Husserl: Phenomenological Method

The following article aims to answer the question: “How do we experience weather and qi?” Answering this question addresses two problems: Both the phenomena of weather and qi elude classic phenomenological paradigms such as thing-perception and Dasein, brought forth by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, respectively. If phenomenology is concerned with giving an account of experience starting with the “things themselves,” weather and qi necessitate a different phenomenological paradigm, which comprehensively accounts for the experience of both. This article demonstrates that (...) inconspicuousness, as it has been recently phenomenologically accounted for by Günter Figal, is such a new paradigm. Philosophy done across different languages and cultures is often faced with the problem of untranslatability. This article further demonstrates, following Hisayama Yuho’s work, how phenomenology can present a ground for such philosophy: Instead of discussing qi through its mistranslations into English, I approach the phenomenon by discussing the similarity of phenomenological accounts of qi from Japanese philosophy with my own account of the phenomenology of weather. Both phenomenological accounts mutually elucidate each other. A phenomenological analysis of weather and qi thus both illustrates a largely unthematized facet of human experience in phenomenology, namely, the immersion in media of perception and experience, and demonstrates the philosophical productivity of intercultural philosophy. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag möchte ich die Auswirkungen untersuchen, die die phänomenologische Reflexion und die Erlangung phänomenologischer Einsichten auf denjenigen haben, der Phänomenologie treibt. Husserl selbst gibt den Impetus für diese Untersuchung, indem er (wie in einer der Textpassagen, die diesem Artikel als Motto vorangestellt sind) behauptet, dass die phänomenologische Reflexion einen derart langanhaltenden Effekt auf denjenigen hat, der phänomenologisch reflektiert, dass eine Rückkehr zum bisher gelebten Leben unmöglich wird. Dieser Punkt der Umkehr – besser gesagt, der Punkt, an dem keine (...) Rückkehr mehr möglich ist –, wie Husserl wiederholt in einer Sammlung von Forschungsmanuskripten aus dem Herbst 1926 betont, die in Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion erschienen sind, ist der Punkt, an dem man transzendentaler Idealist wird. Warum und in welchem Sinn wird es dem transzendentalen Idealisten unmöglich, einfach zu dem Leben zurückzukehren, wie er es vor der phänomenologischen Reflexion geführt hat? Allgemeiner gefragt, wie kann eine philosophische Einsicht das Leben ändern, das dieser Einsicht vorherging und zu ihr hinführte? Und, schließlich – auch, wenn Husserl selbst diese Frage nicht explizit stellte – auf welche Weise kann die Aussicht auf eine solche Veränderung oder die Veränderung selbst das Leben des Phänomenologen als ein lebenswertes Leben erscheinen lassen? In einem Versuch, Antworten auf diese Fragen zu finden, skizziere ich einige Aspekte des Vorgangs der phänomenologischen Reflexion und der verschiedenen Arten der Veränderung, die von der phänomenologischen Reflexion für das Leben des Reflektierenden ausgehen können. Ich beginne hier mit einer Beschreibung der besonderen reflektierenden Haltung, die sich durch die Methode der transzendental-phänomenologischen Epoché und die Reduktion einstellt. Dann diskutiere ich die verschiedenen Möglichkeiten, wie wir von etwas wie einem Habitus des Phänomenologen sprechen können. Schließlich erläutere ich, warum für Husserl eine unveränderte Rückkehr zur natürlichen Einstellung nicht länger möglich ist, wenn phänomenologische Reflexion zu transzendentalem Idealismus führt. (shrink)

