ABSTRACTThis paper argues that Machiavelli's method, his inductive and comparative use of history and experience for political analysis, and his fashioning of historical-political analysis as ‘science’, played an important and still unrecognised role in his reception in the sixteenth century. It makes the case that Machiavelli's inductive reasoning and stress on historia and experientia offered a model for scientific method that open-minded sixteenth-century scholars, eager to understand, organise and augment human knowledge, could fit to their own epistemology. By focusing (...) on the question of method—a crucial issue for sixteenth-century contemporaries—the paper offers more than a key to the understanding of Machiavelli's positive reception. It also helps in apprehending the crucial importance of Lucretius to Machiavelli's scholarship; the role of the late Renaissance fascination with historia in his reception; and the breadth of appropriation of his method exactly in the decades when anti-Machiavellianism became official politics all over Europe. These claims are sustained through the cases of Machiavelli's early translators and promulgators; the French legal humanists and historiographers; the Swiss, Italian and French scholars engaging with medicine, Paracelsism and astronomy; the authors of political maxims from all over Europe; and finally Francis Bacon. (shrink)

Four instances of how science fiction contributes to the elucidation of novelty in the context of discovery are considered by extending existing discussions on temporal and use-novelty. In the first instance, science fiction takes an already well-known theory and produces its own re-interpretation; in the second instance, the scientific account is usually straightforward and whatever novelty that may occur would be more along the lines of how the science is deployed to extra-scientific matters; in the (...) third instance, science fiction takes an idea that appears impossible within the delimitations of reality and produces a universe where such a possibility becomes feasible; and in the fourth instance, science fiction extends from an idea already known at the time of the work’s production to simulate a possibility that could emerge should the extension be experimentally viable. However, the article will not end with a mere evaluation of these instances, but also proposes instances on how science fiction could contribute to new ways of experiencing, discerning, and working with scientific knowledge. (shrink)

The reward system of science is the priority rule. The first scientist making a new discovery is rewarded with prestige, while second runners get little or nothing. Michael Strevens, following Philip Kitcher, defends this reward system, arguing that it incentivizes an efficient division of cognitive labor. I argue that this assessment depends on strong implicit assumptions about the replicability of findings. I question these assumptions on the basis of metascientific evidence and argue that the priority rule systematically discourages replication. My (...) analysis leads us to qualify Kitcher and Strevens’s contention that a priority-based reward system is normatively desirable for science. (shrink)

Bayesian confirmation theory, as traditionally interpreted, treats the temporal relationship between the formulation of a hypothesis and the confirmation (or recognition) of evidence entailed by that hypothesis merely as a component of the psychology of discovery and acceptance of a hypothesis. The temporal order of these events is irrelevant to the logic of rational theory choice. A few years ago Richmond Campbell and Thomas Vinci offered a reinterpretation of Bayes' Theorem in defense of the view that the temporal relationship between (...) hypothesis and evidence really does matter. More specifically, they advocated the thesis that successful predictions implied by scientific hypothesis H will increase the degree of confirmation of H only if they are novel predictions in the following sense; Evidence E is heuristically novel with respect to hypothesis H if and only if H was not deliberately designed to explain E (if E has already been corroborated) or in anticipation of E (if E is regarded as likely to be corroborated at some future date). Campbell and Vinci argue that the traditional interpretation of Bayes' Theorem misconstrues the significance of predictive novelty by ignoring heuristic novelty. In this paper I review the formal component of their preferred interpretation and demonstrate that it fails to establish that heuristic novelty has any special effect on theory confirmation. That is, even on their revisionist interpretation, regardless of whether H was deliberately designed to explain known evidence E (or in anticipation of suspected E), or whether H was designed without any awareness of the entailment relationship between H and E, Bayes' Theorem will generate the same epistemic probability for hypothesis H. Cases where new evidence was not foreseen at the time a hypothesis first emerged do not carry any more epistemic weight than they would have if such evidence had been foreseen. * Research on this paper was supported by an NEH summer grant. My thanks also to Richmond Campbell and Thomas Vinci for their reply to my initial evaluation of their position (in private correspondence), which compelled me to reconsider their arguments more carefully. (shrink)

Machine learning (ML) has been praised as a tool that can advance science and knowledge in radical ways. However, it is not clear exactly how radical are the novelties that ML generates. In this article, I argue that this question can only be answered contextually, because outputs generated by ML have to be evaluated on the basis of the theory of the science to which ML is applied. In particular, I analyze the problem of novelty of ML outputs in (...) the context of molecular biology. In order to do this, I first clarify the nature of the models generated by ML. Next, I distinguish three ways in which a model can be novel (from the weakest to the strongest). Third, I dissect the way ML algorithms work and generate models in molecular biology and genomics. On these bases, I argue that ML is either a tool to identify instances of knowledge already present and codified, or to generate models that are novel in a weak sense. The notable contribution of ML to scientific discovery in the context of biology is that it can aid humans in overcoming potential bias by exploring more systematically the space of possible hypotheses implied by a theory. (shrink)

