Gary Becker and others have done important work to broaden the content of self interest, but have not departed from seeing rationality in terms of the exclusive pursuit of self-interest. One reason why committed behavior is important is that a person can have good reason to pursue objectives other than self interest maximization (no matter how broadly it is construed). Indeed, one can also follow rules of behavior that go beyond the pursuit of one's own goals, even if the (...) goals include non-self-interested concerns. By living in a society, one develops possible reasons for considering other people's goals as well, which takes one beyond an exclusive concentration on one's own goals, not to mention the single-minded pursuit of one's own self interest. The recognition of other people's goals may be a part of rational thought. If rational behavior may depart from the relentless pursuit of one's own goals, commitment has to be important in a theory of rationality. Furthermore, seeing the role of commitment in human behavior can have explanatory importance in allowing us to understand behavior patterns that are hard to fit into the narrow format of contemporary rational choice theory. Commitment is, thus, important both for practical reason and for causal explanation. (shrink)

This paper examines the question of why consumers engage in ethical consumption. The authors draw on self-affirmation theory to propose that the choice of an ethical product serves a self-restorative function. Four experiments provide support for this assertion: a self-threat increases consumers’ choice of an ethical option, even when the alternative choice is objectively superior in quantity (Study 1) and product quality (Study 2). Further, restoring self-esteem through positive feedback eliminates this increase in ethical choice (Studies 2 and 3). As (...) an additional test of the robustness of our results, a final study examined the effect of self-threat on choice in a field setting (Study 4). The findings indicate that ethical purchases are not just altruistic. They hold purposeful individual value and can help in the self-restorative process. Implications for managers making decisions regarding investment in ethical product features are discussed. (shrink)

I feel deeply honored and privileged to have the opportunity of giving the first Baffi Lecture at the Bank of Italy. Paolo Baffi was not only a distinguished banker and financial expert, he was also a remarkable economist and a visionary social thinker. He had outstanding technical expertise in many different fields, but combined his intellectual eminence with a profound sense of values. As Governor Ciampi put it at the general meeting of the Bank of Italy last May, Paolo Baffi (...) represented “an extraordinary combination of penetrating logic, erudition and moral strength … [he was] not only a gifted student of economics, he had a deep-seated commitment to act for the common good.”1 In remembering Baffi today, we must keep in mind both his intellectual contributions and his general evaluative concerns. (shrink)

In this comprehensive collection of essays, most of which appear for the first time, eminent scholars from many disciplines—philosophy, economics, sociology, political science, demography, theology, history, and social psychology—examine the causes, nature, and consequences of present-day consumption patterns in the United States and throughout the world.

Heidegger, M. Andenken an Max Scheler.--Gadamer, H.-G. Max Scheler, der Verschwender.--Plessner, H. Erinnerungen an Max Scheler.--Kuhn, H. Max Scheler als Faust.--Dempf, A. Schelers System christlicher Geistphilosophie als Grundlage einer religiösen Erneuerung.--Scheler, M. Neun Briefe an Karl Muth.--Rombach, H. Die Erfahrung der Freiheit.--Landgrebe, L. Geschichtsphilosophische Perspektiven bei Scheler und Husserl.--Theunissen, M. Wettersturm und Stille.--Good, P. Anschauung und Sprache.--Welsch, W. Mit Scheler.--Avé-Lallement, E. Die phänomenologische Reduktion in der Philosophie Max Schelers.--Gehlen, A. Rückblick auf die Anthropologie Max Schelers.--Schoeps, H. J. Die Stellung (...) des Menschen im Kosmos.--Ströker, E. Der Tod im Denken Max Schelers.--Wyss, D. und Huppmann, G. Die Bedeutung Max Schelers für die Medizinische Anthropologie.--Lieber, H.-J. Bemerkungen zur Wissenssoziologie Max Schelers.--Fetscher, I. Max Schelers Auffassung von Krieg und Frieden.--Bochenski, J. M. Ist die Sprache Schelers in eine analytische übersetzbar? (shrink)

