Résumé Si elle disposait du dispositif théorique adéquat, la théologie protestante saurait que faire des rites que les Églises protestantes célèbrent! Fort de cette conviction, l’auteur propose de comprendre le rite comme une technique d’influence. Reprenant les travaux de Catherine Bell, il invite à rechercher les stratégies de ritualisation mises en place pour chaque rite afin de découvrir le type de relation à Dieu que chaque Église y suggère. À titre d’exemple, l’auteur applique cette méthode à la célébration de (...) la cène dans l’Église évangélique de Polynésie française.If Protestant theology had the theoretical tools to reflect upon ritual activities, it would know how to theologically analyze the rites performed in Protestant churches. Based on this conviction, the author sets up an understanding of ritual as a technique that influences cultural and religious representations. Inspired by Catherine Bell’s work, the author proposes to uncover the strategies of ritualization established for each rite in order to reveal what type of relationship to God each congregation develops. As an example, the author applies this methodology to the celebration of the Eucharist in the Evangelical Church of French Polynesia. (shrink)

D'où vient cette réalité historique particulière qu'est la morale protestante? C'est pour répondre à cette question que les deux premières parties de ce livre sont consacrées à une présentation des sources de l'éthique protestante, celles de la Réforme du 16e siècle (Luther et Calvin), et celles du puritanisme anglais. On découvrira à ce propos le lien étroit du protestantisme et de la modernité, pour le meilleur (démocratie) et pour le pire (utilistarisme). Dès lors, la question de l'avenir d'un tel lien (...) se pose et deux enjeux prioritaires sont ici mis en évidence : comment, dans une société sécularisée, faire valoir l'importance et la valeur d'une morale de conviction théologique? Comment, face à des phénomènes de retour régressif d'une religiosité irrationnelle, maintenir l'exigence d'une relation positive entre foi et raison, sagesse éthique et intelligences? Comment rester à la fois solidaire et critique de notre culture? Enfin l'auteur propose trois engagements spécifiques par quoi le protestantisme pourra prendre utilement sa part au débat contemporain sur la morale nécessaire à notre société actuelle. (shrink)

La pensee de Jean-Jacques Rousseau continue d'appeler les lectures critiques les plus diverses et de susciter des interpretations parfois contradictoires. Jean-Jacques Rousseau d fendit passionn ment les valeurs de la communaut d mocratique.Citoyen de la petite r publique de Gen ve il recueillit avec ferveur l'enseignement des Hommes illustres de Plutarque et les le ons de l'Antiquit r publicaine. Mais Jean-Jacques est aussi le philosophe du XVIIIe si cle qui fit reconna tre avec le plus d' clat son irr ductible (...) singularit. Quand il engagea sa grande entreprise autobiographique, il souligna surtout sa diff rence. Et dans cette qu te personnelle, toute particuli re, Jean-Jacques trouvait l'appui d'une conviction chr tienne protestante. Rousseau recueillait ainsi sa mani re la double tradition de la Reforme et de l'Antiquit r publicaine. Mais alors que ces deux dimensions coexistaient dans la r publique calviniste de Gen ve, Rousseau fut conduit les dissocier, dans un 'triste et grand syst me' qui opposait avec une douloureuse obstination les valeurs de l'Homme et celles du Citoyen. L'enqu te conduite en ce livre explore les profondeurs de ce paradoxe qui fait la grandeur de Rousseau. (shrink)

A short paper presented before the Fellows of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions during the academic year 1969-70, with an Introductory Note written nearly 50 years later. The paper describes the author's enduring personal philosophical precept; it is also an implicit encomium to individuals whose psychology establishes a dependable bridge between their rational convictions and their conduct.