In this essay I address the question, “What is the subject matter of phenomenological research?” I argue that in spite of the increasing popularity of phenomenology, the answers to this question have been brief and cursory. As a result, contemporary phenomenologists lack a clear framework within which to articulate the aims and results of their research, and cannot easily engage each other in constructive and critical discourse. Examining the literature on phenomenology’s identity, I show how the question of phenomenology’s subject (...) matter has been systematically neglected. It has been overshadowed by an unending concern with phenomenology’s methodological identity. However, an examination of recent contributions to this literature reveals that a concern with articulating phenomenology’s subject matter has gradually increased, although such articulations remain preliminary. In light of this, I delineate, define, and illustrate three layers of phenomenological research, which I term “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” While the delineation of these layers is drawn primarily from classical phenomenological texts, they are defined and illustrated through the use of more contemporary literature. Following the articulation of this subject matter, I briefly consider some of the debates—both foundational and applied—that can be facilitated by the adoption of this framework. (shrink)

Hegel, Husserl and the Phenomenology of Historical Worlds by Tanja Staehler is an effort of integration between the phenomenological thinking of two of the most influential philosophers in the contemporary tradition: G.W.F. Hegel and Edmund Husserl. The author main intention is the radicalisation of Hegel's phenomenology by the overcoming of a prescribed teleology with a more open and horizonally constituted historical development.

The objective of this research essay is to understand the episteme of phenomenology using the recent construction of Mark D. Vagle which understands phenomenological knowledge as a conceptual tripod between encounters, way of living and crafting. There is here a preliminary view on the subject where it seeks to understand the phenomenology beyond its big names such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, among others. It is a phenomenology of vision for the twenty-first century, focusing on the epistemological and methodological construction (...) of phenomenological research. -/- . (shrink)

For Husserl, the natural attitude - and hence any further explication of it - is put out of play, bracketed by the phenomenological epoché, which, of course, is not to deny its existence, but only to turn our theoretical gaze elsewhere. As Husserl remarks, “the single facts, the facticity of the natural world taken universally, disappear from our theoretical regard” (Id 60/68). The project of the young Heidegger, I will argue, is precisely a concern with facticity, taking up this forgotten (...) project in phenomenology, and thus attempting an explication of the natural attitude, considered so “extraordinarily important” by Husserl. Heidegger thus effects something of a relocation of phenomenology, turning its analysis to a different site: pretheoretical experience. Further, Heidegger also seeks to honor the precognitive nature of this pretheoretical experience, or what he will call faktische Lebenserfahrung. As such, the young Heidegger is very concerned with Husserl’s “theoreticization” of factical life. To avoid the same in his ‘new’phenomenology, Heidegger must develop a new conceptuality: the “formal indication” (formale Anzeige).Selon Husserl, l’attitude naturelle - et toute explication de celle-ci - est mise hors d’usage, mise entre parenthèses par l’epoche, laquelle ne nie pas son existence, mais fait détourner notre regard théorique. Comme le remarque Husserl: «les faits singuliers, la facticité du monde naturel pris dans son universalité, disparaissent de notre regard théorique» (Id 60/68). Je soutiendrai que le projet du jeune Heidegger consiste précisément en une préoccupation de la facticité, reprenant ainsi un projet oublié de la phénoménologie, et tâchant ainsi d’expliquer l’attitude naturelle, si «extraordinairement importante» aux yeux de Husserl. Ainsi, Heidegger institue une sorte de redéfinition de la phénoménologie, fixant son analyse à un lieu différent: l’expérience préthéorique. De plus, Heidegger cherche é reconnaître la nature précognitive de cette experience préthéorique, ou ce qu’il appellera faktische Lebenserfahrung. Ainsi, Heidegger est hautement préoccupé par la «théorisation» husserlienne de la vie factuelle. Pour éviterune telle chose dans sa «nouvelle» phénoménologie, Heidegger doit développer une conceptualisation nouvelle: l’indication formelle (fonnale Anzeige). (shrink)

