The Stoic theory of knowledge was founded by Zeno on a perceptual and crudely materialistic base, but subsequently developed into an elaborate theory involving λεκτ which has proved difficult to reconstruct. The evolution of the school, influenced not only by internal differences but also by interaction with the Platonic Academy, certainly contributed to this development. Hence any adequate reconstruction of the Stoic theory of knowledge must take account of the differences among the positions of the different representatives of the school (...) with respect to the criticism put foward by the Academics. I propose here to clarify Zeno's position, showing how Arcesilaus' criticism helped to expose certain lacunae and thus to bring about changes in doctrine on the part both of Zeno himself and of his immediate successors. (shrink)

Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae Source presents the transcription of the collection of testimonies about Socrates and Socratics (Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae) originally edited by G. Giannantoni. -/- The site enable users to access texts, exploit resources, and perform queries. Notes, additional information and a legenda for a better access to the texts are also available. -/- The publication is peer-reviewed and aspire to meet the highest quality standards. The content of the site and its internet addresses are stable and can (...) be freely consulted and used for scholarly purposes. -/- The site will be soon open for semantically enrich the data published on the websites. A use of peer-to-peer (p2p) networking will also provide an efficient and engaging collaborative work space. (shrink)

Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...) agents either, he concludes that no interpretation of evidential probabilities in terms of credence is adequate. I argue to the contrary. My overarching aim is to show on behalf of Bayesians how one can still interpret evidential probabilities in terms of ideally rational credence and how one can maintain a tight connection between evidential probabilities and ideally rational credence even if the former cannot be interpreted in terms of the latter. By achieving this aim I illuminate the limits and prospects of Bayesianism. (shrink)

In everyday life and in science we acquire evidence of evidence and based on this new evidence we often change our epistemic states. An assumption underlying such practice is that the following EEE Slogan is correct: 'evidence of evidence is evidence' (Feldman 2007, p. 208). We suggest that evidence of evidence is best understood as higher-order evidence about the epistemic state of agents. In order to model evidence of evidence we introduce a new powerful framework for modelling epistemic states, Dyadic (...) Bayesianism. Based on this framework, we then discuss characterizations of evidence of evidence and argue for one of them. Finally, we show that whether the EEE Slogan holds, depends on the specific kind of evidence of evidence. (shrink)

In the literature, one finds two accounts of the normative status of rational belief: the ought account and the permissibility account. Both accounts have their advantages and shortcomings, making it difficult to favour one over the other. Imagine that there were two principles of rational belief or rational degrees of belief commonly considered plausible, but which, however, yielded a paradox together with one account, but not with the other. One of the accounts therefore requires us to give up one of (...) the plausible principles; whereas the other allows us to save them both. The fact that it allows us to save both of the plausible principles might well be considered a strong reason in favour of the relevant account. The permissibility-account-based resolution of the lottery paradox suggests that the permissibility account is a candidate for being supported in this way, since the account seems to save two plausible principles of rational belief and rational degrees of belief. I argue that even if the permissibility account were supported in this way the support would be defeated, since one cannot provide an analogous resolution of the preface paradox. The principles remain unsaved by the permissibility account. (shrink)

I focus on the No-Paradise Dilemma, which results from some initially plausible epistemic ideals, coupled with an assumption concerning our evidence. Our evidence indicates that we are not in an epistemic paradise, in which we do not experience cognitive failures. I opt for a resolution of the dilemma that is based on an evidentialist position that can be motivated independently of the dilemma. According to this position, it is rational for an agent to believe a proposition on the agent’s total (...) evidence just in case the (total) evidence stably supports the proposition. Based on this evidentialist position, I argue that it is not an epistemic ideal in the actual world that we hold rational beliefs that are logically equivalent to our rational beliefs. The dilemma is resolved by giving up this ideal for the actual world and adopting the evidentialist position in terms of stable evidential support. (shrink)

