The concept of precision medicine aims to tailor treatment based on data unique to the patient. An example is the use of genetic data from malignant tumours to select the most appropriate oncological treatment. The competing interests of utilitarianism and egoism create dilemmas for decisions regarding investment in precision medicine. The need to balance the perceived rights and needs of individuals against those of society as a whole is an on-going challenge in the distribution of limited health service resources. There (...) is need for proper planning, organisation and investment into precision medicine to cope with the consequences of both direct-to-consumer and healthcare-directed genetic testing for genetic counselling, therapeutics and diagnostic networks. Consideration needs to be given to providing adequate time and training to allow for meaningful shared decision-making with patients and there is a strong case in support of a hub-and-spoke model to provide rapid, solid tumour genetic mutational analysis to prevent patients missing out on beneficial treatments. (shrink)

His final set of lectures at the College de France, described here by Thomas Flynn, focused on the concept of truth-telling as a moral virtue in the ancient ...

How does valuing something for its own sake differ from valuing an entity for the sake of other things? Although numerous answers come to mind, many of them rule out substantive views about what is valuable for its own sake. I therefore seek to provide a more neutral way to distinguish the two valuing attitudes. Drawing from existing accounts of valuing, I argue that the two can be distinguished in terms of a conative-volitional feature. Focusing first on “non-final valuing”—i.e. valuing_ (...) x_ for the sake of something else—I argue that it involves adopting certain reasons on account of a desire for _x_ to contribute to other things. I then show how this contrasts final valuing. The result, I argue, is a plausible account of how the two modes of valuing differ that leaves open substantive views about what all can be valued for its own sake. This is helpful because it develops a popular methodology used to explore the value of a wide range of things, including natural entities, family heirlooms, and artworks, as well as, more broadly, entities that might have “extrinsic final value.”. (shrink)

Presents MacIntyre's most explicit defense of his approach to Thomistic metaphysics. This lecture follows MacIntyre's argument in After Virtue that modern philosophy has very literally lost its way, and the problems it faces are insoluble. The difficulties are twofold, and stem from the Cartesian turn to the self in the XVith century.

This paper critically examines Michael Zimmerman’s account of basic final value in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Zimmerman’s account has several positive features. Unfortunately, as I argue, given one plausible assumption about value his account derives a contradiction. I argue that rejecting that assumption has several implausible results and that we should instead reject Zimmerman’s account. I then sketch an alternative account of basic final value, showing how it retains some of the positive features of Zimmerman’s account while avoiding its (...) pitfalls. (shrink)

본 논문은, 대승불교의 『대승기신론』과 레비나스의 『전체와 무한』이 마음의 오염과 정화의 과정에 대해 얼마나 생산적인 대화를 나눌 수 있는지를 보이려는 목적 아래, 그 마지막 단계인 전자의 구경각究竟覺과 후자의 에로스를 비교 분석한다. 양자의 대화는 쌍방에 호혜적이다. 『전체와 무한』 쪽에서는 종잡기 힘들 만큼 얽히고설킨 에로스 드라마가, 『기신론』의 논리적 도식 덕분에, 그에 상응하는 명료한 분절을 얻었다. 『기신론』 쪽에서는 추상성에 갇혀 있던 구경각의 운동이, 『전체와 무한』의 세세한 연출 덕분에, 일련의 구체적 사건들의 드라마로 생동하게 되었다. 특히 『기신론』에서 수수께끼처럼 남아 있던 시각의 역설이 『전체와 무한』의 드라마를 통해 (...) 명쾌히 해명될 수 있었다. (shrink)

Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the (...) physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying the way in which powers work. (shrink)

This is the first book in English devoted entirely to Kant's Opus postumum and its place in the Kantian oeuvre.

Las definiciones de argumentación son tan variadas como las distintas posiciones existentes en torno a la pregunta de qué hacemos exactamente cuando argumentamos y cuándo estamos, de hecho, argumentando. Incluso el mismo autor puede ofrecer más de una definición de lo que entiende por argumentación; en parte, porque el problema de la argumentación no se circunscribe a un solo ámbito, ni del conocimiento ni de la vida práctica.

