Michael Huemer argues that cross-cultural convergence toward liberal moral values is evidence of objective moral progress, and by extension, evidence for moral realism. Nathan Cofnas claims to debunk Huemer’s argument by contending that convergence toward liberal moral values can be better explained by ‘two related non-truth-tracking processes’: self-interest and its long-term tendency to result in social conditions conducive to greater empathy. This article argues that although Cofnas successfully debunks Huemer’s convergence argument for one influential form of moral realism (...) – Robust Moral Realism, which holds that moral facts are non-natural, stance-independent normative facts – Cofnas’s debunking argument broadly supports a second type of moral realism: Enlightened Self-Interest Realism, the view that moral facts are reducible to stance-dependent requirements of instrumental (‘means-end’) rationality. Finally, this article argues that insofar as different Enlightened Self-Interest Realist theories make specific predictions about the intra- and inter-personal mechanisms behind moral convergence toward liberalism, empirical observations of cross-cultural convergence can provide independent support for Enlightened Self-Interest Realism. I conclude that this is an important mark in favor of Enlightened Self-Interest Realism over Robust Moral Realism. (shrink)

How may nations protect their interests in space if its fragility makes military operations there self-defeating? This essay claims nations are in Prisoners Dilemmas on the matter, and applies David Gauthier’s theories about how it is rational to behave morally—cooperatively—in such dilemmas. Currently space-faring nations should i) enter into co-operative space sharing arrangements with other rational nations, ii) exclude—militarily, but with only terrestrial force—nations irrational or existentially opposed to other nations being in space, and iii) incentivize all (...) nations into co-operation by redistributing some space-generated wealth to nations that might otherwise ruin space. Further, since all nations are rationally incentivized to ever greater dependence on space, and since each, by threatening space, can hold hostage its benefits to all, each can demand resolution of terrestrial discontents with other nations. So each has a rational interest in treating others morally both in space and on terrestrial issues. (shrink)

Reason, egoism, and utilitarianism, by H. Sidgwick.--Is egoism reasonable? By G. E. Moore.--Ultimate principles and ethical egoism, by B. Medlin.--In defense of egoism, by J. Kalin.--Virtuous affections and self-love, by F. Hutcheson.--Our obligation to virtue, by D. Hume.--Duty and interest, by H. A. Prichard.--The natural condition of mankind and the laws of nature, by T. Hobbes.--Why should we be moral? By K. Baier.--Morality and advantage, by D. P. Gauthier.--Bibliographical essay (p. 181-184).

It is shown that logical contradictions are derivable from natural translations into first order logic of the description and background assumptions of the Soros Game, and of other games and social contexts that exhibit conflict and reflexivity. The logical structure of these contexts is analysed using proof-theoretic and model-theoretic techniques of first order paraconsistent logic. It is shown that all the contradictions that arise contain the knowledge operator K. Thus, the contradictions do not refer purely to material objects, and do (...) not imply the existence of inconsistent, concrete, physical objects, or the inconsistency of direct sensory experience. However, the decision-making of rational self-interested agents is stymied by the appearance of such intensional contradictions. Replacing the rational self-interest axioms with axioms for an appropriate moral framework removes the inconsistencies. Rational moral choice in conflict-reflexive social contexts then becomes possible. (shrink)

: In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that there is a difference between moral practical reasoning and prudential practical reasoning and what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued that since it is (...) more reasonable to assess prudential practical rationality in terms of the absolute standard than the relative standard, there is no conflict between the demands of MPR and PPR. (shrink)

“Economic man” assumes not only self-interest, but also rationality of choices. The finding that ultimatum game offers can be explained by ambiguity aversion as well as pessimism, plus other findings, suggests the usefulness of taking bounded rationality more into account. Neurodevelopmental and heritability research supports the authors' emphasis on the importance of social learning and socialization.

