In this paper, I will explore the concept that healing activities shape the objects of therapy and seek to construct those objects through therapeutic activities. Objects of therapy are the persons, patients, human bodies, diseases, physiological processes and personal suffering—that which clinical medicine constructs through its distinctive formative processes, practices and knowledge. The rationale for choice of philosophical sources namely, Cassirer, Foucault, the anthropological perspective of Good and the sociological account of Frank will be discussed. The (...) claim articulated by Good will be examined and its relationship to culture, illness, medical knowledge, practice, truth, and science. I then focus on Frank's concepts of the patient and the body and how medical knowledge and practices affects it. The concept that the medicalization of the illness narrative silences the patient's voice requiring an ethic of listening will be emphasized, described and further supported by Charon's (2006, Narrative medicine: Honoring the stories of illness. New York, NY: Oxford University Press) and Cassell's (2015, The nature of suffering and the goals of medicine. New York, NY: Oxford University Press) thoughts on narrative of illness in clinical medicine. My position concludes that healing activities construct the objects of therapy: as the medical culture's way of seeking truth; as medicine's way of mediating and organizing forms of reality through culture and symbolic forms; and, as medicine's way of entering the body and constructing the disease. Lastly, I suggest that in spite of the remarkable progress in the control of disease, the failure to address the interpretation of illness meanings is a fundamental flaw in the work of “doctoring.” The experience and meanings of illness are at the centre of clinical practice and is a moral, political, ethical and professional obligation. The person is a cultural construct, a complex and culturally shaped way of experiencing self and other, and cultural “work” is required to constitute the person who is the object of medical attention and it also necessitates the ethic of listening. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.2 (2003) 157-159 [Access article in PDF] Constructing Persons:The Psychopathology of Identity Stephen R. L. Clark Keywords identity, legal fictions, materialism, psychopathology. Steve Matthews argues that the criteria proposed by Stephen Behnke and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for establishing personal identity in cases of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) are flawed. Neither brain identity nor memory convergence are adequate grounds for ascribing identity, even in the absence (...) of DID. Someone suffering from DID is no less responsible than a drunkard for the crimes she commits when not in her right—or at least her usual—mind, and perhaps no more responsible than someone suffering from some other mental disorder. We may decide to punish someone suffering from DID for her crimes only when she and her presumed alter both share a brain (as obviously they do) and might—at least after therapy—have memories in common, and only when the alternate personality that led to the crime is herself sane. But we should not pretend to ourselves that this judgment rests upon a clear and uncontentious notion of identity.It may be that Matthews still shares too much of his opponents' attitude: namely, that there is some matter of fact about identity, or at least some fact about the central principles by which we ascribe or recognize identity. This, at first sight, is the force of his counterexamples: that the Behnke/Sinnott-Armstrong criteria give counterintuitive results and so cannot exactly map the notion that we have in mind. Just so Socrates was able to prove that Justice did not consist in Paying One's Debts, because we would all at once acknowledge that it was not Just (or Right) to restore his sword to a homicidal maniac (or at least that there were real doubts about who it was that really owned the sword). But neither Socrates' nor Matthews' conclusion need be referred to any simple fact. It would not be sensible to say that the maniac had a right to have his sword, or that its keeper had a duty to return it, because we recognize implicitly that the very point of Justice is to do Good. Correspondingly, maybe the real effect of Matthews's counterexamples is to remind us what the point of Judgment is. Is there any matter of fact about identity, or is identity simply a way of saying who it is that should now be held responsible? Joe is not to be held responsible because he is the same person as the one who committed the crime: he is reckoned the same person because he is the one who is here now to be held responsible. That is what it is to be the same person: to be held responsible for what is personally done. [End Page 157]Someone who is not a person at all is not the same person as anyone (although they may be the same creature). And a person is a creature who holds herself responsible, or can do so: who has memories and anticipations to which she lays claim, appropriates as her own. This in turn is possible because (or so it seems) she has acquired the necessary words and customs: because she sees people being held responsible she can also hold herself responsible—or sometimes disclaim all responsibility. She will not always be allowed to escape all blame or credit, merely because her memories are of a self that no longer makes much sense to her, nor even because she has no memories at all of what was done. But this need not be because she is objectively the very same person as the sometime agent; rather, the person she is taken to be is constructed by the legal and moral attitudes of those who judge her. Those attitudes are not necessarily determinate: how exactly the ordinary rules apply in novel cases may be a matter of decision rather than discovery. The connections that ordinarily ground or specify identity are not robust enough to rely upon in DID patients (that, after all, is the trouble). We have to make... (shrink)

