In the first book of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle sets out, for the first time in Greek philosophy, a logical system. It consists of a deductive system (I.4-22), meta-logical results (I.23-26), and a method for finding and giving deductions (I.27-29) that can apply in “any art or science whatsoever” (I.30). After this, Aristotle compares this method with Plato’s method of division, a procedure designed to find essences of natural kinds through systematic classification. This critical comparison in APr I.31 raises an (...) interpretive puzzle: how can Aristotle reasonably juxtapose two methods that differ so much in their aims and approach? What can be gained by doing so? Previous interpreters have failed to show how this comparison is legitimate or what important point Aristotle is making. The goal of this paper is to resolve the puzzle. In resolving this puzzle we not only learn more about the relationship be- tween division and the syllogistic in Aristotle. We will also learn something about the motivation for the syllogistic itself, by seeing the role that it plays in his philosophy of science. (shrink)

It is well known that in the Republic, Socrates presents a view of the soul or the psyche according to which it has three distinct parts or aspects, which he calls the reasoning, spirited, and appetitive parts. Socrates’ clearest characterization of these parts of the soul occurs in Republic IX, where he suggests that they should be understood in terms of the various goals or ends that give rise to the particular desires that motivate our actions. In Republic X, however, (...) Socrates uses the phenomenon of cognitive conflict about matters of fact to show that the soul has only two parts, the rational and the irrational. Moreover, he characterizes these parts in terms of cognitive tendencies, such as forming beliefs on the basis of reason versus forming beliefs on the basis of perceptual appearances. In this chapter, I explain how these divergent accounts of the soul and its parts are legitimate alternative characterizations. A consequence of my argument is that we should not think of the divided soul as primarily a division of desires, but rather as a division of cognitive attitudes towards the world, each of which yields different sorts of desires. (shrink)

What must laypersons understand about science to allow them to make sound decisions on science-related issues? Relying on recent developments in social epistemology, this paper argues that scientific education should have the goal not of bringing laypersons' understanding of science closer to that of expert insiders, but rather of cultivating the kind of competence characteristic of “competent outsiders” (Feinstein 2011). Moreover, it argues that philosophers of science have an important role to play in attempts to promote this kind of understanding, (...) but that to successfully fulfill this role, they will have to approach central questions in the field differently. (shrink)

The dominant framing of the political corporate social responsibility discussion challenges the traditional economic conception of the firm and aims to produce a paradigm shift in CSR studies wherein the traditional, apolitical view of corporations’ roles in society is replaced by the political conception of CSR. In this paper, we show how the major framing of the political CSR discussion calls for a redirection to take international hard legal and moral regulations, as well as the need for the boundaries between (...) business and politics into account. (shrink)

This paper will examine the issue of Plato’s purposes in the Sophist. First, we will shed light on the main purpose Plato might be drawing in the prologue of the dialog, where the Eleatic Stranger begins to show his philosophical status. Then, we will locate the sophist’s characterization within this main purpose, by reading the result of this characterization as an implicit παράδειγμα which prepares the execution ofthe dialectic and anticipates the defining features of an object key to this science.

We explored the division of parenthood in Chinese families with adolescents by identifying the parental involvement patterns in the data obtained from 786 pairs of parents. Division-of-parenthood patterns were created via factor mixture modeling using self-reported three dimensions of father and mother involvement. Three differential division-of-parenthood patterns were identified: (a) parent-cooperation pattern, where moderate and equivalent involvement existed between mothers and fathers; (b) mother-dominated pattern, where mother involvement was particularly greater than father involvement; and (c) father-dominated pattern, where father involvement (...) was particularly greater than mother involvement. Families were more likely to be in the mother- or the father-dominated pattern as their levels of positive coparenting behaviors increased. By contrast, as the levels of paternal conflict behavior increased, families were likely to be in the mother-dominated pattern. This study highlighted parents’ individual parenting role, the diverse division-of-parenthood patterns in the family, and the important role of coparenting behavior. (shrink)

In the Statesman (287c3-5), Plato proposes that the philosophical divider should divide analogously to how the butcher divides a sacrificial animal. According to the common interpretation, the example of animal sacrifice illustrates that we should “cut off limbs” (kata mele), that is, divide non-dichotomously into functional parts of a living whole. We argue that this interpretation is historically inaccurate and philosophically problematic: it relies on an inaccurate understanding of sacrificial butchery and leads to textual puzzles. Against the common interpretation, we (...) argue that the example of animal sacrifice illustrates that correct division minimizes (it cuts into the smallest number possible) by first dividing dichotomously and then dividing non-dichotomously into “parts,” not “limbs.” We will show that both the philosophical divider and sacrificial butcher proceed exactly in this way. By taking Plato’s comparison to the historical practice of animal sacrifice seriously, our interpretation provides better solutions to the textual puzzles than the common interpretation. (shrink)

