In this commentary we argue that evolution of the human brain to host the language system was accomplished by the selective development of frontal and temporal areas in the left hemisphere. The unilateral development of Broca's and Wernicke's areas could have resulted from one or more transcription factors that have an expression pattern restricted to the left hemisphere.

Hostile epistemology is the study of how environmental features exploit our cognitive vulnerabilities. I am particularly interested in those vulnerabilities arise from the basic character of our epistemic lives. We are finite beings with limited cognitive resources, perpetually forced to reasoning a rush. I focus on two sources of unavoidable vulnerability. First, we need to use cognitive shortcuts and heuristics to manage our limited time and attention. But hostile forces can always game the gap between the heuristic and the ideal. (...) Second, we need to trust others, and trust makes us vulnerable. In particular, we need to trust experts whose expertise lies beyond our individual ability to vet. So we must rely on various imperfect signals and proxies, like institutional affiliation, to manage our trust. We are forced to use these imperfect and exploitable forms of reasoning, in order to cope with a cognitively overwhelming world. I present the hostile epistemology framework as a counterbalance to vice epistemology, which tends to locate responsibility for bad beliefs in the character of the believer. I draw two conclusions from my analysis. First: suppose we accept that that only communities and institutions can know about the world. This deeply social approach doesn’t solve the problem of expert identification. The individual still faces a problem: given their incomplete understanding, how should the individual pick which group to trust? Second: we might have hoped to get some kind of static picture of the right principles of reasoning — but hostile epistemology presents a different picture. We have to use risky heuristics and shortcuts, which hostile forces can game and exploit. We can respond by shifting to a different set of heuristics, but this simply shifts the location of our vulnerabilities. These new heuristics are also exploitable. There is no end to this, only a constant struggle to adapt. Limited beings in a hostile epistemic environment are locked in an unending epistemic arms race. (shrink)

Games occupy a unique and valuable place in our lives. Game designers do not simply create worlds; they design temporary selves. Game designers set what our motivations are in the game and what our abilities will be. Thus: games are the art form of agency. By working in the artistic medium of agency, games can offer a distinctive aesthetic value. They support aesthetic experiences of deciding and doing. -/- And the fact that we play games shows something remarkable about us. (...) Our agency is more fluid than we might have thought. In playing a game, we take on temporary ends; we submerge ourselves temporarily in an alternate agency. Games turn out to be a vessel for communicating different modes of agency, for writing them down and storing them. Games create an archive of agencies. And playing games is how we familiarize ourselves with different modes of agency, which helps us develop our capacity to fluidly change our own style of agency. (shrink)

"This edition, which replaces the original Loeb edition..., offers text, translation, and annotation that are fully current with modern scholarship"--Front flap of dust jacket, volume 1.

I propose an account of aesthetic value, where aesthetic value lies in the process of aesthetic engagement: in our activity of perceiving, guiding our attention, interpreting, and otherwise wrestling with aesthetic objects. It also includes our social activities of engagement: arguing with each other, writing criticism, making top-ten lists. (This is a short summary of a view developed in greater detail elsewhere.).

De uma perspectiva comportamentalista radical, o eu é um repertório verbal complexo, que, como tal, tem uma gênese social. O reconhecimento da origem social do “eu” abre caminho para uma análise política, incluindo uma discussão do pa- pel das relações de poder na constituição do eu. Entretanto, uma concepção radicalmente social do “eu”, como a proposta pelo comportamentalismo, suscita um problema político: se o eu é integralmente produto do ambiente social, de onde viria uma eventual “vontade” de romper com esse (...) sistema? Parece que para reconhecer a possibilidade de ação política transformadora seria preciso preservar uma noção descontextualizada de “eu”. Considerando essa dificuldade, o objetivo deste artigo é propor uma interpretação política da constituição do “eu” no âmbito do comportamentalismo radical, mantendo no horizonte a possibilidade de uma ação política transformadora. Para tanto, destacamos como “eus” oprimidos são tornados submissos, mas também como de certas contingências podem emergir “eus” subversivos, que se opõem a um sistema social opressivo. Esse “eu” subversivo é caracterizado por um repertório de autoconhecimento mais amplo, que inclui a discriminação do papel das relações de poder e do controle promovido por instituições. Concluímos, com isso, que um “eu” socialmente constituído pode ser politicamente ativo. (shrink)

