S’agissant des actes de langage participant à la construction de la réalité sociale, les philosophes contemporains se sont restreints aux déclarations. Nous avançons qu’il existe une autre catégorie qui contribue à la fabrique et au maintien des faits sociaux : celle des incantatifs, actes de langage dont le but est l’expression et la génération d’émotions collectives, et qui contribuent ainsi à la création et au maintien des communautés.

In this essay the visual arts of the machine age morph into literature and theory and then back again to images, gestures, and thought.

“Sophisticated” theories of welfare face two potentially devastating criticisms. They are based upon two claims: that theories of welfare should be tested for what they imply about newborn infants and that even if a theory of welfare is intended to apply only to adults, we might still have sufficient reason to reject it because it implies an implausible divergence between adult and neonatal welfare. It has been argued we ought reject sophisticated theories of welfare because they have significantly counterintuitive implications (...) about neonatal welfare and because they imply an implausible divergence between the welfare of adults and that of newborns. I argue against both claims. (shrink)

Empirical advances have been made in understanding how human language, in its combinatorial complexity and unbounded expressivity, may have evolved from the communication systems present in our evolutionary ancestors. However, a number of cognitive processes and neurobiological mechanisms that support language may not have evolved specifically for communication, but rather from abilities that support perception and cognition more generally. We review recent evidence from comparative behavioural and neurobiological studies on structured sequence learning in human and nonhuman primates. These studies support (...) the notion that certain sequence learning abilities are evolutionarily conserved and engage corresponding inferior frontal brain regions across the species, regions also involved in processing language in humans. Alongside the cross-species similarities is evidence for human specialisations, illuminating the likely evolutionary pathways towards language in modern humans. We argue that cognitive abilities that were in place for animals to learn combinatorial relationships in the sensory world were available and co-opted for language in humans. (shrink)

Many friends of the category of particularised qualities subscribe to the view that particularised qualities have a unique bearer in which they inhere; no such quality then can inhere in two different entities. But it seems that this idea is flawed, for there are apparent counterexamples. An apple's redness is identical with the redness of its skin, though the apple is distinct from its skin. So it seems that a principle of bearer‐uniqueness has to be modified, maybe by excluding certain (...) unwanted cases. However, I argue that the need of a modification is not a direct consequence of the supposed counterexamples. Their dangerous potential for the principle arises if one takes the genitive in expressions of the form ‘a's F‐ness’ to signify the relation of inherence. I propose an alternative view: The genitive signifies a relation which is indeed closely related to inherence, but which is, contrary to inherence itself, partitive. That is, it may hold between a particularised quality and another entity because it holds between the quality and a part of the entity. If one regards the ontologically interesting relation of inherence as non‐partitive, one can still adhere to an unrestricted principle of bearer‐uniqueness. (shrink)

Twenty years is a long time in the life of a science. While the historical roots of psychology have not changed since the first edition of this book, some of the offshoots of the various theories and systems discussed have been crit ically reexamined and have undergone far-reaching modifications. New and bold research has led to a broadening of perspectives, and recent devel opments in several areas required a considerable amount of rewriting. I have been fortunate in the last fifteen (...) years to have worked with about 2,000 psychologists and other behavioral scientists who contributed to several collected volumes I have edited. As the editor-in-chief of the In ternational Encyclopedia of Psychiatry, Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Neurol ogy, I have had the privilege of reading, scrutinizing, and editing the work of 1,500 experts in psychology and related disciplines. In addition, I have written several books and monographs and over one hundred scientific papers. Armed with all that experience, I have carefully examined the pages of the first edition. Chapter 8 required substantial rewriting and several new sections have been added to other chapters: "Current Soviet Psychol ogy" (Chapter 2, Section 7); "New Ideas on Purposivism" (Chapter 5, Sec tion 4); "Recent Developments in the Sociological School of Psychoanalysis" (Chapter 9, Section 4); and "Present Status of Gestalt Psychology" (Chapter 12, Section 4). Chapter 15 was omitted, and two new chapters were added: Chapter 14 ("Humanistic Psychology") and Chapter 16 ("Selected Research Areas"). (shrink)

Incidental research findings, as defined in this symposium’s consensus paper, are unexpected findings discovered in the course of research but “beyond the aims of the study.” These include findings generated by research methodology, such as imaging or genetic analysis, findings related to clinical screening for inclusion or exclusion, or direct observations of physical abnormalities or behavior. Decisions about managing incidental research findings involve important ethical considerations regarding a researcher’s obligations to provide care, minimize harms, and respect research participants’ wishes. When (...) the research participant is a child, the triadic relationship between the researcher, child participant, and parent makes these considerations more complicated. (shrink)