Economists usually assume that rational actions are the ones motivated by a self-interested agent. However in our daily life we often see people doing altruistic actions which we praise and which we do not call irrational. How can we account for this paradox? This question and the tension underlying it, is at the heart of Philip Pettit’s classic essay, “The Virtual Reality of Homo Economicus” (1995). This dissertation constitutes a detailed analysis and evaluation of the claims that Pettit (...) makes there, in particular his original proposal of reconciliation between economic science and common sense, and the role that self-interest occupies in his model. Despite its importance, there are still few written commentaries or critiques of Pettit’s essay (1995). Among the few, most concentrate on the thesis of resilience explanation that Pettit presents at the end of the essay. What is lacking in the literature is a thorough examination of the central claim that Pettit makes there, and which gives the title to his essay: namely, the thesis of the "virtual self-interested control". In my view, this constitutes one of the most sophisticated defences of the assumption of self-interest in rational choice theory and economics. Therefore, it is surprising that it has not been subjected to more discussion, and published research. In section 1, present some of the central concepts of rational choice theory and economics, namely the homo economicus. In section 2, I introduce Pettit’s model, and then evaluate in which sense it is a plausible model to explain the behaviour in non-market contexts. Section 3 presents my criticism of the shortcomings of the model. (shrink)

The Aristotelian view that the moral virtues–the virtues of character informed by practical wisdom–are essential to an individual's happiness, and are thus in an individual's self-interest, has been little discussed outside of purely scholarly contexts. With a few exceptions, contemporary philosophers have tended to be suspicious of Aristotle's claims about human nature and the nature of rationality and happiness. But recent scholarship has offered an interpretation of the basic elements of Aristotle's views of human nature and happiness, and (...) of reason and virtue, that brings them more into line with common-sense thinking and with contemporary philosophical and empirical psychology. This makes it fruitful to reexamine the question of the role of virtue in self-interest. (shrink)

In the moral philosophy of the last two centuries, altruism of one kind or another has typically been regarded as identical with moral concern. When self-regarding duties have been recognized, motivation by duty has been sharply distinguished from motivation by self-interest. I think this view is wrong: self-interest can be the motive of a moral act. My chief concern is to argue that self-interested action -- i.e., action motivated by rational self-interest (...) -- can be moral, but the data I use to argue for this also provide compelling empirical evidence that all human motives do not reduce to self-interest, that altruism is possible. (shrink)

Distinguished philosophers address questions pertaining to the character of human reason and the relation of reason to action and belief.

In what follows I consider whether the idea of a person's interest or good might be better understood through that of care or concern for that person for her sake, rather than conversely, as is ordinarily assumed. Contrary to desire-satisfaction theories of interest, such an account can explain why not everything a person rationally desires is part of her good, since what a person sensibly wants is not necessarily what we would sensibly want, insofar as we care about (...) her. First, however, a tale: There was no other explanation which seemed reasonable. … [W]as it not reasonable to assume that he meant never to claim his birth-right? If this were so, what right had he, William Cecil Clayton, to thwart the wishes, to balk the self-sacrifice of this strange man? If Tarzan of the Apes could do this thing to save Jane Porter from unhappiness, why should he, to whose care she was intrusting her whole future, do aught to jeopardize her interests? (shrink)