Nanotechnology has been facing multiple obstacles related to the applicability of patentability criteria. In this article, the authors addressed the novelty requirement in nanotechnology inventions in Iraqi and Malaysian patent acts. First, novelty was discussed to determine its applicability in the field of nanotechnology. Then, problems on nanotechnology patent application were presented along with some suggested solutions. The problems encountered in the patentability of nanotechnology inventions were summarized in two categories. First, the multidisciplinary nature of nanotechnology casts its (...) shadow on the examination process in patent offices. To overcome this problem, the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the European Patent Office created new divisions to examine nanotechnology inventions; thus, this step must be followed by developing countries. In addition, with the existence of larger scaled materials and devices in prior art, three potentials have been introduced to overcome this issue. First, novel properties in nanoinventions can be demonstrated to reach the point of novelty. Second, nanoinventions can be patentable if they are carried out despite scientific problems occurring when materials are shaped in nanoscale. Third, the process of creating nanomaterials can be patentable as the bottom-up approach, which is not used in larger scaled materials. Finally, pre-disclosure must be considered as an enabling disclosure, which enables a skilled man in the art to put the nanoinvention in practice. (shrink)

This research is devoted to the study of scientific and methodological aspects of providing students with physical education. The research is based on the works of Russian teachers who have adopted the experience of the new higher education program for bachelor's degree. The starting point for the development of new concepts is the latest edition of the Federal State Educational Standard for Higher Education. The purpose of the study is to analysis of the scientific and methodological support of (...) physical education of students under the Federal State Educational Standard program. In the course of the research, we study the most important aspects of the formation of physical skills with the help of basic and additional types of interaction between a teacher and students. Scientific novelty lies new look at complex education, which includes an expanded set of methods, technologies for the development of cognitive interest, activity, physical skills and motivation for active recreation, a healthy lifestyle. The design technology of 2021, based on the method of new generation projects by Evgenia Semyonovna Polat, is a separate factor. The result of the study was the definition of the scientific and methodological aspects of providing physical education in the main and additional types of interaction between the teacher and students, including physical culture, sports, elite sports, competitive tests, project technology and distance learning format. (shrink)

Why do new things happen? Boyle answers through consideration of a conceptual history of the new, logical formalization of how novelty occurs, discussion of the relevance of novelty to scientific questions surrounding Earth, life and consciousness, and integrative reading of the respective philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger.

According to the comparative Bayesian concept of confirmation, rationalized versions of creationism come out as empirically confirmed. From a scientific viewpoint, however, they are pseudo-explanations because with their help all kinds of experiences are explainable in an ex-post fashion, by way of ad-hoc fitting of an empirically empty theoretical framework to the given evidence. An alternative concept of confirmation that attempts to capture this intuition is the use novelty criterion of confirmation. Serious objections have been raised against this (...) criterion. In this paper I suggest solutions to these objections. Based on them, I develop an account of genuine confirmation that unifies the UN-criterion with a refined probabilistic confirmation concept that is explicated in terms of the confirmation of evidence-transcending content parts of the hypothesis. (shrink)

Due to the historical origin and development of reason, an inventory of its main concepts at a particular moment is less interesting to us than the study of their formation and fixation. This process is studied here in the light of examples from the history of physics. The first one concerns the subsumption of the well-known phenomena of free fall and planetary motion to a new concept of gravity in the 17th century; the remaining examples, drawn from 19th century electrodynamics (...) and 20th century microphysics and cosmology, display the interplay of such concepts with empirical novelties that prompt them in some case and realize them in others. (shrink)

This paper analyzes Deborah Mayo's recent criticism of use-novelty requirement. She claims that her severity criterion captures actual scientific practice better than use-novelty, and that use-novelty is not a necessary condition for severity. Even though certain cases in which evidence used for the construction of the hypothesis can test the hypothesis severely, I do not think that her severity criterion fits better with our intuition about good tests than use-novelty. I argue for this by showing (...) a parallelism in terms of severity between the confidence interval case and what she calls 'gellerization'. To account for the difference between these cases, we need to take into account certain additional considerations like a systematic neglect of relevant alternatives. (shrink)

A scientific community cannot practice its trade without some set of received beliefs. These beliefs form the foundation of the "educational initiation that prepares and licenses the student for professional practice". The nature of the "rigorous and rigid" preparation helps ensure that the received beliefs are firmly fixed in the student's mind. Scientists take great pains to defend the assumption that scientists know what the world is like...To this end, "normal science" will often suppress novelties which undermine its foundations. (...) Research is therefore not about discovering the unknown, but rather "a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education". (shrink)

Despite their centrality to the scientific enterprise, both the nature of scientific variables and their relation to inductive inference remain obscure. I suggest that scientific variables should be viewed as equivalence classes of sets of physical states mapped to representations (often real numbers) in a structure preserving fashion, and argue that most scientific variables introduced to expand the degrees of freedom in terms of which we describe the world can be seen as products of an algorithmic (...) inductive inference first identified by William W. Rozeboom. This inference algorithm depends upon a notion of natural kind previously left unexplicated. By appealing to dynamical kinds—equivalence classes of causal system characterized by the interventions which commute with their time evolution—to fill this gap, we attain a complete algorithm. I demonstrate the efficacy of this algorithm in a series of experiments involving the percolation of water through granular soils that result in the induction of three novel variables. Finally, I argue that variables obtained through this sort of inductive inference are guaranteed to satisfy a variety of norms that in turn suit them for use in further scientific inferences. (shrink)

