The present volume is a sequel to Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings : its purpose is to offer a view of some of the main directions of research in contemporary deontic logic. Most of the articles included in Introductory and Systematic Readings represent what may be called the standard modal approach to deontic logic, in which de on tic logic is treated as a branch of modal logic, and the normative concepts of obligation, permission and prohibition are regarded as (...) analogous to the "alethic" modalities necessity, possibility and impossibility. As Simo Knuuttila shows in his contribution to the present volume, this approach goes back to late medieval philosophy. Several 14th century philosophers observed the analogies between deontic and alethic modalities and discussed the deontic interpretations of various laws of modal logic. In contemporary deontic logic the modal approach was revived by G. H. von Wright's classic paper 'Deontic Logic'. Certain analogies between deontic and alethic modalities are obvious and uncontroversial, but the standard approach has often been criticized on the ground that it exaggerates the analogies and tends to ignore those features of normative concepts which distinguish them from other modalities. (shrink)

Risto Hilpinen; X*—Authors and Artifacts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 155–178, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.

Peirce discusses the nature and structure of propositions in several manuscripts written in the 1890’s and during the first decade of this century. In this paper I shall outline the main features of Peirce’s theory of the proposition, especially his account of what may be called indeterminate indices in propositions.

Peirce discusses the nature and structure of propositions in several manuscripts written in the 1890’s and during the first decade of this century. In this paper I shall outline the main features of Peirce’s theory of the proposition, especially his account of what may be called indeterminate indices in propositions.

Many philosophers have used the concept of belief system or some related notion as a basic tool of epistemological discussion and analysis. A belief system is a set of propositions or statements which represents a person’s doxastic state or credal state in a certain situation; it consists of the propositions which the person either explicitly or implicitly accepts in the situation. One of the many concerns of epistemologists is to attempt to formulate general “conditions of rationality” for belief systems. I (...) want to suggest in the present paper that in this endeavour philosophers usually treat belief systems as if they were artifacts or tools made for various epistemic purposes: for providing satisfactory answers to interesting questions, for helping to find answers to new questions, and for providing resources for argumentation and research. Insofar as epistemology and philosophy of science can legitimately be viewed in this way, they may be regarded as “sciences of the artificial” in Herbert Simon’s sense, and not as sciences of the “natural world” or parts of natural science, as some proponents of “naturalised epistemology” have recently suggested. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce introduces the distinction between a token and a type into semiotics and philosophy by using as an example two ways of individuating words:(P1) A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty the's on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in (...) the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose.. (shrink)

In his semiotic system Peirce distinguished between two interpretants and two objects of a sign: an immediate and a dynamical interpretant, and an immediate and a dynamical object. It is argued that Peirce’s immediate object can be interpreted a qua-object which has the dynamical object as its basis, and the dynamical interpretant consists of an interpreter’s conception of the object of the sign. Peirce semiotic system is compared with the accounts given by Frege, Husserl, Meinong, and the Stoics.

: According to C. S. Peirce, there are two ways of explaining what a sign means, namely, a definition and a precept. A precept tells the interpreters of a sign what the sign means by prescribing what they have to do in order to find or become acquainted with an object of the sign. A precept for a concept specifies how an interpreter can determine whether the concept is applicable to a given situation or object.Peirce accepted the scholastic definition of (...) truth, according to which a proposition is true if and only if its subject and predicate refer to the same thing, and applied this analysis to complex as well as singular propositions. However, this account does not tell how an interpreter can become acquainted with the objects of the predicate "true," that is, true propositions: it is not a good precept for the concept of truth. On the other hand, the so-called pragmatic conception of truth, truth as the limit or end of inquiry, can be regarded as a precept for truth, or as a general form of such a precept.The requirement that concepts should have precepts attached to them is a version of Peirce's principle of pragmatism. The availability of precepts should make it possible for an interpreter to determine whether a concept is applicable to a given situation, or whether a given proposition is true. Thus the principle of pragmatism is closely related to the principle knowability, according to which any truth should be knowable. Some formulations of the principle of knowability lead to a paradox. The paper discusses several forms of the principle of knowability, and it is argued that the existence of precept for a proposition entails only a relatively weak form of the principle.Keywords: Action. Inquiry. Knowledge. Meaning. Peirce. Pragmatism. Precept.Resumo: Segundo C. S. Peirce, há dois modos de explicar o que um signo significa, a saber, uma definição e um preceito. Um preceito diz aos intérpretes de um signo o que o signo significa, prescrevendo o que eles devem fazer para encontrar ou inteirar-se de um objeto do signo. Um preceito para um conceito especifica como um intérprete pode determinar se o conceito é aplicável a uma dada situação ou a um dado objeto.Peirce aceitou a definição escolástica de verdade, segundo a qual uma proposição é verdadeira se, e somente se, seu sujeito e seu predicado se referirem à mesma coisa, e aplicou essa análise tanto a proposições complexas quanto a singulares. Entretanto, essa visão não informa como um intérprete pode inteirar-se dos objetos do predicado "verdadeiro", ou seja, proposições verdadeiras: não é um bom preceito para o conceito de ver- On a Pragmatic Theory of Meaning and Knowledge dade. De outro lado, a assim chamada concepção pragmática de verdade, a verdade como o limite ou fim da investigação, pode ser vista como um preceito para a verdade, ou como uma forma geral de tal preceito.A exigência de que conceitos tenham preceitos ligados a eles é uma versão do princípio do pragmatismo de Peirce . A disponibilidade de preceitos deve tornar possível que um intérprete determine se um conceito é aplicável a uma dada situação, ou seja, se certa proposição é verdadeira. Portanto, o princípio do pragmatismo está intimamente ligado ao princípio da cognoscibilidade, segundo o qual toda verdade pode ser conhecida. Algumas formulações do princípio da cognoscibilidade levam a um paradoxo. O artigo discute algumas formas não-paradoxais do princípio da cognoscibilidade, defendendo que a existência de um preceito para uma proposição exige apenas uma forma relativamente fraca do princípio.Palavras-chave: Ação. Investigação. Conhecimento. Significação. Peirce. Pragmatismo. Preceito. (shrink)

