Depuis son invention par Destutt de Tracy et sa réinvention par Marx et Engels, le concept d'idéologie n'a cessé de faire problème. Passé dans le langage courant, largement utilisé par les sciences humaines, bien qu'en des significations souvent exclusives les unes des autres, il hante la philosophie comme une sorte de mauvais génie perturbateur qui lui rappellerait l'impureté de ses origines et de ses usages, et qu'il lui faudrait toujours s'employer à réduire ou à sublimer. Encore faudrait-il en produire une (...) définition cohérente. Mais comment y parvenir sans une enquête systématique, à la fois analytique et épistémologique, qui tienne compte de la multiplicité des usages et dégage une problématique générale, sans éluder pour autant la question du caractère polémique du concept? C'est ce qu'a entrepris Nestor Capdevila en déterminant le jeu de significations pertinentes, bien que potentiellement contradictoires, qui sont à l'œuvre dans les analyses historiques, anthropologiques ou théologiques contemporaines où l'on peut étudier son fonctionnement. Cette approche nouvelle conteste la thèse accréditée par la tradition sociologique d'une modernité de l'idéologie, totalitaire ou non. Elle montre la valeur d'un modèle religieux fondé sur le concept d'hérésie qui, tout en reconnaissant l'exemplarité idéologique de la religion, ne réduit pas l'idéologie à la religion. Elle critique également les définitions de l'idéologie qui par souci d'objectivité prétendent purifier le concept de son aspect intrinsèquement polémique. Celui-ci fait du concept d'idéologie une illustration exemplaire de la dimension politique des concepts de la politique. (shrink)

First published in 1949, Gilbert Ryle ’s The Concept of Mind is one of the classics of twentieth-century philosophy. Described by Ryle as a ‘sustained piece of analytical hatchet-work’ on Cartesian dualism, The Concept of Mind is a radical and controversial attempt to jettison once and for all what Ryle called ‘the ghost in the machine’: Descartes’ argument that mind and body are two separate entities. This sixtieth anniversary edition includes a substantial commentary by Julia Tanney and is essential reading (...) for new readers interested not only in the history of analytic philosophy but in its power to challenge major currents in philosophy of mind and language today. (shrink)

In graph theory, the concept of domination is essential in a variety of domains. It has broad applications in diverse fields such as coding theory, computer net work models, and school bus routing and facility lo cation problems. If a fuzzy graph fails to obtain acceptable results, neutrosophic sets and neutrosophic graphs can be used to model uncertainty correlated with indeterminate and inconsistent information in arbitrary real-world scenario. In this study, we consider the concept of domination as it relates to (...) single-valued neutrosophic incidence graphs (SVNIGs). Given the importance of domination and its utilization in numerous fields, we propose the application of dominating sets in SVNIG with valid edges. We present some relevant definitions such as those of valid edges, cardinality, and isolated vertices in SVNIG along with some examples. Furthermore, we also show a few significant sets connected to the dominating set in an SVNIG such as independent and irredundant sets. We also investigate a relationship between the concepts of dominating sets and domination numbers as well as irredundant and independence sets in SVNIGs. Finally, a real-life deployment of domination in SVNIGsis investigated in relation to COVID-19 vaccination locations as a practical application. (shrink)

I argue that we need to distinguish between three concepts of actual causation: total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. I provide two lines of argument in support of this account. First, I address three thought experiments that have been troublesome for unified accounts of actual causation, and I show that my account provides a better explanation of corresponding causal intuitions. Second, I provide a functional argument: if we assume that a key purpose of causal concepts is to guide agency, we (...) are better off making a distinction between three concepts of actual causation. (shrink)

These are two of only three medieval treatises known to the editors explicitly devoted to discussion of concepts. That is not to deny that other works treat extensively of concepts among other matters.

According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we must possess concepts for all the objects, properties and relations which feature in our perceptual experiences. In this paper, I investigate the possibility of developing an argument against the conceptualist view by appealing to the notion of attention. In Part One, I begin by setting out an apparently promising version of such an argument, a version which appeals to a link between attention and perceptual demonstrative concept possession. In Part (...) Two, however, I show how the conceptualist can challenge what appears to be the key premise of the argument, and I go on to describe, in Part Three, an important further difficulty which we face if we attempt to overcome this challenge in a particular way. My conclusion will be that the conceptualist's challenge to the argument is convincing and hence that the argument remains inconclusive. (shrink)

Studies designed to help us understand how nonspecialists conceive of intentional action have generated some widely discussed results. To what extent are the results accounted for by the existence of different folk conceptions of intentional action? That is my guiding question in this article. I am not in a position to offer a full answer, but I do hope to make some progress.

This volume makes available in English for the first time Adorno’s lectures on metaphysics. It provides a unique introduction not only to metaphysics but also to Adorno’s own intellectual standpoint, as developed in his major work Negative Dialectics. Metaphysics for Adorno is defined by a central tension between concepts and immediate facts. Adorno traces this dualism back to Aristotle, whom he sees as the founder of metaphysics. In Aristotle it appears as an unresolved tension between form and matter. This basic (...) split, in Adorno’s interpretation, runs right through the history of metaphysics. Perhaps not surprisingly, Adorno finds this tension resolved in the Hegelian dialectic. Underlying this dualism is a further dichotomy, which Adorno sees as essential to metaphysics: while it dissolves belief in transcendental worlds by thought, at the same time it seeks to rescue belief in a reality beyond the empirical, again by thought. It is to this profound ambiguity, for Adorno, that the metaphysical tradition owes its greatness. The major part of these lectures, given by Adorno late in his life, is devoted to a critical exposition of Aristotle’s thought, focusing on its central ambiguities. In the last lectures, Adorno’s attention switches to the question of the relevance of metaphysics today, particularly after the Holocaust. He finds in metaphysical experiences, which transcend rational discourse without lapsing into irrationalism, a last precarious refuge of the humane truth to which his own thought always aspired. This volume will be essential reading for anyone interested in Adorno’s work and will be a valuable text for students and scholars of philosophy and social theory. (shrink)

This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...) is very closely tied up with features of the epistemic access they afford to qualia. When we deploy phenomenal concepts introspectively to some phenomenally conscious experience as it occurs, we are said to be acquainted with our own conscious experiences. Accounts of PCs either have to explain the acquaintance relation, or acquaintance with our phenomenal experiences has to be denied. PCs have received much attention in recent philosophy of mind mainly because they figure in arguments for dualism and in physicalist responses to these arguments. The main topic of this paper is to explore different accounts of phenomenal concepts and their role in recent debates over the metaphysical status of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...) is very closely tied up with features of the epistemic access they afford to qualia. When we deploy phenomenal concepts introspectively to some phenomenally conscious experience as it occurs, we are said to be acquainted with our own conscious experiences. Accounts of PCs either have to explain the acquaintance relation, or acquaintance with our phenomenal experiences has to be denied. PCs have received much attention in recent philosophy of mind mainly because they figure in arguments for dualism and in physicalist responses to these arguments. The main topic of this article is to explore different accounts of phenomenal concepts and their role in recent debates over the metaphysical status of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely (...) tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal concepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspection. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory concepts, such as the concept of red. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information theory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and predicts the so-called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a substantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them. (shrink)

We analyze different aspects of our quantum modeling approach of human concepts and, more specifically, focus on the quantum effects of contextuality, interference, entanglement, and emergence, illustrating how each of them makes its appearance in specific situations of the dynamics of human concepts and their combinations. We point out the relation of our approach, which is based on an ontology of a concept as an entity in a state changing under influence of a context, with the main traditional concept theories, (...) that is, prototype theory, exemplar theory, and theory theory. We ponder about the question why quantum theory performs so well in its modeling of human concepts, and we shed light on this question by analyzing the role of complex amplitudes, showing how they allow to describe interference in the statistics of measurement outcomes, while in the traditional theories statistics of outcomes originates in classical probability weights, without the possibility of interference. The relevance of complex numbers, the appearance of entanglement, and the role of Fock space in explaining contextual emergence, all as unique features of the quantum modeling, are explicitly revealed in this article by analyzing human concepts and their dynamics. (shrink)

The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...) suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. This lively, conversational, and superbly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again. (shrink)

In this chapter we argue that our concept of time is a functional concept. We argue that our concept of time is such that time is whatever it is that plays the time role, and we spell out what we take the time role to consist in. We evaluate this proposal against a number of other analyses of our concept of time, and argue that it better explains various features of our dispositions as speakers and our practices as agents.