Some philosophers have argued that refraining from performing an action consists in actively keeping oneself from performing that action or preventing one’s performing it. Since activities must be held to be positive actions, this implies that negative actions are a species of positive actions which is to say that all actions are positive actions. I defend the following claims: (i) Positive actions necessarily include activity or effort, negative actions may require activity or effort, but never include the activity or effort (...) which may be required. (ii) Unless it is, or was, at some time in P’s power to Q, P does not refrain from Q-ing. (iii) Negative actions are actions , they are causings of negative facts. (shrink)

Is a devoted Nazi or a zombie bureaucrat a greater moral and political problem? Because the dangers of immoral fanaticism are so clear, the dangers of mindless bureaucracy are easy to overlook. Yet zombie bureaucrats have contributed substantially to the greatest catastrophes of the 20th century, doing so seemingly oblivious to the monstrous qualities of their actions. Hannah Arendt’s work on thoughtlessness raises a dilemma: if Eichmann, the architect of the Nazi Final Solution, truly was a thoughtless ‘cog’, lacking in (...) intentionality, can one really hold him morally accountable for the evil qualities of his acts? This article relates Arendt’s ‘thought’ and Strawson’s and Bilgrami’s discussion of ‘reactive attitudes’ and Sartre’s concept of ‘bad faith’. To find a basis for moral accountable in seemingly thoughtless cases like Eichmann’s. Although Arendt’s Eichmann is an extreme example, finding a basis to hold him accountable is valuable because ‘little Eichmanns’ will persist as long as impersonal forces structure and depress reactive attitudes. (shrink)

Secondary findings for adult-onset diseases in pediatric clinical sequencing can benefit parents or other family members. In the absence of data showing harm, it is ethically reasonable for parents to request such information, because in other types of medical decision-making, they are often given discretion unless their decisions clearly harm the child. Some parents might not want this information because it could distract them from focusing on the child's underlying condition that prompted sequencing. Collecting family impact data may improve future (...) policy determinations. (shrink)

Ours is an age of offense, a time of reactionary shock—always received, never given. Ours is an age that has forgone cultural narratives, a time of individualism—wherein personal identities trump the collective spirit. Ours is an age of failing earth, a time of ecological collapse—yet the consumption of global capitalism continues to run amok. But don't fear. You have the correct worldview, the best solutions. It’s not your fault these things are happening. It’s the president’s, the immigrant’s, and the Islamicist’s. (...) Or perhaps It’s the socialist’s, the tree hugger’s, and the baby killer’s. But it’s not your fault. Never yours. For the world exists as you see it—in an echo chamber lined with golden pixels. Do I still have your attention? Then join me. Within the covers of Narrativizing Theories, I dive into ambiguity and aesthetics to depict how clashing worldviews exist side by side yet remain mutually incompatible. I examine how cultures distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable beliefs, embodiments, and identities. And I outline an aesthetic theory of ambiguity that highlights—through the twists and turns of literature—the provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of reality. (shrink)

ABSTRACT George Bishop’s The Illusion of Public Opinion does a superb job of showing how various errors and malfeasances in conducting and interpreting surveys have created illusions about public opinion. It thereby offers a very useful compendium on how to do, and especially how not to do, survey research. Nothing in the book, however, provides persuasive evidence for either of two more troubling “illusion” arguments: that collective public preferences on policy issues do not exist; or that surveys cannot measure them. (...) Instead, Bishop’s examples show that even in obscure, low‐information situations, well‐designed survey questions generally reveal meaningful collective policy preferences that are coherent, well differentiated, and reflective of citizens’ basic interests and values. (shrink)

The matter must be attacked from more sides! This is particularly advisable in morals, where the aim is not only to satisfy our desire for knowledge, but to better ourselves.between 1791 and 1792, karl leonhard reinhold, inaugural chair in Critical Philosophy at the University of Jena and popular advocate for the Kantian revolution, received and responded to a series of letters from Salomon Maimon. In the exchange, Maimon reiterated those skeptical doubts regarding the account of a priori synthetic judgments in (...) the Critique of Pure Reason that he had introduced in his Essay on Transcendental Philosophy and that had gained him a modicum of recognition on the German philosophical scene. He made plain his view... (shrink)

Offers a detailed critique of the Bush administration's foreign policy, including arguments about the imposition of democracy on foreign nations and hypocritical actions by America.