Edmund Husserl believed that he had a method in phenomenology, which could be systematically applied. The essence of the method concerned the so-called “bracketing” of the objects outside of our consciousness. Husserl elaborated his idea through the conception of reductions, which he divided into eidetic,transcendental and phenomenological ones. The conception has recently been carefully analyzed by Dagfinn Føllesdal, an outstanding analytical thinker. But he had do admit that Husserl was not consistent in applying his method. Definitely, the core of Husserl’s (...) phenomenology can be studied using the analytic method. However, this does not mean that we can speak about applying a method in the case of Husserl himself. We get somewhat closer to a clearly defined method when we apply the priority argument of Merleau-Ponty for making the method of a phenomenological thinker intelligible. This helps us to clarify that what is being bracketed in phenomenology is the idea of the world embraced by traditional philosophical theory. What we are left with after the reduction is a reformedunderstanding. (shrink)

Entitled merely “On the Object of Thought,” Chapter 8 of Gurwitsch’s Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966) has the following note attached to its title: “Paper read at the meeting of the Phenomenological Society, April 27, 1946, at Hunter College, New York City. It was not possible to include here all the discussion. The original version was published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research VII (1947).” What seems the integral script read at the International Phenomenological Society (...) meeting has, however, survived in the Nachlass. It is 596 lines long and 291 lines of it, i.e. practically half, correspond closely to the published version. The following, however, was added to the previously published version: and I must also forsake surveying the elaboration of concepts analogous to that of the “object of thought” in several contemporary psychological sciences. I have in view the abandonment of the constancy hypothesis in Gestalt theory, the studies of the late Gelb and Prof. Goldstein on the psychical effects of brain injuries, the late Levy-Bruhl’s account of mental functions in primitive societies, the views of the phonological school in linguistics, Max Weber’s verstehende Soziologie and especially his distinction between objektiver and subjektiver Sinn. (shrink)

When Husserl speaks of the so-called ?transcendental reduction? or ?phenomenological epoch?? many believe that he is eschewing the question of truth or existence. Two reasons are given for this: First, Husserl explicitly states that when we perform the reduction, we should no longer naively ?accept [the world] as it presents itself to me as factually existing? (Id I ?30, p. 53) and should suspend our judgement with regard to ?the positing of its actual being? (Id I ?88, p. 182). Second, (...) Husserl seems to have no problem in referring to an ?object? of thought even when we refer to non-existent, hallucinatory or indeed impossible objects. This seems to suggest that he is not interested in the question whether or not there is a corresponding ?ordinary? object. The paper seeks to question this and will show that his inquiry never loses sight of the questions of truth and existence but rather brings them into the foreground. (shrink)

In Husserl’s phenomenology, there are two essential moments; one is the Epoché which makes the phenomenology possible, the other is the teleology of science which directs it to its own goal (telos). The former, later appeared in Husserl’s text, does not seem quite consistent with the latter – on the contrary, theseseem so exclusive that a question arises as to whether Husserl could reconcile Epoché with teleology consistently claimed from the beginning of his career. My aim in this paper is (...) to reveal their conflict in Husserl’s phenomenology, confining my argument to the science as teleological activity which had been claimed from Logical Investigations (1900) to his last work Crisis (1936). The plan is as follows; firstly we will confirm that Husserl defined the idea of the science as an activity which tends to one universal science; secondly we will examine that when he innovated the Epoché as the phenomenological method (Ideas 1, 1913), he confined the range of Epoché in such a science; thirdly we will prove that in his last work, this idea of the science remained in the form of “teleology of history”claimed by Husserl to be possible only by the Epoché; finally we will examine the inconsistency between the Epoché and the teleology, making reference to the critique of Jan Patočka. (shrink)

The main goal of this article is to examine Edmund Husserl’s method of “eidetic variation”—that is, to examine the way this method is supposed to work in connection with the notion of “similarity” (Ähnlichkeit). Unlike most interpretations, it will be suggested that similarity represents the leading methodologicalprinciple of eidetic variation. We will argue, therefore, that, on the one hand, this method is rooted in the sphere of association and passivity while, on the otherhand, it is constituted by the transposition of (...) a passive synthesis into an active operation. After having introduced and discussed a twofold notion of phantasy(as “localized phantasy” and as “pure phantasy”) as well as a twofold concept of eidos (as “hen epi pollon” and as “pure eidos”), the extent to which for Husserl there cannot be any eidetic variation without a monadology will be shown. (shrink)