Thanks to Michel Foucault, Jeremy Bentham's panopticon has become the iconic modern prison. But Foucault and most of his readers neglect the fact that a significant proportion of Bentham's panoptical writings were concerned with critically contrasting his ideal prison with the reality of penal transportation to New South Wales. Among his many criticisms, Bentham focussed particular attention on the problem of convict reform, arguing that surveillance was necessary to ensure genuine reformation, and that such surveillance was impossible in the open (...) prison of New South Wales. This connection between reformation and surveillance was a pervasive feature of Bentham's thought, reflected in his ideas for a centralised information state as well as his wider corpus on criminal justice. In this paper, I historicise Bentham's theory of reformative surveillance, and argue that Bentham, writing from London, misunderstood the importance of surveillance to the penal colony. At least in theory, convicts in New South Wales were subject to extensive systems of surveillance, and the failure of these systems in practice point to the limitations of Bentham's own, largely hypothetical, plans. (shrink)

What role should a citizen's religious convictions play in her political activities? Is she, for example, permitted to decide on the basis of her religious convictions to support laws that criminalize abortion or discourage homosexual relations? Christopher Eberle is deeply at odds with the dominant orthodoxy among political theorists about the relation of religion and politics. His argument is that a citizen may responsibly ground her political commitments on religious beliefs, even if her only reasons for her political (...) commitments are religious in nature. His ideal of citizenship allows citizens to engage in politics without privatizing their religious commitments, and yet does not license mindless and intransigent sectarianism. An inherently controversial book that offers a substantial challenge to political liberalism, it will be read by students and professionals in philosophy, political science, law and religious studies, and general readers seeking insight into the relationship between religious commitments and liberal politics. (shrink)

Oxford Legal Philosophy publishes the best new work in philosophically-oriented legal theory. It commissions and solicits monographs in all branches of the subject, including works on philosophical issues in all areas of public and private law, and in the national, transnational, and international realms; studies of the nature of law, legal institutions, and legal reasoning; treatments of problems in political morality as they bear on law; and explorations in the nature and development of legal philosophy itself. The series represents diverse (...) traditions of thought but always with an emphasis on rigour and originality. It sets the standard in contemporary jurisprudence.This book shows that civil disobedience is generally more defensible than private conscientious objection.Part I explores the morality of conviction and conscience. Each of these concepts informs a distinct argument for civil disobedience. The conviction argument begins with the communicative principle of conscientiousness. According to the CPC, having a conscientious moral conviction means not just acting consistently with our beliefs and judging ourselves and others by a common moral standard. It also means not seeking to evade the consequences of our beliefs and being willing to communicate them to others. The conviction argument shows that, as a constrained, communicative practice, civil disobedience has a better claim than private objection does to the protections that liberal societies give to conscientious dissent. This view reverses the standard liberal picture which sees private 'conscientious' objection as a modest act of personal belief and civil disobedience as a strategic, undemocratic act whose costs are only sometimes worth bearing.The conscience argument is narrower and shows that genuinely morally responsive civil disobedience honours the best of our moral responsibilities and is protected by a duty-based moral right of conscience.Part II translates the conviction argument and conscience argument into two legal defences. The first is a demands-of-conviction defence. The second is a necessity defence. Both of these defences apply more readily to civil disobedience than to private disobedience. Part II also examines lawful punishment, showing that, even when punishment is justifiable, civil disobedients have a moral right not to be punished. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the difficult task of balancing access to misinformation with respect for patient decision-making. Due to its innate antagonism, the paradigm of “physician paternalism” versus “patient autonomy” may not adequately capture the clinical relationship. The authors hypothesized that most patients would, in fact, prefer significant physician input as opposed to unopinionated information when making medical decisions. There is a lack of empirical data corroborating this in the United States. To that end, a survey was distributed to (...) 650 individuals through Amazon Mechanical Turk, of which 499 responses met pre-determined quality criteria. Most respondents believed their doctor's insight would be better than their own if injured or gravely ill. When asked to affirm preferences separately, a significantly higher proportion of respondents preferred guidance from their doctor when making medical decisions compared to being presented with unopinionated information ( p < 0.001). Encouragingly, 93.1% believed that the doctor's primary goal was their health. When asked directly to compare physician guidance to unopinionated information, 69.1% respondents stated they would prefer physician guidance. We found a consistent association between educational/economic background and affirmative responses ( p < 0.001), suggesting particular attention should be paid to patients that are disadvantaged with respect to these demographic factors. The belief in a shared goal, and a consistent preference for physician input, suggests that patients endorse a more collaborative view of the clinical dynamic than is suggested by the paternalism-autonomy paradigm. This pilot study suggests physicians should not be afraid to communicate conviction with regard to treatment decisions. (shrink)

