S has a (moral) right to P if the duty-bearer is not specified? There is an intense ongoing debate on this question. There are two positions in the literature. On the one hand, O´Neill´s much-discussed account of rights holds that it is justified to say that an agent S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined – i.e. if and only if it is clear against (...) whom S may claim her right to P (O’Neill 1986, 1988, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2016). Call this, the ‘claimability condition’. On the other hand, interest-based theorists argue that it can be justified to say that an agent S has a right to P even if the duty-bearer is not sufficiently determined (Caney 2007; Griffin, 2008; Raz 1988; Tasioulas 2007; see also: Etinson, 2013; Ypi 2010). Who (if anyone) is correct in this fundamental discussion about the very nature of rights? In this paper, I provide an answer to this crucial question. Neither O´Neill nor interest-based theorists provide good reasons to justify their positions. However, I argue, the claimability condition is an existence condition of rights justified on the basis of their action-guiding character. The reason is that if the duty-bearer is not specified, the content of the right (its correlative obligation) does not sufficiently guide what the agent should do because it is indeterminate who is required to act (or refrain from acting). (shrink)

The debate about how neurotechnologies impact authenticity has focused on two inter-related dimensions: self-discovery and self-creation. In this paper, we develop a broader framework that includes the experimental and relational dimensions of authenticity, both understood as decisive for shaping one’s narrative identity. In our view, neurointerventions that alter someone’s personality traits will also impact her very own self-understanding across time. We argue that experimental authenticity only needs a minimum conception of narrative coherence of the self and that reversibility should remain (...) a key feature in the ethical assessment of neurotechnologies. The relational dimension of authenticity derives from the fact that a process of self-constitution is never a solitary business. The significant others act not just as subsequent judges of one’s life decisions, but as real co-authors of one’s self. We discuss relevant cases in which others are actively contributing to the meaning-making process, as to the direction one’s life is taking. We also claim that the experimental and the relational dimensions of authenticity should aim to correct each other. The relational dimension introduces socially approved standards as well as limitations to the array of available possibilities of self-fashioning or human enhancement. The experimental side enables us to avoid confusing one’s personal identity with a social and narrative construct that only bears the mark of social pressure and conformism. (shrink)

In this paper, we raise two points. First, any rights‐based theory should provide a method by which to guide reasoning in addressing conflicts of rights. The reason, we argue, is that these theories must provide guidance on what should be done. Second, this method must contain two key recommendations: (1) We should try to find a deliberative mechanism through which none of the rights is simply eliminated from the scene; (2) these rights may be balanced against each other to define (...) which right should prevail, but without considering non‐rights‐interests as if they were rights in the process. These recommendations instantiate two crucial principles that underlie our common intuitions on rights, namely, the principle that rights deserve equal respect and the principle that rights should be taken seriously. (shrink)

The forfeiture thesis is posed as an independent thesis in moral philosophy according to which agents forfeit (or lose) rights if they perform certain act-types. According to many, this thesis plays a crucial role in the justification of (legal) punishment. In this paper, I argue that the forfeiture thesis is unnecessary – we can simply dismiss it without any substantive loss. Echoing an aspect of the specificationist approach to rights, the reason is that we may replace the forfeiture thesis with (...) an exception clause in the very content of the right not to be subjected to hard treatment: P has no right not to be subjected to hard treatment simpliciter, but a right not to be subjected to hard treatment unless P performs an act-type φ – e.g., murdering an innocent person. This alternative has substantive advantages over the forfeiture thesis, which, in turn, shows that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. (shrink)

The much-discussed “claimability objection” holds that it is unjustified to believe that all individuals have a human right to subsistence because the bearers of the correlative duties are not sufficiently determined. This argument is based on the so-called “claimability-condition”: S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined. Practice-based theorists defend the human right to subsistence by arguing that if we take the existing human rights practice seriously, there is no indeterminacy about the allocation (...) of duties. In this paper, I challenge this (apparently compelling) defense of the human right to subsistence with a dilemma. If the claimability condition is true, the practice-based defense fails to undermine the claimability objection because the duty-bearer is determined in some, but not all, cases. If practice-based theorists reject the claimability condition, they generate an account of human rights that is problematic from the practical perspective because it may contain duties that are unable to guide action. (shrink)

