In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about “things in themselves,” namely that they are not spatial or temporal. These negative assertions stand behind the “neglected alternative” problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this problem, Kant may be entitled to assert that spatio-temporality is a subjective element of our cognition, but he cannot rule out that it may also be a feature of the objective world. In this paper, I show in a new (...) way how Kant’s view (focusing on his conclusions about space) is not subject to this objection, by showing that he does not make the denial about mind-independent reality that he is typically held to make. The argument develops consequences of a new reading of Kant’s expression “an sich selbst” (‘in itself’; ‘in themselves’). I argue that “an sich selbst” or “per se” has a special, judgment-level role, so that this expression does not form new noun-terms adjectivally. It follows that the conceptual unit of Kant’s “Conclusions” in the TA is simply “things” (Dinge), since “things in themselves” is not a nominal expression; Kant adopts the Wolffian ontological use of “thing” as the basic kind-term for any existent. The arguments that things per se are not in space are arguments that space cannot be a necessary property or relations of things as a kind. I show that this does not involve the positive claim about mind-independent reality that inspires the neglected alternative objection. (shrink)

The main conclusion drawn in this text is that Piaget's accounts of the construction of necessary knowledge continue to have an intelligible and respectable bases.

It seems obvious that I could have failed to exist. My parents could easily never have met, in which case I should never have been conceived and born. The like applies to everyone. More generally, it seems plausible that whatever exists in space and time could have failed to exist. Events could have taken an utterly different course. Our existence, like most other aspects of our lives, appears frighteningly contingent. It is therefore surprising that there is a proof of my (...) necessary existence, a proof that generalizes to everything whatsoever. I will explain the proof and discuss what to make of it. A first reaction is that a ‘proof’ of such an outrageous conclusion must contain some dreadful fallacy. Yet the proof does not collapse under scrutiny. Further reflection suggests that, suitably interpreted, it may be sound. So interpreted, the conclusion is not outrageous, although it may not be the view you first thought of. (shrink)

In the not too distant past, it was common to treat Hume's skeptical doubts regarding the justification of our beliefs in causal connections—understood as necessary connections between objects or events—as having appeared per conceptionem immaculatam in his post-Cartesian mind. Thanks to recent efforts by scholars in early modern philosophy, however, we are now more informed about the roots of Hume's conclusions in Cartesian thought itself, especially the influence of Malebranche and his arguments for occasionalism. And by the research of (...) historians of Medieval philosophy we are reminded that many aspects of seventeenth-century occasionalism, in turn, have their ancestry in Latin and Arabic thought of the Middle Ages. In this paper I offer a small contribution to the overall project of illuminating the precedents in Medieval philosophy for the theses and arguments in Malebranche that so clearly influenced the most important and influential philosophical analysis of causation ever. There is a tradition here, where the goal is to undermine claims to discover real causal relations or powers in nature. I will concentrate on one particular aspect or tool of that tradition: the negative argument that we can never perceive a sufficiently necessary connection between any two natural objects or events. (shrink)

Joe Campbell has identified an apparent flaw in van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. It apparently derives a metaphysically necessary conclusion from what Campbell argues is a contingent premise: that the past is in some sense necessary. I criticise Campbell’s examples attempting to show that this is not the case (in the requisite sense) and suggest some directions along which an incompatibilist could reconstruct her argument so as to remain immune to Campbell’s worries.

[ draft, later version under review ] Joe Campbell has identified an apparent flaw in van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. It apparently derives a metaphysically necessary conclusion from what Campbell argues is a contingent premise: that the past is in some sense necessary. I criticise Campbell’s examples attempting to show that this is not the case (in the requisite sense) and suggest some directions along which an incompatibilist could reconstruct her argument so as to remain immune to Campbell’s (...) worries. (shrink)

We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of (...) William H. Bragg’s early 20th century work in physics to demonstrate that successful science has in fact violated these norms. We then argue that features of the social epistemic arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold claims of scientific results to their standards. We end by making a suggestion about the norms that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the social epistemology of science—considered as an instance of collective inquiry—would require such apparently lax norms for claims to be put forward. (shrink)