Society typically shows conscientious objectors more deference than civil disobedients, on the grounds that they appear more conscientious and less strategically minded than the latter. Kimberley Brownlee challenges this standard picture in Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience, where she claims that civil disobedience is more conscientious than conscientious objection, in virtue of its communicativeness. Brownlee conceives of conscientious conviction as necessarily communicative, and distinguishes it from ‘conscience’—the set of practical moral skills involved in adequately responding to complex (...) situations. This review article argues that Brownlee’s account of conviction is too narrow, as it excludes many core beliefs which we would want to classify as convictions although they violate one or more of the criteria of communicativeness, while her account of conscience is incomplete, because it ignores some of the persistent obstacles for the development of conscience produced by structural injustice. The article identifies these obstacles and offers some strategies for protecting against them, namely, vigilance, self-scrutiny, empathy and collaborative ambivalence. (shrink)

« Le propre de l’hérétique, c’est-à-dire, de celui qui a une opinion particulière, est de s’attacher à ses propres pensées ; et le propre du catholique, c’est-à-dire de l’universel, est de préférer à ses sentiments le sentiment commun de l’Église : c’est la grâce qu’on demandera pour les errants. »« la conscience erronée doit procurer à l’erreur..

« Le propre de l’hérétique, c’est-à-dire, de celui qui a une opinion particulière, est de s’attacher à ses propres pensées ; et le propre du catholique, c’est-à-dire de l’universel, est de préférer à ses sentiments le sentiment commun de l’Église : c’est la grâce qu’on demandera pour les errants. »« la conscience erronée doit procurer à l’erreur...

Conviction Narrative Theory (CNT) is a theory of choice underradical uncertainty– situations where outcomes cannot be enumerated and probabilities cannot be assigned. Whereas most theories of choice assume that people rely on (potentially biased) probabilistic judgments, such theories cannot account for adaptive decision-making when probabilities cannot be assigned. CNT proposes that people usenarratives– structured representations of causal, temporal, analogical, and valence relationships – rather than probabilities, as the currency of thought that unifies our sense-making and decision-making faculties. According to CNT, (...) narratives arise from the interplay between individual cognition and the social environment, with reasoners adopting a narrative that feels “right” to explain the available data; using that narrative to imagine plausible futures; and affectively evaluating those imagined futures to make a choice. Evidence from many areas of the cognitive, behavioral, and social sciences supports this basic model, including lab experiments, interview studies, and econometric analyses. We identify 12 propositions to explain how the mental representations (narratives) interact with four inter-related processes (explanation, simulation, affective evaluation, and communication), examining the theoretical and empirical basis for each. We conclude by discussing how CNT can provide a common vocabulary for researchers studying everyday choices across areas of the decision sciences. (shrink)

How far may Americans properly rely on their religious beliefs when they make and defend political decisions? For example, are ordinary citizens or legislators doing something wrong when they consciously allow their decisions respecting abortion laws to be determined by their religious views? Despite its intense contemporary relevance, the full dimensions of this issue have until now not been thoroughly examined. Religious Convictions and Political Choice represents the first attempt to fill this gap. Beginning with an account of the (...) basic premises of our liberal democracy, Greenawalt moves to a comparison between rational secular grounds of decision and grounds based on religious convictions. He discusses particular issues such as animal rights and abortion, showing how religious convictions can bear on an individual's decisions about them, and inquires whether reliance on such convictions is compatible with liberal democratic premises. In conclusion, he argues that citizens cannot be expected to rely exclusively on rational, secular grounds. (shrink)

In his overview of recent work on intellectual humility, Nathan Ballantyne (2021) highlights some of the potential ‘dark sides’ of intellectual humility (IH) and calls for a critical study of the ‘value-theory’ of IH. In this article, we sketch out three ways that IH may threaten political conviction. We end our response by arguing that some forms of IH include different kinds of quietism about political convictions, which do not necessarily equate with a lack of conviction.

