One Stoic response to the skeptical indistinguishability argument is that it fails to account for expertise: the Stoics allow that while two similar objects create indistinguishable appearances in the amateur, this is not true of the expert, whose appearances succeed in discriminating the pair. This paper re-examines the motivations for this Stoic response, and argues that it reveals the Stoic claim that, in generating a kataleptic appearance, the perceiver’s mind is active, insofar as it applies concepts matching the perceptual stimulus. (...) I argue that this claim is reflected in the Stoic definition of the kataleptic appearance, and that it respects their more general account of mental representation. I further suggest that, in attributing some activity to the mind in creating each kataleptic appearance, and in claiming that the expert’s mind allows her to form more kataleptic appearances than the amateur, the Stoics draw inspiration from the wax tablet model in Plato’s Theaetetus, where Socrates distinguishes the wise from the ignorant on the basis of how well they match sensory input with its appropriate mental ‘seal’. (shrink)

In the Speech of Pythagoras fromMetamorphoses15, Ovid uses a metaphor of how wax can be stamped with new images to illustrate how theanimacan remain substantially the same while altering in shape when undergoing transmigration. Shortly after he describes how all things are in a state of flux, and compares the flow of time to the movement of a river. In Plato’sTheaetetus, Socrates, in an extended analogy, tells us to imagine that the ψυχή contains a block of wax, upon which are (...) imprinted our memories, while the dialogue also contains a lengthy criticism of the Heraclitean doctrine of flux. This article will argue that Ovid adapts the wax-metaphor from theTheaetetusand that the dialogue also provides the context for Ovid’s allusion to the Heraclitean principle that πάντα ῥεῖ. It will analyse how the wax and river metaphors were transformed in the epistemological theories of the Stoics and the Epicureans in order to demonstrate how Ovid reformulates this series of philosophical discussions for poetic purposes. The final part of this article will discuss how the wax and river metaphors can be read in term of the wider intertextual agenda of the Speech of Pythagoras. (shrink)

In the Speech of Pythagoras from Metamorphoses 15, Ovid uses a metaphor of how wax can be stamped with new images to illustrate how the anima can remain substantially the same while altering in shape when undergoing transmigration. Shortly after he describes how all things are in a state of flux, and compares the flow of time to the movement of a river. In Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates, in an extended analogy, tells us to imagine that the ψυχή contains a block (...) of wax, upon which are imprinted our memories, while the dialogue also contains a lengthy criticism of the Heraclitean doctrine of flux. This article will argue that Ovid adapts the wax-metaphor from the Theaetetus and that the dialogue also provides the context for Ovid’s allusion to the Heraclitean principle that πάντα ῥεῖ. It will analyse how the wax and river metaphors were transformed in the epistemological theories of the Stoics and the Epicureans in order to demonstrate how Ovid reformulates this series of philosophical discussions for poetic purposes. The final part of this article will discuss how the wax and river metaphors can be read in term of the wider intertextual agenda of the Speech of Pythagoras. (shrink)

The Stoics identified the phantasia with the impression (typos) in the soul, or the impressing process (typōsis). Alexander of Aphrodisias engages directly with this account at De anima 68.10–21, and argues against the applicability of the impression in a theory of perception in Mantissa 10, especially 133.25–134.23. I analyse Alexander’s polemic account at De anima 68.10–21, I demonstrate that it differs from Chrysippus’ criticism of Cleanthes (contrary to some commentators), and I show how it fits in the context of his (...) argument. From this analysis it will emerge how Alexander uses Stoic ideas to form his Aristotelian account. Then, I show that Alexander, by taking ‘typos’ metaphorically, not only prefers the term ‘enkataleimma’ over ‘typos’ in his theory of phantasia, but he keeps the ‘typos’ terminology only to remain faithful to Aristotle’s use (contrary to some commentators). (shrink)

This paper focuses on Plotinus’ account of the soul’s cognitive powers of sense perception and discursive thought, with particular reference to the treatises 3. 6 [26], 4. 4 [28] and 5. 3 [49] of the Enneads . Part 1 of the paper discusses Plotinus’ direct realism in perception. Parts 2 and 3 focus on Plotinus’ account of knowledge in Enneads 5. 3 [49] 2–3. Plotinus there argues that we make judgements regarding how the external world is by means of discursive (...) reasoning. This latter claim, however, is in tension with what Plotinus argues elsewhere regarding our perceptual apprehension of the external world (3. 6 [26] 1; 4. 4 [28] 23). This puzzle is addressed in Part 3 of the paper, which investigates Plotinus’ view that there exist some sense perceptions of which we are unaware. Finally, Part 4 looks at Plotinus’ understanding of Plato’s famous wax block analogy, in 5. 3 (49). The overall conclusion of the paper is that Plotinus’ account of knowledge is radically different from that of the Cartesian tradition. (shrink)

At Varro LL VI.56 and SE M 8.275-276, we find reports of the Stoic view that children and articulate non-rational animals such as parrots cannot genuinely speak. Absent from these testimonia is the peculiar case of the superficiality of the actor’s speech, which appears in one edition of the unstable text of PHerc 307.9 containing fragments of Chrysippus’ Logical Investigations. Commentators who include this edition of the text in their discussions of the Stoic theory of speech do not offer a (...) univocal account of the superficiality of the parrot’s, the child’s, and the actor’s speech. In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of the Stoic account of genuine and superficial speech and show that not only is there an account of superficial speech that univocally explains the superficiality of the speech of parrots, children, and actors, but that this account challenges traditional assumptions about the entities at the heart of the Stoic theory of language—lekta. It will turn out that genuine speech is the expression of a lekton by way of performing a speech act, and that this account of superficial speech can be used to explain other linguistic phenomena that are of interest to the Stoics, such as sentences in insoluble sophisms and sentences containing demonstratives that do not refer to anything in the subject term. Importantly, my reconstruction shows, against the near consensus view of lekta, that lekta do not primarily explain what makes an utterance meaningful. Rather, they primarily explain what makes an utterance an instance of genuine speech. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es analizar dos argumentos estoicos (uno de ellos transmitido por Cicerón y Aulo Gelio, el otro por Nemesio y Alejandro) que han sido frecuentemente interpretados como una defensa del compatibilismo. Presentaremos una interpretación alternativa de ambos argumentos, concentrándonos en el horizonte naturalista ofrecido por la metafísica y la ética del estoicismo antiguo. El análisis se articulará sobre el concepto de “asentimiento” y sobre la distinción entre aquello que “depende de nosotros” y aquello que no.

El presente trabajo se propone advertir el momento del proceso cognitivo en el cual la habilidad del sabio de controlar sus asentimientos se haría manifiesta; dicho propósito presenta ciertas dificultades dado el marco de un determinismo radical que caracteriza al pensamiento estoico. Por tanto, y con el objetivo de dilucidar tales problemáticas, conjugaremos la existencia de una cadena de determinaciones (que constituye el destino) con la posibilidad de que un individuo cuente con una facultad que 'esté en su poder'. The (...) present paper proposes to notice the cognitive process' moment in which the sage's ability to control his assents would become apparent; this objective presents some difficulties given the context of a radical determinism that characterizes Stoic thought. Therefore, and with the aim of solving such problems, we will conjugate the existence of a determinations' chain (which constitutes fate) with the possibility that a man has a faculty which 'might be in his power'. (shrink)