According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing (...) about evidence. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a new way of thinking about natural necessity and a new way of thinking about biological laws. I suggest that much of the lack of progress in making a positive case for distinctively biological laws is that we’ve been looking for necessity in the wrong place. The trend has been to look for exceptionlessness at the level of the outcomes of biological processes and to build one’s claims about necessity off of that. However, as Beatty (...) (1995) observed, even when we are lucky enough to find a biological ‘rule’ of some sort, that rule is apt to be a victim of ‘the rule-breaking capabilities of evolutionary change’. If indeed no distinctively biological generalization—even an exceptionless one—is safe, we need to locate necessity elsewhere. A good place to start is, I think, precisely the point at which Beatty sees the possibility of lawhood as breaking down—namely, at the level of chances. 1 The ‘Necessity’ Objection to Biological Laws2 Necessary Chances2.1 Necessary chances: random drift2.2 Necessary chances: fitness3 But is it Biological?4 Conclusion. (shrink)

In Necessary Existence and the Doctrine of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing Daniel De Haan explicates the central argument of Avicenna’s metaphysical masterpiece. De Haan argues that the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s metaphysics is neither being nor thing but is the necessary ( wājib), which Avicenna employs to demonstrate the existence and true-nature of the divine necessary existence in itself. This conclusion is established through a systematic investigation of how Avicenna’s theory of (...) a demonstrative science is employed in the organization of his metaphysical science into its subject, first principles, and objects of enquiry. The book examines the essential role the first principles as primary notions and primary hypotheses play in the central argument of Avicenna’s metaphysics. (shrink)

I introduce new details in an argument for necessarily existing propositions. The crux of the argument marks out a pathway to the conclusion that necessary truths cannot themselves be necessarily true unless they necessarily exist. I motivate the steps in the argument and then address several standard objections, including one that makes use of the distinction between ‘truth in’ and ‘truth at’. The purpose of the argument is to generate deeper insights into the nature of propositions and the (...) logic of necessity. The argument also gives us a new reason to believe the traditional answer to the question of why there is anything: there is something because the alternative is impossible. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, several consistent procedures have been designed to infer causal conclusions from observational data. We prove that if the true causal network might be an arbitrary, linear Gaussian network or a discrete Bayes network, then every unambiguous causal conclusion produced by a consistent method from non-experimental data is subject to reversal as the sample size increases any finite number of times. That result, called the causal flipping theorem, extends prior results to the effect that causal (...) discovery cannot be reliable on a given sample size. We argue that since repeated flipping of causal conclusions is unavoidable in principle for consistent methods, the best possible discovery methods are consistent methods that retract their earlier conclusions no more than necessary. A series of simulations of various methods across a wide range of sample sizes illustrates concretely both the theorem and the principle of comparing methods in terms of retractions. (shrink)

This article constitutes a contribution to the critique of the political economy of contemporary higher education. Its notes form, intended to open "windows" on the thorny issue of metrics permeating academia on both the local/national and global levels, facilitates a conceptualization of the academic law of value as a mechanism responsible for regulating the tempo and speed of academic labor in a higher education system subsumed under capital. First, it begins with a presentation of the Marxist approach to acceleration and (...) measure. Second, it presents the academic law of value as a socially necessary impact/time. Third, it conceptualizes a figure of capital that operates in the contemporary global higher education system. Fourth, it describes the conditions of operation of merchant capital within higher education and explores the close links of global university rankings, metadata providers, and the academic publishing industry. As a fifth and final point, the analysis turns to Central Eastern Europe and the case study of Poland to demonstrate that, to function properly, the academic law of value needs to be imposed by political means, that is, through policy reforms that establish and legitimize the sets of parameters and criteria for the evaluation of academic labor. In conclusion, the argument suggests that the domination of merchant capital over academic labor, resulting in the latter's ongoing and uncontrolled acceleration, cannot be overcome without addressing not so much the issue of private property but, first and foremost, the politically and socially defined metrics. (shrink)

Richard Wright gave a series of lectures in Europe from 1950 to 1956, collected in the following year in the volume, White Man, Listen! One dominant theme in all four essays is that expanding the moral imagination is centrally important in repairing our racism-benighted globe. What makes Wright’s version of this claim unique is his forthright admission that expanding the moral imagination necessarily involves pain and suffering. The best place to hear Wright in regard to the necessary pain of (...) expanding the moral imagination, I would argue, is his poetry collection, This Other World: Projections in the Haiku Manner. To wit, for Wright the necessary pain of expanding one’s moral imagination is the loneliness that results from delegating to others—in the etymological sense of “deputizing or committing”—one’s whiteness qua privilege or social capital. In conclusion, lonely delegation constitutes an imperative template from Wright regarding the painful expansion of our own moral imagination, in the service of social justice for economically oppressed communities of color across the globe. (shrink)

In this chapter I analyze the concept of self-consciousness in order to uncover its conceptual structure. The conclusions of this analysis describe some of the necessary categories of conscious experience. The concept of the self, the concept of consciousness, the concept of objectivity, the temporal distinctions between past, present, and future, and finally the idea of natural regularities, are found to be necessary categories for conscious experience, and hence describe the fundamental cognitive structure of self-conscious beings.