In this essay I argue that sports at their best qualify as final ends, that is, as ends whose value is such that they ground not only the practices whose ends they are, but everything else we do as human agents. The argument I provide to support my thesis is derived from Harry Frankfurt's provocative work on the importance of the things we care about, more specifically, on his claim that it is by virtue of caring about things and practices, (...) really caring about them ? even loving them ? we are able to regard and treat them as final ends. Sports, I claim, are paradigmatic examples of practices cared about and loved in these deep ways, and as such deserve to be considered, rather than dismissed because of their supposed triviality, as one of those ends around which a life most worth living can be legitimately forged. (shrink)

Este trabajo, quiere considerar retórica y narrativamente el relato de Pablo acerca del conflicto de Antioquía, para proponer como tesis, que el final abierto de Pablo en su descripción del conflicto de Antioquía es una estrategia retórica consciente y deseada, que genera tensión en su auditorio gálata, en orden a presentar la afirmación teológica central de la carta: “somos salvados en Cristo por la fe y no por las obras de la ley”, una tesis que quiere sostener su mensaje principal (...) a la comunidad gálata «no os circuncidéis», si lo hacéis, “Cristo no os servirá de nada”. (shrink)

Socrates provides an argument at the end of the Apology that he believes gives hope that death is a blessing. This argument, grounded on the claim that death is one of two things, has been the subject of much derision and some recent defense. In this essay, I build on the work of other sympathetic commentators to show that Socrates' argument, when taken in context, not only makes good sense, but unifies Socrates' speech into a cohesive exhortation toward virtue.

String theory has by now maintained a highly influential position in high energy physics for more than a quarter of a century. The present article analyses the reasons for the considerable trust exponents of string theory have in their theory even though it has neither found empirical confirmation nor a complete formulation up to this point. It is argued that this trust can be understood in terms of an emerging new conception of theory assessment that relies strongly on the identification (...) of limitations to the underdetermination of scientific theory building. The second part of the paper makes the point that another conspicuous element of string theoretical reasoning, the prominent role of the notion of a final theory, can be understood in terms of this altered notion of theory assessment as well. (shrink)

From the perspective of an African ethic, analytically interpreted as a philosophical principle of right action, what are the proper final ends of a publicly funded university and how should they be ranked? To answer this question, I first provide a brief but inclusive review of the literature on Africanising higher education from the past 50 years, and contend that the prominent final ends suggested in it can be reduced to five major categories. Then, I spell out an intuitively attractive (...) African moral theory and apply it to these five final ends, arguing that three of them are appropriate but that two of them are not. After that, I maintain that the African moral theory prescribes two additional final ends for a public university that are not salient in the literature. Next, I argue that employing the African moral theory as I do enables one to rebut several criticisms of Africanising higher education that have recently been made from a liberal perspective. I conclude by posing questions suitable for future research. (shrink)

Gerdessen, H. Die einwirkung der willensbetätigung auf die eigenschaften der bezugsvorstellungen.--Ach, N., und Margaritzky, S. Über die sensorische einstellung beim heben von gewichten.--Kohlhagen, F. Über die gefügigkeitsqualität und ihre bedeutung für die kategorie.--Ach, N. Finale qualität (gefügigkeitsqualität) und objektion.

Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. (...) The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes. (shrink)

(Ak 10:74).[1] During the so-called ‘silent decade’ of the 1770s, when Kant was working on the Critique of Pure Reason, he promised repeatedly not only that he would soon finish that work but also that he would soon publish a “metaphysics of morals” (Ak 10:97, 132, 144).[2] Yet it was not until four years after the first Critique that Kant finally wrote a work on ethics, and even then he merely laid the ground for a metaphysics of morals by identifying (...) and establishing the supreme principle on which a system of duties would be based (G 4:392). Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant once again dealt entirely with foundational questions in moral philosophy. Kantian ethics is primarily known, especially among English-speaking philosophers, through these two ethical works of the 1780s, neither of which contains anything like a ‘metaphysics of morals’. (shrink)

Com base na crítica que Hume faz ao argumento do desígnio, especialmente nas partes 10 e 11 dos Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural, meu objetivo neste artigo é, a partir de uma análise da relação entre a existência do mal no mundo e a suposta existência de uma divindade possuidora dos atributos tradicionais do teísmo, defender a tese segundo a qual o tratamento que Hume dá ao problema do mal corresponde, digamos assim, à cartada final – o último e decisivo (...) recurso que Philo personagem que articula essa crítica) aciona para mostrar que o argumento do desígnio não fornece bases suficientemente sólidas e consistentes para dar suporte à crença na existência de um Deus maximamente poderoso, justo e benevolente; e que, portanto, a existência do mal no mundo tem uma força argumentativa tal que a improbabilidade da existência de Deus é maior do que com base nos argumentos apresentados nas partes 2 a 8 dos Diálogos. Isso significa que eu tomo aqui o problema do mal como o maior problema para o teísta experimental – cuja argumentação pretende provar a existência de Deus a partir da observação dos fenômenos do mundo. (shrink)

