Medieval coin plays an essential role in the imagined history of money: it figures as the primal "commodity money" — a natural medium, spontaneously adopted by parties in exchange who converge upon a metal like silver to represent the value of other goods. As a natural medium with a price objectively established through trade, commodity money appears to offer an independent means of measure in the market. But as the history offered here reveals, medieval money was nothing like (...) its imagined alternative. England’s early coin became a medium when the government began to spend and tax in that unit of account, took coin as a mode of payment, and allowed it to be transferred between people in the meantime. Individuals participated in the arrangement, paying for coin in exchange for the unique quality — liquidity — that set money apart from a commodity. That quality was orchestrated by the very channels that brought public and private together in the project of making a medium. In fact, insofar as the English equated money with the commodity it contained, they engineered instability into the heart of their medium. Depreciating coin — diluting its commodity content — offered a cure. It also confirmed that coin had never been the "commodity money" imagined in later accounts. Coin was, instead, a constitutional medium, one that related the government to its participants and thus helped to configure the world it appeared merely to measure. (shrink)

This paper considers what liberal philosopher Michael Sandel coins the ‘moral limits of markets’ in relation to the idea of paying people for data about their biometrics and emotions. With Sandel arguing that certain aspects of human life (such as our bodies and body parts) should be beyond monetisation and exchange, others argue that emerging technologies such as Personal Information Management Systems can enable a fairer, paid, data exchange between the individual and the organisation, even regarding highly personal data about (...) our bodies and emotions. With the field of data ethics rarely addressing questions of payment, this paper explores normative questions about data dividends. It does so by conducting a UK-wide, demographically representative online survey to quantitatively assess adults’ views on being paid for personal data about their biometrics and emotions via a Personal Information Management System, producing a data dividend, a premise which sees personal data through the prism of markets and property. The paper finds diverse attitudes based on socio-demographic characteristics, the type of personal data sold, and the type of organisation sold to. It argues that (a) Sandel’s argument regarding the moral limits of markets has value in protecting fundamental freedoms of those in society who are arguably least able to (such as the poor); but (b) that contexts of use, in particular, blur moral limits regarding fundamental freedoms and markets. (shrink)

In this chapter we consider economic systems, and in particular financial systems, from the perspective of the physics of complex systems (i.e. statistical physics, the theory of critical phenomena, and their cognates). This field of research is known as econophysics—alternative names are ‘financial physics’ and ‘statistical phynance.’ This title was coined in 1995 by Eugene Stanley, and since then its researchers have attempted to forge it as an independent and important field, one that stands in opposition to standard (‘Neo-Classical’) economic (...) theory. Econophysicists argue that the empirical data is best explained in terms flowing out of statistical physics, according to which the (stylized) facts of economics are best understood as emergent properties of a complex system. However, some economists argue that the methods used by econophysics are not sufficient to prove the existence of underlying complexity in economic systems. The complexity claim can nonetheless be defended as a good example of an inference to the best explanation rather than a definitive deduction. (shrink)

"Central to Schroeder's case is the conviction that reason and passion are two sides of the same coin. Rationality represents the human potential actualized only through desire, she argues; and passion functions only insofar as it preserves the rationality that makes desire possible. Far from being anti-erotic, market relations are, in this analysis, the most basic form of eroticism. Disclosing a fundamental similarity between erotic and economic behavior, The Triumph of Venus reveals that, while the former cannot be (...) reduced to the latter, the latter can only be explained in terms of the former. Venus triumphs over the market."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

In latter-day discussions on corporate morality, duties of commission are fiercely debated. Moral institutionalists argue that duties of commission—such as a duty of assistance—overstep the boundaries of moral duty owed by economic agents. " Moral institutionalism" is a newly coined term for a familiar position on market morality. It maintains that market morality ought to be restricted, excluding all duties of commission. Neo-Classical thinkers such as Baumol and Homann defend it most eloquently. They underpin their position with concerns (...) that go to the core of liberalism—the dominant western political theory that sustains the ideals of both the free market and the free, rational person. Those authors claim that liberalism calls for a fully differentiated market because it resents the politicization of the market. Fully differentiated markets exclude duties of commission. They also claim that full differentiation of the market closes the troublesome gap between moral motivation and moral virtue. Full differentiation redeems the promise of "easy virtue". In this paper moral institutionalism will be rejected from a Kantian point of view, mostly inspired by Herman's thesis on the invisibility of morality. Liberalism may perhaps ban the politicization of the market; it does not forbid its moralization. The idea of a fully differentiated market must also be rejected because it is either morally over-demanding (to the morally autonomous person) or morally hazardous (to the person with failing moral motivation). Contrary to what the moral institutionalists claim, right action, morally, is actually quite difficult in fully differentiated markets. (shrink)

Franco “Bifo” Berardi tells us that the current transformation of every domain of social life into economy has led to “the subjugation of the soul to work processes.” There is a newfound love of work and, consequently, writes Berardi, “no desire, no vitality seems to exist anymore outside of the economic enterprise.” Concerned as it once was with “fostering the soul,” and concerned as it now is with preparing students for the job market, what role might education have in (...) Berardi’s musings? Can “creativity,” “self-actualization” and “curiosity,” which are so valued in education, still speak and help foster a sense of the soul that exceeds economy and work? In this paper, I explore these questions by providing an account of what is at stake in Berardi’s conception of the soul and its subjugation to work. I draw on his ideas to critically appraise the seemingly-benign aspirations of the “creative class,” a term coined to signal a new era for human flourishing afforded by shifts towards personal creativity in the digital economy. I then move to consider how, in particular, the ubiquitous promotion of “creativity” and “curiosity” in education tends to replicate a form of learning that puts the soul to work, as it were, promoting a narrow, self-enterprising subject with a frantic instrumental orientation towards the world. I conclude with a discussion on how demands on learners, to be always curious, innovative, nimble and open to discovery lead to panic, collapse and depression: the diseases of the soul. (shrink)

Prominent radical democrats have in recent times shown a vivid interest in the commons. Ever since the publication of Governing the Commons by Elinor Ostrom, the commons have been associated with a self-governing and self-sustaining scheme of production and burdened with the responsibility of carving out an autonomous social space independent from both the markets and the state. Since the commons prove on a small empirical scale that self-governance, far from being a utopian ideal, is and long has been a (...) lived reality, a few authors have attempted to turn them into the conceptual matrix of their own account of radical democracy. Negri and Hardt, on one hand, Laval and Dardot, on the other, have jointly coined the term ‘the common’ to suggest that the self-governance quintessential to the commons could be turned into a general democratic principle. Though this is an attractive theoretical prospect, I will contend that it fails to account for an important contradiction between the two theoretical frameworks it connects. Whereas the governance of the commons depends on harmonious cooperation between all stakeholders which in turn relies on a strong sense of belonging to a shared community, radical democracy is highly suspicious of any attempt to build a totalizing community and constantly emphasizes the decisive role of internal agonistic conflicts in maintaining a vibrant pluralism. I will further contend that the short-sightedness of radical democrats on this issue may be partially explained by the strong emphasis in the commons literature on a related but distinct conflict, that which opposes the commoners to the movement of enclosures. I will argue, however, that this conflict is not of an agonistic nature and does little to preserve the dynamism and the constant self-criticism proper to the radical democrat regime. (shrink)