In this transdisciplinary investigation, we focus on the invention and development of gunpowder. We aim to answer the questions regarding (1) the inspiration behind the invention, including historical, mythological, and intellectual backgrounds, (2) how it came about in concreto, and (3) its impact on the history of science in China. We argue that the invention has to be viewed in a broader context and that various factors come into play with regard to the above questions. The discussion starts by examining (...) the preconditions of the invention of gunpowder in ancient Chinese mythology, natural philosophy, and the idea of life extension. After that, the invention, its direct contexts, and historical developments during the first millennium CE are investigated. To complement the former analysis of historical worldviews, the modern perspective of chemistry is applied in this context. From the angle of the additional question of “open individuals,” namely as agents of progress, this is also taken into consideration from the perspective of personality analysis. Finally, we investigate how the development of scientific understanding was embedded in the innovative philosophical developments of Song dynasty Neo-Confucianism. In our view, the early Chinese gunpowder research exemplifies the preceding and contemporary development of the scientific stratum that is part of the concept of the “investigation of things” (gewu) in the sense of the teachings of Zhu Xi (1130–1200). (shrink)

Reasons are given to justify the claim that computer simulations and computational science constitute a distinctively new set of scientific methods and that these methods introduce new issues in the philosophy of science. These issues are both epistemological and methodological in kind.

Both Kuhn and Cavell acknowledge their indebtedness to each other in their respective books of the 60s. Cavell in (Must We Mean What We Say (1969)) and Kuhn in (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 1962). They were together at Berkeley where they had both moved in 1956 as assistant professors after their first encounter at the Society of Fellows at Harvard (Kuhn 2000d, p. 197). In Berkeley, Cavell and Kuhn discovered a mutual understanding and an intellectual affinity. They had (...) regular conversations which Cavell describes as "extremely important" (Conant 1989, p. 40; cf. Cavell 1979, p. xix). Cavell says that he felt he wanted to assure Kuhn that "philosophy did not have standing answers to the questions [Kuhn] .. (shrink)

Context: In earlier joint work with Varela and Vermersch, we began the elaboration of a methodological and epistemological framework for a practical experiential phenomenology. Problem: I here wish to update and further develop that earlier work. Method: I present the framework of a practical, as distinct from a conceptual-theoretical, phenomenology. I update that framework, arguing for a shift in emphasis from consciousness to vigilant attention. I offer a still preliminary investigation of the important phenomenon of surprise. I link these results (...) with ongoing scientific research conducted by myself and others. Results: Attention-as-vigilance is a key operator of experience. Attention has an antinomic dynamic with surprise. Implications: Attention and surprise are key participants in the generative process of the experience of novelty. Elaboration of this thesis enables the further development of practical, first-person methodologies. Constructivist content: This paper outlines certain key features of first-person, lived experience, and elaborates a method for linking these results directly to ongoing scientific research. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the institutional negotiation of public engagement in matters of science and technology. We take the example of the Science in Society dialogue program initiated by the UK’s Royal Society, but set this case within the wider experience of the public engagement activities of a range of charities, corporations, governmental departments, and scientific institutions. The novelty of the analysis lies in the linking of an account of the dialogue event and its outcomes to the (...) values, practices, and imperatives—the institutional rationality—of the commissioning organization. We argue that the often tacit institutional construction of scientific citizenship is a critical, and relatively undeveloped, element of analysis—one that offers considerable insight into the practice and democratic implications of engaging publics in science and science policy. We also present evidence indicating that over time the expanding ‘‘capacities’’ associated with dialogue can act in subtle ways to enroll other elements of institutional architectures into more reflexive modes of thinking and acting. In the concluding section of the article, we consider the ways in which research and practice could engage more squarely with facets of institutional context and culture. (shrink)

Often when a new scientific theory is introduced, new terms are introduced along with it. Some of these new terms might be given explicit definitions using only terms that were in currency prior to the introduction of the theory. Some of them might be defined using other new terms introduced with the theory. But it frequently happens that the standard formulations of a theory do not define some of the new terms at all; these terms are adopted as primitives. (...) The audience is expected to come to grasp the meanings of the primitive terms by learning the role they play in the theory and its applications. I shall call such new and undefined terms, as well as new terms that are defined using them, theoretical terms. 1 If T is a theory, the T-terms are the theoretical terms introduced by T. A theoretical term need not be a word new to human language; it might be an old term that is employed in a new and specialized sense, not equivalent to any of its familiar senses; e.g. “color” in quantum chromodynamics. (shrink)