Economist-philosopher Amartya Sen's writings on social and political issues have attracted wide audiences. Section 2 introduces his contributions on: how people reason as agents within society; social determinants of people's (lack of) access to goods and of the effective freedoms and agency they enjoy or lack; and associated advocacy of self-specification of identity and high expectations for ‘voice’ and reasoning democracy. Section 3 considers his relation to social theory, his tools for theorizing action in society, and his limited degree of (...) attention to work by sociologists and to capitalism and power structures. Section 4 characterizes a style marked by conceptual refinement, emphases on complexity and individuality, including personal individuality, and reformist optimism. Section 5 shows the features from Sections 3 and 4 at work in his conception of personhood that advocates freedom to make a reasoned composition of personal identity. Similarly, Section 6 addresses his conception of public reasoning and neglect of the sociology of democracy. It contrasts the ideal of a reasoning polity with features in many countries. Sen's programmes for critical autonomy in personhood and for reasoned politics play, nevertheless, a normic role, while his analytical formats help investigation of obstacles to more widespread agency, voice, and democratic participation. (shrink)

The paper examines Amartya Sen’s seminal work Development and Freedom (1999) in relation to his underlying conception of justice and particularly in relation to the tension that arises in the correlation between basic freedom and basic goods. The idea is to address the question as to which of the two elements (basic goods or basic freedoms) takes precedence to the enactment of global justice. The paper advances a particular distinction between a foundational approach and a functional approach when addressing the (...) question of the priority and primacy of any of the two elements and sheds light on a contentious answer, namely, that basic goods are foundationally primary in relation to basic freedoms and that such a primacy does not rule out the functional priority of basic freedoms. (shrink)

Amartya Sen has made a major contribution to the theory of social justice, and of gender justice, by arguing that capabilities are the relevant space of comparison when justice-related issues are considered. This article supports Sen's idea, arguing that capabilities supply guidance superior to that of utility and resources (the view's familiar opponents), but also to that of the social contract tradition, and at least some accounts of human rights. But I argue that capabilities can help us to construct a (...) normative conception of social justice, with critical potential for gender issues, only if we specify a definite set of capabilities as the most important ones to protect. Sen's "perspective of freedom" is too vague. Some freedoms limit others; some freedoms are important, some trivial, some good, and some positively bad. Before the approach can offer a valuable normative gender perspective, we must make commitments about substance. (shrink)

Science and technology are key to economic and social development, yet the capacity for scientific innovation remains globally unequally distributed. Although a priority for development cooperation, building or developing research capacity is often reduced in practice to promoting knowledge transfers, for example through North–South partnerships. Research capacity building/development tends to focus on developing scientists’ technical competencies through training, without parallel investments to develop and sustain the socioeconomic and political structures that facilitate knowledge creation. This, the paper argues, significantly contributes to (...) the scientific divide between developed and developing countries more than any skills shortage. Using Charles Taylor’s concept of irreducibly social goods, the paper extends Sen’s Capabilities Approach beyond its traditional focus on individual entitlements to present a view of scientific knowledge as a social good and the capability to produce it as a social capability. Expanding this capability requires going beyond current fragmented approaches to research capacity building to holistically strengthen the different social, political and economic structures that make up a nation’s innovation system. This has implications for the interpretation of human rights instruments beyond their current focus on access to knowledge and for focusing science policy and global research partnerships to design approaches to capacity building/development beyond individual training/skills building. (shrink)

Why does Sen maintain that people are capable of putting their own goals offline and deliberating and acting out of sheer commitment to others? How can he endorse such a rejection of the belief-desire model of agency? The paper canvasses three explanations and favors one that ascribes an unusual position to Sen: the belief that so far as agents remain in the belief-desire mould, they cannot deliberate on the basis of reasons other than those that derive from standing goals that (...) form an integrated system. What he thinks of as deliberation on the basis of commitment is just the sort of deliberation that involves the formation of a novel, perhaps occasion-specific goal in which the good of another is prioritised. (shrink)

The discussion centres around two issues: the issue of meaning, and the question whether the tools of rhetoric viewed as the basic tool in interpersonal communication can be helpful in reading and interpreting meaning. The author understands meaning after G. Frege: […] let the following phraseology be established: A proper name expresses its sense, stands for or designates its reference. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference. The purpose of the discussion is also to (...) answer a much more general question: whether through rhetoric can one say something important about the world, so do they define a philosophical thesis or only, from various perspectives, one searches for the most probable answer to a hypothesis. The presented assumption is a result of the suggestion of Willard van Orman Quine: Rhetoric is the literary technology of persuasion, for good or ill, and it entails something which Randal Marlin defined as referentially translucent expressions. Therefore, the hypothesis I shall try to prove is the following: can the sense of any expression be, using the tools of rhetoric, defined to such an extent so that it becomes a philosophical thesis and not a hypothesis? So that in terms of both the subject and the object the expression could be considered as true. Then and only then can one say that such an expression has/contains some sense. (shrink)

Christiane Bailey | : Distinguant deux sens de « communauté morale », cet article soutient que certains animaux appartiennent à la communauté morale dans les deux sens : ils sont des patients moraux dignes de considération morale directe et équivalente, mais également des agents moraux au sens où ils sont capables de reconnaître, d’assumer et d’adresser aux autres des exigences minimales de bonne conduite et de savoir-vivre. Au moyen de la notion d’« attitudes réactives » développée par (...) Peter F. Strawson, je soutiens que les animaux sociaux qui sont à la fois objets et sujets d’attitudes réactives forment des communautés morales au second sens, dans la mesure où ils se traitent mutuellement comme des individus ayant des obligations et tenus à des exigences de bonne volonté minimale dans leurs interactions interpersonnelles. Distinguant l’agentivité morale du raisonnement moral, je soutiens que la capacité de raisonner abstraitement sur les principes et les conséquences de nos actions nous imposent plus de responsabilités que n’en ont d’autres animaux, mais que cela ne fait pas nécessairement de nous des agents moraux plus compétents que d’autres animaux sociaux. Je termine en donnant un aperçu de quelques implications de ce changement de perspective en éthique animale. | : This article draws the distinction between two meanings of “moral community” and maintains that certain animals belong to moral communities in both senses of the term: these animals are moral patients worthy of direct and equivalent moral consideration, but also moral agents in the sense that they are capable of recognizing and respecting minimal requirements of good conduct and manners as well as expecting and demanding the same from other members of their community. By way of the notion of “reactive attitudes” developed by Peter F. Strawson, I maintain that social animals who are at once objects and subjects of reactive attitudes constitute moral communities in the second sense of the term, in that they treat each other as individuals who have obligations and who are bound by the demand for a minimum of good-will in their interpersonal interactions. Distinguishing between moral agency and moral reasoning, I maintain that the capacity to reason abstractly about the principles and consequences of our actions gives us more responsibilities than other animals have, but that this does not necessarily make us more competent moral agents than other social animals. I conclude with an overview of some of the implications that this change in perspective has for animal ethics. (shrink)

Against scepticism from thinkers including John Rawls and Thomas Nagel about the appropriateness of justice as the concept through which global ethical concerns should be approached, Amartya Sen argues that the problem lies not with the idea of justice, but with a particular approach to thinking of justice, namely a transcendental approach. In its stead Sen is determined to offer an alternative systematic theory of justice, namely a comparative approach, as a more promising foundation for a theory of ?global justice.? (...) But in the end Sen offers no such thing. He does not develop a theory of justice and this is all to the good; for if values are plural in the way Sen suggests, then justice is not a master idea but one value among many, and it should be neither the first virtue of social institutions, nor the notion that frames all our reflections on ethical and political life. (shrink)

Any defense of universal norms involves drawing distinctions among the many things people actually desire. If it is to have any content at all, it will say that some objects of desire are more central than others for political purposes, more indispensable to a human being's quality of life. Any wise such approach will go even further, holding that some existing preferences are actually bad bases for social policy. The list of Central Human Capabilities that forms the core of my (...) political project contains many functions that many people over the ages have preferred not to grant to women, either not at all, or not on a basis of equality. To insist on their centrality is thus to go against preferences that have considerable depth and breadth in traditions of male power. Moreover, the list contains many items that women over the ages have not wanted for themselves, and some that even today many women do not pursue – so in putting the list at the center of a normative political project aimed at providing the philosophical underpinning for basic political principles, we are going against not just other people's preferences about women, but, more controversially, against many preferences (or so it seems) of women about themselves and their lives. To some extent, my approach, like Sen's, avoids these problems of paternalism by insisting that the political goal is capability, not actual functioning, and by dwelling on the central importance of choice as a good. But the notion of choice and practical reason used in the list is a normative notion, emphasizing the critical activity of reason in a way that does not reflect the actual use of reason in many lives. (shrink)

La pensée heideggérienne de l'être recèle un paradoxe : elle est à la fois le lieu de découvertes prodigieuses et de l'occultation d'une partie importante de l'être de l'homme : la dimension éthique. Afin de comprendre ce phénomène, notre recherche prend pour fil conducteur la manière restrictive dont Heidegger interprète le bien de Platon, à travers tout son chemin de pensée.

Book Reviews Miriam Teschl, Economics and Philosophy, FirstView Article.

Nach Auschwitz -- Vom Sich-Zeigen und Sich-Entziehen des Bösen -- Indikatoren der Wirksamkeit des Bösen und Fokussierung des Gemeinen -- Zur Epigenese des Bösen -- Zum Aufbau der Untersuchung -- Provokationen: Epigenese, Banalität und Attraktivität des Bösen -- Systematisierungen: Zur Erkenntnis und Hermeneutik des Bösen -- Typologien: Theologisches Denken des Bösen -- Schlussbetrachtung: Dialektik und Epigenese des Bösen.

This book brings together a team of leading theorists to address the question 'What is the right measure of justice?' Some contributors, following Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, argue that we should focus on capabilities, or what people are able to do and to be. Others, following John Rawls, argue for focussing on social primary goods, the goods which society produces and which people can use. Still others see both views as incomplete and complementary to one another. Their essays evaluate (...) the two approaches in the light of particular issues of social justice - education, health policy, disability, children, gender justice - and the volume concludes with an essay by Amartya Sen, who originated the capabilities approach. (shrink)

The capability approach to distributive justice, as defended by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, represents perhaps the most influential recent attempt to reconcile the competing demands of liberty and equality. Specifically, capability theorists have claimed that their insistence on the universal cultivation of a set of capabilities for basic human "functionings" is fully consistent with a liberal neutrality commitment. Their reason is that these capabilities are, like Rawls's primary goods, rational to want "whatever else one wants." This article suggests, in (...) contrast, that the capability approach fails to satisfy the neutrality requirement endorsed by both Sen and Nussbaum. It further suggests that the non-neutral character of the approach reflects its Rawlsian lineage, and raises serious doubts about the coherence of Rawls's account of primary goods. (shrink)

