In this new edition, Arthur Fine looks at Einstein's philosophy of science and develops his own views on realism. A new Afterword discusses the reaction to Fine's own theory. "What really led Einstein . . . to renounce the new quantum order? For those interested in this question, this book is compulsory reading."--Harvey R. Brown, American Journal of Physics "Fine has successfully combined a historical account of Einstein's philosophical views on quantum mechanics and a discussion of some of the (...) philosophical problems associated with the interpretation of quantum theory with a discussion of some of the contemporary questions concerning realism and antirealism. . . . Clear, thoughtful, [and] well-written."--Allan Franklin, Annals of Science "Attempts, from Einstein's published works and unpublished correspondence, to piece together a coherent picture of 'Einstein realism.' Especially illuminating are the letters between Einstein and fellow realist Schrodinger, as the latter was composing his famous 'Schrodinger-Cat' paper."--Nick Herbert, New Scientist "Beautifully clear. . . . Fine's analysis is penetrating, his own results original and important. . . . The book is a splendid combination of new ways to think about quantum mechanics, about realism, and about Einstein's views of both."--Nancy Cartwright, Isis. (shrink)

Quantitative assessments of when infectious disease outbreaks end are crucial, as resources targeted towards outbreak responses typically remain in place until outbreaks are declared over. Recent improvements and innovations in mathematical approaches for determining when outbreaks end provide public health authorities with more confidence when making end-of-outbreak declarations. Although quantitative analyses of outbreaks have a long history, more complex mathematical and statistical methodologies for analysing outbreak data were developed early in the 20th century and continue to be refined. Historically, such (...) methodologies focused primarily on factors affecting the early and middle phases of an outbreak, with less attention given to determining how and when outbreaks end. This review discusses mathematical modelling methods from the last 20 years that have been developed for determining the ends of infectious disease outbreaks, and considers factors that affect the accuracy of such determinations. When disease surveillance systems provide timely and representative data to inform models, the timings of end-of-outbreak declarations can be fine-tuned to allow outbreaks to be declared over quickly and with a low risk of being incorrect. Premature declarations that outbreaks are over can undermine earlier achievements in disease control and may result in a resurgence of cases, but unnecessary delays in declaring outbreaks over can cause significant economic and social harm. Appropriate declarations that balance the benefits of relaxing control measures against the risk of a surge in cases allow public health resources to be conserved (and economic and social pressures to be reduced) while limiting the potential for additional transmission. (shrink)

We review some 30 years of academic research on corporate philanthropy, taking stock of the current state of research about this rising practice and identifying gaps and puzzles that deserve further investigation. To do so, we examine a total of 162 academic papers in the fields of management, economics, sociology, and public policy, and analyze their content in a systematic fashion. We distinguish four main lines of inquiry within the literature: the essence of corporate philanthropy, its different drivers, the way (...) it is organized, and its likely outcomes. After reviewing the main findings of the literature, we build on several research gaps to highlight directions for future research on corporate philanthropy with an interest in strengthening our understanding of this fascinating phenomenon at the crossroads of business and society. (shrink)

Over a decade ago, Arthur Danto announced that art ended in the sixties. Ever since this declaration, he has been at the forefront of a radical critique of the nature of art in our time. After the End of Art presents Danto's first full-scale reformulation of his original insight, showing how, with the eclipse of abstract expressionism, art has deviated irrevocably from the narrative course that Vasari helped define for it in the Renaissance. Moreover, he leads the way to (...) a new type of criticism that can help us understand art in a posthistorical age where, for example, an artist can produce a work in the style of Rembrandt to create a visual pun, and where traditional theories cannot explain the difference between Andy Warhol's Brillo Box and the product found in the grocery store. Here we are engaged in a series of insightful and entertaining conversations on the most relevant aesthetic and philosophical issues of art, conducted by an especially acute observer of the art scene today.Originally delivered as the prestigious Mellon Lectures on the Fine Arts, these writings cover art history, pop art, "people's art," the future role of museums, and the critical contributions of Clement Greenberg--who helped make sense of modernism for viewers over two generations ago through an aesthetics-based criticism. Tracing art history from a mimetic tradition through the modern era of manifestos, Danto shows that it wasn't until the invention of Pop art that the historical understanding of the means and ends of art was nullified. Even modernist art, which tried to break with the past by questioning the ways of producing art, hinged on a narrative.Traditional notions of aesthetics can no longer apply to contemporary art, argues Danto. Instead he focuses on a philosophy of art criticism that can deal with perhaps the most perplexing feature of contemporary art: that everything is possible. (shrink)

Two principles of locality used in discussions about quantum mechanics are distinguished. The intuitive no-action-at-a distance requirement is called physical locality. There is also a mathematical requirement of a kind of factorizability which is referred to as "locality". It is argued in this paper that factorizability is not necessary for physical locality. Ways of producing models that are physically local although not factorizable which are concerned with correlations between the behavior of pairs of particles are suggested. These models can account (...) for all the quantum mechanical single and joint probabilities. (shrink)

We obtain 2 models in which AC is false and in which there are long sequences of consecutive large cardinals.

How do we appreciate a work of art? Awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship to explore connections between art, mind, and brain, Arthur Shimamura takes findings from psychological and brain sciences to address ways of understanding our aesthetic responses.