Scheler subjects Husserl’s categorial intuition to a critique, which calls into question the very methodological procedure of phenomenology. Scheler’s divergence from Husserl with respect to whether sensory or categorial contents furnish the foundation of the act of intuition leads into a more significant divergence with respect to whether phenomenology should, primarily, be considered a form of science to which a specific methodology applies. Philosophical methods, according to Scheler, must presuppose, and not distract from, important preconditions of knowledge that pertain more (...) to the philosopher than to logical procedure. Accordingly, the phenomenological attitude serves as a foundation for, and is not the result of, the phenomenological method. (shrink)

The article explores a gradual refinement of the notion of reflection in Husserlian phenomenology. In his early period, Husserl takes phenomenological reflection to attain adequate evidence, since its object is self-given in an absolute and complete manner. However, this conception of reflection does not remain unchanged. Husserl later realizes that immanent perception or phenomenological reflection also involves a certain horizonality and naivety that has to do with its temporal nature and must be queried in a further critical, apodictic reflection. Focusing (...) more on the notion of apodicticity than adequacy, Husserl subsequently ascribes a new methodological role to reflection: instead of a mere epistemic warrant that guarantees for us the ultimate truth of our experiential life once and for all, phenomenological reflection ensures the strictness of phenomenology insofar as it entails an ethical-existential dimension as the norm of a life-form where the subject pursues full self-understanding and self-justification. (shrink)

This article first outlines the importance of Brentano’s doctrine of inner perception both to his understanding of the science of psychology in general in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and to his new science of descriptive psychology in particular which he later advances in his lecture courses on ‘Descriptive Psychology’ at the University of Vienna in the 1880s and early 1890s. It then examines Husserl’s critique of that doctrine in an ‘Appendix: Inner and Outer Perception: Physical and Psychical Phenomena’, (...) which Husserl added to the 1913 re-issue of his Logical Investigations. This article argues that, though Husserl promotes a very different method in phenomenology to the method of ‘inner perception’ which Brentano designs for descriptive psychology, one cannot fully understand the significance of the method that Husserl advocates in phenomenology, both in the Logical Investigations and in Ideas I, without distinguishing four different meanings for ‘inner perception’ in Brentano’s thought and addressing the problematic issue of the particular kind of scientific method for his new science of descriptive psychology which Brentano bequeaths to Husserl. (shrink)

This study is a phenomenological inquiry into several relatively unexplored phenomena, including certain key methodological issues. It seeks to elicit and explicate the grounds of free-fantasy variation, which Husserl insists contains his “fundamental methodological insight” since it articulates “the fundamental form of all particular transcendental methods…” In the course of pursuing the full sense of this method and its grounds, the essay also uncovers the origins and eventual presence of “self” and explores the multiple connections among self, mental life, embodiment (...) and the surrounding world. To that end, it is necessary to take seriously Husserl’s otherwise odd declaration that “‘feigning’ [‘Fiktion’] makes up the vital element of phenomenology as of every other eidetic science…”, and thus that every philosopher must “fertilize” his or her “fantasy” through works of art and history as well as other areas and practices of human life. The essay offers an in-depth probing of several striking but largely unexplored phenomena: exemplifying and possibilizing, and concludes with an exploration of one of the most pervasive themes in phenomenological inquiry: intersubjectivity. (shrink)