In this article, we provide a broad overview of the interplay among cognition, belief systems, and institutions, and how they affect economic performance. We argue that a deeper understanding of institutions’ emergence, their working properties, and their effect on economic and political outcomes should begin from an analysis of cognitive processes. We explore the nature of individual and collective learning, stressing that the issue is not whether agents are perfectly or boundedly rational, but rather how human beings actually reason and (...) choose, individually and in collective settings. We then tie the processes of learning to institutional analysis, providing arguments in favor of what can be characterized as “cognitive institutionalism.” Besides, we show that a full treatment of the phenomenon of path dependence should start at the cognitive level, proceed at the institutional level, and culminate at the economic level. (shrink)

The biopolitics of empire : slavery and "the Muslim" -- The biopolitics of settlement : temporality, desire, and civilization -- Foucault and queer theory -- Society must be destroyed -- Queer terror -- Bibliography.

Interdisciplinarity has seemingly become a paradigm for modern and meaningful research. Clearly, the interdisciplinary modus of deliberation enables to unfold relevant but quite different disciplinary perspectives to the reflection of broader scientific questions or societal problems. However, whether the comprehensive results of interdisciplinary reflection prove to be valid or to be acceptable in trans-disciplinary terms depends upon certain preconditions, which have to be fulfilled for securing scientific quality and social trust in advisory contexts. The present book is written by experts (...) and practitioners of interdisciplinary research and policy advice. It analyses topical and methodological approaches towards interdisciplinarity, starting with the current role of scientific research in society. The volume continues with contributions to the issues of knowledge and acting and to trans-disciplinary deliberation. The final conclusions address the scientific system as substantial actor itself as well as the relevant research and education politics. (shrink)

John Dewey expresses repeatedly that the significance of democracy is more than political discourse. He invites us to realize that democracy is primarily moral idea that animates a process of living and should be actualized continuously. He underlines that the idea of liberty, equality and fraternity, which is the democratic trinity, is ethical ideal of humanity in which personality is at the centre of reflection. Every human individual is free to actualize its self-realization. His liberty is based on the belief (...) that every human individual has a right to equal opportunity with every other person to develop whatever endowment he has. Then, democracy indicates fraternity as an ethical value, which every human individual is able to actualize his capacities only in actively cooperative relationship with other. Political and social democracy presenting in a real association of life will be effectively sustained if its values of ideal hu-manity becomes an animating force of life. In other words, he envisions that democracy becomes a personal way of life. Keywords: values of democracy, social responsibility, culture of democracy, transformation of life, peaceful life. Absrak: John Dewey menyatakan berulangkali bahwa demokrasi lebih dari sekedar persoalan politik. Ia menunjukkan bahwa demokrasi pertama-tama merupakan sebuah gagasan etis yang menjiwai proses hidup secara terus-menerus. Kebebasan, kesederajatan, dan persaudaraan yang menjadi inti demokrasi merupakan nilai-nilai etis kemanusiaan yang menjadi arah hidup manusia di dalam kehidupan bersama di tengah masyarakat. Setiap individu adalah bebas untuk mewujudkan dirinya. Kebebasannya didasarkan pada keyakinan bahwa setiap individu mempunyai hak dan kesempatan yang sama untuk mengembangkan diri sesuai dengan potensi yang dianugerahkan kepadanya. Persaudaraan merupakan nilai etis yang menegaskan bahwa setiap individu hanya mampu mewujudkan diri di dalam relasi dan kerjasama dengan sesamanya. Ketiga nilai etis tersebut seharusnya menjiwai tata hidup bersama. Dengan kata lain, demokrasi seharusnya menjadi pola hidup setiap pribadi sebagai anggota masyarakat. Kata-kata Kunci: nilai-nilai demokrasi, tanggung jawab sosial, budaya demo-krasi, transformasi hidup, hidup damai. (shrink)