In a series of works, Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley and Robert van Rooij have proposed a nontransitive system (call it ‘_K__3__L__P_’) as a basis for a solution to the semantic paradoxes. I critically consider that proposal at three levels. At the level of the background logic, I present a conception of classical logic on which _K__3__L__P_ fails to vindicate classical logic not only in terms of structural principles, but also in terms of operational ones. At the level of (...) the theory of truth, I raise a cluster of philosophical difficulties for a _K__3__L__P_-based system of naive truth, all variously related to the fact that such a system proves things that would seem already by themselves repugnant, even in the absence of transitivity. At the level of the theory of validity, I consider an extension of the _K__3__L__P_-based system of naive validity that is supposed to certify that validity in that system does not fall short of naive validity, argue that such an extension is untenable in that its nontriviality depends on the inadmissibility of a certain irresistible instance of transitivity (whence the advertised “final cut”) and conclude on this basis that the _K__3__L__P_-based system of naive validity cannot coherently be adopted either. At all these levels, a crucial role is played by certain metaentailments and by the extra strength they afford over the corresponding entailments: on the one hand, such strength derives from considerations that would seem just as compelling in a general nontransitive framework, but, on the other hand, such strength wreaks havoc in the particular setting of _K__3__L__P_. (shrink)

Are we now in a position to give a "final accounting" of Freud's work? Before answering, I should say what this means, or rather what I mean. If we mean a verdict that is certain, in the sense that it could not possibly be overturned by new  ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:100 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY porary philosophers, mesmerized by neurology, does not even appear to exist: that our casual, mechanical view of nature, when extended beyond the workings of gears and pulleys and the collision of billiard balls to become a general conception of how things happen, is a metaphysical prejudice. In sum, this is a valuable addition to the thought of Wittgenstein, and an important work of philosophy in (...) its own right. A. R. LoucH ~laremon$ Graduate ~ehool Final Integration in the Adult Personality. By A. Reza Arasteh. (Leiden: E. J. BriU, 1965. Pp. 404.) This amazing work bears the subtitle ".4 Measure ]or Health, Social Change, and Leaderahip." But though many readers might consider such a design a formidable task, the book actually accomplishes infinitely more. It offers a completely novel approach to depth psy= chology and psychiatry, incorporating these disciplines into the broader context of an original monolithic philosophy of our time. It also shows a unique and quite unexpected way of how to overcome the "departmentalization of sciences" which has resulted in "fragmented theories of man." Thus it provides something many of us have been looking for rather desperately: a holistic psychology and philosophy, directed toward human life in its entirety and, by its own nature, encompassing a great healing force. Dr. A. Reza Arasteh has obtained this fortunate result by amalgamating Western concepts with oriental ideas and, therefore, for the first time has eliminated from our thinking another cleavage which threatened to invalidate our psycho-philosophical findings. For, in the jet and space age where there is actually one world, what use could a Western psychiatrist make of his psychodynamic training when called upon to treat a person from the Near or Far East with a completely different frame of reference based on an apparently distinct culture and tradition? Arasteh, an Iranian now with the George Washington University's Department of Psy= chiatry, has done something quite unusual for a Persian scholar and psychologist brought up in Islamic cultural tradition: he has devoted many years of thorough research to our Western neuropsychiatric, psychological and philosophical heritage and compared and confronted it with his home=grown Near-Eastern and Far-Eastern wisdom, doctrines, and scientific methods. This confrontation performed by a searcher who has delved equally deep into the basic sources of Western and Eastern culture has given Arasteh the golden opportunity to explore the weaknesses and strengths of both approaches to life and more: the insight that if both cultures were to adopt the positive findings of their seemingly opposite doctrines and drop their own negative ones, they could overcome the shortcomings barring the road to full in= tegration and personal maturity. In other words: a pooling of the best philosophical and psychological discoveries of the East and West would help to bring about a monolithic, yet diversified approach to the problems of life and man which was lost after the Middle Ages. It would help to overcome and use for his best the anxiety of modern man who is fumbling in uncertainties while desperately longing for meaningfulness. According to Arasteh, the West has reached the end of its tether because of an overemphasis on intellectual solutions and endeavors which even in their most brilliant forms fall short of any substantial activity of life. It is a fallacy to believe, as Freud and long before him Socrates did, that a purely intellectual understanding of problematic or even neurotic behavior will lead any man to overcome and eliminate these failures. The intellect never has the power to change a personality and bring about what the Iranian psychologist calls a total "rebirth." Oriental attitudes toward life, on the other hand, are too much focused on inner feelings and socio-psychological directedness, thereby neglecting the independent action of the intelhgent individual. Religion and family, in some countries even connected with ancestor worship, have been and sometimes still are at the foreground of oriental thought. BOOK REVIEWS 101 Yet, in the basic chapter of h/s work, titled, "Principles of Psyehocultural Analysis: A Technique for Developing Fully Integrated Individuals," Arasteh stresses a very important point all too frequently overlooked in our era of specialization: "Regardless of language, culture and temporal... (shrink)