The subject of my dissertation is "rationality". In this book I undertake a comprehensive, systematic and independent treatment of the problem of rationality. This furthers progress toward a general theory of rationality, one that represents and defends a uniform conception of reason. The structure and general outline are as follows: Part I: General Definition of the Concept; Part II: Rationality in the Theoretical Realm; Part III: Rationality in the Practical Realm (parts II and III are divided respectively into A. Relative (...) Reasons and B. Absolute Reasons); Part IV: Grounds for the Principle of Reason. My aim in this work is to prove that a conception of rationality as justification of our usage of language is more significant than has been classically recognized, without, however, reducing the concept of rationality. After a definition of the term is provided in the first chapter by means of language analysis, the following three questions are dealt with in the subsequent chapters: a) Exhaustion of rationality in relative reasons—i.e., is reasoning exhausted by reference to existing views and goals, or does rationality also exist in a strong sense? The latter would be the case if the views and goals referred to the relative conception must themselves be justified de novo. I argue that such an absolute justification of views and goals cannot be provided. To this end, in the theoretical domain, I discuss a question prominent in the debate over the rationality of worldviews, namely the question of whether the standards of theoretical rationality are merely culturally relative (chapter V.). Here I arrive at the position that standards of theoretical rationality are only transcultural insofar as there are goals which are not themselves culturally-dependent. With regard to practically fundamental goals, the core standards of modern science can be justified. This justification strategy therefore requires that such goals be established. In practical terms, first I address (in Chapter VII) the so-called "final justification" of norms problem. Here I discuss above all the transcendental-pragmatic proposal and the contractualist conception. According to my view, neither succeed in providing a final rational grounding for norms. That grounding pertains instead to the rationale for objectives, and Chapter VIII demonstrates that even a final justification of objectives is impossible. This does not mean, however, that a person's goals cannot be criticized as irrational. But the warrant in this case depends on the rules that govern the genesis of desires being accepted by the subject. b) If substantive rationality does not exist because no absolute grounding for opinions and goals can obtain, then the question of how strong or weak the concept of rationality is acquires further weight. On that basis, relative theoretical and practical rationality is examined in detail. I aim with this analysis of (relative) rationality to apprehend the structural parallelism between rationality in both the practical and the theoretical domain, and therefore to defend a uniform conception of reason or rationality. This is accomplished by identifying a concept that exhibits the same structure in both theoretical and practical domains: the term "rational" is applied to actions and opinions in order to claim, first of all, that they are "well-founded." For example, one must inquire into the precise rational justification for opinions or actions. To determine the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions required for an opinion or action to be rational, one must first provide a formal characterization of the rationality of those opinions or actions. What is to count as a rational ground can only be explained by formal procedures and results achievable via those procedures. To be more specific, I claim that the process of opinion formation and practical reflection is subject to rational justification based on internalist rules. The rules governing theoretical rationality can have their content transformed in a further move, if one takes the result of the process of rational opinion-formation as the product of an epistemological determination, that is, as a decision about which opinion to hold that is made on the basis of epistemological or prudential goals. Implicit in this position is the controversial idea that one can actually decide to believe something. The rules of practical reason are the rules that guide the rational selection of objectives and actions. The structural parallelism of theoretical and practical rationality consists, therefore, in the fact that both refer to mental processes that are controlled by rules which one freely accepts and follows. In both cases, these rules are to be understood as governing the rational choice of a mental or physical action. c) Therefore, the question of whether rationality—being rational—can in turn be grounded by reasons can be answered in the following way: The rules of rationality can only be justified with reference to a person’s goals, as the best strategy for achieving those goals. If someone does not desire the optimal realization of his goals, there is no other way of arguing directly for rationality. One can only attempt to demonstrate—if the person is open to argument—that it is typically in the person's own best interest to adhere to the rules of rationality. (shrink)

I examine the self-interest based contractarian's attempt to answer the question, "Why be moral?" In order to defeat the skeptic who accepts reasons of self-interest only, contractarians must show that the best theory of practical reasons includes moral reasons. They must show that it is rational to act morally even when doing so conflicts with self-interest. ;I examine theories offered by Hobbes, Baier, and Grice, and show they fail to defeat skepticism. Hobbes' theory (...) gives no special weight to moral reasons as they can be eliminated in favor of prudential reasons; Baier's theory fails to establish that from the fact that it is rational to adopt the moral points of view, it is rational to act from it; and Grice's theory attempts to link promising, obligations, and reasons, but leaves certain crucial points in the argument undefended. ;In Morals by Agreement, Gauthier offers the best theory of its kind, and treatment of it constitutes the bulk of the thesis. Gauthier tries to refute the skeptic by showing that it is in one's interest to adopt a moral disposition, and that every action expressing the disposition is rational. The dispositional move is one the contractarian must make to avoid the problems facing the other theories examined. But Gautheir's argument for the rationality of the disposition relies on an empirically dubious assumption of translucency, and as such, fails to show that persons in ordinary circumstances are rational to be moral. Moreover, Gauthier fails to show that the rationality of the disposition carries over to the particular actions expressing it. The alternative view, called the "Independency Thesis," is more plausible than Gauthier's, but not available to him. Thus the contractarian fails to defeat skepticism. (shrink)