Expressions of the form "s represents an F", "s represents t as G", and "s represents an F as G" are analysed by means of C. S. Peirce's and Nelson Goodman's semiotic theories, and these theories are compared with each other. It is argued that Peirce's concept of interpretant provides a plausible account of what Goodman calls the exemplification features of aesthetic signs (works of art).

In this paper practical reasoning is understood in the Aristotelian sense as reasoning leading to action or to an intention to do something. Georg Henrik von Wright and a number of other philosophers have tried to assimilate certain forms of such reasoning to deductive reasoning. Many examples of practical reasoning, including some examples given by Aristotle, do not fit a deductive or quasi‐deductive model. It is argued that instances of good practical reasoning often resemble abductive rather than deductive or inductive (...) reasoning, and that the principles governing abduction, including the Principle of Economy, are applicable to practical reasoning. (shrink)

Expressions of the form "s represents an F", "s represents t as G", and "s represents an F as G" are analysed by means of C. S. Peirce's and Nelson Goodman's semiotic theories, and these theories are compared with each other. It is argued that Peirce's concept of interpretant provides a plausible account of what Goodman calls the exemplification features of aesthetic signs (works of art).

Deontic logic is an area of logic which investigates normative concepts, systems of norms, and normative reasoning. The word ‘deontic’ is derived from the Greek expression ‘déon’, which means ‘what is binding’ or ‘proper’. Thus, Jeremy Bentham used the word ‘deontology’ for “the science of morality,” and the Austrian philosopher Ernst Mally, who developed in the 1920s a system of the “fundamental principles the logic of ought,” called his theory ‘Deontik’. Normative concepts include the concepts of obligation (ought), permission (may), (...) prohibition (may not), and related notions, such as the concept of right. Systems of deontic logic contain, in addition to the usual sentential connectives and quantifiers, logical constants which represent some of these normative concepts. (shrink)

This paper discusses the probabilities of inductive generalizations in languages containing two-place predicates. The depth of the sentences considered here is restricted to two, that is, they contain at most two layers of quantifiers. The analysis of relational hypotheses presented below is based on the theory of distributive normal forms in first-order logic. The main purpose of this paper is not to present methods of calculating unique probability-values for various generalizations, but rather to clarify the general conceptual situation and concentrate (...) on issues of philosophical interest. (shrink)

In his Logical Investigations Edmund Husserl criticizes John Stuart Mill’s account of meaning as connotation, especially Mill’s failure to separate the distinction between connotative and non-connotative names from the distinction between the meaningful and the meaningless. According to Husserl, both connotative and non-connotative names have meaning or “signification”, that is, what Gottlob Frege calls the sense (“Sinn”) of an expression. The distinction between connotative and non-connotative names is a distinction between two kinds of meaning (or sense), attributive and non-attributive meaning (...) (“attributive und nicht-attributive Bedeutung”). Attributive (connotative) names denote (refer to) objects through their attributes, whereas a non-attributive name means a thing directly (“direkt”). In this paper I examine the concepts of attributive and non-attributive meaning by means of the semiotic theory of Charles S. Peirce, and compare Peirce’s account with the views of Frege, Husserl, Alexius Meinong, and David Kaplan and Gareth Evans. (shrink)

It is argued that the distinction between the normative and the descriptive interpretation of norm sentences can be regarded as a distinction between two kinds of utterances. A norm or a directive has as its content a normative proposition. A normative utterance of a normative proposition in appropriate circumstances makes the proposition true, and an assertive utterance has as its truth-maker the norm system to which it refers. This account of norms, norm-contents, and utterances of norm sentences solves Jørgensen’s problem: (...) logical relations among norms can be defined in the usual way in terms of the truth-conditions of the normative propositions which form their content. There is no distinction between the logic of norms and the logic of normative propositions; in this respect the present account differs from Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin’s account of the logic of normative propositions. (shrink)

This paper outlines the main features of the conception of empirical knowledge presented by Moritz Schlick in his paper 'Über das Fundament der Erkenntnis', and contains a detaüed analysis of Schlick's concept of "Konstatierung". It is argued that in spite of its basically foundationalist appearance, Schlick's theory resembles in important respects contemporary coherence theories of knowledge.

The volume contains 37 invited papers presented at the Congress, covering the areas of Logic, Mathematics, Physical Sciences, Biological Sciences and the ...

This chapter contains sections titled: Modal Concepts The Semantics of Modalities and Systems of Modal Logic Modality and Quantification Deontic, Epistemic, and Temporal Modalities Epistemic Logic Deontic Logic Temporal Frames Conditional Obligations and Rules of Detachment.