The purpose of this dissertation is to identify some of the most pressing problems in the dominant contemporary approach to research ethics, and to devise an alternative approach that avoids these problems. I contend that the fundamental ethical values invoked in human research are often appealed to in contradictory or ambiguous ways, or in ways that do not adequately capture or do not show an adequate understanding of the specific ethical concerns of human research. One significant problem in this domain (...) is that values for ethical research are often unreflectively imported from medical therapy, producing ill-suited guidelines that cannot capture the different ethical situations that arise in the context of research. Furthermore, ethical guidelines in this area are often not developed with a sufficient understanding of the deep philosophical issues that they invoke. I suggest that we can address these problems through examining the fundamental ethical concerns of research on a philosophical level. This method will reveal severe problems with the approach to two of the ethical values underlying research; beneficence and respect for autonomy (or respect for persons). Once the nature of these problems has been revealed, and with reference to ethical problems that typically arise in the domain of research, I construct a coherent philosophical foundation for research ethics, which both avoids these deep-seated problems and better captures the ethical issues that arise in the domain of human research. I argue that we need to radically depart from the values of beneficence and autonomy/respect for persons as they are currently understood in the guidelines. We need an idea of beneficence that is clearly distinct from that which is used in the therapeutic medical context from which this notion is currently drawn. I also contend that we need to move away from autonomy as a central value in research ethics. I posit an alternative choice-based approach to informed consent which is concerned both with respecting agents’ freedom of choice, and also with their wellbeing, as providing a good means of protecting and promoting the interests of the individual research subject. Although these two imperatives are often thought to clash on a fundamental level, I will show that, in research ethics, they can be reconciled with minimal conflict. Though this represents a departure from the ethics of medical therapy, this approach is far more suited to the context of research. This theoretical basis for informed consent can help to clarify the ethical problems that are specific to this domain and provide us with relevant ethical guidance in research ethics. (shrink)

Virtual reality constitutes an alternative, effective, and increasingly utilized treatment option for people suffering from psychiatric and neurological illnesses. However, the currently available VR simulations provide a predetermined simulative framework that does not take into account the unique personality traits of each individual; this could result in inaccurate, extreme, or unpredictable responses driven by patients who may be overly exposed and in an abrupt manner to the predetermined stimuli, or result in indifferent, almost non-existing, reactions when the stimuli do not (...) affect the patients adequately and thus stronger stimuli are recommended. In this study, we present a VR system that can recognize the individual differences and readjust the VR scenarios during the simulation according to the treatment aims. To investigate and present this dynamically adaptive VR system we employ an Anxiety Disorder condition as a case study, namely arachnophobia. This system consists of distinct anxiety states, aiming to dynamically modify the VR environment in such a way that it can keep the individual within a controlled, and appropriate for the therapy needs, anxiety state, which will be called “desired states” for the study. This happens by adjusting the VR stimulus, in real-time, according to the electrophysiological responses of each individual. These electrophysiological responses are collected by an external electrodermal activity biosensor that serves as a tracker of physiological changes. Thirty-six diagnosed arachnophobic individuals participated in a one-session trial. Participants were divided into two groups, the Experimental Group which was exposed to the proposed real-time adaptive virtual simulation, and the Control Group which was exposed to a pre-recorded static virtual simulation as proposed in the literature. These results demonstrate the proposed system’s ability to continuously construct an updated and adapted virtual environment that keeps the users within the appropriately chosen state for approximately twice the time compared to the pre-recorded static virtual simulation. Thus, such a system can increase the efficiency of VR stimulations for the treatment of central nervous system dysfunctions, as it provides numerically more controlled sessions without unexpected variations. (shrink)