Aristotle characterizes a syllogism as “discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so.” This characterization of the syllogism does not require us to include as one of its constituent propositions the conclusion of a syllogism. When what are now called the premisses of a syllogism are stated, “something other than what is stated follows of necessity,” but what necessarily follows need not be a proposition in a syllogism (...) on a par with its premisses. The view that an Aristotelian syllogism contains only its premisses as its constituent propositions I call the premiss account of the Aristotelian syllogism. The more customary accounts of the Aristotelian syllogism are the inference account, according to which the syllogism is an inference whose premisses make necessary its conclusion, and the statement account, according to which it is a conditional statement whose conjunctive antecedent makes necessary its consequent. In this paper I shall not explain my reasons for adopting the premiss account and rejecting the inference and statement accounts of the Aristotelian syllogism, since these reasons are enumerated in another place. Instead, I shall discuss a complication which is involved in the premiss account but not involved in the inference and statement accounts. My explanation of this complication must await a more careful statement of the premiss account. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'irrelevant conclusion'. The fallacy of irrelevant conclusion, also known as the ignoratio elenchi (“ignorance of the proof”) fallacy, is, in effect, the parent of all other fallacies since every fallacy yields a conclusion that even if it be true is not related – that is, is irrelevant – to the premises of the argument. Arguments that commit the irrelevant conclusion fallacy all end with (...) a conclusion that is not related in any necessary way to the premises. Avoiding this fallacy is easier said than done, for it requires one to be a critical thinker at all times. The chapter finally presents an example of an argument with an irrelevant conclusion. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with answering the question, what is the central argument of Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing that brings its opening ontological approach to the subject of first philosophy to its ultimate theological goal and conclusion? This dissertation contends that it is the function of the fundamental scientific first principles of metaphysics, and in particular the fundamental primary notion necessary, to provide the intelligible link that Avicenna employs to demonstrate the existence and true-nature of the divine (...) necessary existence in itself on the basis of his doctrine of being. This conclusion is pursued through a systematic and cumulative line of inquiry that begins in Part I with Avicenna’s logical–cum–epistemological doctrine of conceptualization and assent, the heuristic order of the basic scientific questions, and his theory of a demonstrative science. The thesis then moves from the wider concentric circles concerned with logical matters into a series of narrowing concentric circles pertaining to the scientific order of the MH. Part II presents a close analysis of the Metaphysics of the Healing’s novel reception and reorganization of Aristotelian metaphysics according to Avicenna’s theory of demonstrative science, which consists in a subject, scientific first principles, and objects of inquiry that includes the species, proper accidents, and the science’s ultimate goal which is the aitiological–cum–theological inquiry into the causes of being. Part III transitions into a still narrower set of concentric circles that provide a detailed explication of the formal and material aspects of the scientific first principles of the Metaphysics of the Healing. Finally, the main argument of the thesis reaches the central point and question of the dissertation in Part IV, which establishes the fundamentality of the primary notion the necessary in the ontology, aitiology, and theology of the Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing. Part IV concludes that the principal function of the fundamental primary notion the necessary is to provide the intelligible link that connects Avicenna’s doctrine of being with the divine necessary existence in itself. (shrink)

It is the argument of this paper that many aspects of Lucan's characterization in the Bellum Civile of Caesar and Pompey, and of the conflict itself, reflect a ritual combat for kingship such as the combat and murder codified in the myth of Romulus and Remus. It was a well-established convention by Ennius's time, further developed in the late Republic, that the conflict between the founding brothers over control of Rome was the ultimate cause for the Civil Wars. The religious (...) basis of this myth can be found in the rites of the priest of Diana at Aricia, the rex nemorensis, which were still extant in Lucan's time. The evidence for Lucan's use of this paradigm is reviewed, and Book 3 of the Bellum Civile is then reassessed in the terms that it suggests. The themes of sacred place , scared combat, and the necessary murder are most clearly presented in Book 3. It is further argued that seeming inconsistencies in the nature of the gods in Lucan's epic can be at least partially resolved if we understand that the gods must remain aloof and outside the action while the ritual takes place, even though they themselves have instituted the ritual of kingship murder, and will, when it is completed, receive the murderer as their ritually validated priest-king. In the conclusion, ways are suggested in which this paradigm, if accepted, begins to clarify various puzzling choices Lucan has made elsewhere in the epic regarding his narrative of events, his development of character, and the recurrent images of lightning, tree, and blood-sacrifice owed to the gods. (shrink)

