Contrairement à ses deux ouvrages précédents, qui depuis longtemps sont des classiques incontournables de l’histoire de la philosophie antique, le dernier livre d’AnnaMariaIoppolo ne se présente pas comme l’étude d’un auteur ou d’un problème hellénistique important, mais, plus modestement, comme l’étude d’un témoignage, celui de Sextus sur l’Académie sceptique. À première vue, il s’agirait donc d’un ouvrage appartenant à un genre bien connu et assez ancien, l’étude de sources, au double sen...
The Stoic theory of knowledge was founded by Zeno on a perceptual and crudely materialistic base, but subsequently developed into an elaborate theory involving λεκτ which has proved difficult to reconstruct. The evolution of the school, influenced not only by internal differences but also by interaction with the Platonic Academy, certainly contributed to this development. Hence any adequate reconstruction of the Stoic theory of knowledge must take account of the differences among the positions of the different representatives of the school (...) with respect to the criticism put foward by the Academics. I propose here to clarify Zeno's position, showing how Arcesilaus' criticism helped to expose certain lacunae and thus to bring about changes in doctrine on the part both of Zeno himself and of his immediate successors. (shrink)
Bien qu’il tende à interpréter l’ἐποχή comme une position personnelle d’Arcésilas, Thomas Bénatouïl admet cependant que cette interprétation n’est pas pleinement justifiée par nos sources, lesquelles, loin d’être unanimes, font également état d’une interprétation exclusivement dialectique de l’ἐποχή περὶ πάντων. Mais s’il en est ainsi, il est également difficile de soutenir qu’Arcésilas utilise un vocabulaire qui lui est propre pour exposer son point de vue ; en conséquence de quoi le mot ἄδη...
Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae Source presents the transcription of the collection of testimonies about Socrates and Socratics (Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae) originally edited by G. Giannantoni. -/- The site enable users to access texts, exploit resources, and perform queries. Notes, additional information and a legenda for a better access to the texts are also available. -/- The publication is peer-reviewed and aspire to meet the highest quality standards. The content of the site and its internet addresses are stable and can (...) be freely consulted and used for scholarly purposes. -/- The site will be soon open for semantically enrich the data published on the websites. A use of peer-to-peer (p2p) networking will also provide an efficient and engaging collaborative work space. (shrink)
Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...) agents either, he concludes that no interpretation of evidential probabilities in terms of credence is adequate. I argue to the contrary. My overarching aim is to show on behalf of Bayesians how one can still interpret evidential probabilities in terms of ideally rational credence and how one can maintain a tight connection between evidential probabilities and ideally rational credence even if the former cannot be interpreted in terms of the latter. By achieving this aim I illuminate the limits and prospects of Bayesianism. (shrink)
On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only that we (...) are permitted to do so. In arguing for that, I defend an epistemic teleological position that is radical in nature. It involves no commitment to aiming at the truth. I conclude by dispelling some worries that have been raised about my position. (shrink)
In everyday life and in science we acquire evidence of evidence and based on this new evidence we often change our epistemic states. An assumption underlying such practice is that the following EEE Slogan is correct: 'evidence of evidence is evidence' (Feldman 2007, p. 208). We suggest that evidence of evidence is best understood as higher-order evidence about the epistemic state of agents. In order to model evidence of evidence we introduce a new powerful framework for modelling epistemic states, Dyadic (...) Bayesianism. Based on this framework, we then discuss characterizations of evidence of evidence and argue for one of them. Finally, we show that whether the EEE Slogan holds, depends on the specific kind of evidence of evidence. (shrink)
In the literature, one finds two accounts of the normative status of rational belief: the ought account and the permissibility account. Both accounts have their advantages and shortcomings, making it difficult to favour one over the other. Imagine that there were two principles of rational belief or rational degrees of belief commonly considered plausible, but which, however, yielded a paradox together with one account, but not with the other. One of the accounts therefore requires us to give up one of (...) the plausible principles; whereas the other allows us to save them both. The fact that it allows us to save both of the plausible principles might well be considered a strong reason in favour of the relevant account. The permissibility-account-based resolution of the lottery paradox suggests that the permissibility account is a candidate for being supported in this way, since the account seems to save two plausible principles of rational belief and rational degrees of belief. I argue that even if the permissibility account were supported in this way the support would be defeated, since one cannot provide an analogous resolution of the preface paradox. The principles remain unsaved by the permissibility account. (shrink)
In March 1986, a public symposium took place in Heidelberg about the “unresolved potential dangers of genetic engineering”. The event was organized by institutions affiliated with the environmental movement. Choosing this symposium as an example, the article shows how the public appearance of scientists can be understood as a form of political activism. The article shows how specialists from fields as diverse as biology, chemistry, physics, law and political sciences tried to place political messages by putting themselves in the limelight (...) as independent scientists. I argue that the symposium was both: a place of science communication intertwined with political agitation that, as should be noted, happened in a time when the West German government was working on the legislation of genetic engineering, legitimated by relying on independent expertise. It can be concluded that the discourse of scientific independence became a strategic tool in the controversial debate about the uses and dangers of genetic engineering. Thus, it draws attention to a dimension of political-scientific activity which cannot be fully grasped by the concept of ‘the expert’ that is established in the history of science. (shrink)
Material artefacts consist of many smaller – and ultimately natural – objects such as molecules and atoms that have been intentionally rearranged in such a way as to take the shape of a particular artefact and fulfil its functions. Whenever the arrangement of several parts results in properties that go beyond the properties of the individual parts or their sum, it can be said that this arrangement has resulted in a new object. Once created, material artefacts may take part in (...) natural processes such as reproduction and evolution and cannot be fundamentally distinguished from fully natural objects. This article provides a number of – mainly biological – examples that show the traditional Aristotelian dichotomy between nature and artefacts to be highly problematic and suggest a continuum instead. Most importantly, it is argued that living beings and artefacts are equally capable – or sometimes incapable – of self-reproduction and that there are numerous objects which are both living beings and artefacts. (shrink)
I focus on the No-Paradise Dilemma, which results from some initially plausible epistemic ideals, coupled with an assumption concerning our evidence. Our evidence indicates that we are not in an epistemic paradise, in which we do not experience cognitive failures. I opt for a resolution of the dilemma that is based on an evidentialist position that can be motivated independently of the dilemma. According to this position, it is rational for an agent to believe a proposition on the agent’s total (...) evidence just in case the (total) evidence stably supports the proposition. Based on this evidentialist position, I argue that it is not an epistemic ideal in the actual world that we hold rational beliefs that are logically equivalent to our rational beliefs. The dilemma is resolved by giving up this ideal for the actual world and adopting the evidentialist position in terms of stable evidential support. (shrink)
Definition of the problemIn medicine and bioethics, the term “suffering” is not clearly defined from a normative point of view. Nevertheless, suffering due to infertility is the starting point for medical interventions in assisted reproductive medicine. This implies that the unfulfilled desire to have children is a form of suffering, but the validity of this statement has not yet been clarified.ArgumentsBased on descriptions of some common concepts, certain characteristics of suffering are identified. We discuss the significance of suffering as an (...) anthropological condition in connection with the mission of medicine to alleviate human suffering. Furthermore, the risks of reproductive treatment and their significance for health are addressed.ConclusionWe conclude that the unfulfilled desire to have children is a form of suffering, and therefore has a normative value. The legitimacy of appropriate somatic intervention can only be established by taking the psycho-existential dimension of suffering into account. (shrink)
