A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will argues that the kind of free will required for moral responsibility and just desert is libertarian free will. It is a source of great controversy whether such a libertarian view is coherent and whether we should believe that we have such free will. This book explains and defends Robert Kane¿s conception of libertarian free will while departing from it in certain key respects. It is argued that a suitably modified Kanean model of free (...) will can be shown to be conceptually coherent. In addition, it is argued that while we lack sufficient epistemic grounds supporting belief in the existence of libertarian free will, we may still be justified in believing in it for moral reasons. As such, the book engages critically with the works of a growing number of philosophers who argue that we should jettison belief in the existence of desert-grounding free will and the practices of praise and blame and reward and punishment which it supports. (shrink)
In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which (...) Kane’s view is unclear and I suggest a plausible way of reading Kane that makes his theory immune to Griffith’s objections. (shrink)
Some contemporary philosophers maintain we lack the kind of free will that makes us morally responsible for our actions. Some of these philosophers, such as Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and Bruce Waller, also argue that such a view supports the case for significant reform of the penal system. Pereboom and Caruso explicitly endorse a quarantine model for dealing with dangerous criminals, arguing that while not responsible for their crimes such criminals should be detained in non-harsh conditions and offered the opportunity (...) for rehabilitation. Waller does not explicitly endorse the quarantine model, but his view is similar in significant respects. I argue that such views can too easily lead to the endorsement of legal policies which would result in more frequent punishment of innocent persons for crimes they have not committed. Thus, we should have deep moral reservations about such views. (shrink)
This article articulates and defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. It begins by defining the conception of free will at issue and then goes on to present versions of the luck objection which is often made against theories of LFW. It is argued that the sort of indeterministic weightings model of LFW which has been defended in the recent literature by Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe and John Lemos has the resources to answer such luck objections while (...) possessing virtues which some other libertarian views lack. According to the indeterministic weightings model of LFW, in making undetermined free-willed choices between two courses of action, A or B, the reasons for choosing each option don’t come with pre-established evaluative weights. During the process of deliberation, the agent assigns weight in an undetermined way to the reasons for each option and this typically leads to the choice of the option that has been assigned a greater value. In the paper, it is not only argued that this theory can resolve worries about luck but also that the view has virtues which certain other libertarian views lack, as such the view is contrasted with the modest libertarian models of LFW from Daniel Dennett and Alfred Mele as well as Robert Kane’s view. (shrink)
This paper provides a brief review of some of the central elements of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarian theory of free will. It then goes on to consider four of the central criticisms Derk Pereboom has made of Kane’s view and it shows how each of these criticisms can be reasonably answered. These criticisms are the no further power/control objection, the disappearing agent/luck objection, the randomizing manipulator objection, and the problem of responsibility for efforts of will.
In a recent article, I defended libertarian views of free will against Richard Double’s argument that such views are hard-hearted. In supporting my main argument against Double, I invoked what I call “the Puppetmaster” argument. Double has recently countered that this argument fails. In this essay, I provide a response to this negative assessment of the Puppetmaster argument.