L’album de Franquin et Greg, QRN sur Bretzelburg, explore avec bonheur trois sens singulièrementdifficiles à rendre en BD : l’ouïe, le goût et l’odorat. Ou plutôt il nous invite à réfléchir sur ce qu’il advientlorsque nos sens sont brouillés. Alors le sens lui-même s’embrouille. Et l’incommunication fait retour, àtravers les médias et la communication interpersonnelle. Une incommunication aux effets politiques déliquescents.Ce sera la tâche de Spirou et Fantasio de lutter contre cette incommunication, de renverser leseffets délétères du (...) son notamment au bénéfice du bon goût. Où la BD, dans sa richesse narrative et expressive,nourrit un dialogue serré avec la théorie de l’incommunication, qui n’avait pas jusque-là intégré laquestion des sens, et participe ainsi à son enrichissement.The Franquin & Greg album entitled “QRN sur Bretzelburg” is a delightful exploration of threesenses that are exceedingly difficult to work into a comic strip: hearing, taste and smell. Or rather, thealbum prompts us to ponder on what happens when our senses get confused. The subject of uncommunication– through the media and through interpersonal communication – rides again. And this is uncommunicationwith a deliquescent political effect. Spirou and Fantasio have a mission: a mission to fightuncommunication, to overthrow the pernicious effects of noise so that good taste can win out. The comic strip,through its peculiarly expressive narrative richness, thus contributes to a close-knit dialogue with the theory ofuncommunication, which until now had not dealt with the question of the senses, and so helps to enrich it. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to examine tentatively the difference between two kinds of moral frameworks based on the concepts of the good and that of interest. I shall start with some introductory remarks on language taken as an explanatory framework rooted in Gadamer and a hermeneutical reading of MacIntyre. In parts two and three, I use this hermeneutical background to analyse the difference between the concept of the good as seen within the classical tradition and that (...) of interest as it came up with the turn of modernity. I also deal with some consequences of this distinction for ethics. Finally, in part four I discuss the possibilities of using the Aristotelian idea of the ethical in a contemporary social and philosophical context. I argue for the necessity of including some references to developed economics by pointing out those aspects of Martha Nussbaum’s and Amartya Sen’s projects, which promote a conception of the good within liberal economics. (shrink)

Based on a close reading of the debate between Rawls and Sen on primary goods versus capabilities, I argue that liberal theory cannot adequately respond to Sen’s critique within a conventionally neutralist framework. In support of the capability approach, I explain why and how it defends a more robust conception of opportunity and freedom, along with public debate on substantive questions about well-being and the good life. My aims are: to show that Sen’s capability approach is at odds with (...) Rawls’s political liberal version of neutrality; to carve out a third space in the neutrality debate; and to begin to develop, from Sen’s approach, the idea of public value liberalism as a position that falls within that third space.En me basant sur une lecture attentive du débat entre Rawls et Sen sur les biens premiers versus les capabilités, je soutiendrai que la théorie libérale est incapable, dans un cadre neutraliste conventionnel, de répondre adéquatement à des injustices dans le domaine de la santé. À partir de l’approche des capabilités, j’explique pourquoi et comment cette approche permet de défendre une conception plus robuste de l’opportunité et de la liberté, de même qu’un débat public sur des questions substantielles concernant le bien-être et la vie bonne. Mes objectifs sont : de clarifier le rapport entre le neutralisme de Rawls et sa défense des biens premiers,, de démontrer les implications de la critique des capabilités de Sen, et, d’esquisser une troisième position dans le débat sur la neutralité versus le perfectionnisme – à savoir, celle d’un perfectionnisme motivé par des considérations de légitimité. (shrink)

Most of the estimated 855 million people in the world (one sixth of the population) without access to schooling are women and girls. Two thirds of the 110 million school age children not in school are girls (UNGEI, 2002). This injustice has been a focus of attempts at coordinated international policy interventions since the 1990s, sometimes loosely referred to as the Education for All (EFA) movement. The first of the millennium development targets - gender equity in education - is supposed (...) to be reached by 2005, but it is widely acknowledged that it will be missed. A number of different social theories underpin the EFA policies. By the late 1990s a widespread consensus was emerging that the concept of rights provided a fruitful theoretical, political and policy way forward on this issues. Policy documents and declarations took on a language of rights, which supplanted earlier ideas of basic needs and gender interests. In these documents rights appeared isomorphic with the more philosophically developed versions of basic needs and gender interests in the work on capabilities undertaken by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. (shrink)