Introduction. On February 28, 2023, on the basis of South Ural State University, with the support of the Research Center for Monitoring the Prevention of Destructive Manifestations in the Educational Environment (Chelyabinsk Institute of the Develop- ment of Vocational Education), there was held a regional scientific and practical conference “Preven- tion of destructive practices in the digital environ- ment and measures to improve the digital literacy of students: presentation of research results and the formation of an expert community in (...) the field of social sciences and humanities in the region”. The purpose of the study is to present the key ideas from the reports and the results of the con- ference. Methods. In order to present the key ideas from the reports, the authors use general scientific methods, such as analysis and synthesis, induction, deduction, abstraction. Scientific novelty of the research. In the current discourse of the conference, digital was defined as a new human habitat, which contains the potential for human growth and at the same time anthropo- logical and social risks. Results. In meta-reality, between real and virtual, only monitoring of public opinion on existing and potential social threats is not enough. In this case, sociatria can be a practical response to digital threats and risks. Conclusion. In the current digital environment, constructive practices of individual social subjects and social groups coexist with destructive practices. Sociatria can become a social response to the issue of monitoring, preventing and combating digital threats, and digital literacy is an anthropological response that should be created in the educational environment. (shrink)

Given the pervasiveness of gene sharing in evolution and the extent of homology across the tree of life, why is everything not homologous with everything else? The continuity and overlapping genetic contributions to diverse traits across lineages seem to imply that no discrete determination of homology is possible. Although some argue that the widespread overlap in parts and processes should be acknowledged as “partial” homology, this threatens a broad base of presumed comparative morphological knowledge accepted by most biologists. Following a (...) long scientific tradition, we advocate a strategy of “theoretical articulation” that introduces further distinctions to existing concepts to produce increased contrastive resolution among the labels used to represent biological phenomena. We pursue this strategy by drawing on successful patterns of reasoning from serial homology at the level of gene sequences to generate an enriched characterization of serial homology as a hierarchical, phylogenetic concept. Specifically, we propose that the concept of serial homology should be applied primarily to repeated but developmentally individualized body parts, such as cell types, differentiated body segments, or epidermal appendages. For these characters, a phylogenetic history can be reconstructed, similar to families of paralogous genes, endowing the notion of serial homology with a hierarchical, phylogenetic interpretation. On this basis, we propose a five-fold theoretical classification that permits a more fine-grained mapping of diverse trait-types. This facilitates answering the question of why everything is not homologous with everything else, as well as how novelty is possible given that any new character possesses evolutionary precursors. We illustrate the fecundity of our account by reference to debates over insect wing serial homologs and vertebrate paired appendages. (shrink)

Introduction. A human and the world are an organically connected part and whole, they are always a single World, and therefore they can only evolve together, in one direction. The human world consists of many interconnected and interdepend- ent parts. If any one of the parts (for example, technology) begins to dominate and claim the sta- tus of the whole, then the problem of violating the optimal ratio in the coexistence and co-evolutionary development of each of the parts, and hence (...) the whole itself, becomes aggravated. Hence, the eco-humanistic problem arises. The purpose of the work is to present the content and substantiate the theoretical and practical significance of eco-humanism as a new humanitar- ian knowledge and methodology for understanding the specifics of the relationship “man — technical and-technological world”. Methods. The author uses the methods of dia- lectics, systemic and synergetic approaches, the project (projective) method, which is implemented in the design and development of a new philo- sophical and scientific discipline of eco-humanism, and ideas of co-evolution. Scientific novelty of the research. The author determines basic foundations of eco-humanism as a new type of humanitarian knowledge; formulates and meaningfully substan- tiates the main principles of eco-humanism as a methodological setting for the ecologization of a person and the world: optimality, coordination and dominance of the whole (integrity) in relation to its parts. Results. Eco-humanistics is defined as a new type of knowledge about a person and a specific setting of his thinking and practical activities, focused on finding ways and means to achieve op- timality in relation to various aspects (for example, technical and anthropological) in a person’s being to ensure the possibility of their fruitful existence, to preserve and reproduce a person (as a unique integrity) and his world (as a universal integrity), in their interconnected and interdependent unity. Conclusions. The author of the article comes to the conclusion that the theoretical development of eco-humanistics will make it possible to study and analyze the phenomena of modern culture in a more multifaceted way, to get a more accurate interpretation of the ways of human existence and eco-cultural practices that provide the effect of the state of the “ecosystem” in situations of any intense socio-cultural transformations. (shrink)

Information about the environment is captured in human biological systems on a variety of interacting levels – in distributions of genes, linguistic particulars, concepts, methods, theories, preferences, and overt behaviors. I investigate some of the basic principles which govern such a hierarchy by constructing a comparatively simple three-level selection model of bee foraging preferences and behaviors. The information-theoretic notion of ''''mutual information'''' is employed as a measure of efficiency in tracking a changing environment, and its appropriateness in epistemological applications is (...) discussed at some length. In particular, information accumulated in mid-level preference distributions exhibits suggestive properties for the purposes of naturalistic epistemology. It also appears that the novelty of scientific objects and representations and the rapidity of scientific change relative to genetic change need present no obstacle to the use of such models in explanations of scientific progress and the reliability of scientific judgement. (shrink)

The paper traces the sequence of events which brought Popperian philosophy (including Lakatos) to its position on the issues of excess content, novelty and scientific progress. The general approach is to analyze Popper's and Lakatos's positions on these issues as an appropriate response to a particular philosophical problem situation in which they found themselves. The paper closes with a discussion of how these issues relate to economics and economic methodology.