Conviction Narrative Theory (CNT) is a convincing descriptive theory, and Johnson et al.'s formal model is a welcome contribution to building more precise, testable hypotheses. However, some extensions to the proposed model would make it better defined and more powerful. The suggested extensions enable the model to go beyond CNT, predicting choice outcomes and explaining affective phenomena.

Epistemic injustice occurs when we fail to appropriately respect others as epistemic agents. Philosophers building on the work of Miranda Fricker, who introduced the concept, have focused on epistemic injustices involving certain social categories, particularly race and gender. Can there be epistemic injustice attached to political conviction and affiliation? I argue yes: politics can be a salient social category that draws epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustices might also be intersectional, based on the overlap of politics and some other identity category like (...) race or sex. Further, and more provocatively, I argue that political minorities in academia, in particular conservatives and libertarians, are most likely the victims of epistemic injustice on the basis of their politics. Such epistemic injustices might even be routine. Although more limited in scope and severity than other forms of epistemic injustice, political epistemic injustices in academia ought to be of special concern from a standpoint of social justice because of the academy’s central role in knowledge production and dissemination. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine critically Kimberley Brownlee’s descriptive criteria for identifying when a person has a conscientious moral conviction. Then, I contrast her conception of conscience with other ideas of conscience, including a religious conception, a relativist conception, and those of Butler and Kant. The concepts examined here are central in her argument that, if civil disobedience is grounded in citizens’ conscience-based conscientious convictions, then it deserves legal and moral protection.

This article reconstructs a pragmatist conception of political conviction from the works of William James. Pragmatism is often criticized for failing to account for the force of moral convictions to motivate risky and confrontational political action. This article argues that such criticisms presume a conception of conviction as an experience of moral command that pragmatism rejects. In its place, pragmatism portrays the experience of conviction as acting on faith. Drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s notion of the stutter, I argue that (...) this experience of faith is neither a deliberative justification nor a form of decisionism but rather a style of moral deliberation that is experimental, social and affective. I consider the sole piece of political oratory in James’ corpus, his 1897 oration to Robert Gould Shaw and the Massachusetts 54th Regiment, as a significant example of stuttering conviction. James’ oration seeks to demonstrate the ways that convictions can take hold of actors without relying on deep philosophical foundations or justifications. Although James places his argument squarely within the context of the politics of race, he himself does not attend to the ways his celebration of Shaw obscures the moral experiences of the African–American soldiers of the 54th. In response to this blindness, the final section considers whether or not the martyrdom of John Brown provides a more appropriate conception of conviction than James’ Shaw. (shrink)

This article reconstructs a pragmatist conception of political conviction from the works of William James. Pragmatism is often criticized for failing to account for the force of moral convictions to motivate risky and confrontational political action. This article argues that such criticisms presume a conception of conviction as an experience of moral command that pragmatism rejects. In its place, pragmatism portrays the experience of conviction as acting on faith. Drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s notion of the stutter, I argue that (...) this experience of faith is neither a deliberative justification nor a form of decisionism but rather a style of moral deliberation that is experimental, social and affective. I consider the sole piece of political oratory in James’ corpus, his 1897 oration to Robert Gould Shaw and the Massachusetts 54th Regiment, as a significant example of stuttering conviction. James’ oration seeks to demonstrate the ways that convictions can take hold of actors without relying on deep philosophical foundations or justifications. Although James places his argument squarely within the context of the politics of race, he himself does not attend to the ways his celebration of Shaw obscures the moral experiences of the African–American soldiers of the 54th. In response to this blindness, the final section considers whether or not the martyrdom of John Brown provides a more appropriate conception of conviction than James’ Shaw. (shrink)