Initially coined by Weizenbaum in 1976, ‘alien' thought refers to the radical difference with which ‘thinking machines’ approach the process of thinking. The contemporary paradox of over-determination and indeterminacy—caused largely by algorithmic decision-making in the civic realm—makes these differences both more entangled and more difficult to navigate. In this essay, I trace over-determination to Leibniz and Turing’s axiomatic procedures and to instrumental rationality, and I trace indeterminacy to the mid-twentieth century co-development of computers and neurosciences to advance the following proposition: (...) understanding alien thought requires understanding incomputability, temporal swarming, and inscriptive-significational errance. Understanding these phenomena in turn requires understanding thinking by doing, distributed thinking, and ontological indeterminacy. All are present in machinic operations as well as in the twentieth century experimental artistic practices of artists such as Duchamp, Cage, and Xu. These practices rely on indeterminate procedures and function as diagrammatic machines. A diagrammatic machine is neither abstract nor particular; neither an idea that is determining in the supreme instance, nor an infrastructure that is determining in the last instance, but rather instantiates a real yet to come (Deleuze and Guattari in A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia: Trans. Massumi B, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987). In this essay, indeterminate artistic practices are used as an entry into alien thought and its correlates—infinity and complexity—by way of aesthetic analogy. (shrink)

Tracing the thread of “decreation” in Chinese thought, from constantly changing classical masterpieces to fake cell phones that are better than the original. Shanzhai is a Chinese neologism that means “fake,” originally coined to describe knock-off cell phones marketed under such names as Nokir and Samsing. These cell phones were not crude forgeries but multifunctional, stylish, and as good as or better than the originals. Shanzhai has since spread into other parts of Chinese life, with shanzhai books, shanzhai politicians, shanzhai (...) stars. There is a shanzhai Harry Potter: Harry Potter and the Porcelain Doll, in which Harry takes on his nemesis Yandomort. In the West, this would be seen as piracy, or even desecration, but in Chinese culture, originals are continually transformed—deconstructed. In this volume in the Untimely Meditations series, Byung-Chul Han traces the thread of deconstruction, or “decreation,” in Chinese thought, from ancient masterpieces that invite inscription and transcription to Maoism—“a kind a shanzhai Marxism,” Han writes. Han discusses the Chinese concepts of quan, or law, which literally means the weight that slides back and forth on a scale, radically different from Western notions of absoluteness; zhen ji, or original, determined not by an act of creation but by unending process; xian zhan, or seals of leisure, affixed by collectors and part of the picture's composition; fuzhi, or copy, a replica of equal value to the original; and shanzhai. The Far East, Han writes, is not familiar with such “pre-deconstructive” factors as original or identity. Far Eastern thought begins with deconstruction. (shrink)

Resumen: El concepto “womenomics” propone la idea de “comprar la economía femenina” designando con ello la necesidad de Japón de hacer esfuerzos por incluir exponencialmente a la mujer en el mercado laboral e introducir uno de los mecanismos para corregir un futuro de estancamiento y contracción del crecimiento económico. El concepto lo acuñó en 1999 Kathy M. Matsui al frente de la división de investigación en Asia de Economía, Materias primas y Estrategia del grupo de banca y valores más importantes (...) del mundo, Goldman Sachs. En este ensayo se propone estudiar y analizar críticamente el marco político y económico de la estrategia conocida como Abe-Womenomics con el objetivo de conocer un aspecto de la actual política japonesa doméstica, y, por extensión, las implicaciones regionales e internacionales de su adopción y adaptación, para, luego, demostrar si este tipo de medidas buscan un giro hacia la equidad genuina o solamente replican un patrón productivista, resignificando las aspiraciones feministas en beneficio del sistema neoliberal. Palabras clave: Abe-Womenomics, Womenomics, Kathy M. Matsui, Nancy Fraser, resignificación, neoliberalismo. Abstract: The concept "womenomics" proposes the idea of "buying the female economy", thus designating Japan's need to make efforts to exponentially include women in the labor market and introduce one of the mechanisms to correct a future of stagnation and contraction of the economic growth. The concept was coined in 1999 by Kathy M. Matsui at the head of the Asian research division of Economy, Commodities and Strategy of the world's leading banking and investment group, Goldman Sachs. This essay proposes to study and critically analyze the political and economic framework of the strategy known as Abe-Womenomics, with the aim of knowing an aspect of current Japanese domestic policy, and, by extension, the regional and international implications of its adoption and adaptation. Then, the objective is to demonstrate whether this type of measure seeks a turn towards a genuine equity or only replicates a productivist pattern, re-signifying feminist aspirations for the benefit of the neoliberal system. Keywords: Abe-Womenomics, Womenomics, Kathy M. Matsui, Nancy Fraser, resignification, neoliberalism. (shrink)