La dualité.objectif-subjectif constitue pour le dualisme une structure a priori par essence : ceci se vérifie aussi bien avec le couple contemporain de l'en-soi et du pour-soi qu'avec, sur une autre base, le couple cartésien de la chose étendue et de la chose pensante. Dans le champ théorique actuel règne, de facto, un double monisme juxtaposé qui se partage entre le réductionnisme phénoménologique et celui du néomatérialisme, aussi systématiques l'un que l'autre. Aussi la difficulté générale inhérente au dualisme, loin de (...) disparaître avec cette scission, a-t-elle pris une forme nouvelle. Au lieu de se réduire à une expérience subjective pure (comme dans la phénoménologie) ou à la seule expérience objective (dont se réclame l'explication néomatérialiste), l'auteur du présent essai explore une voie nouvelle pour interpréter la dualité du côté de l'ontologie, grâce à une division préalable et proprement ontologique. La détermination du fondement de cette dualité ne doit plus relever de l'expérience (toujours particulière), mais d'une déduction plus générale."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Durante los últimos decenios del siglo XX la filosofía de Francisco Suárez fue considerada parte integrante de un movimiento escolástico comúnmente mencionado como escuela tomista. La perspectiva de abordaje, según el mote impuesto, colocaba la posición especulativa del Dr. Eximio más próxima al dominico Tomás de Aquino de acuerdo con los siguientes matices: a. en el ámbito epistémico la figura del Aquinate eclipsaba ampliamente aquella de Suárez, promoviendo una auténtica desconsideración de sus tesis originales; b. el jesuita español fundaba, igual (...) que Tomás de Aquino, la división de las ciencias especulativas en el acto intelectual de abstracción; c. la diferencia entre ambas concepciones metafísicas no implicaba necesariamente una comprensión epistémica distinta. Ahora bien, contra estas interpretaciones aparece en el siglo XXI otra lectura, donde se acentúa la diferencia decisiva de la filosofía del jesuita del siglo XVI, quien, en letras medievales, escribe y piensa en permanente tensión entre la herencia de la filosofía antigua y medieval por una parte, y una neo-escolástica de aires renacentistas por la otra. De acuerdo con ello, si bien su pensamiento discurre por una tradición aristotelizante del saber, la comprensión de las ciencias se asienta, a diferencia de Tomás de Aquino, en clave objetiva. Sobre esta premisa, el siguiente estudio abordará con exclusividad la originalidad epistémica de Suárez según la división de las ciencias especulativas y reales, mostrando el orden, el principio y las relaciones entre las ciencias física, matemática y metafísica. (shrink)

I will examine a version of Bubeck's and Robeyns' proposals for ‘care duty’ which looks at the ways in which care work is analogous to defence work, and what the implications are for the best models in terms both of distributive justice and serving the common good. My own analysis will differ from Bubeck's and Robeyns' in two respects. First I will apply their arguments to all aspects of care including housework. This will mean making a case for housework counting (...) as a form of care work as it is not usually regarded as such, and in particular, would probably be excluded from Robeyns' own account as she follows Bubeck's earlier characterisation of care as involving face-to-face interaction. Secondly, I will explore various ways in which care, and especially housework, could and has been distributed by appealing to a number of military models, concluding that the best gender-just distribution of care requires a style of care experience modelled on universal military service. I will consider a number of objections to my view before concluding that not doing one's share of the housework could indeed come to be regarded as not doing one's duty as a citizen. (shrink)

La división de las causas en el De principiis naturae 5 de Tomás de Aquino establece de cuántas maneras pueden distinguirse las cuatro clásicas causas aristotélicas. El texto presenta varias dificultades y las principales son la determinación del número de las divisiones y la no necesaria contemporaneidad del ser en potencia de una causa y de su causado. Nuestro objetivo es resolverlas a través de un análisis pormenorizado del texto latino, que resulta en un comentario completo al capítulo, lo (...) cual es un aporte secundario. A través de este análisis resolvemos las dificultades principales. Primero, al descubrir una distinción tácita entre divisiones de causas en cuanto consideradas en sí mismas y en cuanto conocidas y verbalizadas por los seres humanos, el número de las divisiones es finalmente siete (cuatro fundadas en el ser y tres en el modo de conocer). Esta distinción tiene un signo lingüístico en las expresiones ‘item’ y ‘sciendum est quod’. Segundo, la eventual no contemporaneidad entre los estados potenciales de una causa y su causado se puede justificar respetando la predicación singular, al considerar que un arquitecto, una vez construida una casa, está en potencia de reconstruirla, si ésta perdiera las causas internas de su integridad. (shrink)