In this paper, I seek to challenge two prevailing views about religious accommodation. The first maintains that religious practices deserve accommodation only if they are regarded as something unchosen on a par with the involuntary circumstances of life people must face. The other view maintains that religious practices are nothing more than preferences but questions the necessity of their accommodation. Against these views, I argue that religious conducts, even on the assumption that they represent voluntary behaviours, deserve in certain circumstances (...) certain kinds of accommodation. They must be understood as one possible expression, along with nonreligious or secular beliefs, of a person's convictions of conscience, which are strong ethical commitments upon which depends the moral integrity of those having such convictions. I demonstrate that the main ground for religious accommodation is the need to protect fairly, through such rights as religious freedom and freedom of conscience, the ethical commitments and conscientious beliefs of all citizens. Finally, against the objection that such a view risks leading to the proliferation of demands for accommodation, I maintain that a deliberative approach to religious accommodation is in a good position to put serious hurdles in the path of unreasonable demands. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza los fundamentos doctrinales del derecho penal eclesiástico calviniano, asentado teóricamente en la teología del pecado original y cuyo ejercicio toma forma en la práctica del Consistorio ginebrino. Asimismo, explora las razones de la diferencia entre derecho penal eclesial y civil. Yes que, aunque en el calvinismo la Iglesia y el Estado son titulares de un ius gladii, sólo uno de estos sistemas penales puede reivindicar el ejercicio de la pena corporal, el otro tan sólo puede reclamar un (...) castigo espiritual: en esto haremos radicar la diferencia entre derecho y disciplina. El derecho de coacción propiamente dicho pertenece en exclusiva al Estado como tal y ni el individuo ni la Iglesia pueden reclamarlos para sí. Estamos ante una aportación fundamental de la Reforma a la historia del derecho. (shrink)

People’s feelings about political issues are often experienced as moral convictions, that is, as rooted in beliefs about right and wrong, morality and immorality. The authors tested and found that morally convicted policy preferences are associated with positive as well as negative emotions among policy supporters and opponents, respectively, and that positive and negative emotions partially mediate the effects of moral convictions on relevant behavioral intentions (i.e., willingness to engage in activism).

Conviction Narrative Theory bears a close resemblance to the Theory of Narrative Thought, although the two were designed to address different questions. In this commentary, we detail some of the more pronounced similarities and differences and suggest that resolving the latter could produce a third theory of narrative cognition that is superior to either of these two.

Adherence to certain religious beliefs is often cited as both an efficient deterrent to immoral behavior and as an effective trigger of morally praiseworthy actions. I assume the truth of the externalist theory of motivation, emphasizing emotions as the most important non-cognitive elements that causally contribute to behavioral choices. While religious convictions may foster an array of complex emotions in a believer, three emotive states are singled out for a closer analysis: fear, guilt and gratitude. The results of recent (...) empirical studies are examined to evaluate the relative motivational efficiency of all three emotions, as well as the likely negative psychological side-effects of these affective states, such as aggres­sion and depression. While an action motivated by fear of punishment can be seen as a merely prudential strategy, the reparatory incentive of a guilty subject and a desire to reciprocate of the one blessed by undeserved favors are more plausible candidates for the class of genuine moral reactions. The available evidence, how­ever, does not warrant a conclusion that a sense of guilt before God or as a sense of gratefulness to wards God, may produce a statistically significant increase in the frequency of prosocial actions aimed at other humans. (shrink)

