Conviction, Priority, and Rationalism in Aristotle's Epistemology

Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (1):1-27 (2020)
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In this paper I argue against rationalist readings of Aristotle's epistemology, on which our scientific understanding is justified on the basis of certain demonstrative first principles that are themselves justified only by some brute form of rational intuition. I then investigate the relationship between our intuition of principles and the broadly perceptual knowledge from which it derives. I argue that, for Aristotle, perceptual knowledge helps justify our intuition of principles, and also serves as an authority against which these principles and their consequences must be assessed. I end by considering how we should understand the justificatory role played by perception, and sketching the nuanced, empirically-minded sort of foundationalism I take Aristotle to endorse.

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Marc Gasser-Wingate
Boston University

Citations of this work

Practical Wisdom as Conviction in Aristotle's Ethics.Patricia Marechal - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1.
Aristotle on Intelligent Perception.Marc Gasser-Wingate - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (17):1-22.
Willing and not being able: Nietzsche on akratic action.Thomas Lambert - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (7):1239-1261.
Practical wisdom as conviction in Aristotle's ethics.Patricia Marechal - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):179-203.

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References found in this work

Aristotle: the power of perception.Deborah K. W. Modrak - 1987 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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