The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way

Philosophia 47 (3):681-692 (2019)
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Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes.



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Andrés G. Garcia
Lund University

Citations of this work

On neutral value and fitting indifference.Andrés G. Garcia - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy.
Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund University

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References found in this work

On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The domain of reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Value and the right kind of reason.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.
Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.

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