Callender and Cohen have proposed to apply a “Gricean strategy” to the constitution problem of scientific representation, taking inspiration from Grice’s reduction of linguistic meaning to mental states. They suggest that scientific representation can be reduced to stipulation by epistemic agents. This account has been criticised for not making a distinction between symbolic and epistemic representation and not taking into account the communal aspects of scientific representation. I argue that these criticisms would not apply if Grice’s actual (...) strategy were properly employed. I present Grice’s account of linguistic meaning and transpose his actual strategy and method to epistemic representation. This results in a reduction of epistemic representation to mental states that does not fall prey to the same criticisms. The main novelty of the resulting account is a distinction between contextual representational use and general representational status, which I address using the notion of indexicality. (shrink)

David Hull's (1988c) model of science as a selection process suffers from a two-fold inability: (a) to ascertain when a lineage of theories has been established; i.e., when theories are descendants of older theories or are novelties, and what counts as a distinct lineage; and (b) to specify what the scientific analogue is of genotype and phenotype. This paper seeks to clarify these issues and to propose an abstract model of theories analogous to particulate genetic structure, in order to (...) reconstruct relationships of descent and identity. (shrink)

Psychological science is maturing and therefore transitioning from explorative to theory-driven research. While explorative research seeks to find something “new,” theory-driven research seeks to elaborate on already known and hence predictable effects. A consequence of these differences is that the quality of explorative and theory-driven research needs to be judged by distinct criterions that optimally support their respective development. Especially, theory-driven research needs to be judged by its methodological rigor. A focus on innovativeness, which is typical for explorative research, will (...) instead incentivize bad research practices (e.g., imprecise theorizing, ignoring previous research, parallel theories). To support the advancement of psychology, we must drop the innovation requirement for theory-driven research and instead require the strongest methods, which are marked by high internal and external validity. Precise theorizing needs to substitute novelty. Theories are advanced by requiring explicit, testable assumptions, and an explicit preference for one theory over another. These explicit and potentially wrong assumptions should not be silenced within the peer-review process, but instead be scrutinized in new publications. Importantly, these changes in scientific conduct need to be supported by senior researchers, especially, in their roles as editors, reviewers, and in the hiring process. An important obstacle to further theory-driven research is to measure scientific merit using researchers’ number of publications, which favors theoretically shallow and imprecise writing. Additionally, it makes publications the central target of scientific misconduct even though they are the main source of information for the scientific community and the public. To advance the field, researchers should be judged by their contribution to the scientific community (e.g., exchange with and support of colleagues, and mentoring). Another step to advance psychology is to clearly differentiate between measurement model and theory, and not to overgeneralize based on few stimuli, incidences, or studies. We will use ideas from the theory of science to underline the changes necessary within the field of psychology to overcome this existential replication crisis. (shrink)

Inferences from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories remain central to the most influential arguments for scientific realism. Challenges to such inferences, however, based on radical discontinuities within the history of science, have motivated a distinctive style of revision to the original argument. Conceding the historical claim, selective realists argue that accompanying even the most revolutionary change is the retention of significant parts of replaced theories, and that a realist attitude towards the systematically retained constituents (...) of our scientific theories can still be defended. Selective realists thereby hope to secure the argument from success against apparent historical counterexamples. Independently of that objective, historical considerations have inspired a further argument for selective realism, where evidence for the retention of parts of theories is itself offered as justification for adopting a realist attitude towards them. Given the nature of these arguments from success and from retention, a reasonable expectation is that they would complement and reinforce one another, but although several theses purport to provide such a synthesis the results are often unconvincing. In this paper I reconsider the realist’s favoured type of scientific success, novel success, offer a revised interpretation of the concept, and argue that a significant consequence of reconfiguring the realist’s argument from success accordingly is a greater potential for its unification with the argument from retention.Keywords: Scientific realism; Pessimistic meta-induction; Success; Progress; Aether; Novelty. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe ‘Scientific Culture at Enterprises’ project aims to identify the different factors that characterize the image of science held by entrepreneurs and business managers, explore the relationships among these factors, and shed light on the role they play in defining this image and ultimately in developing a culture of science in the business sector. This article is based on the results of the SCe 2016 survey with a specially designed telephone survey questionnaire of a representative sample of Spanish companies. (...) The novelty of our approach lies in the application of a model developed in the fields of Social Studies of Science and Public Understanding of Science to the business sector, in order to obtain information on the dispositions of perception, interest, knowledge and action and their relationships with science and innovation in the business sector in Spain. Using the PIKA model of the image of science, we found this image in the business sector to be shaped by entrepreneurs... (shrink)