Recent increases in the volume and diversity of life science data and information and an increasing emphasis on data sharing and interoperability have resulted in the creation of a large number of biological ontologies, including the Cell Ontology (CL), designed to provide a standardized representation of cell types for data annotation. Ontologies have been shown to have significant benefits for computational analyses of large data sets and for automated reasoning applications, leading to organized attempts to improve the structure and formal (...) rigor of ontologies to better support computation. Currently, the CL employs multiple is_a relations, defining cell types in terms of histological, functional, and lineage properties, and the majority of definitions are written with sufficient generality to hold across multiple species. This approach limits the CL's utility for computation and for cross-species data integration. Results: To enhance the CL's utility for computational analyses, we developed a method for the ontological representation of cells and applied this method to develop a dendritic cell ontology (DC-CL). DC-CL subtypes are delineated on the basis of surface protein expression, systematically including both species-general and species-specific types and optimizing DC-CL for the analysis of flow cytometry data. We avoid multiple uses of is_a by linking DC-CL terms to terms in other ontologies via additional, formally defined relations such as has_function. This approach brings benefits in the form of increased accuracy, support for reasoning, and interoperability with other ontology resources. Accordingly, we propose our method as a general strategy for the ontological representation of cells. DC-CL is available from http://www.obofoundry.org. (shrink)

A characterization of epistemic rationality, or epistemic justification, is typically taken to require a process of conceptual clarification, and is seen as comprising the core of a theory of (epistemic) rationality. I propose to explicate the concept of rationality. -/- It is essential, I argue, that the normativity of rationality, and the purpose, or goal, for which the particular theory of rationality is being proposed, is taken into account when explicating the concept of rationality. My position thus amounts to an (...) instrumentalist position about theories of epistemic rationality. Since there are different purposes, or goals, for which theories of rationality are proposed, the method of explication leaves room for different characterizations of rationality. I focus on two such (kinds of) purposes: first, the purpose of guiding the formation (or maintenance) of doxastic states and, second, the purpose of assessing (the formation or maintenance of) doxastic states. I conclude by outlining a pluralistic picture concerning rationality. (shrink)

When members of a group doxastically disagree with each other, decisions in the group are often hard to make. The members are supposed to find an epistemic compromise. How do members of a group reach a rational epistemic compromise on a proposition when they have different (rational) credences in the proposition? I answer the question by suggesting the Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation, which is introduced in Brössel and Eder 2014 and is further developed here. I show how this method faces (...) challenges of the standard method of aggregation, Weighted Straight Averaging, in a successful way. One of the challenges concerns the fact that Weighted Straight Averaging does not respect the evidential states of agents. Another challenge arises because Weighted Straight Averaging does not account for synergetic effects. (shrink)

On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only that we (...) are permitted to do so. In arguing for that, I defend an epistemic teleological position that is radical in nature. It involves no commitment to aiming at the truth. I conclude by dispelling some worries that have been raised about my position. (shrink)

This paper is the introduction to the Special Issue “Philosophical Methods”. The Special Issue will be published by Synthese.