It has been recently demonstrated that yeast cells are able to partially regress chromosome segregation in telophase as a response to DNA double‐strand breaks (DSBs), likely to find a donor sequence for homology‐directed repair (HDR). This regression challenges the traditional concept that establishes anaphase events as irreversible, hence opening a new field of research in cell biology. Here, the nature of this new behavior in yeast is summarized and the underlying mechanisms are speculated about. It is also discussed whether it (...) can be reproduced in other eukaryotes. Overall, this work brings forwards the need of understanding how cells attempt to repair DSBs when transiting the latest stages of mitosis, i.e., anaphase and telophase. (shrink)

In free speech theory ‘speech’ has to be defined as a special term of art. I argue that much free speech discourse comes with a tacit commitment to a ‘Subtractive Approach’ to defining speech. As an initial default, all communicative acts are assumed to qualify as speech, before exceptions are made to ‘subtract’ those acts that don’t warrant the special legal protections owed to ‘speech’. I examine how different versions of the Subtractive Approach operate, and criticise them in terms of (...) their ability to yield a substantive definition of speech which covers all and only those forms of communicative action that – so our arguments for free speech indicate – really do merit special legal protection. In exploring alternative definitional approaches, I argue that what ultimately compromises definitional adequacy in this arena is a theoretical commitment to the significance of a single unified class of privileged communicative acts. I then propose an approach to free speech theory that eschews this theoretical commitment. (shrink)

Milner and Goodale's influential account of the primate cortical visual streams involves a division of consciousness between them, for it is the ventral stream that has the responsibility for visual consciousness. Hence, the dorsal visual stream is a ‘zombie’ stream. In this article, I argue that certain information carried by the dorsal stream likely plays a central role in the egocentric spatial content of experience, especially the experience of visual spatial constancy. Thus, the dorsal stream contributes to a pervasive feature (...) of consciousness. (shrink)

This paper develops a new interpretation of the “table of nothing” that appears at the end of the transcendental aesthetic in the Critique of Pure Reason. In contrast to previous interpretations, which have taken it to be part of Kant’s account of the failures of reason, this paper argues that it should be understood as proffering Kant’s positive account of the objects he will be concerned with in the transcendental dialectic, namely objects that, properly understood, are nothing. I examine the (...) four nothings in turn, showing how Kant’s concern is to develop a positive account of each one that allows him to determine its object while recognizing that it in some sense is not. I introduce Allison’s distinction between error and illusion and argue that the table of nothing is Kant’s theoretical account of what illusions are as objects, and thereby explains how something like a transcendental dialectic is possible at all. (shrink)

We now take for granted that despite the disproportionate contribution of females to initial growth of their progeny, there is little or no asymmetry in the contribution of males and females to the eventual character of their shared offspring. In fact, this key insight was only established towards the end of the eighteenth century by Joseph Koelreuter's pioneering plant breeding experiments. If males and females supply equal amounts of hereditary material, then the latter must double each time an embryo is (...) conceived. How then does the amount of this mysterious stuff not multiply exponentially from generation to generation? A compensatory mechanism for diluting the hereditary material must exist, one that ensures that if each parent contributes one half, each grandparent contributes a quarter, and each great grandparent merely an eighth. An important piece of the puzzle of how hereditary material is diluted at each generation has been elucidated over the past ten years. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger was the first philosopher to see skillful coping as the basis of our understanding of the world and ourselves. But he acknowledges that such average understanding is banal and conceals more than it reveals. He, therefore, holds that, to ground intelligibility, people must conform to everyday practical norms, but that, by acting in the face of anxiety, a person can resist conformism and refine standard ways of acting. His model is Aristotle’s phronimos (man of practical wisdom) who responds (...) with ethical expertise to the demands of the concrete situation. Further, Heidegger suggests that, when a person is fully authentic, he or she can transform everyday practice. Here, his model is Kierkegaard’s reborn individuals whom Heidegger sees as radical world disclosers capable of changing the issue for their age and so of changing history. (shrink)