Many theories on cognition assume that people adapt their decision strategies depending on the situation they face. To test if and how affect guides the selection of decision strategies, we conducted an online study (N = 166), where different mood states were induced through video clips. Results indicate that mood influenced the use of decision strategies. Negative mood, in particular anger, facilitated the use of non-compensatory strategies, whereas positive mood promoted compensatory decision rules. These results are in line with the (...) idea that positive mood broadens the focus of attention and thus increases the use of compensatory decision strategies that take many pieces of information into account, whereas negative mood narrows the focus of attention and thus fosters non-compensatory strategies that rely on a selective use of information. The results further indicate that gaining a deeper theoretical understanding of the cognitive mechanisms that govern decision processes requires taking emotions into account. (shrink)

I defend a deontological social contract justification of punishment for philosophers who deny free will and moral responsibility (FW/MR). Even if nobody has FW/MR, a criminal justice system is fair to the people it targets if we would consent to it in a version of original position deliberation where we assumed that we would be targeted by the justice system when the veil is raised. Even if we assumed we would be convicted of a crime, we would consent to the (...) imprisonment of violent criminals if prison conditions were better than the state of nature but deterring enough to prevent the state of nature. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 5, June 2020, Page 22-23.

In Plato's Lysis, Socrates' conversation with Lysis features logical fallacies and questionable premises and closes with a blatantly eristic trick. I show how the form and content of these arguments make sense if we interpret them from the perspective of Socrates' pedagogical goals. Lysis is a competitive teenager who, along with his friend Menexenus, enjoys the game of eristic disputation. Socrates recognizes Lysis' predilections, and he constructs his arguments to engage Lysis' interests and loves, while also drawing the boy into (...) thinking philosophically about the issues that the arguments raise about love, freedom, and happiness. (shrink)

This Note will address the salience of a simple analogy: will privacy law be for the information age what consumer protection law was for the industrial age? At the height of industrialization, the United States market for consumer products faced instability caused by a lack of consumer competence, lack of disclosure about product defects, and advancements in technology that exacerbated the market's flaws. As this Note will show, these same causes of market failure are stirring in today's economy as well. (...) The modern economy is not one of goods but of information, and although consumers have long been aware that their personal information may have marketing value, the Internet has fundamentally changed the scope and depth of information collection, exposing more consumers than ever to injuries requiring not just a comprehensive remedy but a wholesale change in the level of care of the information industry. Just as the mass-production economy precipitated a wave of reforms in consumer protection (in part thanks to a kick-start by author Upton Sinclair), so too must the mass-information economy adapt. After demonstrating the parallels between the problems of today with those of yesterday, this Note will propose parallel solutions, particularly a consolidation of regulatory power and a new tort for breach of information privacy, which draws its inspiration from general products liability. These proposals show that rather than reinvent the wheel, modern lawmakers can (and should) answer today's problems with lessons from the last century. (shrink)

Based on the definitive English edition of Kierkegaard's works by Princeton University Press, this series of commentaries addresses all the published texts of ...

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 211 - 228 In this Reply, I argue that _pace_ Knud Haakonssen it is dubious that Adam Smith managed to ‘blow up’ Hugo Grotius’s universalist system of natural jurisprudence. Rather, Smith emerges as a closet rationalist who put forward crypto-normative universalist claims himself and found that he could not in the end improve upon Grotius’s system. Grotius was not seen by Smith as a ‘casuist’ _tout court_. I try to give an explanation for (...) the tensions introduced into Smith’s work by his incorporation of key aspects of Grotius’s theory of justice. Furthermore, I try to clarify in what regard Grotius should be seen as a novel and original thinker. Lastly, I argue in favor of according ideas and arguments their own weight, against a facile contextualism that is always in danger of falling prey to the genealogical fallacy. (shrink)

Century has requested me to answer for his readers. I comply; but, to be frank, I find it a difficult task. If the editor or one of his contributors had only suggested a reason why I should be anything other than an Anarchist, I am sure I should have no difficulty in disputing the argument. And does not this very fact, after all, furnish in itself the best of all reasons why I should be an Anarchist – namely, the impossibility (...) of discovering any good reason for being anything else? To show the invalidity of the claims of State Socialism, Nationalism, Communism, Single taxism, the prevailing capitalism, and all the numerous forms of Archism existing or proposed, is at the same blow to show the validity of the claims of Anarchism. Archism once denied, only Anarchism can be affirmed. That is a matter of logic. (shrink)

Online food retail has the potential to broaden access to systems of food provision which promote social and environmental quality attributes. This possibility is explored using data from a survey of 365 consumers who purchased food either via internet retailers of local and organic food, or via farmers’ markets, in Vancouver, Canada and Melbourne, Australia. Survey results are analyzed using principal component and regression techniques and interpreted via the theoretical framework of conventions theory. Key findings show that while online retailers (...) of local organic food are not currently attracting more resource constrained consumers, they do appeal to a similar, although broader, array of quality conventions. This research provides new insights into the challenges and opportunities associated with increasing consumer access to alternative food networks, as well as adding to the small number of quantitative studies in the conventions theory literature. (shrink)

This book outlines the various approaches to anarchist thought, explaining differences between rival traditions, and assesses how anarchism challenges hierarchies of power in the generation of social goods.