Sets are central to mathematics and its foundations, but what are they? In this book Luca Incurvati provides a detailed examination of all the major conceptions of set and discusses their virtues and shortcomings, as well as introducing the fundamentals of the alternative set theories with which these conceptions are associated. He shows that the conceptual landscape includes not only the naïve and iterative conceptions but also the limitation of size conception, the definite conception, the stratified conception and the graph (...) conception. In addition, he presents a novel, minimalist account of the iterative conception which does not require the existence of a relation of metaphysical dependence between a set and its members. His book will be of interest to researchers and advanced students in logic and the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Nichols and Bruno claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article, we evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations, the folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity, but instead rely on different concepts of ‘person’, ‘identity’, and ‘individual’. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no longer categorized as persons. Second, we provide new empirical evidence suggesting (...) that the folk do not consider psychological continuity to be necessary for an individual to be categorized as a person or for ascribing identity over time and through transformations. In this, we assume, along with Nichols and Bruno, that folk judgments about identity can be read off the use of proper names. Furthermore, we raise some doubts about the ability of current experimental designs to adequately distinguish between qualitative and numerical identity jud.. (shrink)

Relying on a range of now-familiar thought-experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. (Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state-consciousness, which contrasts with creature-consciousness, or perceptual-consciousness. The different forms of state-consciousness include various kinds of access-consciousness, both first-order and higher-order--see Rosenthal, 1986; Block, 1995; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000. Phenomenal consciousness is the property that mental states have when it is like something to possess them, or when they have subjectively-accessible feels; (...) or as some would say, when they have qualia (see fn.1 below).) Others have thought that we can undermine the credibility of those thought-experiments by allowing that we possess purely recognitional concepts for the properties of our conscious mental states. This paper is concerned to explain, and then to meet, the challenge of showing how purely recognitional concepts are possible if there are no such things as qualia--in the strong sense of intrinsic (non-relational, non-intentional) properties of experience. It argues that an appeal to higher-order experiences is necessary to meet this challenge, and then deploys a novel form of higher-order thought theory to explain how such experiences are generated. (shrink)

The paper proposes a way for adherents of Fregean, structured propositions to designate propositions and other complex senses/concepts using a special kind of functor. I consider some formulations from Peacocke's works and highlight certain problems that arise as we try to quantify over propositional constituents while referring to propositions using "that"-clauses. With the functor notation, by contrast, we can quantify over senses/concepts with objectual, first-order quantifiers and speak without further ado about their involvement in propositions. The functor notation also turns (...) out to come with an important kind of expressive strengthening, and is shown to be neutral on several controversial issues. (shrink)

Concepts: Core Readings traces the develoment of one of the most active areas of investigation in cognitive science. This comprehensive volume brings together the essential background readings on concepts from philosophy, psychology, and linguistics, while providing a broad sampling of contemporary research. The first part of the book centers around the fall of the Classical Theory of Concepts in the face of attacks by W.V.O. Quine, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Eleanor Rosch, and others, emphasizing the emergence and development of the Prototype Theory (...) and the controversies it spurred. The second part surveys a broad range of contemporary theories—Neoclassical Theories, the Prototype Theory, the Theory-Theory, and Conceptual Atomism. (shrink)

At least in one well-motivated sense of ‘concept’, all perception involves concepts, even perception as practiced by lizards and bees. That is because—the paper argues—all perception involves belief.

Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses". Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state.

Medieval theories of ethics tended on the whole to regard self-perfection as the goal of human life. However there was profound disagreement, particularly in the late thirteenth century, over how exactly this was to be understood. Intellectualists such as Aquinas famously argued that human perfection lay primarily in coming to know the essence of God in the next life. Voluntarists such as the Franciscan John Peckham, by contrast, argued that ultimate perfection was to be achieved _in patria_ through the act (...) of loving God. The present article argues that Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent defended a different sort of voluntarism with respect to the final destiny of human beings. Rather than claiming that the goal of human life lay in the perfection of the self, they argued instead that ultimate union with God was to be achieved mystically through an act of self-transcendence, which occurred through ecstasy or quasi-deification. (shrink)

데카르트가 정의하는 사랑의 정념은 자기 보존과 유용성 중심의이기적인 것으로도 해석될 여지가 있고, 사랑의 대상을 위해 자기희생까지 감수하는 이타적인 것으로 해석될 여지도 있다. 여기서나는 데카르트의 입장을 이기주의에 가까운 것으로 보되, 그가 심신합일의 바탕에 심신이원론을 설정함으로써 이타주의나 공동체주의와 완전히 양립 가능한 독특한 에고이즘을 벼려냄을 보여준다. 이를 위해 나는 첫째, 사랑에 대한 데카르트의 정의가 ‘대상의 좋음’을 사랑의 핵심에 두는 아퀴나스적 관점과 결별하고 있음을 보여준다. 둘째, 사랑의 동기가 대상에서 주체로 옮겨온다고 해서, 데카르트의 사랑 개념이 홉스 류의 생물학적 이기주의를 함축한다고볼 수는 없음을 보여준다. 마지막으로, 사랑이 (...) 주체에게 가져다주는 진정한 이익이 자기 보존이나 욕구 충족이 아니라 감응 자체에서 얻는 영혼의 만족임을 보여주고, 이 만족이 영혼이 자기 신체와합일되어 있으면서도 지적 거리를 가질 수 있다는 점에 기반하고있음을 보여준다. (shrink)