Se propone una lectura fenomenológica en torno al concepto bergsoniano de durée. Para esto, se revisa el registro y recepción de Bergson en la tradición fenomenológica. Al advertir la cercanía entre Bergson y la fenomenología, es analizable la durée fenomenológicamente. Es decir, la duración entendida como constitución de conciencia, de los objetos reales del mundo y de la relación entre la conciencia que aprehende y la experiencia aprehendida. Con ello, destaca el método de la intuición o simpatía intelectual en clave (...) de método de división, a la vez, la posibilidad de conocimiento objetivo y esencial respecto de la realidad. (shrink)

The organizational account of biological functions interprets functions as contributions of a trait to the maintenance of the organization that, in turn, maintains the trait. As has been recently argued, however, the account seems unable to provide a unified grounding for both intra- and cross-generation functions, since the latter do not contribute to the maintenance of the same organization which produces them. To face this ‘ontological problem’, a splitting account has been proposed, according to which the two kinds of functions (...) require distinct organizational definitions. In this article, we propose a solution for the ontological problem, by arguing that intra- and cross-generation functions can be said to contribute in the same way to the maintenance of the biological organization, characterized in terms of organizational self-maintenance. As a consequence, we suggest maintaining a unified organizational account of biological functions. (shrink)

El presente texto tiene como propósito analizar teórico-conceptualmente las prácticas pedagógicas de la ética implementadas por los docentes en la universidad tradicional y la universidad popular en los años 2010 – 2020. Teniendo en cuenta, primero, las características inherentes de la universidad tradicional tanto en sus orígenes y principios fundamentales; segundo, las practicas pedagógicas de la ética en el rol docente; y tercero, el advenimiento, desarrollo y propuesta de la Universidad popular. Mediante este análisis fue posible develar los paralelismos entre (...) sus divergencias y puntos de encuentro con base en la ética-práctica del rol docente, para el mejoramiento continuo tanto de esta área del conocimiento como de los demás saberes en general. (shrink)

Entre 1843 y 1844, uno de los conceptos centrales del pensamiento de Karl Marx es el de ser genérico. Es indudable en este concepto la herencia terminológica feuerbachiana, cuya principal referencia es el concepto de género. Sin embargo, este trabajo muestra que en su funcionamiento el ser genérico, lejos prolongar el concepto feuerbachiano, implica su refutación. Esto permite comprenderlo en una problemática más amplia de la obra de Marx: el proceso histórico de sustitución de las interrelaciones fundantes de los cuerpos (...) por su forma representada. (shrink)

This paper argues for a revised concept of authenticity entailing two demands that must be balanced. The first demand moves authenticity from the position of a strictly self-regarding virtue towards the position of a fully social virtue, acknowledging the crucial feature of steadiness, i.e. self-consistency, as being precisely what we ‘naturally’ lack. Nevertheless, the value of personal authenticity in a modern, open society comes from the fact that it brings about not only steadiness, but also the public development of a (...) variety of existential options that can be understood as Millian ‘original experiments in living’. Thus the second demand of authenticity is a demand for ‘experimental’ authenticity which covers the whole spectrum of technologies of the self, from Nietzschean ‘brief habits’, to the use of enhancement technologies. (shrink)

En este artículo defendemos la existencia de un perspectivismo ontológico pluralista inherente a la filosofía de Baruch Spinoza. Indispensable para la constitución de esta noción es la relación establecida entre su teoría general de composición de los cuerpos y los conceptos de “afecto”, “inmanencia”, “potencia” y “multitud”. El objetivo de este análisis es una fundamentación interior del concepto de “puntos de vista”: es imposible pensarlo como una característica epistemológica de un individuo aislado, pero tampoco es posible unificarlo mediante el postulado (...) de una propiedad común. En consecuencia, el perspectivismo ontológico espinosista implica una teoría del punto de vista pluralista que elude los problemas planteados por la clausura del modelo Uno-Todo. (shrink)

Nos proponemos como objetivo general de investigación exponer los fundamentos teóricos y prácticos para el desarrollo de una filosofía de la patuidad en Étienne Souriau. Para esto, recorreremos tres objetivos específicos: i) examinaremos los lineamientos generales del proyecto de una estética comparada en la filosofía del francés a partir de una perspectiva genética respecto del fenómeno artístico, ii) con esto, evaluaremos el alcance ontológico del proyecto de una estética comparada, recurriendo a los conceptos de “instauración” y “patuidad”, iii) finalmente, y (...) como síntesis de lo anterior, propondremos un análisis respecto de lo que Souriau llamará existencia virtual, comprendiéndola como motor del proceso instaurativo de lo real. (shrink)