This paper traces the development of transcendental philosophy in the 20th century back to the strongly perceived need to preserve an exclusive area of a priori research for philosophy. It will argue that a genuine sort of aprioristic philosophical inquiry does not in fact require the step from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology taken by Husserl and well attested in his works from at least his 1911 essay "Philosophy as Strict Science", nor does it require the "detranscendentalization" of Husserlian phenomenology (...) carried out in the work of Heidegger. On the contrary, as I will show, recent work in philosophy connected to the development of the cognitive sciences suggests how it is possible to obtain significant a priori knowledge, by a sort of "wide reflexive equilibrium", consistently with the empirical impugnability of knowledge required by Quinean empiricism. (shrink)

A persistent criticism of Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is that it begs the question of its own possibiIity as science. In this essay I propose a reading of Husserl which addresses this question and attempts to show that the phenomenological ideal of freedom from all presuppositions, that is, the ideal of radical methodological autonomy, is not dogmatically assumed as valid but rests on a conception of philosophy which, although not explicitly formulated by Husserl, nevertheless informs his thinking on questions of (...) method and, ultimately, the nature of science. According to this conception, phiIosophy, phenomenological or otherwise, is not sui generis the ground of is own possibiIity but is derived from the logic of experience itself and so is immanent to conscious, intentional life in all of its manifold occupations and interests. That is, experience ultimately fulfills itself not in the accumulation of objective facts but in its continued faithfulness to the idea of a more perfect knowledge. Thus, in the end, I hope to show that the question of the status and possibiIity of phenomenological philosophy is not of interest to phenomenologists alone but addresses the enterprise of philosophy itself. (shrink)

This paper argues that Husserl’s method is partially driven by an attempt to avoid certain absurdities inherent in Hume’s epistemology. In this limited respect, we may say that Hume opened the door to phenomenology, but as a sacrificial lamb. However, Hume was well aware of his self-defeating position, and perhaps, in some respects, the need for an alternative. Moreover, Hume’s “mistakes” may have incited Husserl’s discovery of the epoche, and thus, transcendental phenomenology.

How do we reconcile Husserl’s repeated criticism of Mach’s phenomenalism almost everywhere in his work with the leading role that Husserl seems to attribute to Mach in the genesis of his own phenomenology? To answer this question, we shall examine, first, the narrow relation that Husserl establishes between his phenomenological method and Mach’s descriptivism. Second, we shall examine two aspects of Husserl’s criticism of Mach: the first concerns phenomenalism and Mach’s doctrine of elements, while the second concerns the principle of (...) economy of thought, which Husserl closely associates with a form of psychologism in his Logical Investigations . Our working hypothesis is that the apparent contradictory comments of Husserl regarding Mach’s positivism can be partially explained by the double status he confers to his own phenomenology—as a philosophical program radically opposed to positivism, and as a method akin to Mach’s descriptivism. (shrink)

Part 1. Husserl: the outlines of the transcendental-phenomenological system -- 1. Husserl's phenomenological discovery of the natural attitude -- 2. Husserl's theory of the phenomenological reduction: between lifeworld and Cartesianism -- 3. Some methodological problems arising in Husserl's late reflections on the phenomenological reduction -- 4. Facticity and historicity as constituents of the lifeworld in Husserl's late philosophy -- 5. Husserl's concept of the "transcendental person": another look at the Husserl-Heidegger relationship -- 6. Dialectics of the absolute: the systematics of (...) the phenomenological system in Husserl's last period -- Part 2. Husserl, Kant, and neo-Kantianism: from subjectivity to lifeworld as a world of culture -- 7. From being to givenness and back: some remarks on the meaning of transcendental idealism in Kant and Husserl -- 8. Reconstruction and reduction: Natorp and Husserl on method and the question of subjectivity -- 9. A hermeneutic phenomenology of subjective and objective spirit: Husserl, Natorp, and Cassirer -- 10. Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms: between reason and relativism: a critical appraisal -- Part 3. Toward a Husserlian hermeneutics -- 11. The subjectivity of effective history and the suppressed husserlian elements in Gadamer's hermeneutics -- 12. Husserl's "hermeneutical phenomenology" as a philosophy of culture. (shrink)