Quine's arguments against the attribution of essential properties de re to individuals have been the motivation for attempts at reinstating essentialism as a respectable metaphysical thesis and at defending the coherence of modal logic in general.I shall argue here along somewhat different lines, that the particular version of essentialism Quine objects to is in fact untenable but that this conclusion is far from entailing a commitment to some version of conventionalism, and in particular that it does not entail the (...) view that the only kind of necessity that is coherent is de dicto necessity.In what follows, I shall assume, without arguing for it, that de re essentialism and subjunctive conditionals are intimately related, and in particular, that any version of de re essentialism which conflicts with our basic intuitions about subjunctive conditionals is untenable. (shrink)

From the introductory chapter. The distinctions taken between the necessary and the contingent, in philosophical discussion no less than in common life, are ordinarily supposed to be so definitive and are permitted so deeply to influence our conceptions that it seems well worth one's while to examine them in their origin. And the Aristotelian system will best serve our purpose as a corpus vile for very obvious reasons. In the first place, Aristotle is the earliest systematic philosopher who essayed (...) to treat consistently of all the greater problems of life and thought, and whose works remain to be studied. His method, too, was such that, standing as he did just on the verge of formalism, the definitions which he attempted still bear definite traces of the purely functional meaning of those terms, while his formulation of their significance has led naturally to their solidification as objective facts in the world. For Aristotle was wont to preface his own conclusions by inquiring, rather superficially to be sure, into the psychology of the conceptions in question ; yet, while the inadequacy of his psychology is now admitted on all hands, the inferences as to fact which he deduced therefrom are even now in part accepted as conclusive. When one reflects upon it this state of the question strikes one as absurd. For this reason there appears to be the greater justification for an analysis of the presuppositions on which these conceptions rest. If one grants their validity, the conclusions and the resultant contradictions of the system must be accepted as ultimate. But I am convinced that Aristotle's presuppositions and his real problems were wholly unreconcilable with each other, and so his contradictions serve all the better to point out the direction in which their solution lay. Plato made the acute observation that surprise is the beginning of philosophy, and Aristotle appropriated and further applied the thought.' The full sweep of the truth contained in these words is vastly greater, however, than they knew. The feeling of wonder is indeed the point of departure for philosophy ; but what precisely does it mean? It indicates first of all that an old habit has been broken up. Old conceptions, like the proverbial old bottles, have become so surcharged with the new wine of meaning that they have burst. But to say this is to describe the phenomenon merely as A brute fact without according it any symbolic value. This state of surprise must acquire an ideal worth, an indicative function, if it is really to become the parent of philosophy. Briefly, then, we may say : surprise indicates the need of reconstructing our supposed facts. And this statement is to be taken at its full value, with all its implications, if philosophy is to be achieved.... (shrink)

In this book I investigate the necessary structure of the aether the stuff that fills the whole universe. Some of my conclusions are. 1. There is an enormous variety of structures that the aether might, for all we know, have. 2. Probably the aether is point-free. 3. In that case, it should be distinguished from Space-time, which is either a fiction or a construct. 4. Even if the aether has points, we should reject the orthodoxy that all regions are (...) grounded in points by summation. 5. If the aether is point-free but not continuous, its most likely structure has extended atoms that are not simples. 6. Space-time is symmetric if and only if the aether is continuous. 7. If the aether is continuous, we should reject the standard interpretation of General Relativity, in which geometry determines gravity. 8. Contemporary physics undermines an objection to discrete aether based on scale invariance, but does not offer much positive support.". (shrink)

Quine's arguments against the attribution of essential properties de re to individuals have been the motivation for attempts at reinstating essentialism as a respectable metaphysical thesis and at defending the coherence of modal logic in general.I shall argue here along somewhat different lines, that the particular version of essentialism Quine objects to is in fact untenable but that this conclusion is far from entailing a commitment to some version of conventionalism, and in particular that it does not entail the (...) view that the only kind of necessity that is coherent is de dicto necessity.In what follows, I shall assume, without arguing for it, that de re essentialism and subjunctive conditionals are intimately related, and in particular, that any version of de re essentialism which conflicts with our basic intuitions about subjunctive conditionals is untenable. (shrink)