This paper provides an examination of some problems caused by the concentration of influence in the capital markets of developed countries. In particular, I argue that large asset managers exercise quasi-political power that is not democratically legitimate. In section two, I will examine the economic driver behind the size and power of the big asset managers: the passive investing revolution. I will discuss several respects in which this revolution has fundamentally changed capital markets, most notably by making a large share (...) of investors universal owners. In the third section, I argue for my central analytical conjecture: asset managers exercise quasi-political power. They use their influence to shape the rules of the game in public capital markets in order to implement social and environmental policies that have traditionally been the exclusive purview of states. “Asset manager capitalism” is a recent term coined to refer to the contemporary system of corporate governance that succeeded the Berle and Means corporation with its dispersed ownership; the argument of this section is that asset manager capitalism is also a new political-economic regime. In the fourth section I defend my central normative claim: asset manager capitalism is an untenable and illegitimate political-economic arrangement, for at least two reasons. First, the power of asset managers is not checked by any institutional constraints, and is not rendered legitimate by any democratic process. More fundamental than this procedural critique is an argument that the interests of asset managers could not be aligned with the public interest, given the fact that the distribution of capital is highly unequal. I conclude by discussing several proposals to reform asset manager capitalism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.2 (2001) 3-8 [Access article in PDF] The Two Secrets of the Fetish Jean-Luc Nancy "Commodity fetishism": Marx's formula has been imprinted on the largest and most resistant of cultural memories. It has become almost anonymous, or rather synonymous with Marx's very name, as is the case with certain coined terms(cogito, categorical imperative...). This privilege could only be due to a very particular virtue. Such a virtue is (...) that which not only consists in characterizing, in the strict sense of the word (to typify a property or an essence), but even in characterizing in such a way that the character (the stamp, the seal) is somehow inscribed on the thing itself and can no longer be detached from it, or at least without some loss in the substance of the thing.In Kantian terms: the intuition presented under the word "fetishism" is printed or traced indelibly onto the concept of "commodity," giving rise to a schema "commodity," from which a new image, and thus a new idea, ensues. Not just the commodity as the fetish—as if this were one of its traits or one approach among others—but rather the essence of the commodity revealed as fetish, so that the fetish character would remain once the approach was shifted or the "secret" of its "mystical character" was revealed. (As we know, these are all Marx's own terms.)As is also known, the secret consists in that the commodity value (or exchange value) of the object (or product), which seems to be its intrinsic or immanent property (parallel in this way to its use value, which is extrinsic and completely relative to its utilization in a given sociotechnical context) only covers, masks or represses the origin of its pure or absolute value—this last value being nothing other than the living human labor of the producer, which the act of production incorporates into the product. But the commodity value deflects this incorporated creative life toward equivalence within an exchange, where the producer (the worker) finds himself surreptitiously stripped of the part of the value that the mercantile calculation does not exchange for the maintenance of its labor force, but rather sets to the account of capital. * * * Here we are not concerned with addressing the problems associated with the evaluation or the appreciation of living work as it is related to the intensification or the very creation of value ("the surplus-value"), nor with respect to the extortion suffered by the creator of value (the valuable and value-making man, the living man as maker, as giver of prices in an absolute fashion) to the benefit of the one who accumulates value in the form of general equivalence, creating mercantile prices through a common currency. Currency is the fetish, where fetishism is fixed: belief in the value of the market price itself. The critique of political economy—that is, the critique of the economy as politics—reveals the inanity of this belief, and if this critique cannot measure the hidden and mysticized or mystified value in monetary terms, the principle of this critique remains [End Page 3] no less, but even more so, the incommensurability of the value creator and the marketed product.Alienation is not measurable. It is at the same time the principle of the critique and its impasse from the moment that we would like to, and indeed that we should, oppose one measure to another: the critical measure of the fetish against the mercantile measure through the fetish.In contrast, what we would like to sketch out here would have the following hypothesis as a point of departure: does not the strength of Marx's formula derive from a power other than that of the only critique thus broached? Is there not another energy, and another enigma, slipped into the first, adding itself to the revelation of the secret, even exceeding this revelation and perhaps in this fashion displacing just a bit the secret itself (precisely because it is not measurable)?This other power would derive from "fetishism" itself. That is to say... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reifying Relevance in Mild Cognitive Impairment:An Appeal for Care and CautionJanice E. Graham (bio) and Karen Ritchie (bio)KeywordsAlzheimer’s disease, construction, dementia, market forces, mild cognitive impairmentWe thank the reviewers for their thoughtful comments that probe shadowy areas in our argument, and we welcome this opportunity to elucidate our position. First, we are not repudiating the natural and social facts of pathologic brain degeneration and the physical and cognitive (...) impairments that manifest in people affected by dementia disorders. We are, however, questioning the epistemology, politics, and persistence by some to harden the construct of mild cognitive impairment (MCI) prematurely as a "natural" precursor to dementia. We suggested insufficiencies in viewing MCI as prodromal to Alzheimer's disease (AD; Graham and Ritchie 2006, 36), and pointed to evidence for the prognostic irrelevance of some MCI subcategories (35). The commentators have read our manuscript as suggesting that AD and MCI are different kinds, and that a diagnosis of AD is more "real" than that of MCI. But AD is also fraught with classification issues, as we describe in the section of our paper that deals with consensus committees, published practice guidelines, and the determination of treatment efficacy. Like MCI, AD is a heterogeneous condition, but unlike MCI, AD is a constructed practical kind that does some "work" beyond essentialist (neural degeneration, brain atrophy) claims. Its criteria identify people with well-defined dementia symptoms and multiple cognitive and functional impairments who are in need of, and benefit from, support. Even with these criteria, however, there have been great attempts to achieve definitional accuracy in dementia diagnoses. Practical refinements to the differential diagnosis of dementia based on solid research evidence have made way for more specific recognitions of vascular dementias, dementia of the Lewy body type, and other subtypes beyond AD. So AD too has been subject to more careful, more cautious operationalization in recent years, with research supporting multiple factors and the comorbidity of several types (kinds) of dementia in any one individual.Our paper takes up concerns that are not resolved for dementia and suggests that the nascent category of MCI is still so insufficiently defined as to be ambiguous, and as such, is in danger of identifying individuals with what will be, and has [End Page 57] already been, linked to a debilitating and deeply stigmatizing and fatal disorder (AD). We are not contesting the reality that some people begin to display early signs of cognitive loss, nor are we suggesting that symptoms be ignored; as researchers, we stand behind the careful tracking of symptoms and signs in patients and research participants as an essential clinical and research practice. In a era where the public has been made wary of the potentially fatal effects of new treatments whose more careful scrutiny in specific populations would have saved lives (e.g., Fontanarosa, Rennie, and DeAngelis 2004; Psaty and Furberg 2005), and made all the more popular by what Kramer coined "diagnostic bracket creep" (1993, 15), we are questioning the drivers and value of a premature diagnostic classification whose definitional accuracy is neither sufficient nor effective for specific identification of individuals.That matters of fact are constructed does not take away from their natural fact. Some people have subjective reports or show objective evidence of cognitive decline while having preserved activities of daily living—the construction of this evidence indicates they are not normal and they are not demented. Based on such evidence, where then does the balance of probability for MCI lie? A multidisciplinary international group of experts gathered in Stockholm in 2003 to discuss MCI concepts (Winblad et al. 2004). They acknowledged that the heterogeneous etiology of MCI contributes to "some confusion concerning the specific boundaries of the condition", stating that this "not normal, not demented" condition is nonetheless "useful both clinically and as a research entity" (p. 241). Importantly, they concluded that MCI needs "better definition" (p. 246). It was at this stage that we first wrote our manuscript, and in the subsequent two years we have eagerly awaited new studies, and the recognition of flexible, practical subtypes to evolve.We state "that MCI cannot be considered to be a separate clinical entity" (Graham and... (shrink)

There is a phenomenon which has from of old and in a peculiar degree attracted the attention of social philosophers and practical economists, the fact of certain commodities (these being in advanced civilizations coined pieces of gold and silver, together subsequently with documents representing those coins) becoming universally acceptable media of exchange. It is obvious even to the most ordinary intelligence, that a commodity should be given up by its owner in exchange for another more useful to him. But that (...) every economic unit in a nation should be ready to exchange his goods for little metal disks apparently useless as such, or for documents representing the latter, is a procedure so opposed to the ordinary course of things, that we cannot well wonder if even a distinguished thinker like Savigny finds it downright 'mysterious.' It must not be supposed that the form of coin, or document, employed as current money, constitutes the enigma in this phenomenon. We may look away from these forms and go back to earlier stages of economic development, or indeed to what still obtains in countries here and there, where we find the precious metals in a uncoined state serving as the medium of exchange, and even certain other commodities, cattle, skins, cubes of tea, slabs of salt, cowrie shells, etc.; still we are confronted by this phenomenon, still we have to explain why it is that the economic man is ready to accept a certain kind of commodity, even if he does not need it, or if his need of it is already supplied, in exchange for all the goods he has brought to market, while it is none the less what he needs that he consults in the first instance, with respect to the goods he intends to acquire in the course of his transactions. And hence there runs, from the first essays of reflective contemplation of a social phenomena down to our own times, an uninterrupted chain of disquisitions upon the nature and specific qualities of money in its relation to all that constitutes traffic.. (shrink)

Originating in a 1983 Mexican Government Program, the term ‘food sovereignty’ was coined in 1996 by La Via Campesina—a global peasant network—to address concerns within the civil society for food security. Rather than to accept the neoliberal framework of mainstream food security definition and governance, the food sovereignty movement seeks to view food security as the right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture systems with limited corporation intervention. As a result, food production should be geared toward the (...) domestic and local markets and not toward international trade that only benefits corporations. This food sovereignty movement was inducted into China in 2013 just as China’s agricultural systems were shifting toward a more corporate-centric structure that increasingly exploits the small-scale farmers. A question was hence raised: How have the global civil society networks influenced the Chinese civil society and promoted China’s local food sovereignty movement? Through the world society theory, the author has identified social forums, such as international conferences and social media channels, as an expedient means for interactions. However, as the Chinese government continues to develop a corporate-centric food security governance system and tighten its civil society space, the impacts of China’s food sovereignty movement remain unclear. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 12.2 (2004) 181-186 [Access article in PDF] Response to June Boyce-Tillman, "Towards an Ecology of Music Education" Claudia Gluschankof Levinsky College of Education, Israel I begin with two confessions. First, music was not my favorite class at school. I cannot even recall what we did there. It did not at all connect with the powerful, meaningful place that music had in my private life, (...) where I loved to sing with my family, and play and sing in ensembles in classes at a private music school. The private piano lessons were fine, but I found no joy in practicing on my own. Music was for me-and still is-a communal experience, associated with personal choice. School did not, and probably could not, provide that.Second, during a recent marketing meeting at the college where I teach and work, I finally said aloud, "I am not sure that I can market a product in which I don't believe." Being a teacher in overcrowded, resource-poor schools where parents are less involved yet more interfering and being expected to conform to standards and to act more as a producer of school ceremonies and festivals and less as a music educator is not a profession I would recommend entering. Boyce-Tillman's paper offers a model for music education in which the corrective emotional experience, in my own case, becomes a remedial object lesson in the setting of the music classroom and a reason to recommend music school teaching as a rewarding profession.Boyce-Tillman calls us to conceive of music "as intimately related to human society and the environment rather than as a discrete and separated category of knowing." Her position is in tune with Christopher Small's coined term "musicking": The act of musicking establishes in the place where it is happening a set of relationships, and it is in those relationships that the meaning of the act lies. They are to be found not only between those organized sounds which are [End Page 181] conventionally thought of as being the stuff of musical meaning but also between the people who are taking part, in whatever capacity, in the performance; and they model, or stand as metaphor for, ideal relationships as the participants in the performance imagine them to be: relationships between person and person, between individual and society, between humanity and the natural world and perhaps the supernatural world.1The five interlocking areas proposed in Boyce-Tillman's model are present in Small's musicking: the relationships among the sounds parallel the area called Materials; the relationships between people and sounds may parallel the area called Expression, which refers to the personal meaning given to the organized sounds. "In the area of Construction, effectiveness often depends on the right management of repetition and contrast within a particular idiom." Such a particular idiom is part of the style ideal of a particular culture. It is defined in terms of form and content, and expresses some inner quality of the society that produced it. The style ideal can be characterized by different factors (for example, historical period, geographic location, school, manner of performance, individual composer, and so on) and can be examined in terms of musical components (form, texture, harmony, melody).2According to Boyce-Tillman, the area of Values "is related to the context of the music-making experience. All musical experiences are culturally related." Because values are shared by groups, I found this present in the relationships be-tween a subculture and the larger society, in its broader meaning. The fifth area is Spirituality, defined by Boyce-Tillman as "the ability to transport the audience to a different time/space dimension." That different time/space dimension may be understood as the supernatural world, referred to by Small.Small sees the greatest challenge to music educators today to be that of providing "that kind of social context for informal as well as formal musical interaction that leads to real development and to the musicalizing of the society as a whole,"3... (shrink)