The train of thought I will follow here begins with two facts about Husserl. First, the main and most intractable problems in interpreting him, and the major conflicts between his interpreters, arise from and are fed by the equivocality and unsteady meaning of his terminology. Second, Husserl has a highly developed theory of terminology, beginning with, but by no means limited to, the earliest periods of his thought. This theory of terminology, moreover, focuses on the causes of equivocality and unsteadiness (...) of meaning. These two facts, taken together, suggest why there is something philosophically deep, some deep aspect of the selfknowledge of knowledge, in Husserl’s work, and helps explains why figures of the stature of Heidegger and Carnap took so much interest in him. Nevertheless, I will suggest that Husserl’s theory of terminology is inadequate to his problems: that the self-knowledge of philosophy is here (as always) incomplete. This helps explain what both Heidegger and Carnap reject in Husserl, and therefore, in turn, why the question, how to give to or recover for terminology an unequivocal and fixed meaning, becomes crucial for both of them. Both of them, in fact, approach this question in a way which is essentially a modification—albeit a root and branch modification—of Husserl’s approach. This paper, despite it’s title, will be devoted mostly to setting up the problem in Husserl. At the end I will then briefly describe Heidegger’s and Carnap’s contrasting solutions. (shrink)

Abstract Following Hubert Dreyfus, this paper takes up the debate over the limits on what can be articulated by means of intentional analysis. Section 1 reviews the contrast between Husserl's position and Heidegger's position. Husserl's is an ?inexhaustibility theory? of the inarticulable, according to which, although it is in principle impossible to articulate everything, there is not anything that it is in principle impossible to articulate. Heidegger's is a genuine ?inarticulability?in?principle theory? of the inarticulable, according to which it is, in (...) principle, impossible to articulate the whole of what makes human understanding possible. On this view, it is, in principle, impossible to articulate the background of skills and practices presupposed by and taken for granted in all our everyday human activities. Whereas Dreyfus has been largely interested in this debate for the sake of its parallels to developments in cognitive science, this paper aims, in Section 2, to consider the political importance of this debate. It is argued that the debate between the inexhaustibility theorist and the inarticulability theorist is misdirected. The two sides in this debate share a pair of questionable assumptions, which lead them to treat the problem of the inarticulable as though the participants in the practices that constitute the ?taken?for?granted background of everyday understanding? are all situated in equivalent positions in those practices. But the everyday phenomena of ostracism and marginalization show that there are political and social concerns that must be addressed as part of the study of constituting practices. ?Who gets to articulate what, and to whom?? is a question that should be asked before ?Is there anything that cannot be articulated?? (shrink)

Husserlian phenomenology depends upon a particular and limited set of related methodologies, which assume not merely abilities and results on the part of phenomenologists which have been severely criticized, but more profoundly, that mental contents are atomistic and independently manipulable. I will show not only that this assumption is mistaken and that questioning it undermines traditional phenomenological method, but that it leads to a paradox when turned upon itself which forces the rejection of a purely Husserlian phenomenology. More generally, any (...) theory whose data is confined to the results of particular and limited methodologies is by that fact unable to investigate those methodologies, and is thus at best only able to function in a severely restricted realm. (shrink)