Already in the ‘classical’ Greek culture a partition of the ‘sciences’ was recognized and established either by considering their different aim, or their different subject matter. This was the first appearance of ‘territories’ in science which, however, did not entail a differentiation in the cognitive approach. A new model of science was introduced in the age of Renaissance with the Galilean revolution based on the proposal to delimit the inquiry to the behavior of physical bodies and, moreover, by considering only (...) a restricted amount of their properties. This delimitation of ‘territory’ was accompanied by a significant novelty in the admitted tools of inquiry, that were concentrated in the use of mathematical descriptions and the adoption of the experimental method. By means of these tools a display of mappings was developed during a couple of centuries, thanks to which the different ‘sub-territories’ of physics were investigated by using the methods originally proposed for mechanics. This was a reductionist program whose aim was that of overcoming the partition in territories and recover the unitary totality at least of the physical world. The failure of this program at the end of the 19th century was interpreted by certain philosophers as the evidence that science is unable to offer a reliable knowledge of reality. This pessimistic view can be avoided by recognizing that science is constituted by a rich variety of ‘territories’, that is, of really distinct disciplines each having its own domain of objects which is also its specific ‘conceptual space’. Within this conceptual space several scientific theories are proposed offering different ways of mapping the territory. Both moments rely upon the presence of operational procedures that are essential for linking the maps with the territories and justify a realistic conception of science. (shrink)

In the 19th century, the conflict thesis was forged to explain the science-religion relationship. This thesis presents religion as an obstacle to the development of science. Andrew White publishes a book that is at the origin of this thesis and Charles S. Peirce writes a review of this book in which he shows that there is nothing in religion that opposes scientific progress, but points to four human characteristics that offer difficulties in the face of radical novelties. It is (...) interesting to note how while the conflict thesis was forged, one of the greatest thinkers already shows the weakness of this thesis. (shrink)

Introduction. The article raises the problem of eugenics as a direction of scientific thought and practice of improving the human species. The modern advances in reproductive medicine, the development of biology, the emergence of methods for editing the human genome have updated the debate around eugenics. The aim of the work is a comprehensive study of the discourse and practice of eugenics in the period of the 19th — 21st centuries. This aim involves solving a number of tasks: 1) (...) analysis of the historical context and prerequisites for the eugenics emergence; 2) the study of the institutionalization and practical implementation of its ideas in Western countries in the period until the end of World War II; 3) research on the position of eugenics after the war and the transition of discussions to the mainstream of genetics, bioethics, transhumanism; 4) study of the modern discourse of eugenics, ethical issues and the degree of government intervention in population reproduction. Methods. The author uses the historical-retrospective method, which makes it possible to comprehensively consider the context of the emergence and development of eugenics, the comparative method (when comparing the characteristic features of the «old» (authoritarian, forced) and «new» (democratic, based on personal choice) eugenics), the institutional approach ( when identifying the main institutions involved in the development, dissemination, implementation of the ideas of eugenics) and a discursive approach (to study modern discussions about the «new» eugenics and related ethical problems). Scientific novelty of the research. A comprehensive study of eugenics has been carried out, a connection has been established between the «old» and «new» eugenics, and their similarities and differences have been investigated. Results. The need to distinguish eugenics as a theory of human selection and as a practice has been proven, and the latter, depending on the political, cultural and socio-economic situation in the country, can take a variety of forms: from counseling and preventive measures to racial cleansing. It was found that population growth, urbanization, mass migration, instability in society, combined with the ideas of modernism about social order by the forces of science and technology, contributed to the spread of eugenics ideas in the late 19th - early 20th centuries. After the Nuremberg trials, the concept under study temporarily dropped out of scientific discourse. The article examines in detail the socio-economic and other preconditions that contributed to the revival of interest in eugenics in the 60s of XX century and at the present stage. It is shown that today part of the discussion has shifted to the mainstream of genetics, bioethics and transhumanism. Conclusions. It has been established that discussions about eugenics run up against the problem of breeding control, which means that they raise the question of who should perform selection, how, what are its criteria. The ethical aspects of introducing control are complicated by the fact that perceptions of the «norm» and the degree of permitted interference depend on the particular society. (shrink)

In the United States, the National Institute of Mental Health is seeking to encourage researchers to move away from diagnostic tools like the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. A key mechanism for this is the “Research Domain Criteria” initiative, closely associated with former NIMH Director Thomas Insel. This article examines how key figures in US psychiatry construct the purpose, nature, and implications of the ambiguous RDoC project; that is, how its novelty is constituted through discourse. In this (...) paper, I explore and analyze these actors’ accounts of what is new, important, or desirable about RDoC, demonstrating how they are constituted through institutional context and personal affects. In my interviews with mental health opinion leaders, RDoC is presented as overly reliant on neurobiological epistemologies, distant from clinical imaginaries and imperatives, and introduced in a top-down manner inconsistent with the professional norms of scientific research. Ultimately, the article aims to add empirical depth to current understandings about the epistemological and ontological politics of contemporary psychiatry and to contribute to science and technology studies debates about “the new” in technoscience. Accordingly, I use discussions about RDoC as a case study in the sociology of novelty. (shrink)