Interpretations of Kant’s account of the forms of “taking-to-be-true” (Fürwahrhalten) have generally focused on three such forms: opinion (Meinung), belief (Glaube), and knowledge (Wissen). A second distinction that has received comparatively less attention is that between conviction (Überzeugung) and persuasion (Überredung). Kant appears to use the distinction between the subjective and the objective sufficiency of a taking-to-be-true to characterize all of these forms. However, it is impossible to account for the differences between them by relying on this latter distinction alone. (...) In turn, this makes it difficult to fit all of these forms into a single classification of taking-to-be-true. In this chapter, I propose a new approach to conviction and persuasion that dissolves these problems. Conviction and persuasion are not single forms of taking-to-be-true with distinctive characteristics, yet it is not useful to treat them as “classes” of taking-to-be-true either. Rather, they are “operators” that determine whether a taking-to-be-true is apt or inapt, depending on whether it rests on a correct evaluation of the grounds we have. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against rationalist readings of Aristotle's epistemology, on which our scientific understanding is justified on the basis of certain demonstrative first principles that are themselves justified only by some brute form of rational intuition. I then investigate the relationship between our intuition of principles and the broadly perceptual knowledge from which it derives. I argue that, for Aristotle, perceptual knowledge helps justify our intuition of principles, and also serves as an authority against which these principles and (...) their consequences must be assessed. I end by considering how we should understand the justificatory role played by perception, and sketching the nuanced, empirically-minded sort of foundationalism I take Aristotle to endorse. (shrink)

Conviction Narrative Theory is an interesting and plausible way to think about how individuals make decisions when quantitative assessments are not open to them. The question I pose is the following. Is there any general result about how decisions should be taken independent of the particular circumstances of that decision?

L’articolo mette in luce due paradossi, il primo dei quali è dato dal fatto che proprio in quelle terre dove si affermò la radicale impostazione anti-umanistica del protestantesimo ebbe a scaturire una straordinaria fioritura dell’umano fino alla consacrazione della libertà come principio della ricerca scientifica e del vivere civile. Il secondo paradosso è dato dalla manifestazione in quelle stesse terre meno di un secolo fa dell’ideologia nazista. La tesi sostenuta è che il principio protestante di fatto affermatosi nella coscienza europea (...) consiste non tanto nella teoria teologica della giustificazione (sola Gratia, sola Fide, sola Scriptura) quanto nella affermazione filosofica e politica della libera coscienza personale, il cui evento decisivo fu la dichiarazione di Lutero alla Dieta di Worms. Ma proprio il carattere abissale della libertà e il destino di interpretazione infinita cui la consegnò Lutero sono anche all’origine di quel disagio della coscienza e dell’esistenza da cui sorse il malessere che portò al totalitarismo.Nel sostenere la tesi enunciata l’articolo si struttura secondo quattro movimenti: 1) argomentazione sul carattere radicalmente anti-umanistico del protestantesimo; 2) argomentazione sui notevoli effetti umanistici storicamente prodotti dalla Riforma protestante; 3) argomentazione sulle possibili connessioni tra il terreno preparato dalla Riforma nella società tedesca e il sorgere in essa dell’ideologia nazionalsocialista; 4) considerazioni finali sulla dialettica della libertà umana. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to bridge the gap between feminist structural explanations for rape and the social psychological mechanisms that make it possible for some men in patriarchal societies to feel neutral about sexual violence toward women. The concept of role taking is used to analyze the perceptions of self and victim held by 79 convicted rapists. Men who defined their behavior during sexual encounters as rape saw themselves from the perspective of their victim through reflexive role taking, had (...) inferred their victims' experience through synesic role taking, and used this awareness to further their plan of action. Men who did not define their behavior as rape did neither reflexive nor synesic role taking and appeared incapable of understanding the meaning of sexual violence to women. The majority of both groups did not experience role-taking emotions, that is, guilt, shame, or empathy, which symbolic interactionists posit are the mediators of self-control. I argue that the gender imbalance of power and the status of women as property are the social factors that render normative emotions inoperative in sexual violence. (shrink)

Abstract: When do we meet the standard of proof in a criminal trial? Some have argued that it is when the guilt of the defendant is sufficiently probable on the evidence. Some have argued that it is a matter of normic support. While the first view provides us with a nice account of how we ought to manage risk, the second explains why we shouldn’t convict on the basis of naked statistical evidence alone. Unfortunately, this second view doesn’t help us (...) understand how we should manage risk (e.g., the risk of violating rights against wrongful conviction) and faces counterexamples of its own. I shall defend an alternative approach that builds on the strengths of these two accounts. On the approach defending here, it is objectively suitable to punish iff we know a defendant to be guilty. To determine what is consistent with procedural justice and to determine what we prospectively ought to do, we need to think about the risks we face of deviating from this objective ideal. (shrink)

