Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):90-117 (1993)

Authors
Neera K. Badhwar
University of Oklahoma
Abstract
In the moral philosophy of the last two centuries, altruism of one kind or another has typically been regarded as identical with moral concern. When self-regarding duties have been recognized, motivation by duty has been sharply distinguished from motivation by self-interest . Accordingly, from Kant, Mill, and Sidgwick to Rawls, Nagel, and Gauthier, concern for our own interests, whether long-term or short-term, has typically been regarded as intrinsically nonmoral. So, for example, although Thomas Nagel regards both prudence and altruism as structural features of practical reason, he identifies only the latter as a moral capacity, prudence being merely rational, long-term egoism. Similarly, John Ravvls and David Gauthier contrast self-interest and other nontuistic interests—interests that are independent of others' interests—with moral interest. We are morally permitted , no doubt, to act out of self-interest within certain constraints, but such acts can have no intrinsic moral worth. Pursuit of our own interests out of duty does have intrinsic moral worth, but such pursuit, by hypothesis, cannot be motivated by self-interest. Self-interested pursuit of our own interests as such, no matter how realistic, farsighted, temperate, honest, or courageous, cannot be intrinsically moral. And this remains the case even if self-interest motivates us to perform other-regarding acts: only those other-regarding acts that are motivated by others' interests count as moral, because only such acts are altruistic
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0265052500004039
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,043
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald de Sousa, Jing-Song Ma & Vincent Shen - 1987 - Philosophy and Culture 32 (10):35-66.
The Sovereignty of Good.Iris Murdoch - 1971 - Religious Studies 8 (2):180-181.
Selflessness and the Loss of Self.Jean Hampton - 1993 - Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):135-16.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Supererogation, Sacrifice, and the Limits of Duty.Alfred Archer - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):333-354.
Egoism, Empathy, and Self-Other Merging.Joshua May - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):25-39.
Beyond Self and Other.Kelly Rogers - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):1.
Self-Interest: What's in It for Me?*: David Schmidtz.David Schmidtz - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):107-121.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-02-07

Total views
21 ( #531,698 of 2,498,582 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #282,166 of 2,498,582 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes