This chapter contains sections titled: What Can Be Fashionable? From Pugs to Poodle Skirts Do Masses Matter? Robinson Crusoe's Runway Do Experts Matter? Khaki Glory Do Intentions Matter? Accidental Chic Do Aesthetics Matter? Form Over Function Does Identity Matter? Tribal Colors Does Timing Matter? To Everything, There is a Season Conclusion: What Matters?

The nineteenth century compared her to Shakespeare; in our own time, she has been likened most often to Henry James. Both comparisons reflect a basic difficulty in reconciling subject matter with treatment, in squaring Jane Austen's restricted world - "3 or 4 Families in a Country Village" - with her profound impact upon our imaginations. Over the years her admirers have tried to resolve this paradox in various ways, none quite successful, but throughout all the changes in critical method (...) one thing has remained constant: the high level of admiration. As Edmund Wilson once remarked, in various revolutions of taste which have occurred during the last century and a half, "perhaps only two reputations have never been affected by the shifts of fashion: Shakespeare's and Jane Austen's. We still agree with Scott about Jane Austen, just as we agree with Ben Jonson about Shakespeare." Even in the half-century after Jane Austen's death, when her reputation was limited in comparison with those of the great Victorians, the praise of discriminating critics was remarkably consistent; and it seems safe to predict, as we begin to celebrate the two-hundredth anniversary of her birth, that this high estimate will remain unchallenged. The bicentennial year will produce the usual tributes, conferences, and collections of essays, but the call for "revaluation" which is usually a ritual part of such occasions will scarcely be heard. The question will not be one of placing Jane Austen in some hierarchy of value, but of trying once again to explain her accepted excellences. A. Walton Litz has written The Art of James Joyce, Jane Austen: A Study of Her Artistic Development, Introspective Voyager: The Poetic Development of Wallace Stevens, and numerous articles. He is professor of English at Princeton University. (shrink)

During a Barolo en primeur tasting session, a seasoned wine taster is assailed by a procedural unease which leads him to question the foundations on which his work rests. Sparked off by his reading of Michel Le Gris’ pamphlet Dionysos crucifié, the taster’s objections and perplexities are directed towards teasing out the rules and coordinates of a tasting aesthetic which has become tamed and domesticated, at the service of a narcissistic “tyranny of instant gratification”. Such an approach translates into wines (...) that are beaten into submission by interventionist winemakers, wines that derive from a tasting model that has been pre-emptively cleansed of tension or dissonance so as to exalt products that are easy, reassuring, docile to marketing logic, and increasingly similar. What sort of doubts, what interpretative friction can hope to reacquaint wine criticism with its true and original aims? What relations between the tongue that tastes and the tongue that speaks can respond to the needs of a new approach to wine appreciation, a ‘tasting different’? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rembrandt and LearningRalph A. Smith (bio)IntroductionIt appears to be a defining characteristic of Rembrandt’s works—as important as the brushstrokes, the underdrawing, the types of ground and the paints used—that they move people exceedingly. [T]hey help us feel something of what the artist may have felt about youth, old age, friendship, isolation, and love.—Anthony Bailey[For] Rembrandt, imperfections are the norm of humanity, which is why he will always speak across (...) centuries to those for whom art might be something other than the quest for ideal form.—Simon SchamaArt can arouse the senses, touch the feelings, and stir the passions. In exercising these formidable powers, the artist should respect certain limits of good taste and moral propriety. Rembrandt possessed unequal skill in depicting the passions in original ways without breaking the code. Well, hardly ever.—Gary SchwartzThe National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Rembrandt Project was designed to apply state-of-the-art digital technology to the development of the multiple competencies needed for understanding and appreciating [End Page 101] Rembrandt and his time. As educational consultant to the project, I was given the assignment of conceptualizing a framework that would accommodate and illuminate the project’s purposes. This meant that I not only had to refamiliarize myself with seventeenth-century Dutch art and culture and with the national and state standards for the visual arts but also acquaint myself with the standards for socials studies; both sets of standards occupy a prominent place in the project and are the subject of the third section of this article. The overarching viewpoint from which I approached my assignment, however, was that of the humanities, a topic to which I turn first. Furthermore, since the project’s foremost concern is with masterpieces of the visual arts, I thought it apposite to address briefly some issues in aesthetics, especially those that relate to experiencing artworks appropriately. Having surveyed the project from the perspectives mentioned, I then ask to what extent it was successful in avoiding the pitfalls that often frustrate the implementation of novel ideas and methods.1The HumanitiesThe following interpretation of the humanities is condensed from the writings of two distinguished philosophers, Albert William Levi and Walter Kaufmann, and the historian Paul Gagnon. Levi, an early member of the National Council for the Humanities and for most of his career a distinguished professor of the humanities at Washington University, was once asked to define the essence of the humanities. He replied that the purposes of the humanities are to encourage persons to “to think critically, to communicate successfully, and to walk proudly with [their] tradition.”2 Noteworthy in this terse statement is its emphasis on the procedural aspects of the humanities, that is, their effects on human actions and attitudes. Such emphasis accorded well with the tradition of the Middle Ages, which construed the humanities as skills of organizing and understanding human experience. Levi, however, also acknowledged the Renaissance conception of the humanities as subject matters, thereby paying tribute to the endeavors of Renaissance scholars who devoted themselves to recovering and transmitting the literary texts of antiquity. A strong believer in historical continuity, Levi synthesized the Medieval and Renaissance traditions by proposing that the humanities be understood as skills of communication, continuity, and criticism. These skills have their substantive grounding in languages and literatures, history, and philosophy, the latter conceived as critical reflection.3 After pondering Levi’s interpretation, I added another “c,” the arts of creation, to his troika. Thus, the humanities can be understood as indispensable to human experience because they are the arts of creation, communication, continuity, and criticism.Another view of the purposes of the humanities and their relevance to the project can be found in the writings of the historian Paul Gagnon. He [End Page 102] stressed the importance of preparing the young for citizenship, personal cultivation, and vocation within a curriculum committed to the values of equity and competence.4 Gagnon interpreted the study of history as providing critical checks on reality, imparting insights into the various ways in which persons have used historical knowledge to find their place in the flow of events, and... (shrink)

ABSTRACTNietzsche’s work is filled with references to taste. He frequently expresses his own judgements of taste and criticizes or praises individuals and groups on account of their taste. Some recent attempts to account for Nietzsche’s understanding of taste argue that Nietzsche understands affective response, when guided by good taste, as being appropriate to, or merited by, the intrinsic features of the object. This is in direct contrast to anti-realist accounts of Nietzsche’s taste, according to (...) which his evaluative judgements have no special epistemic status. In this article, I argue against objectivist or universalist readings of Nietzsche’s judgements of taste. However, in doing so I aim to show that affective responses do not thereby turn out to be arbitrary. Nietzsche suggests that by engaging with one’s affective responses, one can organizes them into a coherent and unified taste. This process of unification is central to Nietzsche’s understanding of value and self-creation. (shrink)

This article examines the primacy of real-world bodily experience for understanding the human mind. I defend the idea that the peculiarities of the living human brain and body, and the bodily experiences they sustain, are essential ingredients of human sense-making and conceptual systems. Conceptual systems are created, brought forth, understood and sustained, through very specific cognitive mechanisms ultimately grounded in bodily experience. They don't have a transcendental abstract logic independent of the species-specific bodily features. To defend this position, I focus (...) on a case study: the fundamental concept of time flow. Using tools of cognitive linguistics, I analyse the foundations of this concept, as it is manifested naturally in everyday language. I show that there is a precise conceptual metaphor whose inferential structure gives an account of a huge variety of linguistic expressions, semantic contents, and unconscious spontaneous gestures: Time Events Are Things In Space. I discuss various special cases of this conceptual metaphor. This mapping grounds its source domain in specific spatial bodily experiences and projects its inferential structure onto a target domain making inferences in that domain possible. This mechanism allows us to unconsciously, effortlessly, and precisely understand expressions such as ‘the year 2000 is approaching’ or ‘the days ahead of us’. The general form of the mapping seems to be universal. The analysis raises important issues which demand a deeper and richer understanding of cognition and the mind: a view that sees the mind as fully embodied. In order to avoid misunderstandings with a general notion of ‘embodiment’ which has become fashionable in contemporary cognitive science, I describe what I mean by ‘full embodiment’: an embodied-oriented approach that has an explicit commitment to all of cognition, not just to low-level aspects of cognition such as sensory-motor activity or locomotion . I take embodiment to be a living phenomenon in which the primacy of bodily grounded experience is inherently part of the very subject matter of the study of the mind. (shrink)