이 글은 ‘롤스의 정의론이 지닌 이론적 결함을 유교의 인간관을 통해 치료할 수 있는가’라는 문제의식에서 출발한다. 이러한 문제의식은 롤스가 유교의 인간관을 바탕으로 자신의 이론을 정당화할 경우 얻을 수 있는 이론적 혜택이 있는지를 비판적으로 검토하는 작업과 연결된다. 작업의 초점은 유교의 인간관이 롤스가 정의의 원칙을 정당화하는 과정에 개입함으로서 기여할 수 있는 부분들에 대한 검토와 해명을 시도함으로써 양자 간의 이상적 결합을 시도하는데 있다. 이러한 시도가 성공적인 것으로 밝혀진다면 기존의 정의론은 동양철학적 관점을 통해 새로운 이론적 방향을 발견하는 계기를 마련할 수도 있다. 보통 정의론은 인간의 본성과 (...) 사회의 본성에 대한 전제에서 출발하여 사회의 구체적인 맥락 및 제도 그리고 관계를 초월하여 모든 사회에 적용될 수 있는 근본적인 규범적 원칙을 도출하려는 기획을 갖는다. 롤스 역시 최소한의 선 이론으로서 칸트의 의무론적 자유주의에 기초하여 합리적인 이기심을 지닌 개인을 전제로 정의의 원칙을 정당화한다. 이러한 방법은 외부의 사회적 맥락들에 휘둘리지 않고 공정으로서의 정의를 실현했지만 무연고적 자아, 원자적 인간관, 반사회적 개인주의라는 공동체주의의 비판에 직면했다. 그런데 한 가지 의문점은 과연 롤스가 추구한 사회 즉 차등의 원칙을 바탕으로 민주적 평등(demacratic eauqlity)을 추구한 롤스에게 그러한 비판이 그다지 적절한 것으로 보이지 않는다는 것이다. 롤스는 자유로운 선택능력을 지닌 개인들에 대한 동등한 고려와 존중을 바탕으로 함께 더불어 잘 살아갈 수 있는 원칙을 제시함으로써 질서정연한 사회를 꿈꾼다. 그런데 그를 반사회적이고 원자적 개인주의자로 규정하는 것은 다소 성급한 것이다. 만약 롤스에게 가해진 비판 중 몇 가지가 그가 자신의 의도를 제대로 반영하지 못하는 이론적 도구인 자유주의적 인간관을 전면에 내세운 데서 비롯된 것이라면 우리는 기꺼이 새로운 도구를 시험해보는 전략을 구상해볼 수 있을 것이다. 앞서 언급했듯이 이 글은 유교의 인간관을 롤스가 자신의 의도와 달리 직면하게 된 비판에서 벗어날 수 있는 통로를 제공하는 새로운 도구로서 제안하고 그것의 유용성을 비판적으로 검토하는데 목적을 둔다. 이러한 목적을 위해 우리는 먼저 롤스의 인간관과 정의의 원칙의 정당화 과정을 살펴볼 것이다. 이어서 그에 대한 비판들을 살펴본 후, 유교의 인간관이 롤스의 정의의 원칙을 정당화 하는 과정에 개입함으로서 기여할 수 있는 부분들은 없는지 검토하고자 한다. 결론에서는 롤스가 유교의 인간관을 통해 그의 의도를 오해 없이 제대로 전달할 수 있으며 보다 안정된 이론적 체계를 구축할 수 있다고 주장할 것이다. (shrink)

This now-classic work challenges what Ryle calls philosophy's "official theory, " the Cartesian "myth" of the separation of mind and matter. Ryle's linguistic analysis remaps the conceptual geography of mind, not so much solving traditional philosophical problams as dissolving them into the mere consequences of misguided language. His plain language and essentially simple purpose put him in the tradition of Locke, Berkeley, Mill, and Russell - philisophers whose best work, like Ryle's, has become a part of our general literature.