A platitude that took hold with Kuhn is that there can be several equally good ways of balancing theoretical virtues for theory choice. Okasha recently modelled theory choice using technical apparatus from the domain of social choice: famously, Arrow showed that no method of social choice can jointly satisfy four desiderata, and each of the desiderata in social choice has an analogue in theory choice. Okasha suggested that one can avoid the Arrow analogue for theory choice by employing a (...) strategy used by Sen in social choice, namely, to enhance the information made available to the choice algorithms. I argue here that, despite Okasha’s claims to the contrary, the information-enhancing strategy is not compelling in the domain of theory choice. (shrink)

John Thackara emphasised that 80% of the negative impact on the natural environment has its origin in design and the randomness of its application. Considering the entirety of design practices, one would have a hard time disputing this. In contemporary times, design understood as design practices has assumed a servile role in relation to big corporations. One can observe the consequences of such practices in real time: social exclusion, the lack of design consideration or consideration of end users, the failure (...) of branding, and the polarisation of entire societies – these are only some dimensions of the current applications of design. Instead of the current applications, we need a change in the paradigm of both the theory of design and practical applications. Design needs a new code of application which would not only look good in social media, but would also be a clear point of reference in the design practice. (shrink)

Gibt es ein B ses der Nachmoderne, das sich von demjenigen fr herer Zeiten auf spezifische Weise unterscheidet? Macht es berhaupt Sinn, von "dem" B sen zu sprechen - in einer Welt, in der wir auf keine Personifikationen alten Zuschnitts mehr treffen? K nnten wir nicht, wenn sich die Bedingungen unserer Existenz auf so grundlegende Weise ndern, wie das gegenw rtig der Fall ist, nun endg ltig auf eine metaphysische Redeweise verzichten, die auch schon in der Moderne nur noch den (...) Charakter eines Relikts hatte? Der Essay von Max Lorenzen geht, um diese Fragen zu beantworten, einen Weg, der in dieser Weise bisher noch nie beschritten wurde. Er verbindet die ungesch tzte Darstellung pers nlichen Erlebens und die philosophische Reflexion, um in diesem wechselseitigen Bezug eine Haltung der denkenden Erfahrung entstehen zu lassen. In ihr, einer Zone der wirklichen und direkten Betroffenheit, setzt sich das Ich der Begegnung mit den Bildern des nachmodernen Lebens aus. Sie sind r tselhaft und unheimlich. Um sie zu verstehen, bedarf es einer neuen Metaphysik, die keinen ontologischen Systemcharakter mehr hat und sich von den tradierten Vorgaben l st. Diese Metaphysik ist ein Desiderat der gegenw rtigen philosophischen Situation: sie kann dazu beitragen, die Erstarrung eines eingefahrenen Frage- und Antwortspiels zu durchbrechen. Auch unsere Zeit muss die Erfahrung des Lebens und des Todes, des Fremden und Kalten, aufeinander beziehen, um ihre spezifischen Bedingungen der Freiheit, von Kunst, Literatur und Philosophie, zu schaffen. Der Beitrag Lorenzens hierzu besteht nicht zuletzt darin, eine nachmoderne Ethik zu entwerfen, in der sich plurale und flexibilisierte Formen mit einem ernsthaften Engagement verbinden. (shrink)

In Politics VII, Aristotle not only gives us some general ideas on what makes a good city and the conditions of its implementation, but also provides a description of such a regime: 1. Citizenship is reserved for those whom, due to their natural attributes and sufficient wealth, may achieve political and ethical excellence; 2. In relation to their age, they are successively hoplites, citizens or priests. Therefore, all that remains to be examined is the relationship between such a regime (...) and the “politeia”, which in the previous books is the standard regarding cities whose citizens are rich, poor, or belong to the middle class. (shrink)

This book brings together a team of leading theorists to address the question 'What is the right measure of justice?' Some contributors, following Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, argue that we should focus on capabilities, or what people are able to do and to be. Others, following John Rawls, argue for focussing on social primary goods, the goods which society produces and which people can use. Still others see both views as incomplete and complementary to one another. Their essays evaluate (...) the two approaches in the light of particular issues of social justice - education, health policy, disability, children, gender justice - and the volume concludes with an essay by Amartya Sen, who originated the capabilities approach. (shrink)

The aim of my contribution is to analyse the role that common sense has played in Umberto Eco’s work. After making clear the distinction between good sense and common sense, and highlighting a number of differences with the Scottish philosophy of common sense, I will consider the uses and functions that common sense assumes in Eco’s philosophy: namely, a phenomenological function, a regulatory function and a communicative function. I will demonstrate how the characterisation of common sense in Eco emphasises (...) the importance of the historical dimension of Sens, the importance of the public and social dimension of semiosis, and how common sense plays a fundamental, pragmatic role in the disposition to act, whilst revealing the importance of the Peircian lesson and Eco’s consonance with Peirce’s positions. (shrink)

And in this book the distinguished scholar Amartya Sen offers a powerful critique of the theory of social justice that, in its grip on social and political ...

While being generally appreciative of Sen's theory of capabilities, the point of this paper is to raise some conceptual challenges that arise in addressing entrenched conditions of power and domination from the capability paradigm. The enhancement of people's capability prospects with regard to education, employment, decent living standards and political participation can empower them to challenge various dominating conditions in society. It can also bestow a sense of self-confidence in people to stand up against discriminating practices. Yet, the objectives of (...) the capability theory remain less secure as long as citizens’ capability prospects are dependent on and subjected to arbitrary power and domination. I argue that Sen's theory of capabilities can be strengthened and developed as an effective antidote to the liberal hegemony in political theory by drawing on resources from Pettit's republicanism particularly by accommodating the robustness condition of freedom and by envisioning individual freedom as intimately tied to the common good of the polity. (shrink)

Das Böse: abstoßend und anziehend zugleich.

Ingolf U. Dalferth studies the complexity of this procedure in three thought processes which deal with the central concepts in the Christian understanding of malum as privation (a lack of good), as evil-doing and as a lack of faith.

Reconstruction théorique magistrale de nos intuitions communes à propos de la justice sociale, la Théorie de la Justice de John Rawls se devait de prendre en compte les plus défavorisés : c’est chose faite avec le principe de différence qui répartit les biens à l’avantage de ces derniers. Mais qui sont-ils exactement ? Comment les définir objectivement ? Pour Rawls, l’objectivité morale est garantie par l’expérience de pensée de la position originelle, caractérisée par le voile d’ignorance qui masque les intérêts (...) particuliers. Mais cet outil méthodologique du jugement désintéressé en philosophie politique ne constitue-t-il pas un obstacle à la caractérisation de la variété empirique des situations de pauvreté ? Ces questions, c’est un économiste, et un économiste lui-même originaire d’un pays « pauvre » qui les soulève : Amartya Sen, prix Nobel d’Économie en 1998 pour ses travaux sur le développement humain, la pauvreté et l’économie du bien-être, a critiqué de manière virulente l’indice des biens premiers dont la privation constitue le critère de définition des plus défavorisés dans la théorie rawlsienne. En effet, l’homogénéité des besoins des individus engagés dans la position originelle exclut la prise en compte de la diversité réelle des êtres humains. Les différences de capacités mises en évidence par les indicateurs économiques élaborés avec la participation d’A. Sen n’apparaissent pas derrière le voile d’ignorance or, une théorie de la justice peut-elle se passer d’une analyse des obstacles réels posés aux libertés positives des individus, tels que l’état de santé, le niveau d’éducation et les discriminations dues au genre, à la couleur de peau ou à la classe sociale ? Ce livre explicite les enjeux de cette discussion et les apports de l’approche par les capacités (capability approach) à la réflexion contemporaine sur les inégalités économiques et sociales. (shrink)