Driven by an impetus to standardize, numerous checklists have been devised to address quality in qualitative research, but these standards and the mindset driving them offer no language with which to speak about taste, or the aesthetic sensibilities that play such a key role in evaluating the goodness of any object. In this article, quality appraisal in qualitative research is considered in the context of taste, that is, in the discernment involved in judging the value of research and (...) in the recognition of the key role reviewer preferences, sensibilities and membership in one or more taste communities play in these judgements. The evaluation of a study is accomplished by evaluating one or more reports from that study, and such reports may be conceived as art forms amenable to the same criteria for appraisal as poems or paintings. Taste implies judgements about the quality of objects and a person's ability to sift through and select from a store of knowledge that knowledge appropriate to judge its value. What binds a community of practitioners (here reviewers of qualitative studies) together is taste‐making, or the constant refinements of judgements concerning what constitutes good and bad practice. (shrink)

In spite of its carefully planned - and fully justified - modesty, the title of this book might very well surprise more than one potential reader. It is not normal to see such controversial concepts as "Renaissance," "Renaissance Thought," "Spanish Renaissance," or even "Spanish Thought" freely linked together in the crowded intimacy of one single printed line. The author of these essays is painfully aware of the com plexity of the ground he has dared to cover. He is also aware (...) that all the assumptions and connotations associated with the title of this book have been the subject of great controversy among scholars of high repute who claimed (and probably had) revealing insight into human affairs and ideas. That these pages have been written at all therefore needs some justification. I am convinced that certain of the disputes among historians of ideas do not touch upon matters of substance, but rather reveal the taste and intellectual idiosyncracies of their authors. Much of the disagreement is, I think, a matter of aesthetics. Those who find special gratification in well-defined labels, clear-cut schemes, and compre hensive generalizations, can hardly bear the company of those who insist upon detail, complexity, and organic growth. The nightmarish dilemma, still unresolved, between Unity and Diversity, between the Universal and the Individual, haunts the History of Ideas. (shrink)

This study aimed to identify the learning and business incubation processes and their impact on developing the performance of business incubators in Gaza Strip, and the study relied on the descriptive analytical approach, and the study population consisted of all employees working in business incubators in Gaza Strip in addition to experts and consultants in incubators where their total number reached (62) individuals, and the researchers used the questionnaire as a main tool to collect data through the comprehensive survey method, (...) where (55) questionnaires were retrieved with a recovery rate of (88.7%). The results of the study showed that there is a high approval of the variables of the study, where the dimension of incubation operations came with a relative weight (84.89%), followed by the learning dimension which got a relative weight (82.50%), while the performance level of the incubators got a relative weight (80.12%) and as the study results showed There is a positive relationship statistically between the two dimensions of learning and business incubation processes and performance development in business incubators, and the linear regression analysis model showed that the main effect in improving the performance of business incubators is "after business incubation operations" while it showed weak effect after learning. The study came out with several recommendations, the most important of which is that business incubators seek to reinforce the learning process and incubation processes for business, and the need to periodically evaluate their performance, and that a more effective mechanism be designed to follow up with companies after the end of the incubation period and monitor the progress of these companies. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with what I believe is the epistemological mission of Kant’s doctrine of taste. The third Critique inherits two problems from the first. The evident one is that the categorial constitution of nature must be complemented with the notion of purposiveness. The less evident one is that the transcendental theory of experience needs a common sense in order to secure a common objectivity. The judgment of taste, conceived of by Kant as a ‘cognition in general’ (...) not restricted to either the particular subject or the particular object, offers a solution. It turns out to be a judgment that cannot be made without assuming the purposiveness of nature and the uniformity of the cognizing subjects. (shrink)

This article explores the links between habit, fashion and subjectification to extend analysis of the clothed body beyond the semiotic frames that have tended to dominate discussions of fashion across the social sciences and humanities. Our goal is to explain how fashion’s diverse materialities participate in the modulations of subjectivity, affecting bodies in diverse encounters between matter, signs and practices. We develop our analysis by way of Gilles Deleuze’s discussion of encounters, habit and memory. Our principal contention is that (...) fashion may usefully be theorised in terms of specific habits of coordination by which affects, memories, sensations and desires are transmitted between bodies in varied spatial, temporal, material and affective encounters. Following the work of John Protevi, we argue that such coordination expresses a distinctive mode of subjectification according to the specific encounters immanent to it. We ground this discussion in detailed analysis of the work of Melbourne artist Fiona Abicare. Abicare’s installation and performance-based practice invokes the affective and habitual aspects of fashion as each is instantiated in encounters between bodies. Abicare’s attention to the habits and memories of the clothed body alludes to the varied practices of subjectification by which diverse subjects of fashion emerge. (shrink)

In this essay I address the question, “What is the subject matter of phenomenological research?” I argue that in spite of the increasing popularity of phenomenology, the answers to this question have been brief and cursory. As a result, contemporary phenomenologists lack a clear framework within which to articulate the aims and results of their research, and cannot easily engage each other in constructive and critical discourse. Examining the literature on phenomenology’s identity, I show how the question of phenomenology’s (...) subject matter has been systematically neglected. It has been overshadowed by an unending concern with phenomenology’s methodological identity. However, an examination of recent contributions to this literature reveals that a concern with articulating phenomenology’s subject matter has gradually increased, although such articulations remain preliminary. In light of this, I delineate, define, and illustrate three layers of phenomenological research, which I term “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” While the delineation of these layers is drawn primarily from classical phenomenological texts, they are defined and illustrated through the use of more contemporary literature. Following the articulation of this subject matter, I briefly consider some of the debates—both foundational and applied—that can be facilitated by the adoption of this framework. (shrink)

Some modern thinkers have supposed that “cause” is an outworn notion, or at least that it is one of which modern science has no need. This is due mainly to the discovery that, while the scientist can give us general laws as to what in fact happens, he cannot help us to discern the reason for the laws or the inward nature of the forces on which they depend. He can tell us the “that” but not the “why”; he cannot (...) show us in a single case that the effect follows necessarily a priori from the nature of the cause, that any other effect than the one which actually takes place would be logically impossible. He has studied the law of gravitation, but this law does not enable him to see why material bodies should attract each other in this fashion; it is only a generalized statement of the fact that they do. He knows that certain substances, if absorbed by eating, will nourish and others destroy our tissues; but he cannot say why they should do so. He can no doubt analyse them further and discover that, for example, meat is nourishing because it contains a large proportion of nitrogenous matter, but he could not tell a priori whether this nitrogenous matter would be likely to nourish or to poison us. Only where mathematics can be applied do we see necessity in such a way that any alternative becomes inconceivable to us; but mathematics alone can never establish from a quantity present here and now what quantity there will be at a later time or in another part of space. Mathematics can show, e.g. , that, if there is 2 + 2 here and now, there must be 4 here and now, not that, if there is 2 + 2 here and now, there will be 4 in an hour's time or a mile away; and therefore it cannot be made the sole basis of any causal law whatever. (shrink)

Institutional review board delays may hinder the successful completion of federally funded research in the U.S. military. When this happens, time-sensitive, mission-relevant questions go unanswered. Research participants face unnecessary burdens and risks if delays squeeze recruitment timelines, resulting in inadequate sample sizes for definitive analyses. More broadly, military members are exposed to untested or undertested interventions, implemented by well-intentioned leaders who bypass the research process altogether. To illustrate, we offer two case examples. We posit that IRB delays often appear in (...) the service of managing institutional risk, rather than protecting research participants. Regulators may see more risk associated with moving quickly than risk related to delay, choosing to err on the side of bureaucracy. The authors of this article, all of whom are military-funded researchers, government stakeholders, and/or human subject protection experts, offer feasible recommendations to improv... (shrink)