In this dissertation I develop a structural model of phenomenal consciousness that integrates contemporary experimental and theoretical work in philosophy and cognitive science. I argue that phenomenology must be “naturalized” and that it should be acknowledged as a major component of empirical research. I use this model to describe important phenomenal structures, and I then employ it to provide a detailed explication of tip-of-tongue phenomena. The primary aim of “structural phenomenology” is the creation of a general framework within which descriptions (...) of experiences may be organized. The work of Husserl, Gurwitsch, the Gestalt psychologists, and many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists reveals several basic parameters underlying subjectivity. Chapter I argues that Husserlian methodology possesses problems both of praxis and of internal logic, and that its phenomenological descriptions cannot have the certainty he claimed. Consequently, an adequate phenomenology must incorporate empirical studies. This conclusion enables explicit transitions between empirical investigations and phenomenological insights. Chapter II introduces the theoretical framework underlying my model. I identify four parameters applicable to all experiences: 1) the degree of volitional emphasis with which something is experienced, i.e., the intensity of our focus on it, 2) the degree of non-volitional emphasis, i.e., the degree to which it is salient, 3) a variant of intentionality I term “directionality”, and 4) the property of recursion. Experiences are embedded within a complex set of relationships that unify and direct a layered phenomenal structure. I support these claims with evidence discovered over the past two centuries of research. Chapter III applies my model to the tip-of-tongue (TOT) state, in which difficulty remembering is accompanied by a sense of active searching. I show that a phenomenological description of the TOT experience is dependent on cognitive data, and that a phenomenological analysis is necessary to properly interpret these data. By showing how structural phenomenology offers a perspective from which to elucidate the results of experimental studies, I hope to clarify and establish the explicit role of introspection in empiricism, and of empiricism in phenomenology. (shrink)

The present paper traces the trajectory of the development of Husserl’s phenomenology from its incipient eidetic phase over the transcendental to the lifeworld-phenomenological, and ascertains that, in spite of all their complexities, the idea of Zu den Sachen selbst is the very objective of all those ‘phenomenological’investigations. The search after the ‘immediately given’ (Vorgegebenheiten) finally discovers that the concrete cultural life-worlds are the authentically ‘immediatelypre-given’ and all kinds of knowledge and sciences (higher cultural configurations) are nothing but idealizations of those (...) floor-like concrete life-worlds. Phenomenology previously as rigorous first science is now re-oriented as phenomenology as rigorous (i.e., transcendental) regional studies. Transcendental regional studies (i.e., life-world phenomenology), I’d like to argue, is the very key to the resolution of the ambiguities of the concept of life-world as well as the key to the understanding of the vague future direction of phenomenological philosophizing that Husserl himself left open. (shrink)

This paper presents an interpretation of Husserl''s phenomenological epoché or bracketing ( Einklammerung), which makes it possible to compare his position with philosophical programs developed within the framework of modern analytical philosophy. At the same time it asks in what sense Husserl''s phenomenology is a form of idealism or exceeds the traditional discussion of idealism versus realism.

The project of naturalising phenomenology is examined within the larger context of the philosophy of science. Transcendental phenomenology, as defended by Husserl, in opposition to the naturalistic enterprise, reflects a particular way of thinking about philosophy and its relationship to the empirical sciences that stands as an obstacle to the project of naturalisation. This paper develops a critique of a basic assumption made in this conception of philosophy, namely that it is possible to ask and answer questions concerning knowledge in (...) the abstract, prior to and independently of the various investigative contexts which are the immediate concern of practicing scientists. To successfully naturalise phenomenology, we need to abandon this conception of philosophy. (shrink)