The first clear and precise statement of the axioms of qualitative probability was given by de Finetti ([1], Section 13). A more detailed treatment, based however on more complex axioms for conditional qualitative probability, was given later by Koopman [5]. De Finetti and Koopman derived a probability measure from a qualitative probability under the assumption that, for any integer n, there are n mutually exclusive, equally probable events. L. J. Savage [6] has shown that this strong assumption is unnecessary. More (...) precisely, he proves that if a qualitative probability is only fine and tight, then there is one and only one probability measure compatible with it. No property equivalent to countable additivity has been used as yet in the development of qualitative probability theory. However, since the concept of countable additivity is of such fundamental importance in measure theory, it is to be expected that an equivalent property would be of interest in qualitative probability theory, and that in particular it would simplify the proof of the existence of compatible probability measures. Such a property is introduced in this paper, under the name of monotone continuity. It is shown that, if a qualitative probability is atomless and monotonely continuous, then there is one and only one probability measure compatible with it, and this probability measure is countably additive. It is also proved that any fine and tight qualitative probability can be extended to a monotonely continuous qualitative probability, and therefore, contrary to what might be expected, there is no loss in generality if we consider only qualitative probabilities which are monotonely continuous. At the present time there is still a controversy over the interpretation which should be given to the word probability in the scientific and technical literature. Although the present writer subscribes to the opinion that this interpretation may be different in different contexts, in this paper we do not enter into this controversy. We simply remark that a qualitative probability, as a numerical one, may be interpreted either as an objective or as a subjective probability, and therefore the following axiomatic theory is compatible with both interpretations of probability. (shrink)

This is a reply to Elisabeth Camp's and Elijah Millgram's probing discussions of "Games and the Art of Agency", in a symposium in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. Millgram argues that games cannot function as a guide to life, because they are too different from life. Games are limited in a special way: in life, we deliberate about what goals we want to take on, but in games, the goals are fixed and given to us. Camp argues that there (...) is nothing particularly special about games, because the fluidity of agency is all over ordinary life too - games are just like ordinary life. I respond to Millgram: we do deliberate about our ends, in games, when we aesthetically reflect on which games to play. And I respond to Camp: games are distinctive in the way they regulate how our reasons flow across the game/life border. To respond to these criticisms, I add some substantial new features to my account of the motivational structure of game-play. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Extension and Extended Substance? Bodies and Extended Substances Bodies, Space, and the Ontology of Everyday Life Acknowledgments References and Further Reading.