Kant claims in the third Critique that one can make about wine the merely subjective judgment that it is agreeable but never the universally valid judgment that it is beautiful. This follows from his views that judgments of beauty can be made only about the formal (spatiotemporal) features of a representation and that aromas and flavors consist of formless sensory matter. However, I argue that Kant's theory permits judgments of beauty about wine because the experience displays a temporal (...) structure: the aromas and flavors evolve over the course of a tasting from the bouquet through the palate to the finish. An analogy with music, which Kant describes as 'a play of sensations in time', illuminates how wine qualifies as an object of pure judgments of taste: the 'structure' of a wine can be compared to harmonic structure, and its development throughout the taste can be compared to the unfolding of melody and harmonic progression. (shrink)

The problem of the subject area of ethics is, so to speak, one with a "double bottom," for beneath the discussion of its subject matter in the narrow sense is actually concealed a diversity of positions and notions on the part of the participants regarding various prospects for the development of that discipline, the relationship among its various aspects, ways of perfecting its methodology, and so forth. This is a response to the new demands made by practical life in (...) socialist society today. It is also a result of the internal logic of the development of ethical thought and, in a certain sense, of the forecasting of science. It is precisely in this framework that V. T. Efimov's article should mainly be considered. It attracts attention, at the right time and in a polemically acute fashion, to the most urgent "growth points" of ethical knowledge, those urgently requiring joint discussion and decision. Also well chosen, in its way, is the term morality studies, even in the capacity of a preliminary denotation of the entire basic sphere of practical, concrete "validation" of ethics as a philosophical discipline. This term reflects, in our opinion, important trends in the development over the past decade of those aspects of ethics and its methodology that were previously described either as "descriptive ethics," "the sociology of morals," or "the sociology of socialization," or as "ethology," "ethnology," and so forth. As we know, all those terms suffered from imprecision or ambiguity of meaning and did not take root in Soviet philosophical literature. (shrink)

_In the mainstream culture to identify oneself as a "feminist" has been a fashion. Feminism covers all issues degrading and depriving women of their due in society vis-à-vis male members and it has started a crusade against atrocities on women across the globe. It is therefore regarded as synonymous with a movement and revolution to defend and promote issues involving women. However, the concerns that feminism raises do seem alien to tribal inhabitants in the Koraput district of Orissa, because, unknowingly, (...) they are its champions. Its principles are ingrained in their very culture. They practice and follow feminism as a matter of habit that has come to them down the ages. They do not follow it out of fear, compassion, enlightenment, education or compulsion; it is a necessity that comes quite naturally to them. It has been spontaneous and indigenous._. (shrink)

Predicates of personal taste have attracted a great deal of attention from philosophers of language and linguists. In the intricate debates over PPT, arguably the most central consideration has been which analysis of PPT can best account for the possibility of faultless disagreement about matters of personal taste. I argue that two models of such disagreement—the relativist and absolutist models—are empirically inadequate. In their stead, I develop a model of faultless taste disagreement which represents it as involving (...) a novel incompatibility relation between preferences that I call type-noncotenability. This model is available to all parties in the ongoing debates about PPT, but it points up an advantage enjoyed by expressivist accounts of PPT. In closing, I consider four objections against the model that, while failing to fully undermine it, open up promising avenues of inquiry about the nature of disagreement. (shrink)

The entwined history of humans and elephants is fascinating but often sad. People have used elephants as beasts of burden and war machines, slaughtered them for their ivory, exterminated them as threats to people and ecosystems, turned them into objects of entertainment at circuses, employed them as both curiosities and conservation ambassadors in zoos, and deified and honored them in religious rites. How have such actions affected these pachyderms? What ethical and moral imperatives should humans follow to ensure that elephants (...) are treated with dignity and saved from extinction? In Elephants and Ethics, Christen Wemmer and Catherine A. Christen assemble an international cohort of experts to review the history of human-elephant relations, discuss current issues of vital concern to elephant welfare, and assess the prospects for the ethical coexistence of both species. Part I provides an overview of the vexatious human-elephant relationship, from the history of our interactions to understanding elephant intelligence and sense of self. It concludes with a discussion of the issues of stress, pain, and suffering as experienced by elephants in human care and the problems inherent in assessing these subjectively. The second part explores how humans use elephants as tools and entertainment. It reviews domestic uses in Asia, examines the history and roles of elephants in zoos and circuses, and discusses the methods and ethics of training and caring for captive elephants. In Part III the contributors examine the fragile and conflict-filled world of human-elephant interactions in the wild. Each chapter delves into a different angle of the "elephant problem" -- the all-too-human problem of our growing populations taking over space that was historically the domain of these pachyderms. The chapters explore attempts to tame and "train" elephants in populous areas, the struggle over balancing species preservation while maintaining biodiversity in protected areas, and the conundrums posed by hunting, tourism, and human-elephant competition on rural land. That the future health and survival of elephants is dependent on human actions is irrefutable. In addressing these issues from multiple perspectives, Elephants and Ethics promotes mutual understanding of the cultural, conservation, and economic difficulties at the root of the many troublesome human-elephant interactions and poses new questions about our responsibility toward these largest of land mammals. (shrink)

Baumard proposes that life history slowing in populations over time is the principal driver of innovation rates. We show that this is only true of micro-innovation rates, which reflect cognitive and economic specialization as an adaptation to high population density, and not macro-innovation rates, which relate more to a population's level of general intelligence.

According to an ordinary view, we distinguish, classify, and appreciate food and beverages according to their taste. However, scientists seem to disagree with this naive view. They maintain that we don't really perceive the lemony taste of a cake or the delicate smoky taste of a single-malt whiskey, because what we ascribe to taste is in reality mostly perceived by smell. As opposed to this scientific consensus regarding taste, I will defend a naive view of (...) taste and deny that olfaction is involved in what we naively call taste. Like the uninformed layman, I will maintain that when I eat a strawberry, what I really perceive is its taste, not its smell or flavor. (shrink)

Rudolf Pfeiffer believed that, as a young man, Callimachus wrote four books of Aetia. To these the poet added in his old age a Reply to his Critics , and a slightly revised version of his recent occasional elegy, the Lock of Berenice ; this revised Coma became the last poem in Aetia book 4, to be followed by an Epilogue which may mark a transition to the Iambi. Pfeiffer's theory generally held the field until the brilliant article of P. (...) J. Parsons, in ZPE 25 , 1–50. With the help of newly recovered papyrus fragments Parsons showed that a previously unplaced elegy celebrating a Nemean victory was connected to the story of Molorchus , who entertained Heracles before that hero killed the Nemean lion and instituted the Nemean Games; thus the poem belonged to Aetia book 3. Furthermore, various pieces of evidence converge to make it probable, if not wholly certain, that this substantial poem stood first in its book. So it appears that, at least in the final form of the Aetia, books 3–4 were framed by two poems honouring the wife of Ptolemy III Euergetes, namely Victoria Berenices and Coma Berenices. Soon afterwards a further important advance was made by E. Livrea , who perceived, on grounds of subject-matter as well as papyrology, that the poor man who sets a mousetrap in fr. 177 Pf. must be none other than Molorchus; note particularly the probable mention of Cleonae in fr. 177.37 Pf. = Supplementum Hellenisticum 259.37. Thus a new fragment of 38 lines accrued to the poem. These discoveries have some implications for the composition of the Aetia. Addition of a Coma Berenices to a pre-existent Aetia book 4 could be countenanced easily enough, but, as Parsons says , it would have required a much more radical, and therefore less plausible, revision for Callimachus to have added Victoria Berenices to a pre-existent Aetia book 3. Accordingly Parsons suggested that the original Aetia contained only books 1–2, united by the conversation with the Muses; then in his old age Callimachus compiled two more books, partly at least from poems already composed, and gave them a frame of two poems honouring Queen Berenice. Parsons' view has, I think, been widely accepted; Professor Lloyd-Jones wrote in SIFC 77 , 56 ‘No-one has yet argued against the simple modification of Pfeiffer's theory of the two editions of the Aetia which Mr. Parsons based on this discovery. The first edition comprised two books only.’. (shrink)

One of the few philosophers who comments on fashion, Kant claims in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View that fashion should be classified as vanity and foolishness. He writes ‘it is novelty that makes fashion popular, and to be inventive in all sorts of external forms, even if they often degenerate into something fantastic and somewhat hideous, belongs to the style of courtiers, especially ladies. Others then anxiously imitate these forms, and those in low social positions burden themselves (...) with them long after the courtiers have put them away. – So fashion is not, strictly speaking, a matter of taste (for it can be quite contrary to taste), but of mere vanity in giving oneself airs, and of rivalry in outdoing one another by it.’ (Anthropology, 2006, 7: 246) Kant’s condemnation of fashion depends on him associating fashion exclusively with mere novelty in production (as opposed to true originality) and imitation in fashion’s wearers. In this paper I distinguish fashion understood as invention for its own sake followed by slavish imitation with a true fashion, which like art, involves both taste and ‘genius’ as understood by Kant. Taste involves a judgement of a particular to be, for example, beautiful. This judgement must be one that we can communicate to others. Genius is in fashion that is original and provides a model to others. (See Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 5: 308) While notable designer fashion provides the most obvious examples, this way of looking at fashion does not preclude the possibility of this kind of genius developing outside or alongside the fashion industry. Furthermore, wearers of fashion have to exercise their sense of taste in choosing what to wear and how to wear it. This sense of taste appeals to others and requires an enlargement of our thought just as our taste in art does. Thus seen, fashion and interest in fashion has a potential for improvement of the self as other forms of taste arguably do. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Theory of Bioethics by David DeGrazia and Joseph MillumColin Hoy (bio) and Winston Chiong (bio)Review of David DeGrazia and Joseph Millum, A Theory of Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2021)David DeGrazia and Joseph Millum’s A Theory of Bioethics 2021 arrives at a curious time for an ambitious effort at systematic theory construction, seemingly out of step with bioethical fashion. At the same time, a prominent group of philosophical (...) bioethicists authored an article, possibly with a touch of defensiveness, to “make the case that philosophy and philosophers still have a very important and meaningful role to play in contemporary bioethics” (Blumenthal-Barby et al. 2021). Meanwhile, the annual meeting of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities included several expressions of impatience with the historical privileging of philosophy over more empirical, situated, and community-oriented approaches to moral problems in health.DeGrazia and Millum’s work itself reflects the current state of bioethics and how it has changed since the heyday of grand bioethical theory construction in the late twentieth century. To apply Parfit’s philosophical taxonomy (1984), the general frameworks promulgated by theorists like Veatch, Engelhardt, and Gert, as well as Beauchamp and Childress, were by necessity revisionary. These bioethical theories were whole-cloth alternatives to a conventional and paternalistic medical ethos that was already widely acknowledged as unsatisfactory. Today, however, bioethics is a mature and institutionalized field, with well-established practices and a corpus of accepted tenets (alongside matters of ongoing but generally demarcated controversy). A plausible and fruitful contemporary theory of bioethics must be largely descriptive, in Parfit’s sense, providing an intellectual framework that gives coherence and sense to existing practice, while at the same time clarifying matters of confusion.In contemporary bioethics, a central component of this practice is the application of the four principles of biomedical ethics—non-maleficence, beneficence, justice and autonomy—not merely as originally proposed by Beauchamp and Childress (2019), but in their refined form, following decades of exchange, critique, and revision. DeGrazia and Millum’s theory begins with two core values: well-being and respect for rights holders. [End Page 321] The bulk of the book then applies the method of reflective equilibrium to specify these two values in terms of the canonical four principles, here treated as “mid-level” constructs with readier application to specific cases than the two core values. Experienced bioethicists may have an uncanny sense of setting off from a new trailhead, and yet, eventually finding themselves still walking a familiar path. However, this way of introducing and explicating the four principles will likely be more accessible to a wider audience, including high-level undergraduates and graduate students not already versed in the revisions, refinements, and compromises embedded in Beauchamp and Childress’s discussions.Two other features recommend this book as a resource for trainees and interested non-experts seeking to deepen their understanding of bioethics. First, the clarity of its style and organizational approach provides a welcome orientation for non-specialists. The chapters are structured so that major contending perspectives are outlined before the authors develop arguments for their own positions in that context. Each chapter proceeds by considering applications of the broader theory, showing how it can illuminate potential candidate approaches or policies, as well as demonstrating how to use the tools of ethical analysis to evaluate these proposals in both ideal and non-ideal cases. This didactic approach to the relationship between conceptual argument and practice will be accessible to many who are initially unfamiliar with or intimidated by theory. Second the commendable decision to make the book electronically available and accessible also has the potential to broaden the reach of the work, and in particular, to engage parties in under-resourced settings, which have so often been overlooked in bioethical discourse.As noted above, while the authors’ approach is descriptive in Parfit’s sense, it is not necessarily conservative. In many places, the authors highlight how their theory includes elements or renders conclusions that are not broadly accepted, and following the method of reflective equilibrium, they advocate for these positions both in terms of broad principles and particular judgments about cases. This begins with their dual-value... (shrink)

Since the fourth century, B.C.E., the Oath of Hippocrates has been the starting point in analyzing the obligations of physicians to protect the privacy and confidentiality interests of their patients. The pertinent provision of the Oath reads as follows: “What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account must be spread abroad, I will keep to myself, holding such things shameful (...) to be spoken about.”This part of the Oath is subject to more than one interpretation, but its commonly accepted meaning provides the ethical foundation for the physician’s duty of confidentiality. The Oath expressly declares that a physician’s obligation of confidentiality applies beyond matters of medical care. At a time when there were no hospitals or physician offices, patients received medical care in their homes or in public places. Physicians treating patients in their homes could be expected to see and hear a wide range of activities that might be considered embarrassing, immoral, or even illegal. (shrink)

Arthur James Balfour was born at Whittinghame, East Lothian, on July 25, 1848. He was barely ten years old when his father died, and he succeeded to the estate. He entered Eton in 1862, and there met Lord Rosebery. In 1866 he went to Trinity College, Cambridge, where he studied philosophy under Henry Sidgwick. In 1869 he obtained a second-class in the Moral Sciences Tripos. In an autobiographical note, written long afterwards, Lord Balfour made the following reference to his (...) mental attitude as an undergraduate: “I went to Cambridge with a very small equipment of either philosophy or science, but a very keen desire to discover what I ought to think, and why . For the history of speculation I cared not a jot. Dead systems seemed to me of no more interest than abandoned fashions. My business was with the groundwork of living beliefs: in particular with the groundwork of that scientific knowledge whose recent developments had so profoundly moved the world.” Considering his attachment to the past in matters of Church and State, Lord Balfour's contempt for the history of philosophy seems to betray a curious limitation. Unfortunately for him, the history of philosophy was not an important feature in the Cambridge philosophical curriculum, and the defect avenged itself by marring his subsequent philosophy in various ways. No doubt Sidgwick did all he could to encourage and develop Balfour's critical powers. Cambridge philosophy, under the influence of Sidgwick, was critical rather than imaginative, just as Oxford philosophy, under the influence of Green, was imaginative rather than critical. (shrink)

Background and Objective: Understanding how trauma impacts the self-structure of individuals suffering from the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms is a complex matter and despite several attempts to explain the relationship between trauma and the “Self”, this issue still lacks clarity. Therefore, adopting a new theoretical perspective may help understand PTSD deeper and to shed light on the underlying psychophysiological mechanisms. Methods: In this study, we employed the “three-dimensional construct model of the experiential selfhood” where three major components of (...) selfhood (phenomenal first-person agency, embodiment, and reflection/narration) are related to three Operational Modules (OMs) of the self-referential brain network. These modules can be reliably estimated through operational synchrony analysis of the Electroencephalogram (EEG). Six individuals with PTSD symptoms and twenty-nine sex-, age- and demographic- (race, education, marital status) matched healthy controls underwent resting state EEG signal acquisition with the following estimation of the synchrony strength within every OM. Results: Our results indicate that subjects with PTSD symptoms had significantly stronger EEG operational synchrony within anterior and right posterior OMs as well as significantly weaker EEG operational synchrony within left posterior OM compared to healthy controls. Moreover, increased the functional integrity of the anterior OM was positively associated with hyperactivity symptoms, reduced synchrony of the left posterior OM was associated with greater avoidance, and increased right posterior OM integrity was positively correlated with intrusion and mood symptoms. Conclusion: The results are interpreted in light of the triad model of selfhood and its theoretical and clinical implications (including a new treatment approach) are discussed. (shrink)