Husserls Ansatz der Transzendentalphänomenologie wird gemeinhin als Versuch einer rationalen Letztbegründung von Erkenntnis überhaupt gedeutet. Sein Verständnis der konstitutiven Rolle des reinen Bewußtseins gegenüber dem Weltphänomen als solchem sowie seine Betonung des teleologischen Aspektes der transzendentalen Vernunft scheint sein Denken von vornherein in radikalen Gegensatz zu all jenen phänomenologischen Entwürfen zu bringen, die – wie etwa Heidegger oder Fink – die Beziehung von Subjekt und Welt sowie die Philosophie als ganze wesentlich vom Spiel her zu verstehen suchen. Andererseits hat die (...) phänomenologische Epoché durch die in ihr liegende Neutralisierung der Existenzsetzung von transzendenter Wirklichkeit bisweilen in dem Ruf gestanden, sich in die freischwebende Sphäre der „reinen Denkbarkeiten und Fiktionen zurückziehen zu wollen. Ausgehend von gewissen kritischen Bemerkungen Husserls zu den Analysen der praktischen Verwendungs- und Verstehenszusammenhänge in Sein und Zeit soll in diesem Artikel gezeigt werden, daß der Spielbegriff bei Husserl so vielschichtig ist wie die intentionale Struktur des Bewußtseins selbst. Zwischen der existenzneutralen Betrachtung „freischwebender eidetischer Strukturen einerseits und der Betonung des absoluten teleologischen Zwecksinnes der transzendentalen Bewußtseinsaktivität andererseits versucht Husserl, die Motivation des Durchbruchs der rein theoretischen Haltung als solcher vor dem Hintergrund spielerischer Freiheit und Spontaneität zu verstehen. Im Gegensatz zu Heidegger wird die „spielerische Neugierde der theoretischen Haltung, die auch der Epoché zugrunde liegt, als ein positives Grundphänomen verstanden, das auf die Freiheit des transzendentalen Subjekts von dinglichen Zweckzusammenhängen und damit auf seine überweltliche Würde als transzendentale Person verweist. (shrink)

An account of the source of first-person knowledge is essential not just for phenomenology, but for anyone who takes seriously the apparent evidence that we each have a distinctive access to knowing what we experience. One standard way to account for the source of first-person knowledge is by appeal to a kind of inner observation of the passing contents of one’s own mind, and phenomenology is often thought to rely on introspection. I argue, however, that Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction (...) was designed precisely to find a route to knowledge of the structures of consciousness that was independent of any appeal to observation of one’s own mental states. The goals of this essay are to explicate Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction in contemporary terms that (1) show its distance from all inner-observation accounts, (2) exhibit its kinship to and historical influence on outer-observation accounts of selfknowledge popularized by Sellars, and (3) demonstrate that a contemporary ‘cognitive transformation’ view based on Husserl’s method may provide a viable contribution to contemporary debates about the source of self-knowledge. (shrink)

It is argued that the work of Husserl offers a model for self-knowledge that avoids the disadvantages of standard introspectionist accounts and of a Sellarsian view of the relation between our perceptual judgements and derived judgements about appearances. Self-knowledge is based on externally directed knowledge of the world that is then subjected to a cognitive transformation analogous to the move from a statement to the activity of stating. Appearance talk is (contra Sellars) not an epistemically non-committal form of speech, but (...) talk to which we are fully committed. However, it is a commitment to a certain kind of claim about our experiences, viewed as cognitive phenomena, after a process of transformation. Such reductive and hypostatizing transformations can exhibit the intentional structure of consciousness. Phenomenology thus gives a form of knowledge about our mental states that is first personal but not introspective knowledge in any philosophically problematic sense. The account offered is also, in key respects, dissimilar to Sellars's outer directed view of the origin of self-knowledge. (shrink)

Along with “epoché” or his “reductions”, Husserl’s “noema” and “noesis”, being neologisms invented by him, are main concepts in phenomenology able to represent its originality. Following the trace of a recent paper (Penchev 2021 July 23), its formal and philosophical approach is extended to both correlative notions, in the present article. They are able to reveal the genesis of the world from consciousness in a transcendental method relevant to Husserl, but furthermore described formally as a process of how subjective temporality (...) appears being isomorphic to objective temporality of the “world by itself” (an abstraction meaning it out of consciousness or transcendental consciousness): thus, it shares the same mathematical structure, which is embodied in the physical process of decoherence by the physical quantity of quantum information. The temporal world is able to appear naturally (rather as a ridiculous effect of the mythical “Big Bang”). The same process translated by formal and mathematical tools as interpreted in terms of “noema”, “noesis”, or transcendental consciousness is isomorphic to how “Self” (including in an individual and psychological sense) appears in virtue of transcendental consciousness. (shrink)