I compare Mill's and Sen's accounts of the value of opportunity, focusing on a tension between two ideas they both uphold: that individual freedom is an important component of well-being, and that, because desires can be adaptive, actual desire is not always a good indicator of what will give well-being. The two writers' responses to this tension reflect different understandings of the relationship between freedom and desire. Sen links an individual's well-being to her freedom to choose what she has (...) reason to desire, and looks to a democratic political process for a collective judgement about what it is rational to desire. Mill links the individual's well-being to her freedom to act on her own desires, whatever they may be, within the constraints imposed by a fair initial distribution of resources. He sees no need for collective judgement about what is ultimately valuable in human life. I side with Mill. (Published Online February 16 2006). (shrink)

Harsanyi claimed that his Aggregation and Impartial Observer Theorems provide a justification for utilitarianism. This claim has been strongly resisted, notably by Sen and Weymark, who argue that while Harsanyi has perhaps shown that overall good is a linear sum of individuals’ von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, he has done nothing to establish any con- nection between the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility and that of well-being, and hence that utilitarianism does not follow. The present article defends Harsanyi against the Sen-Weymark (...) cri- tique. I argue that, far from being a term with precise and independent quantitative content whose relationship to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is then a substantive question, terms such as ‘well-being’ suffer (or suffered) from indeterminacy regarding precisely which quantity they refer to. If so, then (on the issue that this article focuses on) Harsanyi has gone as far towards defending ‘utilitarianism in the original sense’ as could coherently be asked. (shrink)

Amartya Sen?s The Idea of Justice (2009) mistakenly characterizes transcendental accounts of justice as being unable to compare non-ideal alternatives, and thus misfires as a criticism of Robert Nozick and John Rawls. In fact, Nozick?s disinterest in when rights may be overridden does not bespeak indifference to specific questions of comparative assessment, and Lockean rights do give determinate advice in everyday circumstances. Sen correctly reports that Rawls?s theory is defective at giving practical normative advice, but the basic problem is the (...) over-rigidity of Rawls?s absolute priority relations, not transcendentalism. Sen?s search for a complete moral theory requires that he produce one. Act consequentialism is one promising complete theory of justice, having both transcendental grounding and clear methods for comparative assessment. I also propose moving from Sen?s capabilities standard of social justice to one based on functioning. The latter facilitates distinguishing between trivial and worthless capabilities and important and worthwhile ones, and focuses social justice more squarely on the end of well-being. (shrink)

Om det ondas problem i nyplatonism och fornkristen filosofi.

Das Problem des Bösen wurde von der Aufklarung marginalisiert. Seinen Grund hat dies im Glauben an die unbezwingbare Starke der Vernunft und der damit einhergehenden Uberzeugung, dass die Menschheitsgeschichte eine Geschichte des Fortschritts, nicht bloss auf wissenschaftlicher und kultureller, sondern auch auf moralischer Ebene sei. Dass solch ein einseitiges Beharren auf der Vernunft selbst ins Bose umschlagen kann, wurde in der Gestalt des Terrors der Franzosischen Revolution auf schmerzliche Weise anschaulich. Die Klassische Deutsche Philosophie erkennt, dass die Vernunft ihre wahrhafte (...) Kraft und Gute nur entfalten kann, wenn sie - anstatt das Böse zu verdrangen - sich mit dem Bösen konfrontiert. Das Vertrauen in die Vernunft ist also keineswegs gebrochen. Das Böse wird nicht als das vollkommen Fremde und Andere verstanden. Vielmehr entsteht der neue Anspruch an die Vernunft, das Böse mit dem Denken zu durchdringen. Dieser Band sucht die vielfaltigen Zugange der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie zum Problem des Bosen darzustellen. (shrink)