Cet article aborde la question de la confrontation à l’éventualité de la mort chez l’enfant en situation de maladie grave. Prenant comme exemple paradigmatique la clinique de l’onco-hématologie pédiatrique, ce travail explore les retentissements psychiques de cette question à partir d’une approche principalement psychanalytique, en dialogue avec des savoirs issus de la sociologie et de la médecine. La méthodologie propose une articulation entre littératures théorique et clinique sur cette problématique. L’article met en lumière les effets du risque de mort à (...) travers l’étude des logiques médicales de traitement, des figurations de la mort et de leurs retentissements dans la pensée et les affects de l’enfant malade, et enfin des sentiments de guérison chez les enfants et adolescents guéris. Ce travail souligne l’importance pour l’enfant d’établir un dialogue avec un autre sur ce qu’il vit, ainsi que de pouvoir inscrire sa vie et sa présence au monde dans une histoire familiale élargie et contenante. (shrink)

Resumen: El siguiente artículo parte reconociendo el carácter protector de la téchne y sus momentos constitutivos. De acuerdo a esta determinación es posible advertir el límite de la téchne a partir de la cuestión socrática de la virtud. La virtud, en la medida que no es un asunto análogo a los objetos de la téchne, precisa de un especial acceso. Desde la constatación del diálogo como el único modo de conocer la virtud, se pone de relieve su sentido comunitario y (...) el carácter del examen socrático. En el diálogo socrático se anuncia, así, que la virtud no es nunca algo técnicamente clausurado ni epistémicamente conceptualizado, sino el mayor bien humano que se cumple en su aproximación a través del examen conjunto de la propia vida.: This article starts by recognizing the protective nature of téchne and its development. It is thereby possible to understand the limits of téchne based on the Socratic question of virtue. Virtue, insofar as it is not a matter analogous to the objects of téchne, requires a special access. The communitarian sense and the character of the Socratic inquiry are made plain, given dialogue as the only way of knowing virtue. Socratic dialogue discloses that virtue is never technically closed or epistemically conceptualized, but that this greatest human good is fulfilled through the joint examination of life itself. (shrink)

Aunque el contenido del Eutifrón se revela en saber qué es la piedad, este diálogo, pese a una inevitable apariencia, no tiene como fin último proporcionar una definición proposicional de este fenómeno. La piedad se pone al descubierto a partir de la dialéctica de Sócrates, cuya insistencia en volver al principio del problema no proviene de una incapacidad del interlocutor de definir el asunto, sino de la debilidad misma del discurso. La necesidad de plantear otra vez desde el principio la (...) cuestión suscita en el intérprete advertir la importancia de la ejecución misma del diálogo como testimonio y acreditación de su propio contenido. De acuerdo a esta ejecución se podrá comprender en qué medida el sentido de la piedad se encuentra en relación al carácter principiante de Sócrates. (shrink)

De ce a fost fondată Uniunea Europeană? Un prim răspuns ar fi dorinţa de pace după un război devastator şi umilitor. Un al doilea răspuns ar fi realizarea importanţei unităţii. O unitate care se va caracteriza printr-o diversitate a culturilor şi a limbilor. Statele europene nu au dorit să renunţe la suveranitatea lor, au vrut să devină un corp comun pentru a nu a mai putea fi călcate în picioare de iureşul istoriei. Ca orice unitate, UE avea nevoie de un (...) cadru de reglementare oferit de instituţii şi politici europene. De asemenea, pentru a armoniza ceva trebuie să poţi pune împreună anumite elemente separate. Armonizarea Uniunii a fost realizată prin fondarea instituţiilor şi a reglementărilor acestora (structura instituţională a UE este prezentată în Anexa nr. 1). Instituţionalizarea Uniunii Europene este cheia de boltă a construcţiei istorice europene. Început în anul 1957, acest proces a lăsat urme adânci în conştiinţa politică europeană. Dacă la început a fost privită cu reticenţă, acum Uniunea nu poate exista fără instituţii. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine the problematic frontier that separates the phenomenology of the body and the phenomenology of animality. The main difficulty is to differentiate phenomenologically not only between embodiment and animality, but also between specifically human embodied experience and what is accessible to us through empathy in relation to the corporeality of the animal. I will tackle these questions by considering relevant textual material from the writings of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. On the one (...) hand, I will show that although embodiment and animality are convergent on the level of the naturalistic attitude in Husserl’s Ideas II, they are divergent as soon as we place ourselves in the personalistic attitude, where the body enters into a different conjunction—namely, with the idea of person and of the spiritual world. On the other hand, Heidegger claims that, in spite of the abysmal bodily kinship with the animal, there is an essential difference between the human body and the animal organism, thus opposing the tendencies to humanize the animal and to animalize the human. (shrink)