Infectious and parasitic diseases cause enormous health problems in the developing world whereas they leave the developed one relatively unscathed. Research and development (R&D) of drugs for diseases that mainly affect people in developing countries is limited. The problem that relatively few drugs are available for diseases that cause an enormous burden of disease in the developing world is called the 'availability problem'. In recent years, the availability problem has received quite a bit of attention. A number of proposals have (...) been fielded as to how this problem might be minimized. Wild-card patent extensions, advance market commitments, cash prizes and the Health Impact Fund are prominent examples of such proposals. These proposals can be thought of as pull-mechanisms for R&D of drugs for neglected diseases. What has been coined a 'priority review voucher' is another pull-mechanism. This paper is a critical discussion of this pull-mechanism. First, the original priority review voucher scheme, as proposed by Ridley et al. (2006), is described. A number of objections to this scheme are thereafter presented. A few amendments to the original scheme are then suggested, and it is argued that with these amendments in place, the priority review voucher scheme constitutes an attractive way of stimulating R&D of drugs for neglected diseases. (shrink)

My title refers to a very modern problem, for what else is modernization than a process of rational differentiation of society in autonomous, mutually isolated sub-spheres, to the point where no one any longer knows what the unity of it all is? We differentiate, we specialize, we hyperspecialize, and then we get puzzled over the fragmentation we have produced around us, between ourselves and even within ourselves. Look at our own area. You cannot even specialize in practical ethics any more. (...) You have to limit your attention to medical ethics, for example, the ethics of engineering, or business ethics. And within business ethics, my own field of research, the homo universalis is also threatened with extinction. You can do marketing ethics, ethics of finance or computer ethics, until you finally become the typical ‘expert’: someone who knows almost everything about almost nothing.From the despair over hyper-differentiation, the call for integration arises: the call for meaning, for reconfiguration, for making sense of our world and our lives again, the call for reconnection with the great traditions of our culture, the call for community.If we read the great theorists of modernization — Weber, Durkheim, Parsons, Habermas, Münch — we learn that the quest for integration is in fact an equally important aspect of modernization as is differentiation. They are two sides of the same coin. In this sense, I think, the integrative endeavour of the EEN can still be considered a modern one.We are presently facing an escalation, or a climax, of modernity. We live in a state of hypermodernity, in which technological, economic and cultural forces dynamize our society on an unprecedented scale. We are really living high up on the dazzling slopes of the exponential growth curves that the Club of Rome predicted over 25 years ago. Everyone speaks of change. Everything is changing, and with institutionalized change, everything has become uncertain. Within uncertainty, however, social disintegration is lurking. Does not the structural uncertainty that we are introducing in our society bring us back to a state of nature, to a state outside the hypothetical social contract on which modern social communities are based? Is not the life of the individualized, flexible wanderers on the labour market again resembling the pledge of man which Hobbes described as ‘solitary, nasty and brutish’ . Has not the life of many in our society again become ‘very unsafe and very insecure, full of fears and continual dangers’, in the way that Locke depicted the state of nature .I understand business ethics as an integrative undertaking in our society, integrative in particular with respect to the economy and the realm of formal organization, integrative also at the interface between life-world and system, to use the terminology of Habermas.Integrative endeavours in our society have an ambiguous relation to change. Change is a key challenge to business ethics. Should we accept disruptive forms of change as inevitable, in order to remain on speaking terms with the economy and its spokesmen? Or should we fiercely resist certain changes? Is change on our side, perhaps? Business ethics is sometimes presented as a way to help managers cope with the many paradoxes of our time. One-dimensional technological rationality, we say, is no longer adequate to grasp the complexities, ambiguities and paradoxes of our world. Successful management requires more flexible, more creative forms of thinking. Philosophy and ethics are then presented as alternatives. But then aren’t we, the philosophers, simply promoting ourselves as the new masters of change for our time? Isn’t the so-called postmodern consciousness in fact an ideological underpinning of hyper differentiation, and in this sense the ultimate self-realization of the spirit of modernity? What sense of direction do we offer, as business ethicists?I would like to speak about the integration of micro, meso and macro-levels in business ethics, from the perspective of social change. My basic thesis is that only an adequate ethics of responsibility can integrate a highly differentiated and ultra-complex society like ours. This integration through responsibility opens up new directions of social change, that proceed simultaneously at the micro, meso and macro-level.In order not to complicate matters too much, I will limit myself to two dimensions of change which are important for business ethics at the moment: economic change ; organizational change . In relation to these changes, I will conclude with some reflections on changes in business ethics itself, the ones that I think are needed. (shrink)

Minimum wages are usually assumed to be inefficient as they prevent the full exploitation of mutual gains from trade. Yet advocates of wage regulation policies have repeatedly claimed that this loss in market efficiency can be justified by the pursuit of ethical goals. Policy makers, it is argued, should not focus on efficiency alone. Rather, they should try to find an adequate balance between efficiency and equity targets. This idea is based on a two-worlds-paradigm that sees ethics and economics (...) as two inherently conflicting ways of thinking. We, however, believe that this view of the relationship between ethics and economics is fundamentally flawed and blurs our understanding of how an ethically responsible regulation of the labour market should be conducted. In drawing on an economic-ethical approach that resolves the antinomy between efficiency and equity, we show that ethics and economics are, in fact, two sides of the same coin and that minimum wage legislation can only be ethically responsible, if it is at the same time economically efficient. In other words, we can have our cake and eat it too. On the basis of our approach, we develop two simple game theoretical models for different types of labour markets and derive policy implications from an economic-ethical viewpoint. We suggest that under the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets a tax-funded wage subsidy is preferable over minimum wages, as it makes everyone better off. If, however, employers have monopsony power in the wage setting process, the minimum wage is justifiable under certain conditions. (shrink)