When members of a group doxastically disagree with each other, decisions in the group are often hard to make. The members are supposed to find an epistemic compromise. How do members of a group reach a rational epistemic compromise on a proposition when they have different (rational) credences in the proposition? I answer the question by suggesting the Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation, which is introduced in Brössel and Eder 2014 and is further developed here. I show how this method faces (...) challenges of the standard method of aggregation, Weighted Straight Averaging, in a successful way. One of the challenges concerns the fact that Weighted Straight Averaging does not respect the evidential states of agents. Another challenge arises because Weighted Straight Averaging does not account for synergetic effects. (shrink)
Der Begriff Leiden ist in der Medizin und in der Bioethik bisher kaum reflektiert und dahingehend in normativer Hinsicht wenig bestimmt. Dennoch bildet das Leiden an einer Unfruchtbarkeit den Ausgangspunkt für die medizintechnischen Interventionen der assistierten reproduktionsmedizinischen Behandlung. Dabei wird implizit angenommen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch ein Leiden ist. Ob der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch allerdings ein Leiden darstellt, ist bisher nicht eindeutig geklärt worden.Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, die Annahme, dass es sich beim unerfüllten Kinderwunsch um ein Leiden handelt, zu überprüfen. (...) Anhand der Darstellung einiger gängiger Leidenskonzeptionen werden Merkmale von Leiden herausgearbeitet, die als treffende Grundannahmen für eine Leidensbestimmung gelten können. Es wird sich zeigen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch, entsprechend der Leidenskonzeptionen, als ein Leiden angesehen werden sollte, und ihm somit ein normativer Stellenwert zukommt. In einem weiteren Schritt ist zu klären, ob das Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch als ein Rechtfertigungsgrund für reproduktionsmedizinische Interventionen gelten kann. Dafür wird zum einen der Stellenwert von Leiden, als eine anthropologische Grundbedingung, im Zusammenhang mit dem Leidenslinderungsauftrag der Medizin diskutiert. Zum anderen werden die Risiken der reproduktionsmedizinischen Therapien sowie deren Bedeutung als Gesundheitsressourcen erörtert. Dabei wird deutlich, dass Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch immer ein psychosomatischer Komplex ist. Nur unter Berücksichtigung der psychoexistenziellen Dimension des Leidens ergibt sich eine Legitimation für eine angemessene somatische Intervention. (shrink)
Der Begriff Leiden ist in der Medizin und in der Bioethik bisher kaum reflektiert und dahingehend in normativer Hinsicht wenig bestimmt. Dennoch bildet das Leiden an einer Unfruchtbarkeit den Ausgangspunkt für die medizintechnischen Interventionen der assistierten reproduktionsmedizinischen Behandlung. Dabei wird implizit angenommen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch ein Leiden ist. Ob der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch allerdings ein Leiden darstellt, ist bisher nicht eindeutig geklärt worden.Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, die Annahme, dass es sich beim unerfüllten Kinderwunsch um ein Leiden handelt, zu überprüfen. (...) Anhand der Darstellung einiger gängiger Leidenskonzeptionen werden Merkmale von Leiden herausgearbeitet, die als treffende Grundannahmen für eine Leidensbestimmung gelten können. Es wird sich zeigen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch, entsprechend der Leidenskonzeptionen, als ein Leiden angesehen werden sollte, und ihm somit ein normativer Stellenwert zukommt. In einem weiteren Schritt ist zu klären, ob das Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch als ein Rechtfertigungsgrund für reproduktionsmedizinische Interventionen gelten kann. Dafür wird zum einen der Stellenwert von Leiden, als eine anthropologische Grundbedingung, im Zusammenhang mit dem Leidenslinderungsauftrag der Medizin diskutiert. Zum anderen werden die Risiken der reproduktionsmedizinischen Therapien sowie deren Bedeutung als Gesundheitsressourcen erörtert. Dabei wird deutlich, dass Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch immer ein psychosomatischer Komplex ist. Nur unter Berücksichtigung der psychoexistenziellen Dimension des Leidens ergibt sich eine Legitimation für eine angemessene somatische Intervention. (shrink)