In this paper, I reevaluate Kripke’s arguments for the necessary a posteriori contra a Kantian pure modal rationalism according to which modal cognition is a priori. I argue that Kripke’s critique of Kant suggests an impure but nevertheless ambitious modal rationalism according to which the basis of modal cognition remains a priori. I then argue that Kripke’s critique of pure modal rationalism does not go deep enough. More specifically, I argue that certain conditional modal judgments, which Kripke regards as (...) a priori, are, in fact, a posteriori. An example is the conditional modal judgment that if gold is a metal, then it is necessary that gold is a metal (if gold exists). However, Chalmers has developed a general frontloading strategy for turning a posteriori conditionals into a priori ones. So, I consider whether the frontloading strategy may be applied in a development of a modest modal rationalist account of the necessary a posteriori. Although the frontloading strategy is attractive for the modal rationalist, I argue for a twofold conclusion. First, I conclude that a posteriori conditionals constitute a serious and unanswered challenge to modal rationalists. Second, I conclude that the frontloading strategy does not by itself provide a response to this challenge and that substantiating the strategy is problematic. (shrink)

Cosmological arguments for the existence of God face a gap problem. This is the problem of convincingly arguing that their intermediate conclusions that some first cause or necessary being exists provide evidence for their main conclusion that God exists. This paper develops a simple and innovative approach to solving this problem, applicable to many cosmological arguments. According to the proposal, the best explanation for why the necessary being is found to have necessary existence is that it (...) is a perfect being. Since a perfect being would be God, the intermediate conclusions of the relevant cosmological arguments provide abductive evidence for their main conclusions. (shrink)

This study aims to uncover the processes of interaction through which knowledge acquisition in new employee orientation is monitored and controlled. Using video-recordings of orientation lectures as data, the study focuses on question–answer sequences in which the lecturer’s question probes into the state of the employees’ knowledge; in particular, it looks at the third turn of the sequence, in which the lecturer comes to a conclusion concerning the participants’ knowledge. This is shown to be an unavoidably practical accomplishment, which (...) is contingent on both the often ambivalent responses of the participants and the design of the knowledge-probing question. Also, the lecturer orients to being responsible for providing the employees with the necessary knowledge that they do not have. The study contributes to discussion of the interactional organization of knowledge in institutional settings, and it sheds light on the pros and cons of lectures as interactional encounters. (shrink)

An argument for the eponymous conclusion is given through a series of hypothetical syllogisms, the most basic of which is as follows: morality is necessary for self-respect; self-respect is necessary for happiness; therefore, morality is necessary for happiness. Some of the most obvious objections are entertained and rejected.

Timothy Williamson (2002) has offered an argument for the claim that, necessarily, he exists, that is, that he is a necessary existent.1 Though this argument has attracted a great deal of attention (e.g., Rumfitt 2003 and Wiggins 2003), I present a new argument for the same conclusion which reveals a new way of denying the soundness of Williamson’s argument, one which denies not only that it is necessary that he exists but also that there are any true (...) necessities about Williamson at all. In conclusion, given that it is contingent that Williamson exists, I nevertheless distinguish a sense in which he is, after all, a necessary existent: Williamson necessarily exists, though it is not necessary that he exists. (shrink)

Previous chapter Inconsistencies and Confusions in the Definition of the Concept of Rhythm These limits of Deleuze and Guattari's approach to language and literature have clearly had negative consequences on their capacity to develop their own rhuthmic strategy. Due to their rejection of the lessons learned from experience by writers, as well as the linguistic and poetic theories based on this experience, they did not have all the resources necessary to build a theory of rhythm robust - Philosophie – (...) Nouvel article. (shrink)

Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness? Call this central question of this treatise, “Q.” We commonly have the experience of consciously paying attention to something, but is it possible to be conscious of something you are not attending to, or to attend to something of which you are not conscious? Where might we find examples of these? This treatise is a quest to find an answer to Q in two parts. Part I reviews the foundations upon which (...) the discourse on Q is built. Different inputs to Q produce different answers. After consideration of the many ways “attention” and “consciousness” have been defined, I settle upon phenomenal consciousness and Executive Attention (defined as a suite of strategies for structuring cognition for further processing implemented by the executive of working memory) as the most interesting inputs to Q, and the ones on which Part II focuses. Attention without consciousness seems relatively easy to establish empirically, but consciousness without attention is much harder. The putative candidates all seem to have major problems, but I build a strong abductive case for the hitherto ignored case of foveal phenomenal overflow. We consciously see far more detail in our foveal fields than we can Executively Attend, although there is a serious obstacle to our ever confirming that empirically—identifying conscious content relies on Executive Attentional report. Triangulating the capacity limitations of attention, consciousness, and working memory strengthens this case for consciousness without attention, and suggests that cognition must work something like my “Witches’ Hat Model,” on which content can become conscious outside of Executive Attention or working memory. I conclude with some reflections on the implications of my arguments for the discourse on Q, and for other discourses such as the ontologies of attention and consciousness, theories of consciousness, some other cognitive concepts, and ethical considerations in humans, animals, and machines. A conclusive answer to Q continues to elude us. It may perhaps be an ultimately insoluble conundrum. But it is the very essence of humanity to seek an answer, and in so doing, to improve our understanding of our own nature: “The proper study of mankind is man.”1. (shrink)