The article deals with the theme of updating of Cuba’s economic model mainly from the perspective of economic and political philosophy and its interdisciplinary contexts. First, it examines the historical origins of Cuba’s socialist model and the subsequent changes after the fall of the Eastern Bloc. Second, it analyses the actualization of Cuba’s model in the first two decades of the 21st century, that is, mainly the introduction of market and private ownership to complement planning and public ownership. Third, (...) it explains the codification of these changes in the new constitution. Forth and finally, it focuses on an interpretation of international cooperation both in Latin America, especially within the framework of the two pink tides, and with other partners in global interactions, particularly China. This will make it possible to understand the updated Cuba’s model, which the author has coined strategic socialism with Cuban characteristics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good? by Michael J. SandelYoko NagaseMichael J. Sandel. The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good? New York: Penguin Books, 2021. 272 pp. Hardcover, £9.99. ISBN 978-0-141-99117-7.Is a meritocratic capitalist society a utopia? The answer depends on who you are. A libertarian is likely to embrace the meritocratic credo that talent and effort deserve rewards, regarding their (...) success in a competitive market system as their own doing and even looking down on those who are not successful (25). A liberal may emphasize the need for a redistributive safety net and yet still promote meritocratic capitalism as utopian as we may ever achieve.1 Michael Young, who coined the term meritocracy in 1958, depicted an imaginary meritocratic society as a dystopia (116). In The Tyranny of Merit, Michael J. Sandel spends six out of seven chapters exemplifying the misery of not-being-a-winner in a meritocratic society.The Tyranny of Merit does a brilliant job at providing an “A-ha!” moment to anyone who has been compelled to accept, and to live with, the seemingly fair meritocratic rule of evaluating individuals, despite the frustrating awareness that something is not quite right. The author articulates exactly what’s wrong with meritocratic capitalism.The problem of meritocratic capitalism is, succinctly put, “merit drives out grace” (58). Meritocratic capitalism denigrates those who lack abilities or, worse, it humiliates those who hold jobs that are needed by the society but do not pay a lot (203). Meritocracy provides a justification for inequality that markets deliver by making people believe that their success is their own doing, not something they inherit (120, 125). However, distribution of income and wealth based on the natural distribution of talent and abilities on which the success depends is just as arbitrary as the distribution based on the [End Page 154] historical and social fortune such as class.2 This lack of gratitude and humility among those who are rewarded richly by the markets, Sandel points out, discourages the successful people from caring for the common good or those who are less fortunate than themselves (14, 59).Any mainstream introductory economics textbook would say that prices provide market participants with information about the scarcity of productive inputs and incentive to pursue their self-interests (utility and profits), resulting in markets’ delivering goods and services that best serve consumers’ needs and wants. These textbooks would also clarify that efficiency that markets deliver in allocating productive resources and goods does not imply that the outcomes are necessarily fair or equitable. What is not necessarily made explicitly clear, however, is that market prices do not represent moral values. Rawls, Hayek, and Friedman agreed with Knights in that a market price depends on supply and demand that depend on institutional settings such as property rights, taxation, and support for higher education; therefore, distributing according to the market outcome has “little or no ethical significance.”3 Sandel laments that, in reality, those who are marked by markets as lacking merits (via low pay) live with a sense of demoralizing, humiliating failure (185). The outcome is a lack of contributive justice; those who lack merits struggle to achieve the recognition and honor that they deserve for what they offer through their works (203).What is likely to be completely missing in introductory economics classes at universities is the emphasis on contributive justice. Contributive justice, in my view, is the most important concept introduced by The Tyranny of Merit. The author emphasizes that individuals should be given a chance “to win the social recognition and esteem that go with producing what others need and value” (206). The author challenges us to think again how we should value different types of occupations (191). Aren’t plumbers, social workers, and teachers just as important for society as bankers? Why should there be any prejudice against those who choose not to go to universities? (73). Economics should emphasize that we are not just consumers; we are (proudly?) producers as well. Chapter 3 of The Tyranny of Merit provides many examples of politicians embracing meritocratic policies based on... (shrink)

Abstractabstract:The concept of “boring dystopia,” a term coined by Mark Fisher, describes the banal and mildly coercive signs that are prevalent in contemporary neoliberal society. It is characterized by a pervasive sense of boredom, banality, and total alienation, which arises from the depletion of social connections caused by free-market fundamentalism and consumer culture. For the author, Edward Hopper’s paintings embody this sense of dystopia, as they depict deserted cityscapes and isolated figures, creating a vision of a society where human (...) connection and interaction have broken down. The COVID-19 pandemic response has further highlighted the erosion of empathy and compassion under neoliberal capitalism, making Fisher’s call for collective action and the creation of new forms of community and solidarity even more urgent. Edward Hopper’s haunting art reminds us that we are already living in a dystopia, and that it is crucial to confront this dystopian reality and imagine new possibilities for the future. (shrink)

Science and the humanities share the same kit of working tools, called the world's literature. While the author of this article deals mainly with the scientific and mathematical literature, the reader probably gravitates towards some other branches, but such distinctions were hardly made in the Middle Ages. The American philosopher, Wallace Stevens, in his book The Necessary Angel remarks that at the time of Aristotle, the Greek language had no word to signify literature. The reason is surely that literature had (...) long since been too universal an element in Greece to require a name. We have no name for the smell of air. This all-pervading power of literature is apparent already two generations before Aristotle, when Socrates made his defence against leading the youth of Athens towards atheism. Plato's Apology tells us how Socrates taunted his accuser: “Have you such a low opinion of the judges, that you fancy them so illiterate as not to know these doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras which are full of them? And so, my word, the youth are said to be taught them by Socrates, when they can be bought in the book-market for one drachma at most…” (a coin today worth 1.4 pence!). (shrink)

Resumo: O pensamento de Walter Benjamin ocupa uma posição particular e, pode-se até dizer, especial na história do pensamento crítico moderno. Sua obra, fragmentada, inacabada, hermética, atual, anacrônica e complexa, possibilita um passeio sobre uma diversidade de temáticas que vão desde a literatura, passando pela sociologia, filosofia, arte, história, entre outras. O objetivo principal deste artigo consiste, assim, em estabelecer mais um olhar em direção a esse pensador. Trata-se, sobretudo, de compreender como as temáticas do fetichismo da mercadoria e da (...) fantasmagoria podem ser vistas em uma de suas principais obras semificcionais (“Infânc[1]ia Berlinense: 1900”). Foram selecionados, para fins deste trabalho, oito excertos. São eles: “O telefone” “Rua de Steglitz, esquina com a rua de Genthin”, “Mercado”, “Krumme Straβe”, “Um fantasma”, “O anãozinho corcunda”, “Blumeshof 12” e “Desgraças e Crimes”. Após a análise dos excertos, pôde-se observar que o conceito de fetichismo da mercadoria, cunhado por Marx no Capital e ampliado por Benjamin como um elemento de interpretação da realidade burguesa alemã da época de sua infância (fantasmagoria), pode ser visualizado na maioria dos excertos escritos pelo autor na obra “Infância Berlinense: 1900”. Palavras-chave: Fetichismo; Fantasmagoria; Infância Berlinense: 1900; Walter Benjamin. Fetishism and Phantasmagoria in the Work “Berliner Childhood: 1900”, by Walter Benjamin Abstract: Walter Benjamin's thought occupies a particular and, one might even say, special position in the history of modern critical thought. His work, fragmented, unfinished, hermetic, current, anachronistic and complex, allows a tour of a diversity of themes ranging from literature, through sociology, philosophy, art, history, among others. The main objective of this article is, therefore, to establish another look towards this thinker. It is, above all, to understand how the themes of commodity fetishism and phantasmagoria can be seen in one of his main semi-fictional works (“Berlin Childhood: 1900”). Eight excerpts were selected for the purposes of this work. They are: “The Telephone”, “Steglitz Street, Corner with Genthin Street”, “Market”, “Krumme Straβe”, “A Ghost”, “The Humpbacked Little Dwarf”, “Blumeshof 12” and “Misfortunes and Crimes”. After analyzing the excerpts, it was possible to observe that the concept of commodity fetishism, coined by Marx in Capital and expanded by Benjamin as an element of interpretation of the German bourgeois reality of his childhood (phantasmagoria), can be visualized in most excerpts written by the author in the work “Berlin Childhood: 1900”. Keywords: Fetishism; Fantasmagoria; Berlin Childhood: 1900; Walter Benjamin. Fetichismo y Fantasmagoría en la Obra “Infancia Berlinesa: 1900”, de Walter Benjamin Resumen: El pensamiento de Walter Benjamin ocupa un lugar particular y, hasta se podría decir, especial en la historia del pensamiento crítico moderno. Su obra, fragmentada, inconclusa, hermética, actual, anacrónica y compleja, permite un recorrido por una diversidad de temáticas que van desde la literatura, pasando por la sociología, la filosofía, el arte, la historia, entre otras. El objetivo principal de este artículo es, por tanto, establecer otra mirada hacia este pensador. Se trata, sobre todo, de entender cómo los temas del fetichismo de la mercancía y la fantasmagoría pueden verse en una de sus principales obras semificcionales ("Infancia berlinesa: 1900"). Se seleccionaron ocho extractos para los propósitos de este trabajo. Ellos son: "El teléfono", "Calle Steglitz, esquina con calle Genthin", "Mercado", "Krumme Straβe", "Un fantasma", "El enanito jorobado", "Blumeshof 12" y "Desgracias y crímenes". Tras el análisis de los extractos, fue posible observar que el concepto de fetichismo de la mercancía, acuñado por Marx en El Capital y ampliado por Benjamin como elemento de interpretación de la realidad burguesa alemana de su infancia (fantasmagoría), puede visualizarse en la mayoría de los extractos escritos del autor en la obra "Infancia berlinesa: 1900". Palabras clave: Fetichismo; Fantasmagoría; Infancia Berlinesa: 1900; Walter Benjamin. Data de registro: 04/03/2022 Data de aceite: 01/12/2022. (shrink)

