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  1. Knowing in Aristotle Part 1: Epistēmē, Nous, and Non-Rational Cognitive States.Caleb Cohoe - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass.
    In this first part of a 2-part survey of Aristotle's epistemology, I present an overview of the features Aristotle attributes to gnōsis (cognition or knowledge), a term Aristotle applies to true cognitive states, whether rational or non-rational. Gnōsis is being in contact with reality. This, for Aristotle, happens when the soul takes on the form of the object known, which is what makes gnōsis factive. I present Aristotle’s account of non‐rational cognitive states, discussing perception and experience (empeiria) and the role (...)
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  2. The Necessary and Necessarily Limited Role of Perception in Aristotle’s Account of Human Knowing.Mitchell Timothy Carson - 2021 - Dissertation, Catholic University of America
  3. The Necessary and Necessarily Limited Role of Perception in Aristotle’s Account of Human Knowing.Mitchell Timothy Carson - 2021 - Dissertation, Catholic University of America
  4. Aristotle's Empiricism.Marc Gasser-Wingate - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    Aristotle is famous for thinking that all our knowledge comes from perception. But it's not immediately clear what this view is meant to entail. It's not clear, for instance, what perception is supposed to contribute to the more advanced forms of knowledge that derive from it. Nor is it clear how we should understand the nature of its contribution—what it might mean to say that these more advanced forms of knowledge are "derived from" or "based on" what we perceive. Aristotle (...)
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  5. Conviction, Priority, and Rationalism in Aristotle's Epistemology.Marc Gasser-Wingate - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (1):1-27.
    In this paper I argue against rationalist readings of Aristotle's epistemology, on which our scientific understanding is justified on the basis of certain demonstrative first principles that are themselves justified only by some brute form of rational intuition. I then investigate the relationship between our intuition of principles and the broadly perceptual knowledge from which it derives. I argue that, for Aristotle, perceptual knowledge helps justify our intuition of principles, and also serves as an authority against which these principles and (...)
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  6. Jean De Groot. Aristotle’s Empiricism: Experience and Mechanics in the Fourth Century BC. Las Vegas, NV: Parmenides, 2014. Pp. Xxv+442. $127.00. [REVIEW]Richard DeWitt - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (1):176-179.
  7. Aristotle's Case for Perceptual Knowledge.Robert Howton - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    Sense experience, naïvely conceived, is a way of knowing perceptible properties: the colors, sounds, smells, flavors, and textures in our perceptual environment. So conceived, ordinary experience presents the perceiver with the essential nature of a property like Sky Blue or Middle C, such that how the property appears in experience is identical to how it essentially is. In antiquity, as today, it was controversial whether sense experience could meet the conditions for knowledge implicit in this naïve conception. Aristotle was a (...)
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  8. Aristotle on Induction and First Principles.Marc Gasser-Wingate - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16:1-20.
    Aristotle's cognitive ideal is a form of understanding that requires a sophisticated grasp of scientific first principles. At the end of the Analytics, Aristotle tells us that we learn these principles by induction. But on the whole, commentators have found this an implausible claim: induction seems far too basic a process to yield the sort of knowledge Aristotle's account requires. In this paper I argue that this criticism is misguided. I defend a broader reading of Aristotelian induction, on which there's (...)
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  9. Aristotle on Meaning.Jean-Louis Hudry - 2011 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (3):253-280.
    This paper shows that Aristotle's De Interpretatione does not separate syntax from semantics. Linguistic sentences are not syntactic entities, and non-linguistic meanings are not semantic propositions expressed by linguistic sentences. In fact, Aristotle resorts to a mental conception of meaning, distinguishing linguistic meanings in a given language from non-linguistic mental contents in relation to actual things: while the former are not the same for all, the latter are shared by everyone. Aristotle is not a modern logician, like Boole, Frege, or (...)
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  10. Observações sobre o conhecimento empírico em Aristóteles.Daniel Rubião de Andrade - 2010 - Itaca 15:32-41.