Although Sibawayh dealt with it in a scattered manner under different headings there have been different views on na't (adjective), which is gene-rally included in the tawabi group in Arabic syntax, and there have been debates around these views. Na't, which is categorized as a proper adjective and qualifies the meaning of man'ut (mawsuf), has different characteristics from the sentence elements that indicate the subject. Nahiv scholars have mostly divided na't into two parts: real and causal na't, and they have (...) formulated certain rules for these two parts in accordance with the structure of the Arabic language. Since na't and man'ut are accepted as nouns, the i'rab of na't is subject to men'ut. However, some examples in the Qur'an and some expressions used by the Arabs caused objections to the i'rab of na't being the same as men'ut. It is observed that these objected examples are the cases where men'ut is known and the exceptional cases of madih, zam and jarri jivar. It is also obligatory for the na't to conform to the man'ut in terms of ma'rifiyyah, nekiriyyah, custom and gender. While Sibawayh (d. 180/796) considered it qabh (ugly) for non-propositional words to be na't, scholars such as Ibn Hisham (d. 218/833), Ibn al-Ḥajib (d. 646/1249), and Abd ar-Rahman Jami (d. 898/1492) accepted that na't could be either propositional or non-propositional and cited many examples of na't in the case of non-propositional words. Scholars such as Ibn Jinni (d. 392/1002) and Ibn al-Hajib gave an explanation of the causative na't without naming it, scholars such as Ebu’l-Bekā al-Ukbari (d. 616/1219) analyzed the subject under the title of causative adjective or causative na't, and Halid b. Abdullah al-Azhari discussed it under the title of al-wasf al-majazi. The subject of our study is to examine the handling of na't, which is one of the sentence elements in the Arabic language, in the works written on the field, its parts, the dimension that affects the meaning and the controversial aspects. The aim of the research is to examine the rules that Sibawayh deals with in his al-Kitâb on na'ta and the objections of later Arab linguists to these rules, and to contribute to the field by revealing different views on the subject. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe known works of the medieval astronomer/astrologer Henry Bate include a set of planetary mean motion tables for the meridian of his Flemish hometown Mechelen. These tables survive in three manuscripts representing two significantly different recensions, but have never been examined for their principles of construction or underlying parameters. Such analysis reveals that Bate employed an unusual value for the length of the tropical year, which was probably derived by comparing ancient and contemporary observations of the vernal equinox. In addition, (...) there are clear signs that Bate kept revising his parameters for the mean motions of Venus and the three superior planets, none of which can be traced back to earlier sources. Together with some of Bate’s preserved statements, these findings support the conclusion that the Tabule Machlinenses were unique among the astronomical tables produced in medieval Latin Christendom for using independently derived parameters that were the result of new observations. Bate’s achievement connects him to a wider milieu of astronomers operating in late-thirteenth-century Paris, who put an increased emphasis on observation and the critical examination of received data. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.1 (2005) 77-78 [Access article in PDF] Language, Mind, and World Werdie (C. W.) Van Staden Keywords psychotherapy, linguistics, semantics, references, speech The paper by Mcconnell and Gillett touches, in a Lacanian way, on the connections between language, world, and the conscious and unconscious mind. Their paper brings together the influential ideas of Freud, philosophical phenomenology, existentialism, and structuralism in describing Lacan's approach to these (...) connections. Going further than Lacan's concerns in psychotherapy, their paper calls on us to consider the importance of these connections more generally in philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology.These connections matter substantially in the practice of psychiatry and psychology, for there we need to understand as much as possible of the ways in which language is intimately involved with the minds and brains of people and their biological and interpersonal worlds. Even at first glance, we can easily concede that people use language to express their troubled minds and their past, present, and anticipated relations with their biological and interpersonal worlds; that language use depends inescapably on brain functions (of the Broca and the Wernicke areas, for example); and that practitioners use language receptively and exploratively to access and examine the minds as well as the biological and interpersonal worlds of the people.Cognizant of the connections between language, mind, and world, language has received considerable attention in the psychotherapy literature and practice (e.g., Russell 1987), including from Lacan and his followers. In addition to these practices and theoretical expositions, empirical linguistic studies in psychotherapy have also been published recently (e.g., Van Staden in press; Van Staden and Fulford 2004; Spence 1995; Spence, Mayes, and Dahl 1994).There has been, furthermore, a growing interest in defining linguistic variables for empirical research in general psychiatry and psychology (Van Staden 2002; Thomas and Fraser 1994). The necessary and intimate role of language has also been reviewed recently in coming to a diagnostic understanding of people's difficulties (Van Staden 2003) and in conducting ethically sound assessments of mentally disordered people's capacity to give informed consent (Van Staden and Krüger 2003). Furthermore, the underlying connections between language, mind, and world, for example, have brought about the expectation that genetic factors in the etiology of schizophrenia would be related to the far-reaching capacity of human beings to use language (Crow 1997).A philosophical interest in the connections between language, mind, and world can be traced back to Plato. More recently, it has been taking a central place in analytic philosophy. The vast and sophisticated philosophical literature on this topic suggests that these connections are very [End Page 77] intricate and that we probably have an inchoate understanding of them. These connections are about theories of reference; theories of descriptions; semantic theories of truth; Kant's distinction between form and content; meaning; contextual content; linguistic pragmatism and speech act theories—all elaborate topics, of course, intertwined with various ontological commitments (cf. Luntley 1999).Lacan's contribution, driven by practical need albeit in the constrained area of psychotherapy, has not yet been taken up in analytic philosophy circles. The paper by McConnell and Gillett sets the scene for further philosophical examination that could determine whether Lacan's work does advance contemporary analytic philosophy on this topic. The most potential for such advance concerns probably, as indicated by McConnell and Gillet, insights about the unconscious mind.Notwithstanding a worthy philosophical examination of whether Lacan's work advances contemporary analytic philosophy on the connections between language, mind, and world, it may prove to be a challenging undertaking—probably even more challenging than the admirable groundwork done in the paper by McConnell and Gillett. The reason is, in my opinion, that the depth of Lacan's work is difficult to penetrate, in part because of the abundance of his esoteric terms, some of which are prima facie incommensurable with ordinary analytic language. The philosophical cogency of his work, moreover, is difficult to verify, because he often simply made conjectures, true as they might be, without explicating (sufficiently) the justification thereof.Lacan's work is commendable, however, even if... (shrink)

This new volume gives discursive shape to several key facets of the relationship among politics, theology and religious thought. Powerfully relevant to a wealth of further academic disciplines including history, law and the humanities, it sharpens the contours of our understanding in a live and evolving field. It charts the mechanisms by which, contrary to the avowed secularism of many of today's polities, theology and religion have often, and sometimes profoundly, shaped political discourse. By augmenting this broader analysis with a (...) selection of authoritative papers focusing on the prominent sub-field of political theology, the anthology offsets a startling academic lacuna. Alongside focused analysis of subjects such as conscience, secularism and religious tolerance, the discussion of political theology examines the tradition's critical moments, including developments during the post-World War I Weimar republic in Germany and the epistemological imprint the theory has left behind in works by political thinkers influenced by the three major monotheistic traditions. (shrink)

In this dialogue Plato shows the pretensions of the leading sophist, Protagoras, challenged by the critical arguments of Socrates. The dialogue broadens out to consider the nature of the good life and the role of intellect and pleasure.

_ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 294 - 321 Manuscript London, British Library, Burney 330 contains an anonymous collection of grammatical sophisms, dating in all probability from early 13th-century France or England, and all based on problematic biblical, liturgical or religious propositions. After a presentation of the manuscript and collection, this article examines two analysis tools that are applied in the majority of the sophisms, viz. a distinction between three layers of grammatico-semantic perfection or completeness, and the grammatical and (...) semantic supposition doctrines. It appears that these sophisms pay prominent attention to improper or figurative supposition, but are not intended for highly advanced readers. These preliminary results suggest that the Burney Sophismata Collection constituted an exercise tool to support textbook-based instruction in theological grammar, which was developed by such masters as Peter the Chanter and William de Montibus in the late 12th and early 13th centuries. (shrink)

In this dialogue the view of Paul Hoyningen-Huene as defended in Systematicity. The Nature of Science is presented and criticized. The approach is developed dialectically by the two interlocutors, a series of critical points are debated and an alternative view is introduced. The dialogical form is intended to honor the general philosophical approach of the author summarized in the last sentence of the book, where he states that he sees philosophy as an ongoing, open-ended dialogue.

Why are cities looking more and more alike? Why do hipster coffee shops and clothing boutiques all share that same vibe? One answer is that gentrification represents an invasive force that forcibly re-models cities, from the top-down, to meet the monotone eye of the gentrifier. Gentrification brings in external developers and designers, who create new businesses which all meet that one monotonous aesthetic mold. But I suggest, using work from Quill Kukla and Jane Jacobs, that this top-down model of gentrification (...) is incomplete. Gentrification also incentivizes local residents to remake their own businesses and properties to meet that monotone eye. Gentrification is a pressure which pushes cities to meet a universalized and therefore homogenized taste, rather than letting diverse tastes flourish. (This piece originally published as part of a symposium on Quill Kukla's City Living.). (shrink)

One way to show that text interpretation can be treated as a scientific problem is to show that the standards that are currently used in the natural sciences when dealing with problems not involving meaningful material can also be successfully employed in the case of text interpretation. These standards involve intersubjective intelligibility, testability with the use of evidence, rational argumentation, and making methodological decisions aiming at the attainment of truth, accuracy, simplicity and other epistemic values. In the case of text (...) interpretation—despite the fact that we deal with meaningful material—hypotheses can be formulated, consequences can be drawn by deduction, and these can be tested against empirical data. This claim is substantiated by the provision of an example of a scientific text. (shrink)

This paper defends the claim that social scientists who are interested in the study of institutions should not conduct fights about the meaning of the terms "institution", "organization" and the other terms that are used in the theory of institutions. They should instead concentrate on constructing theories in order to explain the phenomena they are interested in. Defining the terms that one wants to use is a legitimate part of the theoretical endeavor, but it is by no means as important (...) as most institutional theorists tend to think. The paper argues in favor of this claim by drawing on a relevant discussion in the philosophy of science which deals with the role of definitions in the process of constructing a theoretical system. (shrink)

Dieter Schmidtchen hat mein institutionenökonomisch-evolutionäres Wettbewerbsleitbild einer kritischen Würdigung unterzogen. In dieser Replik werden drei Arten von Argumenten zugunsten meines Wettbewerbsleitbildes vorgetragen. Zunächst wird mit Hilfe von wissenschaftstheoretischen Argumenten gezeigt, dass die Konkurrenz von Erkenntnisprogrammen auch im Fall der Wettbewerbstheorie durchaus wünscheswert ist. Dann werden die normativen Grundlagen des Leitbildes erläutert und gezeigt, wie das Prinzip der kritischen Prüfung zum Tragen kommt. Schließlich wird für eine regelgeleitete Wettbewerbspolitik plädiert, die den Schutz des Wettbewerbs als minimalistisches Ziel anstrebt.