We show relative to strong hypotheses that patterns of compact cardinals in the universe, where a compact cardinal is one which is either strongly compact or supercompact, can be virtually arbitrary. Specifically, we prove if V “ZFC + Ω is the least inaccessible limit of measurable limits of supercompact cardinals + ƒ : Ω → 2 is a function”, then there is a partial ordering P V so that for , There is a proper class of compact cardinals + If (...) ƒ = 0, then the αth compact cardinal is not supercompact + If ƒ = 1, then the αth compact cardinal is supercompact”. We then prove a generalized version of this theorem assuming κ is a supercompact limit of supercompact cardinals and ƒ : κ → 2 is a function, and we derive as corollaries of the generalized version of the theorem the consistency of the least measurable limit of supercompact cardinals being the same as the least measurable limit of nonsupercompact strongly compact cardinals and the consistency of the least supercompact cardinal being a limit of strongly compact cardinals. (shrink)

Reductio arguments are notoriously inconclusive, a fact which no doubt contributes to their great fecundity. For once a contradiction has been proved, it is open to interpretation which premise should be given up. Indeed, it is often a matter of great creativity to identify what can be consistently given up. A case in point is a traditional paradox of the infinite provided by Galileo Galilei in his Two New Sciences, which has since come to be known as Galileo’s Paradox. It (...) concerns the set of all numbers, N: since to every number there is a corresponding square, there are as many squares as numbers. But since there are non-squares between the squares, “all numbers, comprising the squares and the non-squares, are greater than the squares alone”, i.e. there must be fewer numbers in the set of all squares S than in N. Thus N is both equal to and greater than S. This is a contradiction, so one of the premises must be given up: the question is, which one? (shrink)

In the transition to Einstein’s theory of Special Relativity (SR), certain concepts that had previously been thought to be univocal or absolute properties of systems turn out not to be. For instance, mass bifurcates into (i) the relativistically invariant proper mass m0, and (ii) the mass relative to an inertial frame in which it is moving at a speed v = βc, its relative mass m, whose quantity is a factor γ = (1 – β2) -1/2 times the proper mass, (...) m = γm0. (shrink)

THE CONCEPT of basic action rests upon a not especially controversial observation and a standard sort of philosophical argument. The observation is that there occur a great many actions in which what is said to be done—say a—is not done directly but rather through the agent doing something b, distinct from a, which causes a to happen. Thus I move a stone by pushing against it, and the pushing, itself an action, causes the locomotion of the stone when all relevant (...) conditions are supposed benign. Sometimes an agent m performs an action in which b is done and another occurrence a is caused by b, but as a is only a consequence of b and is not itself said to be done, such cases fall outside the circumference of the observation just described. What falls within that circumference I designate nonbasic actions, leaving it open that there may be species of nonbasic actions other than those specified by this observation. (shrink)

In last year’s Review Gregory Brown took issue with Laurence Carlin’s interpretation of Leibniz’s argument as to why there could be no world soul. Carlin’s contention, in Brown’s words, is that Leibniz denies a soul to the world but not to bodies on the grounds that “while both the world and [an] aggregate of limited spatial extent are infinite in multitude, the former, but not the latter, is infinite in respect of magnitude and hence cannot be considered a whole”. Brown (...) casts doubt on this interpretation—or rather, he begins by questioning its adequacy as an interpretation of a central passage, only to concede its essential correctness as an interpretation of Leibniz’s position, and to turn his attack on the latter itself. In this note I shall argue that Brown underestimates the subtlety of Leibniz’s views on the infinite, and that Carlin is basically correct in his suggestion that the infinite magnitude of the world is what precludes it from having even the phenomenal unity that a body does. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a fresh interpretation of Leibniz’s theory of space, in which I explain the connection of his relational theory to both his mathematical theory of analysis situs and his theory of substance. I argue that the elements of his mature theory are not bare bodies (as on a standard relationalist view) nor bare points (as on an absolutist view), but situations. Regarded as an accident of an individual body, a situation is the complex of its angles (...) and distances to other co-existing bodies, founded in the representation or state of the substance or substances contained in the body. The complex of all such mutually compatible situations of co-existing bodies constitutes an order of situations, or instantaneous space. Because these relations of situation change from one instant to another, space is an accidental whole that is continuously changing and becoming something different, and therefore a phenomenon. As Leibniz explains to Clarke, it can be represented mathematically by supposing some set of existents hypothetically (and counterfactually) to remain in a fixed mutual relation of situation, and gauging all subsequent situations in terms of transformations with respect to this initial set. Space conceived in terms of such allowable transformations is the subject of Analysis Situs. Finally, insofar as space is conceived in abstraction from any bodies that might individuate the situations, it encompasses all possible relations of situation. This abstract space, the order of all possible situations, is an abstract entity, and therefore ideal. (shrink)

Increasing the “truth per dollar” of money spent on science is one legitimate long-run goal of the economics of science. But before this goal can be achieved, we need to increase our knowledge of the successes and failures of past and current reward structures of science. This essay reviews what economists have learned about the behavior of scientists and the reward structure of science. One important use of such knowledge will be to help policy-makers create a reward structure that is (...) more efficient in the future. (shrink)

We construct two models containing exactly one supercompact cardinal in which all non-supercompact measurable cardinals are strictly taller than they are either strongly compact or supercompact. In the first of these models, level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. In the other, level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. Each universe has only one strongly compact cardinal and contains relatively few large cardinals.