Malformations concerning the ventral body wall constitute one of the leading categories of human birth defects and are present in about one out of every 2000 live births. Although the occurrence of these defects is relatively common, few detailed experimental studies exist on the development and closure of the ventral body wall in mouse and human. This field is further complicated by the array of theories on the pathogenesis of body wall defects and the likelihood that there is no single (...) cause for these abnormalities. In this review, we summarize what is known concerning the mechanisms of normal ventral body wall closure in humans and mice. We then outline the theories that have been proposed concerning human body wall closure abnormalities and examine the growing number of mouse mutations that impact normal ventral body wall closure. Finally, we speculate how studies in animal models such as mouse and Drosophila are beginning to provide a much‐needed mechanistic framework with which to identify and characterize the genes and tissues required for this vital aspect of human embryogenesis. BioEssays 26:1307–1321, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Summary According to the so-called Starnberger Group1, the amenability of a science to science policy measures, conceptualised by the Group in terms of finalization , depends crucially on conditions intrinsic to the science not invariably present at every stage of its development. Finalization is possible only at junctures where the science in question faces methodologically divergent alternative lines of development. The most significant kind of case depends on the presence of completed , or classical , theories.

Aristotle maintains that every man has, or should have, a single end, a target at which he aims. The doctrine is stated in E.N. I 2. ‘If, then, there is some end of the things we do which we desire for its own sake, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else, clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall (...) we not, like archers who have a mark to aim t, be more likely to hit upon what is right?’. Aristotle does not here prove, nor need we understand him as claiming to prove, that there is only one end which is desired for itself. He points out correctly that, if there are objects which are desired but not desired for themselves, there must be some object which is desired for itself. The passage further suggests that, if there were one such object and one only, this fact would be important and helpful for the conduct of life. (shrink)

Finality suggests an unchangeable conclusion. It also raises the idea of a goal towards which a reality is directed. This is the sense in which one finds the final cause in Aristotle and other philosophers. Nearly everyone feels helpless before finality. This is because it evokes the spectrum of finitude as it appears to occur in the dead. No one in the prime of life and at the peak of health, wealth, pleasure and hopeful optimism actively desires death. (...) Yet like a shadow, the awareness of a possible sudden end stalks at everyone. It is not the most comfortable feeling. This raises a situation where both the idea and the reality of death must be confronted in order to make sense of life. Has it meaning? Is it destined or free floating? How and when will life end or does it even have an absolute termination at all? Is death life’s last unassailable barrier or just a simple demarcation from other forms of conscious existence in some way? Though often never put into words, failure to engage these questions raises conundrum. Attempts to answer them form and inform cultures, nourish customs, create traditions, inspire inventions, and generally stimulate the human spirit. They keep religions alive, engage thinkers, inspire fidelity to cultural roots and symbols and fire up the spirit of research. It is the position of this paper that confronting human finality is at the service of valorizing human life further. It is like an unseen engine that keeps the vehicle alive. Thus, life approaches death while death serves life. It (death) forbids anyone at the level of the intellect, experience and knowledge from making any absolute positive claims regarding the termination of life. Confronting death psychologically, physically and spiritually requires specific perspectives since each man must face it inevitably in his person and each culture and religion must make sense of it in its own way. That is what this study examines. (shrink)