In the moral philosophy of the last two centuries, altruism of one kind or another has typically been regarded as identical with moral concern. When self-regarding duties have been recognized, motivation by duty has been sharply distinguished from motivation by self-interest . Accordingly, from Kant, Mill, and Sidgwick to Rawls, Nagel, and Gauthier, concern for our own interests, whether long-term or short-term, has typically been regarded as intrinsically nonmoral. So, for example, although Thomas Nagel regards both prudence (...) and altruism as structural features of practical reason, he identifies only the latter as a moral capacity, prudence being merely rational, long-term egoism. Similarly, John Ravvls and David Gauthier contrast self-interest and other nontuistic interests—interests that are independent of others' interests—with moral interest. We are morally permitted , no doubt, to act out of self-interest within certain constraints, but such acts can have no intrinsic moral worth. Pursuit of our own interests out of duty does have intrinsic moral worth, but such pursuit, by hypothesis, cannot be motivated by self-interest. Self-interested pursuit of our own interests as such, no matter how realistic, farsighted, temperate, honest, or courageous, cannot be intrinsically moral. And this remains the case even if self-interest motivates us to perform other-regarding acts: only those other-regarding acts that are motivated by others' interests count as moral, because only such acts are altruistic. (shrink)

We have taken the “why be moral?” question so seriously for so long. It suggests that we lack faith in the rationality of morality. The relative infrequency with which we ask “why be prudent?” suggests that we have no corresponding lack of faith in the rationality of prudence. Indeed, we have so much faith in the rationality of prudence that to question it by asking “why be prudent?” sounds like a joke. Nevertheless, our reasons and motives to be prudent are (...) every bit as contingent as our reasons and motives to be moral–or so I argue in Sections II and III.A second theme of this essay is thatconflictbetween morality and self-interest is contingent as well. The moral perspective, as characterized in Section IV, does not require a universal regard for others, whereas the kind of self-interested perspective characterized in Section III does not require a wholesale disregard for others. Both perspectives make room for a deep although not universal other-regard–or so I argue in Section V. (shrink)

Derek Parfit argues in Reasons and Persons that acting according to your present desires is more rational, or at least as rational, as acting in your long-term self-interest. To do this, he puts forward a case supporting a 'critical present-aim theory' of rationality opposed to the self-interest theory, and then argues against a number of possible replies. This article is a response to these arguments, concluding that Parfit's favouring of the present-aim theory is unfounded, (...) and that self-interest is the better theory of rationality. (shrink)

The adoption of experimental methods from economics, in particular script-enactment, performance-related payment, and the absence of deception, will turn experimental social psychology into a trivial science subject. Such procedures force participants to conform to a normative expectation that they must behave rationally and in accordance with their self-interest. The self-fulfilling prophecy inherent in these procedures makes it more difficult to conduct innovative social-psychological research.

In this paper I aim to do two things. First, I attempt to illustrate an interesting pattern of argument one can find in Hume's work. Next, I employ this Humean pattern of argument to show that IF there is a cogent and intuitive argument for any form of epistemological skepticism, which despite its cogency and intuitiveness has a unbelievable conclusion, THEN we lack a very important form of doxastic self-control, which I call rational self-control, over the beliefs (...) problematized by that skeptical argument. Thus, the challenge posed by skepticism is even deeper and more radical than commonly supposed: If any form of skepticism proves unanswerable and yet unbelievable, then we demonstrably lack RSC in the domain problematized by that form of skepticism. Thus, one's views on skepticism may entail definite views on doxastic self-control. (shrink)