Carl Hausman makes human creativity "the most pressing problem of our time" and "speculate[s] systematically" about what it means for something to be a creation rather than a product. The problem is posed: if there is "absolute uniqueness and freedom of certain human acts," with the consequent impossibility of reducing creativity to a system of law, must we then say it is only "a mystery that defies speech and all forms of understanding?" In many other ways Hausman reformulates the challenge (...) of the existentialist absurd to inherited presuppositions about cosmic order, scientific lawfulness and predictability, and intelligibility. (shrink)

The purpose is to provide researchers with reliable Scientific Research Data from the massive amounts of research data to establish a sustainable Scientific Research environment. Specifically, the present work proposes establishing an Intelligent Recommendation System based on Machine Learning algorithm and SRD. Firstly, the IRS is established over ML technology. Then, based on user Psychology and Collaborative Filtering recommendation algorithm, a hybrid algorithm [namely, Content-Based Recommendation-Collaborative Filtering ] is established to improve the utilization efficiency of SRD and Sustainable (...) Development of SR. Consequently, the present work designs literature and SRD-targeted IRS using the hybrid recommendation under the background of SD. The proposed system’s feasibility is analyzed through experiments. Additionally, the system performance is analyzed and verified from accuracy, diversity, coverage, novelty, and recommendation efficiency. The results show that the hybrid algorithm can make up for the shortcomings of a single algorithm and improve the recommendation efficiency. Experiments show that the accuracy of the proposed CBR-CF algorithm is the highest. In particular, the recommendation accuracy for the single-user system can reach 82–93%, and the recall of all recommended algorithms falls between 60 and 91%. The recall of the hybrid algorithm is higher than that of a single algorithm, and the highest recall is 91%. Meanwhile, the hybrid algorithm has comprehensive coverage, good applicability, and diversity. Therefore, SD-oriented SRD-targeted IRS is of great significance to improve the SRD utilization and the accuracy of IRS, and expand the achievement value of SR. The research content provides a reference for establishing a sustainable SR environment and improving SR efficiency. (shrink)

"Partial realism" is a common position in the contemporary philosophy of science literature. It states that the "essential" elements of empirically successful scientific theories accurately represent corresponding features the world. This thesis makes several novel contributions related to this position. Firstly, it offers a new definition of the concept of “empirical success”, representing a principled merger between the use-novelty and unification accounts. Secondly, it provides a comparative critical analysis of various accounts of which elements are "essential" to the (...) success of a theory, including structural realism and the divide et impera strategy. A novel account of essentialness, entitled the “empirically successful sub-theory "account", is defended. Thirdly, it is argued that the realism/anti-realism debate should put to the side metaphysical questions and focus instead on partial realism's commitment to the continuity of science. Because this commitment lacks metaphysical implications, it is referred to as "deflationary realism". Anti-realists cannot reject deflationary realism as a matter of a priori principle; its overall viability can therefore only be assessed by a careful examination of the history of science. Finally, another consequence of partial realism, named "partial rationalism", is defended. Partial rationalism states that, in cases where several competing theories have been suggested, scientists are rational just in case they accept the essential elements of each of the scientific theories on offer. This novel position subverts the existing literature on scientific "revolutions", as it sometimes demands that scientists devise a synthesis between competing scientific theories, instead of "choosing" only one. The philosophical points defended in this thesis are illustrated and supported by case studies from the history of science, including Fresnel’s wave theory of light, the Copernican revolution, the "neo-Darwinian synthesis" in evolutionary biology, the "prion revolution" in molecular biology, the miasma theory of disease, and the chemical revolution. (shrink)

Whitehead’s metaphysical conception of life in Process and Reality is elucidated. The article is about neither biology nor psychology, but about how Whitehead’s view of interstitial life might account for these scientific disciplines’ range of phenomena. Whitehead’s view of the universe as always novel but rarely original will be clarified, as will the role of eternal objects.

In the late 19th century great changes in theories of light and electricity were in direct conflict with certitude, the view that scientific knowledge is infallible. What is, then, the epistemic status of scientific theory? To resolve this issue Duhem and Poincaré proposed images of fallible knowledge, Instrumentalism and Conventionalism, respectively. Only in 1919–1922, after Einstein's relativity was published, he offered arguments to support Fallibilism, the view that certainty cannot be achieved in science. Though Einstein did not consider (...) Duhem's Instrumentalism, he argued against Poincaré's Conventionalism. Hitherto, Einstein's Fallibilism, as presented at first in a rarely known essay of 1919, was left in the dark. Recently, Howard obscured its meaning. Einstein's essay was never translated into English. In my paper I provide its translation and attempt to shed light on Einstein's view and its context; I also direct attention to Einstein's images of philosophical opportunism in scientific practice. (shrink)

After the publication of The structure of scientific revolutions, Kuhn attempted to fend off accusations of extremism by explaining that his allegedly “relativist” theory is little more than the mundane analytical apparatus common to most historians. The appearance of radicalism is due to the novelty of applying this machinery to the history of science. This defence fails, but it provides an important clue. The claim of this paper is that Kuhn inadvertently allowed features of his procedure and experience (...) as an historian to pass over into his general account of science. Kuhn’s familiar claims, that science is directed in part by extra-scientific influences; that the history of science is divided by revolutionary breaks into periods that cannot be easily compared; that there is no ahistorical standard of rationality by which past episodes may be judged; and that science cannot be shown to be heading towards the Truth—these now appear as methodological commitments rather than historico–philosophical theses.Author Keywords: Kuhn; Koyré; Butterfield; Historicism; Revolution. (shrink)