How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given this position it is possible to provide an adequate answer (...) to the question of how to rationally revise one’s epistemic state in the light of disagreement. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Begriff Leiden ist in der Medizin und in der Bioethik bisher kaum reflektiert und dahingehend in normativer Hinsicht wenig bestimmt. Dennoch bildet das Leiden an einer Unfruchtbarkeit den Ausgangspunkt für die medizintechnischen Interventionen der assistierten reproduktionsmedizinischen Behandlung. Dabei wird implizit angenommen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch ein Leiden ist. Ob der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch allerdings ein Leiden darstellt, ist bisher nicht eindeutig geklärt worden.Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, die Annahme, dass es sich beim unerfüllten Kinderwunsch um ein Leiden handelt, zu überprüfen. (...) Anhand der Darstellung einiger gängiger Leidenskonzeptionen werden Merkmale von Leiden herausgearbeitet, die als treffende Grundannahmen für eine Leidensbestimmung gelten können. Es wird sich zeigen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch, entsprechend der Leidenskonzeptionen, als ein Leiden angesehen werden sollte, und ihm somit ein normativer Stellenwert zukommt. In einem weiteren Schritt ist zu klären, ob das Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch als ein Rechtfertigungsgrund für reproduktionsmedizinische Interventionen gelten kann. Dafür wird zum einen der Stellenwert von Leiden, als eine anthropologische Grundbedingung, im Zusammenhang mit dem Leidenslinderungsauftrag der Medizin diskutiert. Zum anderen werden die Risiken der reproduktionsmedizinischen Therapien sowie deren Bedeutung als Gesundheitsressourcen erörtert. Dabei wird deutlich, dass Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch immer ein psychosomatischer Komplex ist. Nur unter Berücksichtigung der psychoexistenziellen Dimension des Leidens ergibt sich eine Legitimation für eine angemessene somatische Intervention.Definition of the problem In medicine and bioethics, the term “suffering” is not clearly defined from a normative point of view. Nevertheless, suffering due to infertility is the starting point for medical interventions in assisted reproductive medicine. This implies that the unfulfilled desire to have children is a form of suffering, but the validity of this statement has not yet been clarified. Arguments Based on descriptions of some common concepts, certain characteristics of suffering are identified. We discuss the significance of suffering as an anthropological condition in connection with the mission of medicine to alleviate human suffering. Furthermore, the risks of reproductive treatment and their significance for health are addressed. Conclusion We conclude that the unfulfilled desire to have children is a form of suffering, and therefore has a normative value. The legitimacy of appropriate somatic intervention can only be established by taking the psycho-existential dimension of suffering into account. (shrink)

Material artefacts consist of many smaller – and ultimately natural – objects such as molecules and atoms that have been intentionally rearranged in such a way as to take the shape of a particular artefact and fulfil its functions. Whenever the arrangement of several parts results in properties that go beyond the properties of the individual parts or their sum, it can be said that this arrangement has resulted in a new object. Once created, material artefacts may take part in (...) natural processes such as reproduction and evolution and cannot be fundamentally distinguished from fully natural objects. This article provides a number of – mainly biological – examples that show the traditional Aristotelian dichotomy between nature and artefacts to be highly problematic and suggest a continuum instead. Most importantly, it is argued that living beings and artefacts are equally capable – or sometimes incapable – of self-reproduction and that there are numerous objects which are both living beings and artefacts. (shrink)

Der Begriff Leiden ist in der Medizin und in der Bioethik bisher kaum reflektiert und dahingehend in normativer Hinsicht wenig bestimmt. Dennoch bildet das Leiden an einer Unfruchtbarkeit den Ausgangspunkt für die medizintechnischen Interventionen der assistierten reproduktionsmedizinischen Behandlung. Dabei wird implizit angenommen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch ein Leiden ist. Ob der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch allerdings ein Leiden darstellt, ist bisher nicht eindeutig geklärt worden.Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, die Annahme, dass es sich beim unerfüllten Kinderwunsch um ein Leiden handelt, zu überprüfen. (...) Anhand der Darstellung einiger gängiger Leidenskonzeptionen werden Merkmale von Leiden herausgearbeitet, die als treffende Grundannahmen für eine Leidensbestimmung gelten können. Es wird sich zeigen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch, entsprechend der Leidenskonzeptionen, als ein Leiden angesehen werden sollte, und ihm somit ein normativer Stellenwert zukommt. In einem weiteren Schritt ist zu klären, ob das Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch als ein Rechtfertigungsgrund für reproduktionsmedizinische Interventionen gelten kann. Dafür wird zum einen der Stellenwert von Leiden, als eine anthropologische Grundbedingung, im Zusammenhang mit dem Leidenslinderungsauftrag der Medizin diskutiert. Zum anderen werden die Risiken der reproduktionsmedizinischen Therapien sowie deren Bedeutung als Gesundheitsressourcen erörtert. Dabei wird deutlich, dass Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch immer ein psychosomatischer Komplex ist. Nur unter Berücksichtigung der psychoexistenziellen Dimension des Leidens ergibt sich eine Legitimation für eine angemessene somatische Intervention. (shrink)