: This article compares translation and commentary practices surrounding the texts associated with French feminism with those of contemporary French women philosophers more generally. Many of the latter, discussing the history of philosophy, ask questions such as "How do texts play against the means they supply themselves?" and "How are philosophical forces, and the institutions of commentary, countered, destabilized, deregulated?" Deutscher asks what institutional means are available to understand this work as innovative philosophy, and to what extent these projects can (...) usefully be analyzed as the gestures of women in philosophy. (shrink)

Originally published in Russian in 1981, this unique history of early Soviet philosophy is now available for the first time in English, translated by Frederick Choate.Yehoshua Yakhot (1919-2003) was a professor of philosophy in the Soviet Union until forced to emigrate to Israel in 1975. While in emigration, he finished writing the book begun in Moscow years before. Yakhot's book is essential reading for an understanding of the counter-revolutionary role of Stalinism and its devastating impact on every aspect of Soviet (...) thought. Rare among works dealing with this period, Yakhot presents an objective account of the theoretical role of the major figures in the early Soviet Union—including, most significantly, that of Leon Trotsky, co-leader with Lenin of the Russian Revolution of October 1917.The book describes the flourishing of philosophical discussion after the revolution and ensuing Civil War. By 1922, the major theoretical journal Under the Banner of Marxism had been founded at Trotsky's urging. The first two issues contained letters from Trotsky and Lenin that constituted the program of the journal. By the mid-1920s, two contending camps had formed in philosophy: the mechanists and dialecticians. The relatively free debate between them on many complex issues was followed by Stalin's intervention in December 1930. In a ferocious reaction against the theoretical foundations of the October Revolution, Stalin sent countless genuine Marxists to their deaths during the Great Terror of 1936-38. Prior to the opening of the archives in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Yakhot presents the largely unknown history of many of the Marxist philosophers victimized by Stalinism.The subjects covered in the book include: the subject matter of Marxist philosophy; the problem of contingency; the principle of partisanship in philosophy; Hegel and Marxist dialectics; Spinoza's place in the discussions of the 1920s and 1930s; the rejection of ideology by Marx and Engels; the influence of Bogdanov's ideas; the inevitable crisis of Soviet ideology; and continued attempts to conceal the crimes of Stalinism in the USSR.This new English edition contains photographs, biographical information, an index and two letters by Trotsky and Lenin. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aesthetics and Humean Aesthetic Norms in the Novels of Jane AustenEva M. Dadlez (bio)IntroductionThe eighteenth century, Paul Oskar Kristeller tells us, in addition to crystallizing what we now call the fine arts, is also marked by an increased lay interest both in the arts and in criticism.1 Amateurs as well as philosophers ventured critical commentary on the arts. Talk concerning taste or beauty or the sublime was so (...) much a part of general discourse that even novelists of that era incorporated such subjects in their work. Henry Fielding "was able to construct a novel on the true and false sublime in art," according to Samuel Monk, "and to draw an analogy between the sublime in art and the sublime in character."2 So we shouldn't find it surprising that perspectives on aesthetics are sometimes presented in the novels of Jane Austen.3 This subject matter ranges from descriptions of skill in the execution and sensitivity in the appreciation of particular arts to general observations about beauty and taste and what is requisite for the apprehension of the former and the possession of the latter.Consider the following catalog of arts and beauties. Mansfield Park, Sense and Sensibility, and Northanger Abbey contain many references to the beauties of nature, both cultivated and wild. Taste in music is a topic in Persuasion, Mansfield Park, Pride and Prejudice, and Lady Susan. A taste for poetry and literature is the lot of the heroines of Persuasion, Northanger Abbey, Mansfield Park, and Sense and Sensibility. Taste and talent for drawing is exhibited by characters in Sense and Sensibility, Emma, and Northanger Abbey. Both Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park contain discussions of the merits of effective reading, that is, reading well aloud. Mansfield Park even comments on [End Page 46] acting ability, albeit rather disapprovingly. More general reflections on taste and beauty, as well as their connection to morality, are equally typical.It is possible to venture several different arguments about the philosophical perspective into which such observations best fit. Kantian analyses have already been ventured in the literature. Anne Crippen Ruderman calls our attention to the Kantian flavor of the connection Austen draws between a sensitivity to natural beauty and one's moral disposition, for instance, and David Kaufman compares Austen to Kant, though primarily in regard to ethics.4 Nonetheless, in this article I will argue that the strongest correlations and correspondences are in fact between Austen's and Hume's positions on aesthetics. Evidence in support of a Kantian analysis will first be canvassed and later compared with claims in favor of a Humean alternative.I will establish that the positions on taste and beauty and delicacy that are explicitly stated in or can be inferred from Austen's novels fit a Humean model—and fit it with a fair degree of precision. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate a correspondence strong enough to serve as the staging area for the further speculations that constitute the second thesis of this article. A great deal has already been said by philosophers about the capacity of literature to elicit moral reactions from the reader. Fictions can present ethical endorsements and invite us to adopt ethical perspectives by making it true in the world of the work that some course of action is right or some character is laudable. They can do this not by telling us that an act is right or a person meritorious but by showing us the rightness of the action and the commendability of the individual—by asking us to imagine traits that call forth our own approval and commendation. I will contend that aesthetic norms can be treated in much the same way as moral norms. That is, I will claim that the fiction of Jane Austen, in addition to evidencing the conscription of a Humean aesthetic, so engages and educates us that we are led imaginatively to adopt certain aesthetic perspectives in the course of its contemplation: not just by being told what is aesthetically pleasing or commendable, but by being made to feel pleasure and to experience commendation; not just by being told what constitutes discriminating taste, but by being led... (shrink)

This article compares translation and commentary practices surrounding the texts associated with French feminism with those of contemporary French women philosophers more generally. Many of the latter, discussing the history of philosophy, ask questions such as “How do texts play against the means they supply themselves?” and “How are philosophical forces, and the institutions of commentary, countered, destabilized, deregulated?” Deutscher asks what institutional means are available to understand this work as innovative philosophy, and to what extent these projects can usefully (...) be analyzed as the gestures of women in philosophy. (shrink)

This article compares translation and commentary practices surrounding the texts associated with French feminism with those of contemporary French women philosophers more generally. Many of the latter, discussing the history of philosophy, ask questions such as "How do texts play against the means they supply themselves?" and "How are philosophical forces, and the institutions of commentary, countered, destabilized, deregulated?" Deutscher asks what institutional means are available to understand this work as innovative philosophy, and to what extent these projects can usefully (...) be analyzed as the gestures of women in philosophy. (shrink)

This article compares translation and commentary practices surrounding the texts associated with French feminism with those of contemporary French women philosophers more generally. Many of the latter, discussing the history of philosophy, ask questions such as “How do texts play against the means they supply themselves?” and “How are philosophical forces, and the institutions of commentary, countered, destabilized, deregulated?” Deutscher asks what institutional means are available to understand this work as innovative philosophy, and to what extent these projects can usefully (...) be analyzed as the gestures of women in philosophy. (shrink)

I propose that human experience of matter provides the source domain for the metaphor that motivates the grammatical category of aspect in Russian. This model is a version of the universal TIME IS SPACE metaphor, according to which SITUATIONS ARE MATERIAL ENTITIES, and, more specifically, PERFECTIVE IS A DISCRETE SOLID OBJECT versus IMPERFECTIVE IS A FLUID SUBSTANCE. The contrast of discrete solid objects with fluid substances reveals a rich array of over a dozen properties; the isomorphism observed between those (...) properties and the complex uses of aspect in Russian is compelling. This model presents a more finely articulated account of Russian aspect than feature analysis can achieve. Although some of these properties overlap significantly with the count versus mass distinction often associated with aspect, the properties provide more detail and ground the metaphor to concrete experience. Properties of matter can be divided into three groups: inherent properties such as edges, shape, and integrity (which correspond to inherent situation aspect); interactional properties such as juxtaposition, dynamism, and salience (which correspond to discourse phenomena of aspect); and human interactional properties such as graspability and impact (which correspond to pragmatic phenomena of aspect). The interactional and human interactional properties can be used to motivate subjective construal, whereas the inherent properties serve as default motivators. The model will be demonstrated in detail using Russian data, followed by a survey comparing Russian with the other Slavic languages, which will show that deviations consist of either non-implementation of a given property, or the implementation of an inherent (default) property in place of an interactional or human interactional property. This model will be contrasted with a brief discussion of a selection of non-Slavic languages. The specific metaphor in this model does not apply beyond Slavic, but perhaps it will encourage investigation into the source domain of aspect in other languages. There appears to be a correlation between the relatively heavy morphological investment Slavic languages make in nominal individuation and the individuation of situations presented in this metaphorical model. (shrink)