Barnes (2014) has argued in this journal for the following conditional: If there is any metaphysical indeterminacy, this must be at the most fundamental level of reality. To argue for this claim, Barnes relies on two principles that I shall call bivalent completeness and determinate link. According to the former, a complete description is a bivalent assignment of truth values to every sentence. The determinate link, instead, establishes that the determination relation between levels of reality preserves determinacy from one level (...) to another. In response to Barnes’ conclusion, Eva (2018) has recently pointed out that bivalent completeness is question begging. In this paper, I will first show why Eva's line of reasoning can be resisted. My aim will then be to present a stronger case against Barnes’ argument by challenging the determinate link. In the presence of metaphysical indeterminacy, the link between fundamental and derivative facts might itself be the locus of indeterminacy. I will conclude by showing that Barnes and Eva make many unwarranted assumptions regarding both indeterminacy and fundamentality. The logical space around the connection between these two notions appears to be much wider than what they seem to be aware of, or so I will argue. (shrink)

What are the main conditions that any theory of human rights should satisfy to guide action? If agents must take action for a fairer world as human rights discourse suggests, this is a crucial question to reflect upon. In this paper, I make a proposal. I argue that any theory of (moral) human rights that guides action on the basis of correlative duties must satisfy three key conditions. The first condition is focused on the specification of act-types, the second concerns (...) the distribution of correlative duties, and the third is focused on the resolution of (resolvable) conflicts of human rights. I show that this proposal has substantive implications because it implies to reject, challenge and, in some cases, resist ideas that are commonly accepted in the literature on human rights. (shrink)

Kitcher has proposed an ideal-theory account—well-ordered science (WOS)— of the collective good that science’s research agenda should promote. Against criticism regarding WOS’s action-guidance, Kitcher has advised critics not to confuse substantive ideals and the ways to arrive at them, and he has defended WOS as a necessary and useful ideal for science policy. I provide a distinction between two types of ideal-theories that helps clarifying WOS’s elusive nature. I use this distinction to argue that the action-guidance problem that WOS faces (...) remains even under the aims/means distinction, because the WOS’s failure is more basic than critics have suggested. (shrink)

The paper presents some knowledge of history of medicine – especially those from the embryological field – correlated with theological marks in order to motivate the rightfulness of the method of „bringing the mind down into the heart”, a procedure during the Jesus Prayer. The ascetic Fathers mentioned that the mind is an energy which starts from the heart and reaches the brain – which offers the possibility to express itself. It is possible to consider that this transfer begins since (...) the primitive heart is in the same plane and before the cerebral area. Then, after the folding of the embryo, the heart will be placed under the brain. So “bringing the mind down into the heart” is also biologically feasible. Although the primitive heart is structured after the neural tube, it starts beating at 21 to 22 days, unlike the brain which began its function on the 40th day. This explains the theological meaning of the heart, wider than the signification of the mind (attribute of the brain). (shrink)

We reply to Artiga and Martinez’s claim according to which the organizational account of cross-generation functions implies a backward looking interpretation of etiology, just as standard etiological theories of function do. We argue that Artiga and Martinez’s claim stems from a fundamental misunderstanding about the notion of “closure”, on which the organizational account relies. In particular, they incorrectly assume that the system, which is relevant for ascribing cross-generation organizational function, is the lineage. In contrast, we recall that organizational closure refers (...) to a relational description of a network of mutual dependencies, abstracted from time, in which production relations are irrelevant. From an organizational perspective, ascribing a function to an entity means locating it in the abstract system that realizes closure. In particular, the position of each entity within the relational system conveys an etiological explanation of its existence, because of its dependence on the effects exerted by other entities subject to closure. Because of the abstract relational nature of closure, we maintain that the organizational account of functions does not endorse a backward looking interpretation of etiology. As a consequence, it does not fall prey of epiphenomenalism. (shrink)