Der Begriff Leiden ist in der Medizin und in der Bioethik bisher kaum reflektiert und dahingehend in normativer Hinsicht wenig bestimmt. Dennoch bildet das Leiden an einer Unfruchtbarkeit den Ausgangspunkt für die medizintechnischen Interventionen der assistierten reproduktionsmedizinischen Behandlung. Dabei wird implizit angenommen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch ein Leiden ist. Ob der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch allerdings ein Leiden darstellt, ist bisher nicht eindeutig geklärt worden.Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, die Annahme, dass es sich beim unerfüllten Kinderwunsch um ein Leiden handelt, zu überprüfen. (...) Anhand der Darstellung einiger gängiger Leidenskonzeptionen werden Merkmale von Leiden herausgearbeitet, die als treffende Grundannahmen für eine Leidensbestimmung gelten können. Es wird sich zeigen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch, entsprechend der Leidenskonzeptionen, als ein Leiden angesehen werden sollte, und ihm somit ein normativer Stellenwert zukommt. In einem weiteren Schritt ist zu klären, ob das Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch als ein Rechtfertigungsgrund für reproduktionsmedizinische Interventionen gelten kann. Dafür wird zum einen der Stellenwert von Leiden, als eine anthropologische Grundbedingung, im Zusammenhang mit dem Leidenslinderungsauftrag der Medizin diskutiert. Zum anderen werden die Risiken der reproduktionsmedizinischen Therapien sowie deren Bedeutung als Gesundheitsressourcen erörtert. Dabei wird deutlich, dass Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch immer ein psychosomatischer Komplex ist. Nur unter Berücksichtigung der psychoexistenziellen Dimension des Leidens ergibt sich eine Legitimation für eine angemessene somatische Intervention. (shrink)

Semantyka teoriomonogościowa dla wielowartościowych rachunków pozycyjnych Celem artykułu jest zdefiniowanie adekwatnych semantyk teoriomonogościowych dla rachunków pozycyjnych.

The paper is about the connotations of the philosophical novel. It explores the question of whether and how the philosophical novel can become functional model for philosophical praxis. I argue that the philosophical novel is a tool for activating a relational process whereby the concept of “situated relationship” becomes clear and is enhanced in conjunction with the activation of philosophical praxis. A “situated relationship” is identified as a relational practice which is contextualized and exerted in and between thinking, language and (...) action, within the framework of an educational process which becomes a dialogue-oriented research through relational networks. This form of thinking is not only Logos, but also Pathos and Ethos, inasmuch as the interconnection of thinking, language, meaning and behavior is made manifest, recognized and practiced in thinking and with thinking. By fostering awareness of the cognitive and affective dimensions, this form of thinking can extend such awareness to the relational dimension, interpersonal and intrapersonal, within a constant circular form of complementarity. (shrink)

La Collection Les Alchimistes Grecs della CUF si arricchisce d'un altro volume con un'opera del tutto nuova rispetto ai due volumi già pubblicati, l'Anonyme de Zuretti: il testo, che prende il nome da C. O. Zuretti, il quale ne curò nel 1930 l'editio princeps nel VII volume del Catalogue des manuscrits alchimistes grecs, è «un traité pratique, complet et systematique, rédigé à l'époque médiévale par un Grec d'Italie du Sud. Celui-ci se base sur de nombreuses sources latines et arabo-latines, sans (...) renier pour autant la tradition grecque, et il écrit dans une langue déroutante … respectée au maximum» . Come scrive l'Editrice nell'Avant-propos, questa sintesi delle conoscenze alchemiche mediterranee degli inizi del 1300 è il più lungo dei testi alchemici greci e presenta diversi motivi di interesse: è il testimone del sincretismo culturale che fioriva nel regno di Napoli in epoca angioina; è un documento interessante per lo studio della lingua greca medievale della Calabria; permette di affrontare problemi filologici legati al fenomeno della traduzione. (shrink)