The explanation of change or movement has always been a central concern of philosophers. Some, like Aristotle, have taken the movement of living things as their paradigm, and tried to explain all movement or change in that way. Others, after the fashion of Descartes, concentrate on the movement of inanimate things and generalise explanations of this to encompass all movement or change. For Aristotle, things have a principle of growth, organisation and movement in their own right. The movement or change (...) of a natural thing is explained by its tendency to move in that way. The line he draws is not, as the line which we would perhaps like to draw is, between organic and inorganic things, but between these grouped together as subject to the same kind of explanation and, on the other hand, artificial things. A problem that results from this division is that while it might seem plausible to explain changes which occur in a baby when it grows into a man by saying that babies naturally tend to grow into men, and if they do not then something has interfered with their natural development, it seems odd to treat inorganic things in this way. Restricted to the contrast between the natural and the artificial, the explanation of stones falling when unsupported is clearly going to provide some difficulty. Although it is true that Aristotle does not think that because in the case of man the form with which matter is formed to make that substance is called a soul, that therefore any kind of form joined with matter to make a substance is called a soul, nevertheless the explanation of things which are a combination, a natural combination, of form and matter is the same for both man and other substances. Confronted with the explanation of falling bodies in this way, it first of all seems implausible and then suggests that things should happen which in fact do not. If it is assumed that the principle of movement is in the stone, ought it not to be assumed that the principle of stopping is in it too? Babies grow into men because it is in their nature to do so perhaps, but that stones fall downwards because it is in their nature to do so has, as Molière noticed in the case of a similar explanation of why opium puts you to sleep, a hollow ring. (shrink)

The explanation of change or movement has always been a central concern of philosophers. Some, like Aristotle, have taken the movement of living things as their paradigm, and tried to explain all movement or change in that way. Others, after the fashion of Descartes, concentrate on the movement of inanimate things and generalise explanations of this to encompass all movement or change. For Aristotle, things have a principle of growth, organisation and movement in their own right. The movement or change (...) of a natural thing is explained by its tendency to move in that way. The line he draws is not, as the line which we would perhaps like to draw is, between organic and inorganic things, but between these grouped together as subject to the same kind of explanation and, on the other hand, artificial things. A problem that results from this division is that while it might seem plausible to explain changes which occur in a baby when it grows into a man by saying that babies naturally tend to grow into men, and if they do not then something has interfered with their natural development, it seems odd to treat inorganic things in this way. Restricted to the contrast between the natural and the artificial, the explanation of stones falling when unsupported is clearly going to provide some difficulty. Although it is true that Aristotle does not think that because in the case of man the form with which matter is formed to make that substance is called a soul, that therefore any kind of form joined with matter to make a substance is called a soul, nevertheless the explanation of things which are a combination, a natural combination, of form and matter is the same for both man and other substances. Confronted with the explanation of falling bodies in this way, it first of all seems implausible and then suggests that things should happen which in fact do not. If it is assumed that the principle of movement is in the stone, ought it not to be assumed that the principle of stopping is in it too? Babies grow into men because it is in their nature to do so perhaps, but that stones fall downwards because it is in their nature to do so has, as Molière noticed in the case of a similar explanation of why opium puts you to sleep, a hollow ring. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Princess and the Philosopher: Letters of Elisabeth of the Palatine to Rene DescartesRichard A. WatsonAndrea Nye. The Princess and the Philosopher: Letters of Elisabeth of the Palatine to Rene Descartes. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. Pp. xiii + 187. Cloth, $57.95. Paper, $18.95.Princess Elisabeth was an acute, persistent critic of Descartes's philosophy. Because he liked her and she was a princess, Descartes did not dismiss her (...) criticisms as he did those of Gassendi and Hobbes. How can an immaterial mind interact with a material body? How can God determine all our actions and yet give us free will? Elisabeth was dissatisfied with Descartes's answer that an all-powerful God can do anything even if we cannot understand how.Andrea Nye analyzes the correspondence between Elisabeth and Descartes to support the thesis that Elisabeth developed and defended a worldly philosophy of life in opposition to the unworldly rules Descartes offered for living a tranquil and happy life. Descartes said she should focus on the separation of the mind from the body to avoid disturbing the intellect with sensory matters. Think positively about such nice things as birds and flowers and not of bad things that happen to one. Descartes told Elisabeth that "there are no events so dreadful, nor so absolutely bad in the judgments of people, that a person of spirit cannot look on them with a bias that makes them appear favorable" (48). If we do our best to find out the right course of action and act accordingly, then even if the results are bad, we have no reason for remorse or recrimination, but can be happy that we have done the best we can. Descartes even says that a person who follows his rules can view everything that happens to him, even the worst, as though these events were taking place in a theatre, for in the end they do not impinge upon the ultimate happiness of one's immortal soul.Elisabeth, earnestly. sardonically, and sometimes with annoyance responds that this is perhaps possible for a single man of independent means with few civil and personal relationships, but for someone engaged in family affairs, royal politics, and social interaction with other human beings, Descartes's philosophy of life is both impossible and wrong. One never knows what is best; even if one did know, it is difficult to carry it out; and finally, if the results are bad, then one is after all responsible. One would be inhuman to deny fault, monstrous to deny moral responsibility. Above all, Elisabeth says, one should not view one's own life as theatre. One must be responsible for oneself and others.Nye casts this as a difference between Descartes's abstract and Elisabeth's particularist approaches to life, but also as a contrast between those who can live a disengaged life and those who cannot. Some of the amusement in Nye's perceptive discussions comes from her showing how Descartes's passions often run away with him, and how Elisabeth gently turns his own rules back onto him. [End Page 277]Nye's analyses of the correspondence are excellent, but she makes some mistakes about the lives of Descartes and Elisabeth. Nye explains Descartes's coolness by his having suffered from a "motherless infancy" (129), even speaking of "the mother's milk denied him as a child" and calling him an "orphan" (156), which he was not. His mother died thirteen months after his birth, but he had a wet nurse. Descartes may never have tasted his own mother's milk, but he was never deprived of nursing. Children were often sent to live with wet nurses for as long as four years, although Descartes is traditionally said to have been raised by his grandmother. In any event, such psychoanalyzing is off the mark.Nye also says that Descartes was asked by Queen Christina to write a ballet. She cites the wrong ballet and attributes a verse from the right ballet incorrectly, but beyond that, there is no evidence either that Descartes wrote verses for a ballet or that Christina asked him to.Then Nye speaks of Descartes's daughter Francine... (shrink)

Privacy is something we all want. We seek privacy to prevent others from securing information about us that is immediately embarrassing, and so causes us pain but not material loss. We also value privacy for strategic reasons in order to prevent others from imposing material and perhaps psychic costs upon us. I use the expression “securing information” so that it covers everything from the immediate sensory data that a voyeur acquires to the financial data a rival may acquire about our (...) businesses. In the degenerate case of the Peeping Tom's invasion of our privacy, suffering is caused just by the voyeur's having acquired the information, even if nothing is ever done with it beyond the voyeur's recalling it from time to time. In all other cases, privacy prevents others from imposing costs or harms on us in ways that require that they secure information about us. (shrink)