Richard Double argues that libertarians believe we should hold people morally responsible for their actions and we must possess libertarian free will to be morally responsible for our actions; most libertarians believe there is scant epistemic justification for the belief that any of us possess LFW; and morally conscientious persons hold people responsible for their actions only if they have epistemic justification for their guilt. Thus, he concludes most libertarians are not being morally conscientious when they hold people responsible for (...) their actions. Double considers a possible pragmatic, moral argument against his position, but in so doing he only considers a consequentialist version of the pragmatic response. I show that there is a plausible nonconsequentialist way of responding to Double’s argument, and I defend it in the article. (shrink)
: This article critically examines central arguments made in Sam Harris’ Free Will as well as key aspects of Daniel Dennett’s compatibilist conception of free will. I argue that while Dennett makes thoughtful replies to Harris’ critique of compatibilism, his compatibilism continues to be plagued by critical points raised by Bruce Waller. Additionally, I argue that Harris’ rejection of the libertarian view of free will is ill-informed and I explain the basics of Robert Kane’s libertarian view, arguing that it can (...) be defended against points raised by both Dennett and Harris. Keywords: Free Will; Libertarianism; Compatibilism; Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris Una replica libertaria Dennett e Harris sul libero arbitrio Riassunto : Questo articolo prende criticamente in esame gli argomenti principali presentati nel volume di Sam Harris “Free Will” e gli aspetti principali della concezione compatibili sta proposta da Daniel Dennett sul libero arbitrio. Intendo sostenere che Dennett, pur rispondendo accuratamente alla critica del compatibilismo proposta da Harris, sostiene un compatibilismo che resta sotto il giogo delle critiche sollevate da Bruce Waller. Inoltre, cercherò di sostenere che il rifiuto della prospettiva libertarian proposto da Harris è una posizione male informata ed esporrò I principi di base della prospettiva libertarian di Robert Kane, affermando che lo si può difendere dale critiche sollevate sia da Dennett che da Harris. Parole chiave: Libero arbitrio; Libertarianismo; Compatibilismo; Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris. (shrink)
Robert Kane has for many years claimed that in our underivatively free actions, what he calls “self-forming acts”, we actually try to do both of the two acts we are contemplating doing and then we ultimately end up doing only one of them. This idea of dual willings/efforts was put forward in an attempt to solve luck problems, but Randolph Clarke and Alfred Mele argue that for this to work agents must, then, freely engage in the dual efforts leading up (...) to their SFAs. In response, Kane has said they do so freely by meeting compatibilist criteria of freedom. In Free Will and Luck , Mele argues that this move is deeply problematic. In this essay, I defend Kane's position. In doing so, I clarify important differences between the SFAs of adults and those of young children, making more clear the connections between SFAs, character, and responsibility. (shrink)
Robert Kane's event-causal libertarian theory of free will has been subjected to a variety of criticisms. In response to the luck objection, he has provided an ambiguous answer which results in additional criticisms that are avoidable. I explain Kane's theory, the luck objection and Kane's reply to the problem of luck. I note that in some places he suggests that the dual wantings of agents engaged in self-forming actions (SFAs) provides the key to answering the luck objection, whereas in other (...) places he suggests that the dual willings or tryings of agents is the key. Various philosophers criticize Kane's view by focusing on his concept of the dual willings/tryings involved in SFAs. I argue that despite Kane's efforts to answer these criticisms, they still hold; but I also go on to argue that Kane can avoid these criticisms and also answer the luck objection by just focusing on the important role of the dual wantings in SFAs. (shrink)
This article is a defense of Michael Ruse's sociobiological account of the origins and nature of morality. In the piece, the author provides a summary explanation of Ruse's views and arguments. Then he goes on to explain and critically discuss a variety of objections that have been made against sociobiological accounts of morality. He argues that the criticisms that have been made often work against less sophisticated sociobiological theories but that Ruse's theory is immune to the criticisms. The author responds (...) to the arguments of the following critics of sociobiology: Kitcher, Flew, Flanagan, Nagel, Miles, Singer, and Jacquette. Key Words: Michael Ruse E. O. Wilson sociobiology altruism ethical naturalism. (shrink)
This article compares the views of Foot and Aristotle on virtues and flourishing. It is argued that the view put forward in Philippa Foot’s recent book, Natural Goodness, suffers from a certain sort of vagueness and it is open to other criticisms which the Aristotelian view can avoid. Foot’s views have been subjected to criticism in the recent literature by David Copp and David Sobel. These criticisms are given consideration in the article and it is argued that the more traditional (...) Aristotelian view advocated by the author will have the means to answer some of these criticisms whereas Foot’s view will not. (shrink)