The financial crisis of 2008–2009 presents us with the opportunity to not only understand what has happened in the markets but also to reflect on the purpose of the marketplace. Drawing from expert economic analyses, we first assess the central lesson of the crisis—the failure of self-regulation by rational self-interest to moderate externalized risk in financial markets. Second, we ask the philosophical question occasioned by the crisis concerning the moral meaning of economic activity: Is market exchange (...) solely for the sake of self-interest? Reflecting on the poetry of Kahlil Gibran and engaging with the recent encyclical of Pope Benedict XVI, we turn our attention from political economy to moral economy: the relationships among market exchange, self-interest, and the common good—and, in particular, the prior conditions of market exchange and their moral significance for the present crisis. (shrink)

Philosophers have debated for millennia about whether moral requirements are always rational to follow. The background for these debates is often what I shall call “the self-interest model.” The guiding assumption here is that the basic demand of reason, to each person, is that one must, above all, advance one's self-interest. Alternatively, debate may be framed by a related, but significantly different, assumption: the idea that the basic rational requirement is to develop and pursue (...) a set of personal ends in an informed, efficient, and coherent way, whether one's choice of ends is based on self-interested desires or not. For brevity I refer to this as “the coherence-and-efficiency model.” Advocates of both models tend to think that, while it is sufficiently clear in principle what the rational thing to do is, what remains in doubt is whether it is always rational to be moral. They typically assume that morality is concerned, entirely or primarily, with our relations to others, especially with obligations that appear to require some sacrifice or compromise with the pursuit of self-interest. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The need to cooperate in countless ways in a democracy raises the fundamental question posed by the prisoner's dilemma: How can self‐interested individuals cooperate? Tocqueville recognized this problem and anticipated the most convincing solution to date: Robert Frank's conception of emotions as “commitment devices.” Tocqueville's analysis of the miscalculations of modern “individualism,” which lead people first into isolation and then into servitude, mirrors the failure of conscious rationality in the prisoner's dilemma. Conversely, Tocqueville emphasizes emotional “habits of the (...) heart” as the key to resisting the blandishments of individualism. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung In der sportökonomischen Literatur ist in den vergangenen Jahren eine Hinwendung zum ökonomischen Ansatz unter Verwendung der Modellannahmen des Homo Oeconomicus festzustellen. In diesem Aufsatz wird argumentiert, dass dies Ausdruck des ökonomischen Imperialismus ist, weil unter ökonomischem Imperialismus die Anwendung der ökonomischen Methode auf originär außerwirtschaftliche Lebensbereiche zu verstehen ist. Darüber hinaus wird die Auffassung vertreten, dass diese Anwendung der ökonomischen Methode im Sport in den meisten Fällen zu fruchtbaren Ergebnissen und guten Erklärungen sozialer Situationen im Sport führt. Bei (...) der Anwendung der ökonomischen Methode sind aber die Grenzen und Gefahren hinsichtlich der Rationalität und Motivation der Akteure sowie hinsichtlich des normativen Gehalts der Methode zu berücksichtigen. (shrink)

A spate of recent attacks on the rationality assumption in economic theory is noticed. Some of these attacks are fresh and, in many ways, original, but the central ideas underlying them are not new. They appear to have been provoked by the direction in which much of mainstream economics has been moving in recent years. On the other hand, it is suggested here, certain developments in contemporary economics, associated particularly with the revival of interest in the Austrian paradigm, offer (...) afresh understanding of the way in which the rationality assumption, its role in economics properly understood, is able to meet these old?new attacks. (shrink)