Crises in therapist-patient relationship can also become a challenge in clinical supervision. However, success and failure in establishing and maintaining constructive relationships in therapy and supervision is not only subject to a lucky fit of personal characteristics (therapist A gets along well/badly with client B; supervisee A gets along well/badly with supervisor C). Rather, we can identify determining field conditions in the overall therapeutic and supervisory situation for this outcome. We do not only focus on the persons involved, (...) but also on their environment, the task to be accomplished together, further framework conditions and the power relations resulting from their mutual influence-in the supervised case of therapy as well as in supervision itself. We want to examine the structure and dynamics of these relationships from a genuine Gestalt psychological perspective. What contributes to a cooperative atmosphere? When do goals get out of sight? What can make the atmosphere hostile? How do such developments become accessible in supervision? (shrink)

Introduction: Resilience is a multidimensional and dynamic construct associated with positive growth and the capacity to transform stressful and negative factors into opportunities of personal development and self-improvement when faced with difficult experiences. The resilience process of each individual integrates multiple analysis levels, which range from genetic-environmental interactions to a complex process of adaptation between the individual and his/her family, friends, co-workers, society, and culture.Objective: To determine whether resilience improves in students of occupational therapy when exposed for (...) the first time to practice placement education.Methodology: Quasi-experimental, prospective, observational, multi-center study with a sample composed of students from the Degree of Occupational Therapy of the public universities of Málaga and Castilla-La Mancha. Two weeks prior to the beginning of the practice education period, the participants completed a questionnaire that included sociodemographic data and the area of their internships. They were also given the Spanish version of the Connor-Davidson's resilience scale. All these instruments were also completed 1 week after the end of the clinical practice.Results: There were statistically significant differences between the variables that make up resilience and the different internship areas. On the other hand, there was a significant improvement of global resilience after the clinical practice period, in both women and men, when the internship area was not considered.Conclusions: The results show that resilient students are more optimistic and work to improve a situation beyond doing simply what is expected of them, knowing how to control their feelings. This is beneficial for students in practice education, since, during these, they face difficult situations that require a resilient pattern, which helps reduce stress and the burnout syndrome. (shrink)

During the last few years forgiveness has been seen as an important element in psychological health. The development of forgiveness therapy and its application by psychotherapists to areas like family therapy attests to its growing significance. As a consequence it is important to investigate what people understand by forgiveness and in what circumstances this knowledge structure is retrieved. The present study forms part of ongoing research to access and measure a person's construct of forgiveness. Two studies are (...) compared across three dimensions: semantics, questionnaire instructions and five methods of accessing a forgiveness knowledge structure. In the first study, 49 students from the University of Glasgow were presented with descriptions or videoed scenarios of an act of infidelity. After each presentation they completed the Scobie Forgiveness Scale . In the second study, 315 students from the University of Glasgow completed four measures, only the SFS is used in the current study. A comparison of the studies suggests that minor word changes and questionnaire instructions may not exert a significant influence on participants' responses. However, different methods of accessing knowledge structures may have an effect on an individual's construct of forgiveness. The results suggest that different methodologies , affect participants' responses in both the forgiver and the forgiven mode. The findings may have implications for the general accessing of knowledge systems and for the measurement of forgiveness. (shrink)

This book traces the philosophical history of Personal Construct Psychology through the broad and complex tradition of phenomenology and thinkers such as Spinoza, Hegel and Heidegger.

Despite recognition as an important, potentially unifying construct within the social sciences and humanities, value lacks an overarching theoretical framework. One theory within the social sciences, personal construct theory, is suggested as a theoretical foundation for human values, and an attempt to situate values within this theory is presented. It is argued that human values are core constructs in the language of personal construct theory, while ordinary beliefs are peripheral constructs. Various implications and applications of (...) this formulation are discussed. (shrink)