Theo C. Meyering, in “Mind Matters: Physicalism and the Autonomy of the Person,” takes yet a third approach to the issue of reduction. He states that “if (true, downward) mental causation implies nonreducibility [as Stoeger and Murphy argue] and physicalism implies the converse, it is hard to see how these two views could be compatible.” Meyering distinguishes three versions of reductionism: radical (industrial strength) physicalism; ideal (regular strength) physicalism, and mild or token physicalism. Radical physicalism asserts that all special sciences (...) are reducible to physics in the sense that their laws can be deduced via bridge laws from those of physics. Ideal physicalism asserts that while it is practically impossible to reduce the special sciences, such reduction would be possible were there an ideally complete physics" (Note: This distinction parallels Stoeger’s recognition that epistemological reducibility is relative to the meaning of “laws of nature). Token physicalism is ontologically reductionist: there are no events that are not “token-identical” with some physical event or other (Note: See above, sec. 3.3). However, there are no identities between higher-level and lower- level types of events; consequently some events described by the special sciences have no physical explanation at all. -/- All of these reductionist positions are to be contrasted with compositional (milder than mild) physicalism, which asserts that some higher-level events are not even token-identical with physical events because the higher-level event (say, a crash in the stock market) is constituted by innumerable physical particulars in all sorts of states and interactions. -/- Meyering then surveys some of the existing arguments for the nonreducibility of the special sciences. One of the most important is the argument from multiple realizability. The claim is that economics, for example, is not reducible to physics because economic concepts (for example, monetary exchange) are “wildly multiply realizable” (for example, using coins, strings of wampum, signing a check). Thus, there can be no bridge laws and no reduction. Such an argument, however, only cuts against radical physicalism, not the weaker (and a priori more plausible) ideal physicalism. -/- A stronger argument for the indispensability of special-science explanations is based on the role of functional explanations. For example, the functional description of aspirin as an analgesic is in some instances a more useful explanation of its causal role (relieving a headache) than is its description as the chemical level. -/- Meyering’s own contribution focuses neither on multiple realizability of supervenient properties nor on multiple “fillers” of functional roles, but on “multiple supervenience.” In particular, a single subvenient state of affairs (for example, a cloud of free electrons permeating the metal of which a ladder is constructed) may realize a variety of supervenient dispositional properties (in this case, electrical conductivity, thermal conductivity, opacity). An explanation (say, of the cause of a deadly accident) requires reference to the dispositional property (electrical conductivity), not merely to the subvenient property. Meyering argues that it is this possibility of multiple supervenience, not multiple realizability, that gives arguments against reduction based on functional properties their real force. Downward causation, then, can be understood in terms of selective activation of one of several dispositional properties of a lower-level state, and thus can be assigned a stable place in our picture of how the world is organized without upsetting our conception of physics as constituting a closed and complete system of physical events. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:La séduction de la fiction by Jean-François VernayDiana MistreanuVernay, Jean-François. La séduction de la fiction. Hermann, 2019. 214pp.Published in Hermann’s prestigious “Savoirs Lettres” book series founded by Michel Foucault, Jean-François Vernay’s latest work is a compelling neurophenomenology of literary fiction. This makes it a valuable contribution to the burgeoning field of cognitive literary studies pioneered in Anglo-Saxon research in the late 1970s, but which French academia, with a (...) few notable exceptions such as Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Pierre-Louis Patoine, Alexandre Gefen, Catherine Grall, or Françoise Lavocat, is still largely reluctant to embrace. The author is a lecturer in Australian studies at the Global Institute in Sydney, and he is a bilingual literary scholar whose recent research explores the complex interface between fiction and human cognition.Vernay’s book starts by restating a narratological cliché: in the words of Paul Valéry, stories accompany humans from the cradle to the tomb, as monsters, pirates, fairies, and other fantastic creatures fascinate children’s minds from the first years of their lives (7). A truism follows this cliché: the origin of any story is the human brain (16), as the author reminds us by underlining the bio-anthropological origins of fiction in pages that cite the works of Umberto Eco and Nancy Huston (the writer who coined the notion of “espèce fabulatrice,” “the tale-teller species” [2008]), and that echo the research of scholars such as Mark Turner (1996) and Jean-Marie Schaeffer (1999). Indeed, oral and written stories are not only created, but also interpreted by human minds, triggering states and emotions that range from extreme boredom to excitement and inviting identification with fictional characters. Nevertheless, the mechanisms of the interaction between the human mind and brain and one of its most sophisticated products, namely fiction, are largely still understudied in the field of literature. Placing fiction under the sign of seduction (8) – which allows us to read between the lines an homage to Roland Barthes, the theorist of the “plaisir du texte” referenced later in the book (85-86) – Vernay defines works of fiction as catalysts of a sensori-affective experience [End Page 151] that engages almost all our senses and arouses emotions (“le vecteur d’une expérience sensori-affective qui sollicite la quasi-totalité de nos sens et suscite des émois” [19]). Characterized by the interdisciplinarity that forms the core of cognitive approaches to fiction, Vernay’s study investigates the literary phenomenon in its complexity, asking not only how fiction seduces us, but also why it sometimes fails to do so. Drawing on state-of-the-art research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, the book manages to eschew over-simplified or reductionist analyses. Our engagement with and consumption of literary fiction is thus analyzed by discussing marketing strategies and editorial choices, the activity of reading as a solitary pleasure versus a professional obligation, as well as the interplay between society, politics, and educational curricula. The author answers his multi-layered research question in nine different chapters, each of them exploring one facet of the relationship between literature and the human mind.The first chapter, “Émois livresques,” highlights the marketing value of books, as well as their status as objects of consumption, in the capitalistic sense of the word. Books are presented here as the targets of our desire, since in financial terms, the notion of reader, the author reminds us, is a mere euphemism for that of consumer (20-22). As we are entering the era of what Yves Citton, often quoted in this essay, calls “cognitive capitalism,” a system in which society is conceptualized as a set of machines that process information (21), fictional literature, along with the arts, is devalued. To counterbalance this trend, Vernay explains, the book industry has to adopt effective strategies that create a desire for consumption. Thus, this chapter addresses the editorial and marketing techniques designed to attract our attention and trigger our impulse to buy and read. From the smell and color of books to the blurb and the careful mention of literary prizes, no detail is overlooked or considered redundant.After addressing the... (shrink)