: According to a consensus of psycho-physiological and philosophical theories, color sensations (or qualia) are generated in a cerebral "space" fed from photon-photoreceptor interaction (producing "metamers") in the retina of the eye. The resulting "space" has three dimensions: hue (or chroma), saturation (or "purity"), and brightness (lightness, value or intensity) and (in some versions) is further structured by primitive or landmark "colors"—usually four, or six (when white and black are added to red, yellow, green and blue). It has also been (...) proposed that there are eleven semantic universals—labeling the previous six plus the "intermediaries" of orange, pink, brown, purple, and gray. There are many versions of this consensus, but they all aim to provide ontological, epistemological and semantic blueprints for the brute fact of the reality of color ordained by Nature (evolution). In contrast to this consensus, we have argued that "seeing color" is not a matter of light waves impacting on our eyes, producing sensations to be categorized and labeled in the "color space" in the brain. While electrochemical events may unproblematically be regarded as the causal precondition for seeing color, the reception of sensations in "the color space" as semantically labeled natural categories, kinds, or information, is a "just so" story: it is Wittgenstein's beetle in a box. In contrast we consider that the authority of this consensus might better be regarded not as the result of the truth-tracking of nature, but as the sociohistorical outcome of philosophical presuppositions, scientific theories, experimental practices, technological apparatus, and their feed forward into the lifeworld. The question we shall therefore explore is whether, or to what extent, we ourselves are changed, as the conditions of production of color science change. Thus we are doing a kind of anthropology at two levels: of color science itself (and its effect on our own lifeworld), and of those studied by the "anthropology of color". As befits this stance we are agnostic about the theoretical entities of color science (cf. van Fraassen 2001), and within this new context, we propose to cross-cut object-and-subject, organism-and-environment (the bedrock of color science) in socio-historical ways. Our approach is in part inspired by, but not the same as, that of Gibson, in that we wish to pursue the notion of "social affordances" (Burmudez 1995). We suggest that color has become a naturalization through science-based technologies, which, through praxes and materializations, have become the perceptual and cultural entities that structure experience and understanding in the lifeworld. It is this naturalization that we shall refer to and characterize as "the historically inflected exosomatic organ". Consequently we shall explore the historical ontology of "color" without assuming an underlying biological constant (Dupré 2001). In part 1 we show the flimsiness of the evidence for the three dimensions of color, borrowed from physics, and fine-tuned to a "standard observer" (a "spectral creature" with a phenomenal "color space"). In part 2 we address the structuring of hue through the development of color circles and color spaces. This is followed by a review of the evidence for unique hues. Again the evidence is shown to be flimsy. We then show that an isolated domain of color is a particular kind of model, not a "natural given". In part 3, after reviewing what is referred to as "the isomorphy thesis," we discuss the exemplary case study of Berlin and Kay (1969). This illustrates the pull of stadial models presupposed by their evolutionary theory of color language. The Berlin and Kay paradigm proposes that American English color terms are incorrigible and can provide the universal metalanguage. We conclude by presenting an alternative account, namely that we ourselves are changed as the conditions of production of color science change. We argue that it is better to regard "seeing-color" as a historically inflected exosomatic organ that provides social affordances for those trained to grasp them. (shrink)

The topic of homonymy, especially the variety of homonymy that has gone under the title, “focal meaning,” is of fundamental importance to large portions of Aristotle’s work-not to mention its central place in the ongoing controversies between Aristotle and Plato. It is quite astonishing, therefore, that the topic should have gone so long without a book-length treatment. And it is all the more gratifying that the new book on homonymy by Christopher Shields should be so comprehensive, and of such uniformly (...) high quality.’ Everyone who cares about Aristotle will be in his debt. Shields’s book falls into two parts. In the first, he is concerned to lay out the basic structure of Aristotle’s views about homonymy; in the second part, we are led through the various applications of the idea, to the analysis of friendship, for example, the homonymy of the body, the account of goodness and, not least, the homonymy of being. Shields’s book brings out well how the topic of homonymy weaves in and out of the fabric of Aristotle’s thinking in a variety of areas. I will resist the temptation to follow Shields through these various subject-matters, and instead take up essentially two topics. First, (I), the basic outline of Aristotle’s notion of homonymy, more or less independently of its different applications (here, I follow Shields’s example in the first half of his book). Thereafter, I discuss a single application: the homonymy of being (this is the subject of Shields’s last and longest chapter). Here, I will be interested (II) in how homonymy relates to the theory of the categories; and (III) in the application of homonymy to the analysis of substance in the Metaphysics. (shrink)

Following up on a 1989 paper on the subject, this essay revisits the question of ethical expertise in the court room. Informed by recent developments in the use of ethics experts, the authors argue 1) that the adversarial nature of court proceedings challenges the integrity of the ethicist's pedagogical role; 2) that the use of ethics experts as normative authorities remains dubious; 3) that clarification of the State's interest in “protecting the ethical integrity of the medical profession” is urgently (...) required; and 4) that the expertise of the ethicist may be more appropriately used in advising the legislature than in influencing the court. (shrink)

Despite recognition of the importance of family in health‐care and progress in family theory development, there has been limited transfer of family theory to acute care nursing practice. We argue that this family theory–practice gap results from a persistent lack of conceptual clarity in family nursing and other barriers. Lack of conceptual clarity takes the form of conceptual overlap and semantic inconsistency, as well as the complexity of language found in the family nursing literature. Barriers include practice contexts, relational problems, (...) and knowledge types. Our exploration begins with a brief discussion of the intimate link between nursing theory and practice followed by an overview of some issues associated with the family nursing theory–practice gap. Based on a synthesis of family nursing literature, problems associated with conceptual clarity in family nursing theory are explored. We conclude with recommendations for family nursing research to develop concepts grounded in nursing practice. (shrink)

A structural analogy is pointed out between a check hermeneutically developed phenomenological description, based on Husserl, of the process of perceptual cognition on the one hand and quantum mechanical measurement on the other hand. In Husserl's analytic phase of the cognition process, the 'intentionality-structure' of the subject/object union prior to predication of a local object is an entangled symmetry-making state, and this entanglement is broken in the synthetic phase when the particular local object is constituted under the influence of an (...) iota ('inner horizon') and the 'facticity' of the local world ('outer horizon'). Replacing 'perceptual cognition' by 'measurement' and 'subject' by 'expert subject using a measuring device' the analogy of a formal quantum structure is extended to the conscious structure of all empirical cognition. This is laid out in three theses: about perception, about classical measurement, and about quantum measurement. The results point to the need for research into the quantum structure of the physical embodiment of human cognition. (shrink)

Fascism has traditionally been characterized as irrational and anti-intellectual, finding expression exclusively as a cluster of myths, emotions, instincts, and hatreds. This intellectual history of Italian Fascism--the product of four decades of work by one of the leading experts on the subject in the English-speaking world--provides an alternative account. A. James Gregor argues that Italian Fascism may have been a flawed system of belief, but it was neither more nor less irrational than other revolutionary ideologies of the twentieth century. Gregor (...) makes this case by presenting for the first time a chronological account of the major intellectual figures of Italian Fascism, tracing how the movement's ideas evolved in response to social and political developments inside and outside of Italy.Gregor follows Fascist thought from its beginnings in socialist ideology about the time of the First World War--when Mussolini himself was a leader of revolutionary socialism--through its evolution into a separate body of thought and to its destruction in the Second World War. Along the way, Gregor offers extended accounts of some of Italian Fascism's major thinkers, including Sergio Panunzio and Ugo Spirito, Alfredo Rocco, and Julius Evola, a bizarre and sinister figure who has inspired much contemporary "neofascism."Gregor's account reveals the flaws and tensions that dogged Fascist thought from the beginning, but shows that if we want to come to grips with one of the most important political movements of the twentieth century, we nevertheless need to understand that Fascism had serious intellectual as well as visceral roots. (shrink)

1. 1. PROGRAM It will be our aim to reconstruct, with precision, certain views which have been traditionally associated with nominalism and to investigate problems arising from these views in the construction of interpreted formal systems. Several such systems are developed in accordance with the demand that the sentences of a system which is acceptable to a nominalist must not imply the existence of any entities other than individuals. Emphasis will be placed on the constructionist method of philosophical analysis. To (...) follow this method is to introduce the central notions of the subject-matter to be investigated into a system governed by exact rules. For example, the constructionist method of investigating the properties of geometric figures may consist in formulating a system of postulates and definitions which, together with the apparatus of formal logic, generates all necessary truths concerning geometric figures. Similarly, a constructionist analysis of the notion of an individual may take the form of an axiomatic theory whose provable assertions are just those which seem essential to the role played by the concept of an individual in system atic contexts. Such axiomatic theories gain in interest if they are supple mented by precise semantical rules specifying the denotation of all terms and the truth conditions of all sentences of the theory. (shrink)