There is a form of argument for a certain kind of essentialist conclusion which appears not to depend upon any appeal to intuition. Identity statements involving natural kind terms are often adverted to in the literature as examples of the necessary a posteriori, and it can appear as though the essentialist is on very strong ground with respect to these claims. It is not merely that they are apt to strike one as plausible in the light of philosophical (...) arguments or modal intuitions; rather, they appear to be provable, given only fairly trivial logical principles and uncontroversial scientific truths. This paper attempts to counter the claim, made particularly convincing by the work of Saul Kripke, that this indeed the case. (shrink)

Some necessary truths are a posteriori. That’s widely agreed and is presumed here. Their existence might appear to show that discoveries about how things are in fact—about how things actually are—can lead to discoveries about all the ways things might be, about the nature of logical space. I detail one way of resisting this conclusion for a number of examples, and the implications of Twin Earth for the issue. Central is the notion of a Cambridge discovery.

What is it for an object to be a physical object? Here I provisionally take up the idea that spatial extension is at least a necessary condition for being a physical object, whether or not it is also sufficient. I then argue for the following conditional proposition: if spatial extension is a necessary condition for being a physical object, then metaphysical naturalism is false. Given that all religious systems affirm the falsity of metaphysical naturalism, this conditional carries obvious (...) significance for philosophy of religion. And if it holds, two possible consequences ensue: for those committed to the idea that spatial extension is a necessary condition for being a physical object, a new disproof of metaphysical naturalism results. By contrast, for those committed to metaphysical naturalism, a new disproof of any extension-based account of the physical results. Either way, we obtain a significant conclusion. (shrink)

Some of Tichý's conclusions rest on an assumption about substitutivity which Kripke would not accept. If we grant the assumption, then Tichý successfully shows that we can discover true identity statements involving names a priori, but not that we can discover a priori what properties things have essentially. Many of Tichý's arguments require an implausible rejection of the possibility of indirect belief as described in Section III. 25Are there necessary a posteriori propositions? I have argued that we certainly can (...) discover necessary propositions a posteriori, but have left it an open question whether there are necessary propositions which we can only discover a posteriori.What effect do the considerations here presented have on the positivist doctrine that the a priori and the necessary coincide? My explanation of how we discover necessary propositions a posteriori involves our believing them indirectly, in virtue of believing contingent propositions. I would argue that Kripke's examples of the contingent a priori involve, similarly, our believing the contingent propositions in directly, in virtue of believing necessary propositions.This suggests that a reformulation of the positivist thesis along something like the following lines may well be correct. Let us say that someone directly believes a proposition just in case he could not fail to believe it without being in a different cognitive state. Then perhaps one can directly believe a proposition on the basis of a priori evidence only if it is necessary, and can directly believe a proposition on the basis of a posteriori evidence only if it is contingent. (shrink)

Researchers are concerned about whether manipulations have the intended effects. Many journals and reviewers view manipulation checks favorably, and they are widely reported in prestigious journals. However, the prototypical manipulation check is a verbal (rather than behavioral) measure that always appears at the same point in the procedure (rather than its order being varied to assess order effects). Embedding such manipulation checks within an experiment comes with problems. While we conceptualize manipulation checks as measures, they can also act as interventions (...) which initiate new processes that would otherwise not occur. The default assumption that manipulation checks do not affect experimental conclusions is unwarranted. They may amplify, undo, or interact with the effects of a manipulation. Further, the use of manipulation checks in mediational analyses does not rule out confounding variables, as any unmeasured variables that correlate with the manipulation check may still drive the relationship. Alternatives such as nonverbal and behavioral measures as manipulation checks and pilot testing are less problematic. Reviewers should view manipulation checks more critically, and authors should explore alternative methods to ensure the effectiveness of manipulations. (shrink)

In, “Some Conclusive Reasons Against ‘Conclusive Reasons’”, Pappas and Swain have criticized Dretske’s theory that conclusive reasons are necessary for knowledge. In their view this condition is too strong. They attempt to show this by means of two purported counterexamples: the cup-hologram case and the generator case. This paper defends Dretske’s analysis against these challenges.