In the second half of their recent, critically acclaimed book Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior , Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson discuss psychological hedonism. This is the view that avoiding our own pain and increasing our own pleasure are the only ultimate motives people have. They argue that none of the traditional philosophical arguments against this view are good, and they go on to present theirownevolutionary biological argument against it. Interestingly, the first half of their (...) book, which is a defense of group selectionism, has received almost all of the attention of those people who have published reactions to the book. No one has published a detailed reaction to the argument of the latter half of the book. In this article, the author explains and critically discusses their evolutionary biological argument against psychological hedonism, concluding that in its current form it is not strong enough to support its conclusion. However, the author goes on to argue that despite recent criticisms of Robert Nozick’s experience-machine argument, it is still a good argument against psychological hedonism. In support of the latter point, the author responds to the objections of Sober and Wilson and to the more recent criticisms offered by Matthew Silverstein. Key Words: hedonism • psychological egoism • evolution • Robert Nozick • Elliott Sober. (shrink)
Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative can be expressed as the formula of humanity. This states that rational beings ought always to treat humanity, whether in our own persons or in others, as ends in themselves and never as mere means. In this essay, I argue that if God exists, then the Kantian formula of humanity is false. The basic idea behind my argument is that if God exists, then he has knowingly created a world with all kinds of naturally occurring threats, (...) such as disease, flood, drought, etc. and he has knowingly placed human beings in such a world without their consent, knowing that many innocent human beings will be led to suffer, and he allows this suffering to occur. I argue that even if this is somehow for their own good or the good of others or contributes to the goodness of the world as a whole, God treats these innocent human beings as mere means when he places humans in such a world without their consent and allows this suffering to occur. (shrink)
Organizational ecology applies Darwinian principles of natural selection to understand the evolution of new forms of organizations over time. The idea here is that there are different forms of human organizations, such as different business organizations, religious organizations, political organizations, etc. The growth of new forms of organizations within each of these fields is to be understood in terms of a struggle for existence among organizations with different traits. In a recent article, Reydon and Scholz (2009) argue that this Darwinian (...) view of the evolution of new organizational forms is highly problematic because organizational populations do not exhibit the levels of internal cohesion, isolation, and closure that are necessary for something like Darwinian evolution to occur. In this article, I defend organizational ecology by rebutting the arguments of Reydon and Scholz. (shrink)
John Lemos' _Freedom, Responsibility, and Determinism_ offers an up-to-date introduction to free will debates in an engaging, dialogic format that recommends it for use by beginning students in philosophy as well as by undergraduates in intermediate courses in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and action theory.
Naturalistic naturalized epistemology combines ontological naturalism with naturalized epistemology. Ontological naturalism is the view that nothing exists other than spatio-temporal beings embedded within a space-time framework. Naturalized epistemology is a view about the nature of knowledge characterized by its commitment to externalism and the idea that knowledge consists in beliefs reliably generated by cognitive mechanisms operating in a suitable environment. Alvin Plantinga has provided a much discussed evolutionary biological argument against naturalistic naturalized epistemology. In this article I defend naturalistic naturalized (...) epistemology by refuting Plantinga's replies to two important criticisms of his argument. /// La epistemología naturalizada naturalista combina el naturalismo ontológico con la epistemología naturalizada. El naturalismo ontológico sostiene que no existe nada más que seres espacio-temporales inmersos en un marco espacio-temporal. La epistemología naturalizada sostiene que la naturaleza del conocimiento se caracteriza por su compromiso con el externismo, y la idea de que el conocimiento consiste en creencias generadas de manera confiable mediante mecanismos cognitivos que operan en un entorno adecuado. Alvin Plantinga ha propuesto un muy discutido argumento biológico evolucionista contra la epistemología naturalizada naturalista. En este artículo defiendo esta epistemología refutando las réplicas de Plantinga a dos críticas importantes a su argumento. (shrink)
Dwayne Moore argues that libertarians about free will who are reductive physicalists cannot make proper sense of free will. In doing so, he presents what he calls “the physical indeterminism luck objection” to libertarian free will. He goes on to consider three different contemporary naturalistic approaches to libertarian free will – those of Christopher Franklin, Mark Balaguer, and Robert Kane – and argues that if understood as reductive physicalist views they all fall prey to this objection. While it’s not entirely (...) clear that Kane is a reductive physicalist, it is clear that he would reject any kind of eliminative materialism or eliminative physicalism. Regardless, in this essay I argue that even if Kane’s view is a kind of reductive physicalist view, it is immune to the arguments made in Moore’s essay. (shrink)