Despite hundreds of definitions, no consensus exists on a definition of life or on the closely related and problematic definitions of the organism and death. These problems retard practical and theoretical development in, for example, exobiology, artificial life, biology and evolution. This paper suggests improving this situation by basing definitions on a theory of a generalized particle hierarchy. This theory uses the common denominator of the “operator” for a unified ranking of both particles and organisms, from elementary particles to animals (...) with brains. Accordingly, this ranking is called “the operator hierarchy”. This hierarchy allows life to be defined as: matter with the configuration of an operator, and that possesses a complexity equal to, or even higher than the cellular operator. Living is then synonymous with the dynamics of such operators and the word organism refers to a select group of operators that fit the definition of life. The minimum condition defining an organism is its existence as an operator, construction thus being more essential than metabolism, growth or reproduction. In the operator hierarchy, every organism is associated with a specific closure, for example, the nucleus in eukaryotes. This allows death to be defined as: the state in which an organism has lost its closure following irreversible deterioration of its organization. The generality of the operator hierarchy also offers a context to discuss “life as we do not know it”. The paper ends with testing the definition’s practical value with a range of examples. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Utility and Morality: Adam Smith's Critique of Hume Marie A. Martin Reading Smith's Theory ofMoral Sentiments one cannot help but note that, in spite ofthe obvious similarities between Smith and Hume and the equally obvious borrowings and adaptions Smith makesofportions of Hume's theory, the two differ substantially on the role of utility in morality. The difference is, in fact, practically diametrical opposition. Hume believed that utility was the "foundation (...) of the chief part of morals." Smith, on the other hand, believed that, while utility may contribute an additional beauty to virtue, it is never the source oftheir virtue and rarely the source of moral approbation. Given their agreement in so many other respects, why the difference regarding utility? To answer this question I shall examine both Smith's specific criticisms ofHume regarding the role ofutility in morals and his more general objections to any theory that makes an appeal to utility a foundation ofmoral approval. I shall show that, while Smith does raise anumber ofgenuine difficulties for Hume's theory, he does not succeed in his most serious criticism, that is, that Hume's theory does not adequately capture the essentially social nature ofmorality. Hume's View ofthe Role ofUtility AccordingtoHume, the sentimentofmoral approbation arisesfrom the perception ofqualities ofcharacter or mind which are either useful or agreeable to ourselves or others. Examples of qualities agreeable to ourselves include cheerfulness, confidence, self-respect, and taste. Examples of qualities agreeable to others include manners, wit, eloquence, andmodesty. But themajorityofourmoral sentiments arise from the perception of the usefulness of qualities, that is, "from reflexions on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particularpersons."2 Utility or usefulness is nothing but a tendency to a certain end. But, Hume claims, "itis acontradictioninterms, thatany thingpleases as means to an end, where the end itself no wise affects us" (E 219). Thus, ifwe approve ofthose qualities thathave a tendency to promote the happiness or well-being of either the possessor or others, it must be eitherbecause we value theirhappinessin itselforbecause we value it as a means to our own interests. Volume XVI Number 2 107 MARIE A. MARTIN Hume rejects the second alternative as contrary to experienced fact. The "selfish systems" which attempt to reduce all moral approbation to self-interest cannot account for our praise and admiration ofthe courage and fortitude ofour enemies even when their consequences thwart our own interests. Neither can such systems account for the fact that "[w]e frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed in very distant ages and remote countries; where the utmost subtilty ofimagination would not discover any appearance ofself-interest" (E 215-16). If it is not self-interest that leads us to approve useful qualities, thenitis clear that"[w]e must adopt amore public affection, and allow, that the interests ofsocietyare not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to us" (E 219). We approve of qualities that promote the well-being of others because we have a natural concern for their welfare. In general, it is certain, that, wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converse about, every thing still presents us with the view of human happiness or misery, and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness. (E 221) Thus, our approval of useful qualities rests on their tendency to promote the happiness of those who possess or are affected by them, and this, in turn, rests on sympathy, the communication of passions, whereby we "feel" for others—happiness for theirjoys, sorrow for their miseries. So, althoughtheutilityofqualitiesofcharacteris notthe solecause ofour approbation, it is the most extensive and important one. It appears tobe matter offact, that the circumstance oíutility, in all subjects, is a source ofpraise and approbation: That it is constantly appealed to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit ofactions: That it is the sole source ofthat high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, allegiance, and chastity: That it is inseparable from all the other social virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation: And, in a word, that it is the foundation ofthe chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and our fellow-creatures. (E... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Utility and Morality: Adam Smith's Critique of Hume Marie A. Martin Reading Smith's Theory ofMoral Sentiments one cannot help but note that, in spite ofthe obvious similarities between Smith and Hume and the equally obvious borrowings and adaptions Smith makesofportions of Hume's theory, the two differ substantially on the role of utility in morality. The difference is, in fact, practically diametrical opposition. Hume believed that utility was the "foundation (...) of the chief part of morals." Smith, on the other hand, believed that, while utility may contribute an additional beauty to virtue, it is never the source oftheir virtue and rarely the source of moral approbation. Given their agreement in so many other respects, why the difference regarding utility? To answer this question I shall examine both Smith's specific criticisms ofHume regarding the role ofutility in morals and his more general objections to any theory that makes an appeal to utility a foundation ofmoral approval. I shall show that, while Smith does raise anumber ofgenuine difficulties for Hume's theory, he does not succeed in his most serious criticism, that is, that Hume's theory does not adequately capture the essentially social nature ofmorality. Hume's View ofthe Role ofUtility AccordingtoHume, the sentimentofmoral approbation arisesfrom the perception ofqualities ofcharacter or mind which are either useful or agreeable to ourselves or others. Examples of qualities agreeable to ourselves include cheerfulness, confidence, self-respect, and taste. Examples of qualities agreeable to others include manners, wit, eloquence, andmodesty. But themajorityofourmoral sentiments arise from the perception of the usefulness of qualities, that is, "from reflexions on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particularpersons."2 Utility or usefulness is nothing but a tendency to a certain end. But, Hume claims, "itis acontradictioninterms, thatany thingpleases as means to an end, where the end itself no wise affects us" (E 219). Thus, ifwe approve ofthose qualities thathave a tendency to promote the happiness or well-being of either the possessor or others, it must be eitherbecause we value theirhappinessin itselforbecause we value it as a means to our own interests. Volume XVI Number 2 107 MARIE A. MARTIN Hume rejects the second alternative as contrary to experienced fact. The "selfish systems" which attempt to reduce all moral approbation to self-interest cannot account for our praise and admiration ofthe courage and fortitude ofour enemies even when their consequences thwart our own interests. Neither can such systems account for the fact that "[w]e frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed in very distant ages and remote countries; where the utmost subtilty ofimagination would not discover any appearance ofself-interest" (E 215-16). If it is not self-interest that leads us to approve useful qualities, thenitis clear that"[w]e must adopt amore public affection, and allow, that the interests ofsocietyare not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to us" (E 219). We approve of qualities that promote the well-being of others because we have a natural concern for their welfare. In general, it is certain, that, wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converse about, every thing still presents us with the view of human happiness or misery, and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness. (E 221) Thus, our approval of useful qualities rests on their tendency to promote the happiness of those who possess or are affected by them, and this, in turn, rests on sympathy, the communication of passions, whereby we "feel" for others—happiness for theirjoys, sorrow for their miseries. So, althoughtheutilityofqualitiesofcharacteris notthe solecause ofour approbation, it is the most extensive and important one. It appears tobe matter offact, that the circumstance oíutility, in all subjects, is a source ofpraise and approbation: That it is constantly appealed to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit ofactions: That it is the sole source ofthat high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, allegiance, and chastity: That it is inseparable from all the other social virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation: And, in a word, that it is the foundation ofthe chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and our fellow-creatures. (E... (shrink)

An argument map visually represents the structure of an argument, outlining its informal logical connections and informing judgments as to its worthiness. Argument mapping can be augmented with dedicated software that aids the mapping process. Empirical evidence suggests that semester‐length subjects using argument mapping along with dedicated software can produce remarkable increases in students’ critical thinking abilities. Introducing such specialised subjects, however, is often practically and politically difficult. This study ascertains student perceptions of the use of argument mapping in two (...) large, regular, semester‐length classes in a Business and Economics Faculty at the University of Melbourne. Unlike the semester‐length expert‐led trials in prior research, in our study only one expert‐led session was conducted at the beginning of the semester and followed by class practice. Survey results conducted at the end of the semester, show that, with reservations, even this minimalist, ‘one‐shot inoculation’ of argument mapping is effective in terms of students’ perceptions of improvements in their critical thinking skills. (shrink)