A personal story of the ways in which persistence, chance, and creativity interact in biomedical research. This first book by the author of Zen and the Brain examines the role of chance in the creative process. James Austin tells a personal story of the ways in which persistence, chance, and creativity interact in biomedical research; the conclusions he reaches shed light on the creative process in any field. Austin shows how, in his own investigations, unpredictable events shaped the outcome of (...) his research and brought about novel results. He then goes beyond this story of serendipity to propose a new classification of the varieties of chance, drawing on his own research and examples from the history of science—including the famous accidents that led Fleming to the discovery of penicillin. Finally, he explores the nature of the creative process, considering not only the environmental and neurophysiological correlates of creativity but also the role of intuition in both scientific discoveries and spiritual quests. This updated MIT Press paperback edition includes a new introduction and recent material on medical research, creativity, and spirituality. (shrink)

Might traditional Chinese thought regarding creativity not just influence, but also enrich, contemporary European thought about the same? Moreover, is it possible that traditional Chinese thought regarding creativity might enrich contemporary thought both in a more broad, holistic sense, and more specifically regarding the nature and role of creativity as it pertains to scientific inquiry? In this paper, I elucidate why the answer to these questions is: yes. I explain in detail a classical Chinese conception of creativity rooted in (...) Zhuangist philosophy and which centrally involves spontaneity engendered by embracing yóu遊, or “wandering”, rather than novelty or originality. I then illustrate how this conception of creativity can be used to enrich contemporary thought regarding the nature and role of creativity both in general and as it pertains to scientific inquiry in particular, as well as how to engender creativity, by arguing that it might allow us to: i) more easily remove what is frequently an obstacle to creativity, and; ii) better understand creative agents as being more intimately connected with, and as processes within and products of, their environments. Finally, I conclude by briefly remarking on how exploring various cultural perspectives on creativity promises to help us to better comprehend and promote creativity, by encouraging us to become more creative about creativity itself. (shrink)

In the methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP) there are important features on the problem of prediction, especially regarding novel facts. In his approach, Imre Lakatos proposed three different levels on prediction: aim, process, and assessment. Chapter 5 pays attention to the characterization of prediction in the methodology of research programs. Thus, it takes into account several features: (1) its pragmatic characterization, (2) the logical perspective as a proposition, (3) the epistemological component, (4) its role in the appraisal of (...) research programs, and (5) its place as a value for scientific research. -/- The notion of “novel facts” is highly relevant in his conception, where several aspects are involved: the directions of novel facts, the different kinds of novelty, and the transition from six possible options of “novel facts” to four choices. Thereafter, the prediction of novel facts as the criterion of appraisal is considered. On the one hand, this requires analyzing the theoretical, empirical, and heuristic possibilities of appraisal; and, on the other, whether there is an overemphasis on the role of prediction in methodology of scientific research programs. As a consequence, there is an analysis of Lakatos’ criterion of appraisal in MSRP and economics. (shrink)

In this account of the philosophical and scientific pursuits of Pierre Gassendi , I challenge a traditional view which says that the inspiration, motivation, and demonstrative grounds for his physical atomism consist not in his empiricism but in his historicist commitments. Indeed, Gassendi suggests that it's a consequence of our best theory of knowledge and sound scientific method that we get evidence which warrants his microphysical theory. ;The primary novelty of his theory of empirical knowledge is his (...) proposal, against the Stoics and Descartes, that it is not a necessary condition of our knowing some claim that we are certain of it. This move immediately broadens the scope of what we can know through the senses, as does his suggestion that we include among such knowledge claims those assertions about what is hidden to the senses which we legitimately infer from the evidence of the perceptually given. ;On the basis of these epistemological positions, Gassendi develops his views on scientific method according to which we attain and justify our best empirical claims by deduction yet, he believes, these claims are at root probabilistic, and we may maintain hypotheses as the basis of our scientific reasoning so long as there is some empirical evidence for them, however broadly construed. ;Hence Gassendi suggests that his atomism constitutes a 'most likely hypothesis' for which we have empirical evidence--which of necessity is found indirectly in 'indicative' signs, those surface level phenomena for which he takes the existence of atoms to be a sine qua non condition. Perhaps the paramount case of such evidence consists in those microscopic observations of crystalline formation and dissolution that he takes to demonstrate the molecular structure of matter--a key and innovative consequence of his atomism. ;The robust character of Gassendi's method emerges in his appeals to indirect evidence for claims about the unobservable and his willingness to count this as adequate empirical grounds for maintaining an atomist hypothesis. Remarkably, he stands at the dawn of the modern era with at least a proposal as to how to resolve one of empiricism's more vexing difficulties, still with us in some form today. (shrink)