Proponents of sustainable agriculture seek deeply rooted social changes, but to advance this agenda requires political credibility and work with diverse partners. Asthe literature on political co-optation makesclear, the tension between conviction andcredibility is persistent and unavoidable; nota problem to be solved so much as a built-incondition of movement politics. Drawing on acase history of California's largestsustainable agriculture organization, astructural assessment is made of the strategicchoices facing movement leaders, organizationaltensions that accompany these choices, andperceived gains and losses. The case historydemonstrates (...) how movement leaders craft middlerange strategies that adapt to politicalcircumstances while retaining attachments tocore values and constituencies. Thesestrategies are ripe with tradeoffs, placingdemands on leaders who must implement them in aspirit that sustains organizational vitalitywhile broadening political and social impact.But they also enlarge the democraticsensibilities of movement leaders, increasingtheir ability to listen, learn, and forgealliances based on shared goals rather thansimilar motives. (shrink)

_Criticism and Conviction_ offers a rare opportunity to share personally in the intellectual life and journey of the eminent philosopher Paul Ricoeur. Internationally known for his influential works in hermeneutics, theology, psychoanalysis, and aesthetics, until now, Ricoeur has been conspicuously silent on the subject of himself. In this book--a conversation about his life and work with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay--Ricoeur reflects on a variety of philosophical, social, religious, and cultural topics, from the paradoxes of political power to the (...) relationship between life and art, and life and death. In the first of eight conversations, Ricoeur traces the trajectory of his life, recounting the origins of his convictions and the development of his intellect against the tragic events of the twentieth century. Declaring himself the "son of a victim of the First World War," Ricoeur, an orphan, sketches his early years in the house of stern but loving grandparents, and the molding of his intellect under the tutelage of Roland Dalbiez, Gabriel Marcel, and André Philip. Ricoeur tells the intriguing story of his capture and five-year imprisonment by the Germans during World War II, where he and his compatriots fashioned an intellectual life complete with a library and lectures, and where he, amazingly, was able to continue his dissertation research. Elegantly interweaving anecdotal with philosophical meditations, Ricoeur recounts his relationships with some of the twentieth century's greatest figures, such as Heidegger, Jaspers, and Eliade. He also shares his views on French philosophers and explains his tumultuous relationship with Jacques Lacan. And while expressing his deepest respect for the works of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Michel Foucault, Ricoeur reserves his greatest admiration for the narratologist Algirdas Julien Greimas. Ricoeur also explores the relationship between the philosophical and religious domains, attempting to reconcile the two poles in his thought. And readers who have struggled with Ricoeur's work will be grateful for these illuminating discussions that provide an invaluable key to his writings on language and narrative, especially those on metaphor and time. Spontaneous and lively, _Criticism and Conviction_ is a passionate confirmation of Ricoeur's eloquence, lucidity, and intellectual rigor, and affirms his position as one of this century's greatest thinkers. It is an essential book for anyone interested in philosophy and literary criticism. (shrink)

La llegada de los protestantismos históricos al Norte de México trajo consigo múltiples implicaciones, entre las cuales se puede mencionar al arribo de nuevas ideas. Justamente, dichas ideas se transmitieron a través de la Educación. El presente artículo representa una aproximación a la creación de escuelas protestantes en la Ciudad de Monterrey a finales del siglo XIX, así como un análisis de las posibles contribuciones de los centros de enseñanza enmarcado en un contexto de cambios importantes como la secularización (...) de la sociedad y la consolidación del naciente estado Mexicano. (shrink)