If maximizing utility leads to the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people, as utilitarianism has always proposed, then why is it that as many of us currently maximize our utility--by working endlessly, undertaking further education and training, relentlessly marketing and selling ourselves--we are met with the steady worsening of collective social and economic conditions? In Futilitarianism, social and political theorist Neil Vallelly eloquently tells the story of how neoliberalism transformed the relationship between utility maximisation and the common good. (...) Drawing on a vast array of contemporary examples, from self-help literature and marketing jargon to political speeches and governmental responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, Vallelly coins several terms--including "the futilitarian condition," "homo futilitus," and "semio-futility"--to demonstrate that in the neoliberal decades, the practice of utility maximisation traps us in useless and repetitive behaviors that foreclose the possibility of collective happiness. This urgent and provocative book chimes with the mood of the time by at once mapping the historical relationship between utilitarianism and capitalism, developing an original framework for understanding neoliberalism, and recounting the lived experience of uselessness in the early twenty-first century. At a time of epoch-defining disasters, from climate emergencies to deadly pandemics, countering the futility of neoliberal existence is essential to building an egalitarian, sustainable, and hopeful future" -- Publisher description. (shrink)

Originating in a 1983 Mexican Government Program, the term ‘food sovereignty’ was coined in 1996 by La Via Campesina—a global peasant network—to address concerns within the civil society for food security. Rather than to accept the neoliberal framework of mainstream food security definition and governance, the food sovereignty movement seeks to view food security as the right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture systems with limited corporation intervention. As a result, food production should be geared toward the (...) domestic and local markets and not toward international trade that only benefits corporations. This food sovereignty movement was inducted into China in 2013 just as China’s agricultural systems were shifting toward a more corporate-centric structure that increasingly exploits the small-scale farmers. A question was hence raised: How have the global civil society networks influenced the Chinese civil society and promoted China’s local food sovereignty movement? Through the world society theory, the author has identified social forums, such as international conferences and social media channels, as an expedient means for interactions. However, as the Chinese government continues to develop a corporate-centric food security governance system and tighten its civil society space, the impacts of China’s food sovereignty movement remain unclear. (shrink)

The concept of innovation defines our age. It fuels the global economy, promises a sustainable future, and stands at the heart of our interconnected society. On the one hand, the concept of innovation is widely presupposed in terms of the commercial value it generates. As claimed in the tradition of economic analysis, innovation is characterized by its competitive dynamics and primarily directed at developing marketable products and services. On the other hand, the reality of today’s global issues, such as climate (...) change and food security, urges innovation to generate societal value beyond mainstream economic incentive. To this end, the EU policy discourse has paved the way for Responsible Innovation. The core idea here is to steer innovation processes towards societally desirable outcomes, specifically in response to the ‘grand challenges’ of our time. Under the sway of ‘science with and for society’, the hypothesis is that innovation can only respond to the needs and ambitions of society by including all its actors throughout the process. However, while much effort is dedicated to governing innovation, little thought goes to what innovation itself means conceptually. What understanding of innovation underpins the framework of RI? What implications, if any, does this have for the ambition to achieve RI? These are important questions to raise as they enable critical reflection on the relation between responsibility and innovation, broadly speaking. Does the ‘R’ in RI entail an application of ethical keys to an already existing concept of innovation, or does it require us to rethink the concept of innovation altogether? After providing a general introduction in chapter 1 on the context of the dissertation and its main research objectives, chapter 2 shows how RI emerged from a longer history of efforts to incorporate ethical dimensions in new and emerging technologies, such as Technology Assessment and Science and Technology Studies. While similar to its precursors in prioritizing ethical concerns, RI clearly distinguishes itself by shifting from an ethics of constraints to an ethics of construction. The chapter continues to show that such an approach comes with an epistemic challenge, a political challenge, and a conceptual challenge. Through an extensive analysis of policy documents and academic literature, chapter 3 breaks open the concept of innovation in the RI discourse. Firstly, it demonstrates that the RI discourse tends to presuppose a techno-economic concept of innovation, as coined by the terms ‘technological innovation’ and ‘commercialized innovation’. Secondly, it provides a historical analysis to show that the concept of innovation was originally politically oriented and had little to do with the way in which it is commonly understood today. Thirdly, it discusses the implications of a techno-economic concept of innovation for achieving the ideal of RI and brings into question whether the political origins of innovation may inspire an alternative route. Chapter 4 engages with the philosophy of technology to assess the feasibility of RI at both an ontic and ontological level. While innovation at the ontic level refers to concrete innovative artefacts, innovation at the ontological level refers to the mode through which these artefacts are seen, understood, and created. At the ontic level, RI is shown to play a significant role in steering emerging technologies towards societally desirable outcomes. Even so, at the ontological level, the question is whether the ideal of RI is feasible insofar its scope is limited to governing a techno-economic concept of innovation. Parallel to Martin Heidegger’s view of technology as Enframing, this chapter denotes that in trying to govern a techno-economic concept of innovation, the RI discourse remains subject to its dominance. This in turn explains why, at the operational level, RI is often employed for mere strategic and instrumental purposes, while falling short on its promoted ambitions. Chapter 5 articulates an orientation shift from a techno-economic concept of innovation towards a political concept of innovation in the RI discourse. To this end, the chapter distinguishes between weak RI, which seeks to govern a techno-economic concept of innovation through an applied set of ethical dimensions; and strong RI, which seeks to conceive a political concept of innovation beyond techno-economic ideology and practice. Inspired by the work of Hannah Arendt, the chapter establishes a political concept of innovation that actualizes the human capacity for speech and action, inspires radical novelty, and empowers the public sphere. In doing so, the chapter concludes that strong RI is principally a plural undertaking which guards individual opinion from collective opinion; enables a physical and symbolic openness that genuinely activates citizenry; and stimulates performative speech. The final chapter, chapter 6, briefly recaps the main research objectives and takes stock of the insights gained. It concludes that the contribution of this dissertation does not reside in the concern with the techno-economic ideology of innovation as such – a concern which RI in fact already expressed when it first emerged – but more so in the ontological critique to the idea that this ideology can somehow be overpowered through governance and regulation. The rehabilitation of an ontological dimension in RI in turn provides a new perspective to the philosophy of technology, which over the years has taken a course away from ontological viewpoints. Moreover, the chapter elaborates on how a political concept of innovation adds depth to the foundational claims of RI. Based on these conclusions, the chapter reflects on a range of broader insights, particularly in relation to the philosophy of innovation and the ethics of socially disruptive technologies. In sum, this dissertation politicizes the RI discourse precisely in the way it was originally envisioned, that is, through conceptualizing innovation as a fundamentally political matter. In this view, politics is not merely an extension of RI but is itself the condition of RI; it is what enables innovation to genuinely serve the public good. (shrink)