The Euclidean ‘Division of the canon’ and Pythagorean harmonics: The article presents the first Polish translation of a short Ancient Greek treatise entitled The division of the canon, which is commonly dated to the 3rd century BC, with a doubtful assumption that the author of the treatise is Euclid himself. It is the oldest surviving text derived from the mathematical school of harmonics, which combined the mathematical theory of proportion with the musical laws of harmony. The main purpose of this (...) Euclidean treatise is to describe the instrument called canon, which consists in determining the successive notes of the Greek musical system by means of mathematical principles. The treatise essentially consists of two distinct parts: an introduction and twenty propositions in the style of Euclid’s Elements. To bring this highly esoteric text closer to the modern reader, the translation is preceded by a brief introduction, which deals with the basic issues of the transmission of the text, its structure, and the problem of authorship. The philosophical problems of the treatise and its basic concepts are also discussed. An underlying idea of both the introduction and the work on the translation is that The division of the canon is an eminently Pythagorean text, which both expressed and proved their conviction about the mathematical structure of the universe. (shrink)
A characterization of epistemic rationality, or epistemic justification, is typically taken to require a process of conceptual clarification, and is seen as comprising the core of a theory of (epistemic) rationality. I propose to explicate the concept of rationality. -/- It is essential, I argue, that the normativity of rationality, and the purpose, or goal, for which the particular theory of rationality is being proposed, is taken into account when explicating the concept of rationality. My position thus amounts to an (...) instrumentalist position about theories of epistemic rationality. Since there are different purposes, or goals, for which theories of rationality are proposed, the method of explication leaves room for different characterizations of rationality. I focus on two such (kinds of) purposes: first, the purpose of guiding the formation (or maintenance) of doxastic states and, second, the purpose of assessing (the formation or maintenance of) doxastic states. I conclude by outlining a pluralistic picture concerning rationality. (shrink)
Nostalgia is a fond longing for the past that has been shown to increase feelings of meaning, social connectedness, and self-continuity. Although nostalgia for personal memories provides intra- and interpersonal benefits, there may be negative consequences of group-based nostalgia on the perception and acceptance of others. The presented research examined national nostalgia, and its effects on group identification and political attitudes in the United States. In a sample of US voters, tendencies to feel personal and national nostalgia are associated with (...) markedly different emotional and attitudinal profiles. Higher levels of national nostalgia predicted both positive attitudes toward President Trump and racial prejudice, though there was no evidence of such relationships with personal nostalgia. National nostalgia most strongly predicted positive attitudes toward president Trump among those high in racial prejudice. Furthermore, nostalgia's positive relationship with racial prejudice was partially mediated by perceived outgroup threat. Results from this study will help us better understand how the experience of national nostalgia can influence attitudes and motivate political behavior. (shrink)
Opponents of women's education assumed that women were less naturally gifted than men, that education was inappropriate for Christian women, or that it was irrational to educate women because they could not fulfil the civil and ecclesiastical offices for which education was the required preparation. Van Schurman argued against all three assumptions in her Dissertatio . She presented her arguments as syllogisms, which she based on the authority of the Bible, on the Christian churches' understanding of human nature, and on (...) the necessity of knowledge to acquire virtues and to avoid falling into heresy. Van Schurman concluded that education was appropriate for women, in general, for exactly the same reasons as it was appropriate for men. Les opposants à une éducation des femmes considéraient qu'elles étaient naturellement moins douées que les hommes, que l'éducation était quelque chose d'inapproprié pour les femmes chrétiennes, ou qu'il était irrationnel d'éduquer les femmes car elles ne remplissent aucune charges civile ou ecclé siastique, charges pour lesquelles l'éducation constituait une préparation requise. Van Schurman discute ces trois assertions dans sa Dissertatio . Elle présente ses arguments comme des syllogismes, qu'elle fonde sur l'autorité de la Bible, sur la compréhension de la nature humaine par les églises chrétiennes, et sur la nécessité de la connaissance pour acquérir de la vertu et pour éviter de tomber dans l'hérésie. Van Schurman conclut qu'il est approprié que les femmes en général soient éduquées, tout comme cela est approprié pour les hommes. (shrink)