A spate of recent attacks on the rationality assumption in economic theory is noticed. Some of these attacks are fresh and, in many ways, original, but the central ideas underlying them are not new. They appear to have been provoked by the direction in which much of mainstream economics has been moving in recent years. On the other hand, it is suggested here, certain developments in contemporary economics, associated primarily with the revival of interest in the Austrian paradigm, offer (...) a fresh understanding of the way in which the rationality assumption, its role in economics properly understood, is able to meet these old-new attacks.On assiste depuis quelques années à une recrudescence des critiques à l'égard de l'hypothèse de rationalité employée en théorie économique. Certaines de ces critiques sont nouvelles, et originales à bien des égards, mais les idées essentielles qui les sous-tendent sont anciennes. Ces critiques semblent avoir été provoquées par la direction vers laquelle une grande partie du courant dominant en économie a évolué durant ces dernières années. D'un autre côté cependant, certains développements au sein de l'économie contemporaine - des développements essentiellement dus à la renaissance du paradigme autrichien - offrent une compréhension nouvelle de la manière dont l'hypothèse de rationalité est capable de résister à ces critiques anciennes/nouvelles - si on comprend correctement le rôle joué par cette hypothèse en théorie économique. (shrink)

Adam Smith rejected Mandeville's invisible-hand doctrine of 'private vices, publick benefits'. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments his model of the 'impartial spectator' is driven not by sympathy for other people, but by their approbation. The innate capacity for sympathy makes approbation credible. Approbation needs to be authenticated, and in Smith's model authentication relies on innate virtue, which is not realistic. An alternative model of 'regard' makes use of signalling and is more pragmatic. Modern versions of the invisible hand in (...) rational choice theory and neo- liberalism are shown to be radical departures from the ethical legacy of Enlightenment and utilitarian economics, and are not consistent with Adam Smith's own position. (shrink)

Although Professor Lewin is not testing existing views that, for people in politics, 'egoism rules' on deep theoretical grounds, he strongly argues that empirical facts do not support such views and thus opens a new chapter in the debate on individuals' rationality.

One of the most noteworthy features of David Gauthier's rational choice, contractarian theory of morality is its appeal to self-interested rationality. This appeal, however, will undoubtedly be the source of much controversy and criticism. For while self-interestedness is characteristic of much human behavior, it is not characteristic of all such behavior, much less of that which is most admirable. Yet contractarian ethics appears to assume that humans are entirely self-interested. It is not usually thought a virtue (...) of a theory that its assumptions are literally false. What may be said on behalf of the contractarian? (shrink)

Constitutional political economy addresses four questions: the causal question: What explains the constitutional institutions we observe? the consequential question: What consequences do constitutional institutional have? the ideal question: What constitutional institutions does justice require? and the design question: What constitutional institutions are best for a polity given the constraints imposed by its current situation? Answers to the ideal and design questions require a theory of behavior that predicts how individuals will behave within constitutional institutions. Analysts usually assume that this theory (...) of behavior corresponds to the explanatory theory developed to answer the second, consequential question. This essay argues that the assumption of rational self-interested behavior as the basis for a behavioral theory is not justified. (shrink)

Mitigation of climate change is often described as a tragedy of the commons. According to this theoretical framework, it is collectively rational for present-generation countries to mitigate climate change, but not individually rational to do so. It is rather in national self-interest to ‘free-ride’ on the mitigation actions of other countries. In this paper, I discuss two arguments criticizing this view. According to these arguments, it is in most cases individually rational for present-generation countries to (...) mitigate, i.e., it is in their national self-interest. The first argument focuses on national self-interest in terms of economic efficiency, the second on national self-interest in terms of national security. I conclude that the critical arguments to a large extent are tenable, but that they seem to underestimate the significance of those cases in which it is not in national self-interest to mitigate climate change. In these cases the tragedy of the commons framework is still applicable. (shrink)

In this paper I want to present the guiding lines of a research programme into the economics of scientific knowledge, a programme whose ultimate goal is to develop what I would like to call a contractarian epistemology. The structure of the paper is as follows: in the first section I will comment on two conflicting approaches to the topic of rationality in science: the view of the rationality of scientific knowledge as deriving from the employment of sound methodological norms, and (...) the view of scientists as rational agents pursuing the optimisation of their own personal and professional interests. In section 2 I will try to make both approaches mutually consistent by showing that a competition among rational "recognition-seekers" is only possible if they agree in accepting some system of methodological norms. Section 3 will be devoted to analyse the main kinds and properties of these norms. Finally, in section 4 I will discuss a question which is far from being easy and innocent: why are scientific norms obeyed by researchers, once they have been established in a scientific discipline? (shrink)