As artificial intelligence (AI) deployment is growing exponentially, questions have been raised whether the developed AI ethics discourse is apt to address the currently pressing questions in the field. Building on critical theory, this article aims to expand the scope of AI ethics by arguing that in addition to ethical principles and design, the organizational dimension (i.e. the background assumptions and values influencing design processes) plays a pivotal role in the operationalization of ethics in AI development and deployment contexts. Through (...) the prism of critical theory, and the notions of underdetermination and technical code as developed by Feenberg in particular, the organizational dimension is related to two general challenges in operationalizing ethical principles in AI: (a) the challenge of ethical principles placing conflicting demands on an AI design that cannot be satisfied simultaneously, for which the term ‘inter-principle tension’ is coined, and (b) the challenge of translating an ethical principle to a technological form, constraint or demand, for which the term ‘intra-principle tension’ is coined. Rather than discussing principles, methods or metrics, the notion of technical code precipitates a discussion on the subsequent questions of value decisions, governance and procedural checks and balances. It is held that including and interrogating the organizational context in AI ethics approaches allows for a more in depth understanding of the current challenges concerning the formalization and implementation of ethical principles as well as of the ways in which these challenges could be met. (shrink)

This is an excerpt from the content“Accountability” used to be a term that applied primarily to K-12 education, especially following the passage of No Child Left Behind. However, the recent economic downturn and subsequent recovery prompted debates on whether the cost of pursuing a college degree is “worth it” for students. Students’ post-graduation debt and job market prospects have been publicly scrutinized as well as the operations of large research universities. Supporters of higher education posit that these critiques of (...) the system impose a business model where it should not be as they emphasize outputs and efficiency over quality. At the same time, it is hard to ignore that calls for accountability in higher education are getting louder than ever before.In Accountability, Pragmatic Aims, and the American University, Ana M. Martínez-Alemán examines accountability from a historical perspective, arguing that accountability arose in the American university during the early part of the twentieth century. This rise coin. (shrink)

More intellectual modesty, but also conceptual clarity is urgently needed in AI, perhaps more than in many other disciplines. AI research has been coined by hypes and hubris since its early beginnings in the 1950s. For instance, the Nobel laureate Herbert Simon predicted after his participation in the Dartmouth workshop that “machines will be capable, within 20 years, of doing any work that a man can do”. And expectations are in some circles still high to overblown today. This paper addresses (...) the demand for conceptual clarity and introduces precise definitions of “strong AI”, “superintelligence”, the “technological singularity”, and “artificial general intelligence” which ground in the work by the computer scientist Judea Pearl and the psychologist Howard Gardner. These clarifications allow us to embed famous arguments from the philosophy of AI in a more analytic context. (shrink)

Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) technology is a promising research area in many domains. Brain activity can be interpreted through both invasive and non-invasive monitoring devices, allowing for novel, therapeutic solutions for individuals with disabilities and for other non-medical applications. However, a number of ethical issues have been identified from the use of BCI technology. In this paper, we review the academic discussion of the ethical implications of BCI technology in the last five years. We conclude that some emerging applications of BCI (...) technology—including commercial ventures that seek to meld human intelligence with AI—present new and unique ethical concerns. Further, we seek to understand how academic literature on the topic of BCIs addresses these novel concerns. Similar to prior work, we use a limited sample to identify trends and areas of concern or debate among researchers and ethicists. From our analysis, we identify two key areas of BCI ethics that warrant further research: the physical and psychological effects of BCI technology. Additionally, questions of BCI policy have not yet become a frequent point of discussion in the relevant literature on BCI ethics, and we argue this should be addressed in future work. We provide guiding questions that will help ethicists and policy makers grapple with the most important issues associated with BCI technology. (shrink)

In their paper “Algorithms for Ethical Decision-Making in the Clinic: A Proof of Concept,” Meier et al. present the design and preliminary results of a proof-of-concept clinical ethics algor...

Ethical analyses of biomedical human enhancement often consider the issue of authenticity — to what degree can the accomplishments of those utilizing biomedical enhancements be considered authentic or worthy of praise? As research into Brain-Computer Interface technology progresses, it may soon be feasible to create a BCI device that enhances or augments natural human intelligence through some invasive or noninvasive biomedical means. In this article we will review currently existing BCI technologies and to what extent these can be said to (...) enhance or augment the capabilities of the respective users, describe one hypothetical type of BCI device that could augment or enhance a specific aspect of human knowledge — namely, mathematical ability, and relate these concepts to the active externalism view of the extended mind as espoused by Clark and Chalmers in order to argue that knowledge of mathematics derived from the usage of a BCI and the application thereof constitutes authentic knowledge and achievement. (shrink)

Inspirado por el trabajo de Deborah Lupton, Inger Mewburn y Pat Thomson, The Digital Academic: Critical Perspectives on Digital Technologies in Higher Education (2017), este artículo examina el yo digital académico contemporáneo. Más allá de la utilidad que pueden tener en cuanto a la interacción, plataformas digitales como Academia.edu, Linkedin, Google Scholar, etc. transforman al académico o académica en un sujeto digital cuyo rendimiento se controla constantemente hasta convertirlo en prisionero de una creciente dataveillance, una vigilancia a través de los (...) datos. En este contexto, analizamos el impacto de los mencionados procesos de monitorización continua del rendimiento y la productividad sobre las condiciones de vida y trabajo de los profesionales universitarios contemporáneos, en un momento en el que las tensiones, los conflictos y el malestar que habitan la universidad neoliberal parecen volverse cada vez más incapacitantes.Drawing inspiration from the work of Deborah Lupton, Inger Mewburn and Pat Thomson, The Digital Academic: Critical Perspectives on Digital Technologies in Higher Education (2017), this paper looks at the digital self of contemporary academics. Using digital platforms such as Academia.edu, Linkedin, Googlescholar, digital academics can increase their daily interactions and the impact of their research. More than being interaction tools, these tools transform the academics into digital individuals whose performance is constantly monitored until they find themselves prisoner of a growing «dataveillance» (Lupton, Mewburn and Thomson, 2017). In this context, the question concerns not only the impact of digital technologies on the quality of contemporary research, but also the impact of digital surveillance on the living and working conditions of contemporary academics, at a time where the tensions, conflicts and malaise that inhabit the neoliberal university have become ever more manifest. (shrink)

A Estratégia Saúde da Família (ESF) busca se confirmar como intervenção emancipadora e transformadora dos sujeitos, consideradas a preocupação com o acolhimento e a especificidade da atenção, como no caso mães adolescentes. O objetivo deste trabalho foi estudar as condições para a implantação de um ..

As artificial intelligence technologies become increasingly prominent in our daily lives, media coverage of the ethical considerations of these technologies has followed suit. Since previous research has shown that media coverage can drive public discourse about novel technologies, studying how the ethical issues of AI are portrayed in the media may lead to greater insight into the potential ramifications of this public discourse, particularly with regard to development and regulation of AI. This paper expands upon previous research by systematically analyzing (...) and categorizing the media portrayal of the ethical issues of AI to better understand how media coverage of these issues may shape public debate about AI. Our results suggest that the media has a fairly realistic and practical focus in its coverage of the ethics of AI, but that the coverage is still shallow. A multifaceted approach to handling the social, ethical and policy issues of AI technology is needed, including increasing the accessibility of correct information to the public in the form of fact sheets and ethical value statements on trusted webpages, collaboration and inclusion of ethics and AI experts in both research and public debate, and consistent government policies or regulatory frameworks for AI technology. (shrink)

Se editan los textos centrales de la conferencia pronunciada en 1860 por K. E. y. Baer, según la rara edición que hizo de la misma en ¡862. Su mostración imaginativa de lo diferente que sería nuestra representación de la realidad natural con el USO de otros cánones espacio-temporales, puede volver a interesar hoy, sobre todo, al llamado Constructivismo,Zentrale Texte des Vortrages von 1860, den It E. y. Baer lii Petesbrug hielt, nach der seltenen Ausgabe von 1862, sowie ibre spanische Ubersetzung (...) sind hier herausgegeben. Seine imaginative Darstellung der ganz verschiedenen Auffasung der Natur nach der Veránderung des Raum-Zeit-Mai3stabes gelten jinmer noch als Anregung ciner fruchtbaren Reflexion, tiberhaupt in Zeiten des sogenannten Konstruktivismus. (shrink)