Our concern in this essay are the roles of religious conviction in what we call a “publicly justified polity” — one in which the laws conform to the Principle of Public Justification, according to which (in a sense that will become clearer) each citizen must have conclusive reason to accept each law as binding. According to “justificatory liberalism,”1 this public justification requirement follows from the core liberal commitment of respect for the freedom and equality of all citizens.2 To respect each (...) as free and equal requires that no one simply be forced to submit to the judgments of others as to what she must do. Laws must be justified to those subject to them — each must accept grounds that justify the law. As Kant indicated, if such a condition is achieved, each is both subject and legislator: each is subject to the law, yet each legislates the law, and so all our free and equal under the law.3 Now it would appear that if we are to justify laws to each and every person, the reasons for these laws must be “accessible to all.”4 Religious reasons, however, are not shared by everyone, and may be inaccessible to some: they would thereby seem inappropriate in public justification. On the face of it, justificatory liberals seem committed to expunging religious-based reasoning from political justification. Not surprisingly, this apparent commitment of justificatory liberalism is adamantly rejected by many citizens of faith who consider themselves liberals. These citizens embrace the traditional liberal freedoms and rights and, moreover, reject any suggestion that a legitimate polity might seek to establish a religion, much less a theocracy. Yet they.. (shrink)

L'étude du concept de Max Weber " éthique protestante-capitalisme " dans un contexte de pauvreté est un double défi. D'abord parce que le présent ouvrage se propose d'intégrer Weber dans la lignée des économistes. Son affiliation à l'institutionnalisme économique, déterminera ainsi le canevas de l'analyse de la pertinence de sa théorie dans un contexte de pauvreté qu'est le cas malgache. Ensuite car l'évident paradoxe soulevé par l'influence majeure de la religion chrétienne et protestante sur la société malgache, face à une (...) pauvreté ambiante concomitante à un capitalisme embryonnaire, semble remettre en question la présente étude. En intégrant le concept de la pensée complexe, cette analyse avance une approche théorique et pratique, non cloisonnée d'un problème de développement. (shrink)

This essay offers a start on sorting out the relationships of argumentation and persuasion by identifying two systematic ways in which definitions of argumentation differ, namely, their descriptions of the ends and of the means involved in argumentative discourse. Against that backdrop, the traditional “conviction-persuasion” distinction is reassessed. The essay argues that the traditional distinction correctly recognizes the difference between the end of influencing attitudes and that of influencing behavior—but that it misanalyzes the means of achieving the latter (by focusing (...) on emotional arousal) and that it mistakenly contrasts “rational” and “emotional” means of influence. The larger conclusion is that understanding the relationships of the phenomena of argumentation and persuasion will require close attention to characterizations of communicative ends and means. (shrink)

According to Kant, a certain kind of knowledge is essential to the achievement of moral autonomy. In order for an action to be obligatory, it must be possible for me to know not only what I have a...

Si les sympathies de Toland pour le régime «républicain» (en anglais de l’époque, « commonwealthman » pour le substantif, « republican » pour l’adjectif ou le substantif) ne sont guère mises en doute aujourd’hui, encore faut-il s’entendre sur ce que signifie ce terme de «républicain». Les éditions que donna Toland d’ouvrages dont les thèses antiabsolutistes étaient connues de tous et les préfaces dont il les munit sont un argument sérieux en faveur d’un Toland « républicain ». Il faut cependant mettre (...) en lumière les différents sens que Toland accepterait ou refuserait de donner à la notion de « république ». De nombreuses thèses de l’auteur sont communes aux whigs et aux républicains, et pourtant il manifeste sa méfiance à l’égard des partis. Ce qui est certain, c’est que Toland défend vivement les libertés – liberté de conscience, liberté de la presse, liberté du commerce – et aussi l’idée d’équilibre tant à l’intérieur des divers pouvoirs de l’État que dans le concert des nations. (shrink)

We connect Conviction Narrative Theory to an account that views people as intuitive scientists who can flexibly create, evaluate, and modify representations of decision problems. We argue that without understanding how the relevant complex narratives (or indeed any representation, simple to complex) are themselves constructed, we also cannot know when and why people would rely on them to make choices.