Kurt Baier’s The Rational and the Moral Order, is the long-awaited sequel to his The Moral Point of View. Like the earlier work, Baier’s new book provides a characterization and defense of morality. It begins with a general account of reason, moves on to a detailed account of practical reason which includes an important distinction between “self-anchored” and “society-anchored” reasons. Morality is then characterized and defended as a system of society-anchored reasons. To illustrate its practical utility, Baier then (...) uses his account of morality to answer specific moral questions relating to killing and letting die. Throughout, the book is a treasure trove of philosophical riches that bears reading and re-reading. (shrink)

Kurt Baier’s The Rational and the Moral Order, is the long-awaited sequel to his The Moral Point of View. Like the earlier work, Baier’s new book provides a characterization and defense of morality. It begins with a general account of reason, moves on to a detailed account of practical reason which includes an important distinction between “self-anchored” and “society-anchored” reasons. Morality is then characterized and defended as a system of society-anchored reasons. To illustrate its practical utility, Baier then (...) uses his account of morality to answer specific moral questions relating to killing and letting die. Throughout, the book is a treasure trove of philosophical riches that bears reading and re-reading. (shrink)

Adam Smith is respected as the father of contemporary economics for his work on systemizing classical economics as an independent field of study in The Wealth of Nations. But he was also a significant moral philosopher of the Scottish Enlightenment, with its characteristic concern for integrating sentiments and rationality. This article considers Adam Smith as a key moral philosopher of commercial society whose critical reflection upon the particular ethical challenges posed by the new pressures and possibilities of commercial society remains (...) relevant today. The discussion has three parts. First I address the artificial separation between self-interest and morality often attributed to Smith, in which his work on economics is stripped of its ethical context. Second I outline Smith’s ethical approach to economics, focusing on his vigorous but qualified defence of commercial society for its contributions to prosperity, justice, and freedom. Third I outline Smith’s moral philosophy proper as combining a naturalistic account of moral psychology with a virtue ethics based on propriety in commercial society. (shrink)

In three recent books, Jon Elster continues the project that began when he showed that Marxism lacked micro foundations. This project is the use of methodologically individualistic assumptions to understand social behavior. In his latest work, however, he supplements rational choice theory by means of non?rational ?norms,? begging the question of the sources and possible variations among these ?given? individual value?preferences. This move invites a comparison of Elster's results with those offered by cultural theory. While not a review (...) of Elster's recent books, these reflections on them suggest that it is better to allow for a pluralism of cultural biases than to insert ?norms? into the rational?choice model on an ad hoc basis. (shrink)

Self-interest is widely regarded as an important, if not as the only, source of reasons for action, and hence it is widely held that one can rationally give special weight to one’s self-interest in deciding how to act. In what follows, I will argue against this view. I will do so by following the lead of Derek Parfit, and considering cases in which personal identity appears to break down. My argument will differ from Parfit’s, however, in (...) that it will have a stronger conclusion, it will involve fewer assumptions, and it will be compatible with a wider range of theories of personal identity. (shrink)

Hume has a special place in justifications of claims made for rational choice theory to offer a unified language and explanatory framework for the social sciences. He is invoked in support of the assumptions characterising the instrumental rationality of agents and the constancy of their motivations across different institutional settings. This paper explores the problems with the expansionary aims of rational choice theory through criticism of these appeals to Hume. First, Hume does not assume constancy. Moreover, Hume’s sensitivity (...) to the relationships between institutional setting and individual motivation owes something to the relative transparency of the plural language of vices and virtues that he employs. Second, rational choice theory’s minimal modification of Hume’s account of the relation of reason and the passions through the introduction of constraints of consistency on preferences is unstable. (shrink)