In, “Some Conclusive Reasons Against ‘Conclusive Reasons’”, Pappas and Swain have criticized Dretske’s theory that conclusive reasons are necessary for knowledge. In their view this condition is too strong. They attempt to show this by means of two purported counterexamples: the cup-hologram case and the generator case. This paper defends Dretske’s analysis against these challenges.

Philosophical analyses of science tend to ignore illustrations, implicitly regarding them as theoretically dispensible. If challenged, it is suggested that such neglect is justifiable, because the use of illustrations only leads to faulty reasoning, and thus is the mark of bad or inadequate science. I take as an example one of the most famous illustrations in the history of evolutionary biology, and argue that the philosophers' scorn is without foundation. I take my conclusions to be support for a naturalistic approach (...) to philosophy. (shrink)

David Hume's claim that necessary connection is essential to causality was at the expense of a useful causal distinction we sometimes note with the words ‘necessity’ and ‘contingency’. And since, as J. L. Mackie has stated, Hume made ‘the most significant and influential single contribution to the theory of causation’, subsequent writers on causality, regardless of their support for, or opposition to, Hume, have joined him in trampling this distinction. The object of this paper is not so much to (...) undermine one of Hume's conclusions as it is to describe a use of ‘necessary’ that, while surviving in popular usage, is ignored or obfuscated in the literature on causality. (shrink)

I briefly defend the following claims in response to my critics: (1) We cannot make a principled division between features of contingent reality that do and features that don’t "cry our for explanation." (2) The physical data indicating fine-tuning provide confirmation of the hypothesis of a personal necessary cause of the universe over against an impersonal necessary cause, notwithstanding the fact that the probability of either hypothesis, if true, would be 1. (3) Theism that commits to God’s (...) class='Hi'>necessary existence makes more sense than theism that denies it. (4) God is likely to have created an infinity of universes, and this conclusion helps with (though does not solve) the many problems of evil. (shrink)

Roderick Chisholm addressed the issue of the necessary a posteriori on at least three occasions and, characteristically, modified his views over time. He first advanced a three-stage argument that concluded that no necessary truths are known a posteriori. Without abandoning that argument, he later weakened its conclusion, claiming only that not all knowledge of necessary truths is a posteriori. In the main, this paper is a detailed critical exposition of Chisholm's arguments. However, it also picks up (...) on some suggestive remarks of Chisholm's, draws them out, and explores them. (shrink)

As opposed to the computer, the human being can intentionally mislead in many different ways, can behave chaotically, and whenever he has the motivation can choose also by improvisation, non‐consequent misleading, and spontaneous manners of reasoning and articulation. Human perception and the elaboration of the experience are existentially interest‐related, and distorted if found necessary. The arbitrariness is unlimited; human beings can initiate and produce absurd combinations, contextual failures and deceptive expressions, and do so also by intonation and body‐language. These (...) are the sources of social behaviour, of literature, arts, jurisprudence, politics, etc., all representing systems of meaning constructed by human beings, present in their ‘Lebenswelt’. Human beings are flexible, sensible of emotions and well‐trained to code and decode hidden fallacies, to produce wild associations, capricious‐temporary conclusions, tasks that the rigid computer cannot fulfil. They can choose incorrect and dysfunctional answers; the exactness of their reasoning can be logically invalid. The computer has only inner horizons; human beings have also outer ones, in which they are able to produce multidimensional relationships. They are not truth‐conditioned.The reduction of organic human thinking to the computer’s mechanisms can end up in humankind’s dehumanisation. (shrink)

As opposed to the computer, the human being can intentionally mislead in many different ways, can behave chaotically, and whenever he has the motivation can choose also by improvisation, non‐consequent misleading, and spontaneous manners of reasoning and articulation. Human perception and the elaboration of the experience are existentially interest‐related, and distorted if found necessary. The arbitrariness is unlimited; human beings can initiate and produce absurd combinations, contextual failures and deceptive expressions, and do so also by intonation and body‐language. These (...) are the sources of social behaviour, of literature, arts, jurisprudence, politics, etc., all representing systems of meaning constructed by human beings, present in their ‘Lebenswelt’. Human beings are flexible, sensible of emotions and well‐trained to code and decode hidden fallacies, to produce wild associations, capricious‐temporary conclusions, tasks that the rigid computer cannot fulfil. They can choose incorrect and dysfunctional answers; the exactness of their reasoning can be logically invalid. The computer has only inner horizons; human beings have also outer ones, in which they are able to produce multidimensional relationships. They are not truth‐conditioned.The reduction of organic human thinking to the computer’s mechanisms can end up in humankind’s dehumanisation. (shrink)

Animal welfare in pig production is frequently a topic of debate and is sensitive in nature. This debate is partly due to differences in values, forms, convictions, interests and knowledge among the stakeholders that constitute differences among their frames of reference with respect to pigs and their welfare. Differences in frames of reference by stakeholder groups are studied widely, but not specifically with respect to animal behaviour or welfare. We explored this phenomenon using a qualitative behaviour assessment . Participating stakeholders (...) were classified into two expert groups consisting of pig farmers and animal scientists and a lay-group consisting of urban citizens . The stakeholders were asked to observe the behaviour of a specific pig in each of the nine videos and to assign a score for each video using 21 predefined terms describing the mood, such as ‘happy’ or ‘irritated’. They were asked to complete two additional questionnaires to obtain information on their frames of reference. Results from the QBA showed that the pig farmers observed the behaviour of pigs more positively than the urban citizens and the animal scientists. This was evident from the consistently higher scores on the positive terms to assess pig behaviour. The questionnaires revealed that the farmers had a different frames of reference regarding pigs and different understanding of welfare, which might explain the differences in assessment. In a follow-up stakeholder workshop, which focussed on differences in observation, QBA showed to be an effective tool to stimulate mutual learning among stakeholders, which is necessary to find shared solutions. (shrink)

© The Authors 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] Propositions, Trenton Merricks defends a certain vision of the metaphysics of propositions: propositions exist necessarily and they primitively and essentially represent the world as being a certain way. The book is compact but rich: it is packed with arguments, moves at a fast pace, yet is written with admirable clarity.While I am sympathetic to many of Merrick’s conclusions, (...) I found some of his arguments towards these conclusions lacking. In Section 1, I discuss his claim that arguments constituted by propositions cannot be logically valid. In Section 2, I discuss his argument against singular propositions as having the entities they are about as constituents, and in particular his commitment to necessarily existing singular propositions... (shrink)

It has been proposed that, Under the restriction of singular terms to proper names, Singular de re propositions would be equivalent to certain de dicto propositions. But that is so only if a certain thesis--A thesis which is itself irreducibly de re--Is true of proper names. The conclusion is that the restriction to proper names is not, By itself, Sufficient to render the de re and de dicto equivalent.

What role do demand deposits serve in the financial system? The answer to this simple question has great implications in keeping the legal terms of the contract consistent with the demands of the financial system. Demand deposits are a perfect monetary substitute. Since money is only held to hedge against perceived uncertainty in both the timing and magnitude of future expenditures, demand deposits are demanded for the same reason. From this we derive three main conclusions. First, a financial contract similar (...) to a demand deposit cannot substitute for money. Second, full agreement to a financial contract does not create a perfect substitute for money unless it provides money’s two key characteristics: on demand and par value redemption. Finally, the demand for fractional-reserve demand deposits is fostered by an exogenous source and that demand for a good or service is not a sufficient condition to justify its legality or ethicality. (shrink)

I present an argument which is related to the ontological argument which has a more plausible premise and a weaker conclusion. I assume two postulates concerning the meaning of ‘x creates y’. I then prove that the proposition possibly, something (non-vacuously) creates everything entails, in quantified S5, that there is a necessarily existing object with creative power - an object which creates all (and some) contingently existing objects in some possible world.

Background Randomized controlled trials are central to generating knowledge about effectiveness of interventions as well as risk, protective and prognostic factors related to diseases in emergency newborn care. Whether prospective participants understand the purpose of research, and what they perceive as the influence of the context on their understanding of the informed consent process for RCTs in emergency obstetric and newborn care are not well documented. Methods Conceptual review. Discussion Research is necessary to identify how the illnesses may be (...) prevented, to explore the causes, and to investigate what medications could be used to manage such illness. Voluntary informed consent requires that prospective participants understand the disclose information about the research, and use this to make autonomous informed decision about participation, in line with their preferences and values. Yet the emergency context affects how information may be disclosed to prospective research participants, how much participants may comprehend, and how participants may express their voluntary decision to participate, all of which pose a threat to the validity of the informed consent. I challenge the claim that the ‘understanding’ of research is always necessary for ethical informed consent for research during emergency care. I argue for reconceptualization of the value of understanding, through recognition of other values that may be equally important. I then present a reflective perspective that frames moral reflection about autonomy, beneficence and justice in research in emergency research. Conclusion While participant ‘understanding’ of research is important, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a valid informed consent, and may compete with other values with which it needs to be considered. (shrink)