In this article I discuss the conditions under which sovereign debts are not morally binding for a state. Following an old legal doctrine, I call non-binding debts ‘odious'. I proceed as follows. First, I argue that alternative accounts on the morality of debts are unsatisfactory. The problem these accounts have are that they do not clearly identify the philosophical issues that underlie the notion of odious debts, or that they fail to specify what exactly the immorality of odious debts consists (...) in. Second, I defend the view that a debt is odious when two conditions are satisfied: borrowed funds were used by public officials for purposes for which they were not authorised lenders knew, or should have known, about possible unauthorised uses of those funds. If these two conditions are both satisfied, debts should not be considered debts of the state, but rather personal debts of rulers. Third, I discuss the feasibility of my approach by exploring how it would work in the current world. Finally, I d.. (shrink)

In this paper a tentative explanation of the competence of argumentation from an evolutionary point of view is offered. Because in contemporary argumentation theory and the informal logic approach the evolutionary perspective has been neglected, this paper gives an initial overview on the matter with the hope that core aspects of the argumentative faculty—such as argumentative normativity, the function of arguments, or fallacious moves, among others—can be seen differently afterwards. In order to specify the proposal, the main concepts considered are (...) the notion of collective intentionality, cooperation, reputation, niche construction and, of course, basic evolutionary terms. (shrink)

In the philosophical debate on aging, it is common to raise the question of the theoretical definition of aging in terms of its possible characterization as a disease. Understanding aging as a disease seems to imply its medicalization, which has important practical consequences. In this paper, we analyze the question of whether aging is a disease by appealing to the concept of disease in the philosophy of medicine. As a result of this analysis, we argue that a pragmatist approach to (...) the conception of disease is the best alternative to highlight the relevance of the medicalization of aging. From this pragmatist perspective, it can be seen that the notion of aging is going through a conceptual change, and aging can today be understood as a not radically different process from any other condition that is usually considered a disease. (shrink)

Explanations of the genuine openness of the future often appeal to objective indeterminacy. According to the received view, such indeterminacy is indeterminacy of certain future-tensed state of affairs that presently obtain. We shall call this view the weak indeterminate present, to distinguish it from the view we will defend in this paper, which we dub the strong indeterminate present. According to our view, unsettledness of the future is grounded on the present indeterminacy of some present-tensed state of affairs. In order (...) for an indeterminate present-tensed state of affairs to explain the unsettledness of a future-tensed state of affairs, there has to be a connection between the two. We argue that this connection can only be provided if we look at the internal structure of the relevant state of affairs. Finally, we will suggest that the best background theory to explain the connection are the so-called spontaneous collapse models of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that specificationism deprives rights of any significant role in practical reasoning before it arrives at a conclusion, while the generalist conception preserves the practical role we intuitively assign to rights in reasoning directed to action. Assuming that a conception of rights faithful to ordinary practical reasoning is preferable, this fact gives a strong reason to prefer generalism over specificationism, although not without qualification. To be satisfactory from the practical standpoint, any account of rights that adopts (...) the generalist view must include second-order principles to orientate agents with regards to addressing rights conflicts. I show that my practical analysis is substantially different from others available in the literature. (shrink)

Este trabajo se centra en el concepto de humanismo de la libertad de Carlos Astrada, entendido como eje principal de articulación de los pensamientos de Marx y Heidegger. Esa articulación es presentada en principio a partir de la copertenencia de ambos filósofos al campo de las filosofías de la praxis. Sin embargo, si prestamos mayor atención al modo concreto en que Astrada comprende y expone lo más propio de cada uno de esos pensamientos, notaremos que esa confluencia no remite simple (...) ni fundamentalmente a la filosofía de la praxis, sino a una tarea aún pendiente en la que se anudan la historia de la filosofía y la filosofía de la historia: la salida definitiva del sistema cerrado del idealismo y de la filosofía de Hegel. (shrink)

In contrast to the “normativist” view, “naturalist” theorists claim that the concept of health refers to natural or normal states and propose different characterizations of healthy and diseased conditions that are meant to be objectivist and biologically grounded. In this article, we examine the core concept of these naturalist accounts of disease, i.e., the concept of biological malfunction, and develop a new formulation of the notion of malfunction following the recent organizational approach to functions in the philosophy of biology. We (...) focus on the notions of adaptive regulation and functional presupposition to develop a new conceptual framework that justifies the ascription of malfunctional behaviors to biological systems according to the embodied normativity of biological organizations. (shrink)

Climate change, pollution, and deforestation have a negative impact on global mental health. There is an environmental justice dimension to this challenge as wealthy people and high-income countries are major contributors to climate change and pollution, while poor people and low-income countries are heavily affected by the consequences. Using state-of-the art data mining, we analyzed and visualized the global research landscape on mental health, climate change, pollution and deforestation over a 15-year period. Metadata of papers were exported from PubMed®, and (...) both relevance and relatedness of terms in different time frames were computed using VOSviewer. Co-occurrence graphs were used to visualize results. The development of exemplary terms over time was plotted separately. The number of research papers on mental health and environmental challenges is growing in a linear fashion. Major topics are climate change, chemical pollution, including psychiatric medication in wastewater, and neurobiological effects. Research on specific psychiatric syndromes and diseases, particularly on their ethical and social aspects is less prominent. There is a growing body of research literature on links between mental health, climate change, pollution, and deforestation. This research provides a graphic overview to mental healthcare professionals and political stakeholders. Social and ethical aspects of the climate change-mental health link have been neglected, and more research is needed. (shrink)

Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy, which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world (...) at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es analizar la noción de subjetivación, clave en el último Foucault, a la luz de la metáfora barroca del _pliegue_. Según Deleuze, hay dos fuentes distintas, la memoria del Ser de Heidegger y la monadología de Leibniz, que se reúnen en cierto sentido en esta noción foucaultiana. A este respecto, pretendo destacar la importancia del concepto de subjetivación en el contexto de un giro performativo en la filosofía contemporánea, así como diversas formas históricas de entender (...) este concepto. Un aspecto técnico, pero crucial, que hay que subrayar es la compleja interacción y la mutua co-dependencia entre la subjetivación activa y la sujeción (_assujettissement_). La comprensión del «modo de la sujeción» en Foucault como uno de los «cuatro pliegues de la subjetivación» proporciona un argumento convincente para el pluralismo ético. Por último, esta perspectiva brinda una importante clave para revisar la interpretación de Deleuze de Foucault. Pues es la memoria violenta de Nietzsche, y no la memoria heideggeriana del Ser, la que se revela como decisiva en el proceso de subjetivación, y también como una vía de conversión necesaria de la libertad «negativa» en libertad positiva en el sentido de la autonomía y autodisciplina, en concordancia con el proyecto nietzscheano de hacer que el «ascetismo vuelva a ser natural». (shrink)

In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘tall’, and ‘heap’ are said to be. I then argue that (...) the moral non-naturalist seeking to countenance moral vagueness faces a dilemma: are moral properties vague, or perfectly sharp? On either horn of the dilemma, serious problems arise for some of the central tenets of non-naturalism: vague properties seem to threaten Objectivism, Supervenience, and Non-reductivism; on the other hand, sharp properties raise problems for Supervenience and Rationalism. The difficulties on each horn of the dilemma are real, and while they may not be insuperable, they do, at the very least, drastically limit the things non-naturalists can consistently say about moral properties, facts, and reasons. (shrink)

In the last decade, the migrant population in Chile has substantially increased, where the rates have not only increased in the adult population, but also among children and adolescents, creating a potential for social and cultural development in the educational system. The present work analyzes the relationship between self-concept, self-efficacy, and subjective well-being in native and migrant adolescents in Santiago de Chile. The sample consisted of 406 students, 56.65% women, with an age range that fluctuated between 12 and 16 years, (...) with an average of 13.36 years. Student’s t-tests were used to compare the average of the constructs evaluated between natives/migrants and boys/girls participants. Subsequently, two multivariate models of simple mediation were constructed, one for natives and another for migrants, which assumed subjective well-being as a dependent variable, academic self-concept as an independent variable and the general self-efficacy as a mediating variable. In both models, gender was considered as a control variable. Results show that migrant students present higher levels of academic self-concept and general self-efficacy than native students. There are no differences with regard to well-being. In the case of gender, differences are observed only for the case of general self-efficacy, where boys present higher levels. On the other hand, a partial mediation is observed for the model of native students and a total mediation for the model of migrant students. The study yielded interesting results regarding the differences in the evaluation of the constructs of self-concept, self-efficacy, and subjective well-being in both groups. Such data can be used as inputs for the development of public policies for adolescents. (shrink)

Wodak (2019) persuasively argues that we are not justified in believing that well-being measurements are linear. From this, he infers grave consequences for both political philosophy thought experiments and empirical psychological research. Here I argue that these consequences do not follow. Wodak’s challenges to the status of well-being measurements do not affect thought experiments, and well-being empirical researchers may be justified in making average comparisons even if their measurements are not linear.