The emergence of population as an object of government in the 18th century produced a new problematic of government. The focus of this new problematic was how to ensure that the pursuit of self-interest by individual economic actors was compatible with the reproduction and useful employment of the population. From the 18th century to the present, government in the West has addressed this problem in a number of different ways, each of which represents a 'tricky adjust ment' between (...) a liberal element concerned with commercial freedom and a pastoral element concerned with the welfare of the population. The tension between the liberal and pastoral elements of modern Western governance is explored by examining the place of commercial freedom within a householding concept of rule in which security at the level of the state is dependent upon the sovereign's rational management of the population. (shrink)

It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on the (...) offered odds. And even apart from this consideration, assigning probabilities to the options among which one is choosing is futile since such probabilities could be of no possible use in choice. The paper subjects these arguments to critical examination and suggests that, appearances notwithstanding, practical deliberation need not crowd outself-prediction. (shrink)

_Winner of the 2009 Goethe Award for Psychoanalytic Scholarship!_ Irwin Hirsch, author of _Coasting in the Countertransference,_ asserts that countertransference experience always has the potential to be used productively to benefit patients. However, he also observes that it is not unusual for analysts to 'coast' in their countertransferences, and to not use this experience to help treatment progress toward reaching patients' and analysts' stated analytic goals. He believes that it is quite common that analysts who have some conscious awareness of (...) a problematic aspect of countertransference participation, or of a mutual enactment, nevertheless do nothing to change that participation and to use their awareness to move the therapy forward. Instead, analysts may prefer to maintain what has developed into perhaps a mutually comfortable equilibrium in the treatment, possibly rationalizing that the patient is not yet ready to deal with any potential disruption that a more active use of countertransference might precipitate. This 'coasting' is emblematic of what Hirsch believes to be an ever present conflict between analysts’ self-interest and pursuit of comfortable equilibrium, and what may be ideal for patients’ achievement of analytic aims. The acknowledgment of the power of analysts’ self-interest further highlights the contemporary view of a truly two-person psychology conception of psychoanalytic praxis. Analysts’ embrace of their selfish pursuit of comfortable equilibrium reflects both an acknowledgment of the analyst as a flawed other, and a potential willingness to abandon elements of self-interest for the greater good of the therapeutic project. (shrink)

This book brings together the most important theoretical work of James S. Coleman on problems of collective action. Coleman's work has formed a consistent and highly distinguished attempt to find an account of the workings of social and political processes rooted in the rationality of the individual participants. The chapters address in various ways the fundamental Hobbesian problem of order; the question of how a set of self-interested individuals can arrive at some kind of social order. The volume is (...) organised in three parts. The essays in Part I address the problem of social choice as a fundamental problem of the functioning of social systems. Those in Part II deal with relations of power as a crucial aspect of the relations between individual actions and their social consequences. Part III considers the question of the creation of collectivities and the rights that are allocated under them. As a whole, the volume demonstrates the integration and force of the views Coleman has developed. (shrink)

Truth, Rationality, and Self-Control incorporates work from seven previously published essays and five chapters of new material. Sometimes collections of this sort lack continuity. This is not the case with Hookway’s text. With only a few minor exceptions, the essays work well together, developing ideas in increments as the text unfolds. Although Hookway offers no single theme as the book’s project, his decision to focus on Charles Peirce’s notions of truth, rationality, and pragmatism indicates an investigation of Peirce’s overall (...) approach to inquiry. Specifically, he attends to all the features of human experience, from instinctive beliefs to logical constraints, that make scientific inquiry possible. What gives the book a feel of coherence and presence are Hookway’s persistence and penetrating style. He carefully pursues Peirce’s ideas among the manuscripts and published texts to find reasonable interpretations of even the most perplexing issues. (shrink)

Self-reference in semantics, which leads to well-known paradoxes, is a thoroughly researched subject. The phenomenon can appear also in decision theoretic situations. There is a structural analogy between the two and, more interestingly, an analogy between principles concerning truth and those concerning rationality. The former can serve as a guide for clarifying the latter. Both the analogies and the disanalogies are illuminating.