Years ago Robert Nozick provided the experience machine argument, which states that since many people would forgo a life of artificially stimulated tremendous pleasure provided by an "experience machine," it must be that sometimes people are motivated by things other than the pursuit of their own pleasure. This is to say that he rejected psychological hedonism. In a recent book Elliot Sober and David Wilson defend the view that Nozick's argument does not provide adequate refutation of psychological hedonism. This article (...) defends Nozick's argument against their objections. (shrink)
This article provides a defense of a variety of MacIntyrean arguments against emotivism. In After Virtue MacIntyre explains that emotivism might be understood either as a theory about the meaning or about the function of moral language. He also argues that emotivism is false either way. I argue that MacIntyre is right about this by explaining and then answering the recent defenses of emotivism that have appeared in the literature. I conclude by reminding the reader that according to MacIntyre his (...) attacks on emotivism also serve as attacks on other subjectivist ethical theories, such as prescriptivism and existentialism. Thus, if he is right about this, then his critique of emotivism has more far ranging implications than one might initially suppose. (shrink)
Human beings are the products of many thousands of years of biological evolution, and this process occurs in accordance with the principles of natural selection originally articulated and defended by Charles Darwin and developed and defended further in the modern synthesis of the 20th century. In this paper, I consider how it may be thought that this fact threatens the rationality of belief in the Christian God. These threats are countenanced with respect to issues of design, randomness, suffering, and the (...) objectivity of ethics. I argue that while some versions of Christian belief, such as those grounded in a literalist reading of the Genesis creation story or those committed to the image of God thesis, may be threatened by a Darwinian worldview, there are nonetheless plausible versions of Christian belief that are immune to Darwinian challenges. (shrink)
In his recent book The Natural Selection of Autonomy, Bruce Waller defends a view that he calls “natural autonomy.” This view holds that human beings possess a kind of autonomy that we share with nonhuman animals, a capacity to explore alternative courses of action, but an autonomy that cannot support moral responsibility. He also argues that this natural autonomy can provide support for the ethical principle of noninterference. I argue that to support the ethical principle of noninterference Waller needs either (...) a libertarian or a compatibilist theory of autonomy. I then go on to argue that, contra Waller, the libertarian view is both compatible with Darwinism and able to make sense of how autonomous acts belong to the agents who perform them. Thus, I conclude that the libertarian position is a live option for Darwinians. If however, naturalism is taken to include a deterministic view of the universe, as is often the case, then my article takes some strides in defending “Darwinian non–naturalism.”. (shrink)
Introduction -- Defending a socio-biological account of morality -- Non-objectivist evolutionary ethics -- Recent objectivist approaches to evolutionary ethics -- Sketch of an Aristotelian evolutionary ethics -- Evolutionary biology and the moral status of animals -- Faith, reason, and evolutionary epistemology -- Psychological egoism and evolutionary biology -- Evolution and free will : darwinian non-naturalism defended -- Recent developments in philosophy of evolution.
: In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that there is a difference between moral practical reasoning and prudential practical reasoning and what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued that since it is (...) more reasonable to assess prudential practical rationality in terms of the absolute standard than the relative standard, there is no conflict between the demands of MPR and PPR. (shrink)
In a recent book, The Problem of the Soul, Owen Flanagan discusses the Cartesian, or agent causation, view of free will. According to this view, when a person acts of his own free will his action is not caused by antecedent events but is caused by the agent himself, and in acting the agent acts as an uncaused cause. Flanagan argues at length that this view is false. In this article, I defend the agent causation view against Flanagan’s criticisms and (...) I go on to critically address his own ‘neo-compatibilist’ alternative to the agent causation view. In doing so, I hope to exhibit some common misconceptions about the nature of the agent causation view and to show that this is a view that deserves more serious consideration. (shrink)
This article provides a brief explanation of Robert Kane’s indeterministic, event-causal libertarian theory of freedom and responsibility. It is noted that a number of authors have criticized libertarian theories,such as Kane’s, by presenting the problem of luck. After noting how Kane has tried to answer this problem in his recent writings, the author goes on to explain Ishtiyaque Haji’s recent version of the luckargument. The author considers three possible Kanian replies to Haji’s luck argument and argues that the third reply (...) can adequately answer the luck objection. It is also noted that the third reply requires making some significant alterations to Kane’s theory that would also help him resolve certain problems with his views about responsibility for character. (shrink)
This article provides a defense of a variety of MacIntyrean arguments against emotivism. In After Virtue MacIntyre explains that emotivism might be understood either as a theory about the meaning or about the function of moral language. He also argues that emotivism is false either way. I argue that MacIntyre is right about this by explaining and then answering the recent defenses of emotivism that have appeared in the literature. I conclude by reminding the reader that according to MacIntyre his (...) attacks on emotivism also serve as attacks on other subjectivist ethical theories, such as prescriptivism and existentialism. Thus, if he is right about this, then his critique of emotivism has more far ranging implications than one might initially suppose. (shrink)
In a recent book, The Problem of the Soul, Owen Flanagan discusses the Cartesian, or agent causation, view of free will. According to this view, when a person acts of his own free will his action is not caused by antecedent events but is caused by the agent himself, and in acting the agent acts as an uncaused cause. Flanagan argues at length that this view is false. In this article, I defend the agent causation view against Flanagan’s criticisms and (...) I go on to critically address his own ‘neo-compatibilist’ alternative to the agent causation view. In doing so, I hope to exhibit some common misconceptions about the nature of the agent causation view and to show that this is a view that deserves more serious consideration. (shrink)
In such works as A Short History of Ethics, Against the Self-lmages of the Age, and After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the intelligibility of the moral life hinges upon viewing the moral life as essential to the happy life, or eudaimonia. In my article I examine the reasons he gives for saying this, arguing that this thesis is not sufficiently defended by MacIntyre. I also draw connections between this thesis about the intelligibility of the moral life and other (...) aspects of MacIntyre’s thought, such as his communitarianism. In concluding I note that several of MacIntyre’s more significant claims about morality might well be true even if his thesis about the intelligibility of the moral life is false. (shrink)
Free determined decisions are free decisions that are causally determined by the character of the agent. Robert Kane is a libertarian about free will who believes some of our free decisions are determined in this way. According to Kane, for a determined decision to be free it must proceed from the agent's character and the agent must have shaped that character through previous undetermined free decisions. In recent writings, Mark Balaguer has argued that human beings may well possess libertarian freedom, (...) but he rejects Kane's view that free determined acts must proceed from a character that is constructed from prior undetermined free decisions. This essay explains Balaguer's argument for rejecting the Kanean view and critically responds to it in defense of Kane's position on free determined decisions. (shrink)
In Happiness Is Overrated, Raymond Belliotti discusses the nature of happiness, the worth of happiness, how to be happy, and the meaning of life. The book provides clear explanations and critical evaluations of the views of important figures from the history of philosophy as well as the views of various contemporary thinkers. In the first chapter Belliotti discusses the views of ancient and medieval philosophers. In chapter 2 he discusses the views of various modern philosophers, such as Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, (...) Bentham, and Mill, and he moves on to discuss the views of twentieth century social scientists. The next chapter addresses the work of contemporary philosophers. Chapter 4 examines different strategies for leading a happy life, and the final chapter discusses the meaning of life. (shrink)
In his book, Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (1990), James Rachels argues that the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection undermines the view that human beings are made in the image of God. By this he means that Darwinism makes things such that there is no longer any good reason to think that human beings are made in the image of God. Some other widely read and respected authors seem to share this view of the implications (...) of Darwinism, most notably Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett. Unlike Dawkins and Dennett, Rachels gives a detailed argument for this view about the implications of Darwinism. In this article I explain Rachels’s argument and critically engage with it, arguing that he does not sufficiently well consider all of the options that are open to the theist in defending the view that human beings are made in the image of God. (shrink)
This article provides a brief explanation of Robert Kane’s indeterministic, event-causal libertarian theory of freedom and responsibility. It is noted that a number of authors have criticized libertarian theories,such as Kane’s, by presenting the problem of luck. After noting how Kane has tried to answer this problem in his recent writings, the author goes on to explain Ishtiyaque Haji’s recent version of the luckargument. The author considers three possible Kanian replies to Haji’s luck argument and argues that the third reply (...) can adequately answer the luck objection. It is also noted that the third reply requires making some significant alterations to Kane’s theory that would also help him resolve certain problems with his views about responsibility for character. (shrink)
In such works as A Short History of Ethics, Against the Self-lmages of the Age, and After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the intelligibility of the moral life hinges upon viewing the moral life as essential to the happy life, or eudaimonia. In my article I examine the reasons he gives for saying this, arguing that this thesis is not sufficiently defended by MacIntyre. I also draw connections between this thesis about the intelligibility of the moral life and other (...) aspects of MacIntyre’s thought, such as his communitarianism. In concluding I note that several of MacIntyre’s more significant claims about morality might well be true even if his thesis about the intelligibility of the moral life is false. (shrink)