For Sigmund Freud, founder of psychoanalysis, the Unconscious is characterized by the fact that it is born from the repression of impulses. For Carl Jung, on the other hand, the Unconscious is made up of everything that is not conscious. According to Jung: “It is inherent to reality and to the communication of the conscious with the Unconscious, and allows the becoming of the individual”. He called it “collective” because its pictorial manifestations, the archetypes, were common to all human beings. (...) For 20 years he searched, with the physicist Wolfgang Pauli, for an extra-personal origin of the Unconscious, called “synchronicity”. The study of near-death experiences sheds new light on this question: the last image the dying man/woman sees would be himself a few weeks before his birth. The ego is believed to be built in the fetal stage around the discovery of the body, and to remain unchanged until brain death. Personalism would describe the fetus’ access to self-consciousness by discovering his body. (shrink)

In the field of psychology, filial piety is usually defined in terms of traditional Chinese culture-specific family traditions. The problem with this approach is that it tends to emphasize identification of behavioral rules or norms, which limits its potential for application in other cultural contexts. Due to the global trend of population aging, governments are searching for solutions to the accompanying financial burden so greater attention is being focused on the issue of elder care and its relevance to filial practices. (...) We contend that the psychological investigation of filial piety in Chinese societies has progressed to the point that it can now provide a solid structure for research targeting intergenerational relations in other cultures. We describe an indigenous psychology approach that integrated Chinese historical, philosophical, and social trends to construct a model of filial piety in terms of the dual reciprocal and authoritarian filial aspects underlying parent-child relations: the dual filial piety model (DFPM). We use this model to re-conceptualize filial piety from its usual definition as a set of Chinese culture-specific norms to a contextualized personality construct represented by a pair of culturally-sensitive psychological schemas of parent-child interaction. We then describe how the DFPM can provide a framework for research on filial relations on individual, structural, societal, and cross-cultural levels. We conclude with a discussion of how the model may be able to integrate and extend Western research on intergenerational relations and contribute to the issue of elder care beyond Chinese societies. (shrink)

Two recurring ideologies are used to explore and explain differences in approach to media coverage and problems, both by those within the media and by critics outside the media. Models of Left (individualism, liberty, human happiness) and Right (achievement, maintenance of norms) are used to map three contemporary journalism issues: professionalism, journalist as Good Samaritan, and objective reporting. Each readily lends itself to ideological and para-ideological analysis. Ideological constructs made a significant contribution to the mapping and assessing of ethical and (...) professional media problems. (shrink)

Kelly’s work was formed and developed in the context of the American philosophical movement known as pragmatism. The major figures to which this tradition is attributed are Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey. In Personal Construct Psychology, Dewey was acknowledged by Kelly and by subsequent writers as perhaps his most important influence. It has recently become increasingly apparent, however that Peirce was a much more pervasive and crucial influence on James and Dewey than has previously been (...) recognized. Kelly did not mention Peirce but a close reading of the two writers reveals a remarkable correspondence and relationship between their two bodies of work. To set these two thinkers side by side proves to be an interesting and productive exercise. In this paper, after introducing Peirce and examining the relationship between him and Dewey, Kelly’s basic philosophical assumptions, as outlined at the beginning of Volume 1 of the Psychology of Personal Constructs, are used as a framework for exploring their similarities and differences. The result is an enrichment of our understanding of Kelly’s philosophy which allows us to make links with many different subsequent thinkers’ ideas and provides a basis for exploring the psychological aspects of the two men’s work. The latter forms the subject of Part II of this series which is in preparation. (shrink)

People construe reality by using words as basic units of meaningful categorization. The present theory-driven study applied the method of a free association task to explore how people express the concepts of the world and the self in words. The respondents were asked to recall any five words relating with the word world. Afterwards they were asked to recall any five words relating with the word self. The method of free association provided the respondents with absolute freedom to choose any (...) words they wanted. Such free recall task is suggested as being a relatively direct approach to the respondents’ self- and world-related conceptual categories, without enormous rational processing. The results provide us, first, with associative ranges for constructs of the world and the self, where some associative dimensions are defined by semantic polarities in the meanings of peripheral categories (e.g., Nature vs. Culture). Second, our analysis showed that some groups of verbal categories that were associated with the words world and self are central, while others are peripheral with respect to the central position. Third, the analysis of category networks revealed that some categories play the role of a transmitter, mediating the pathway between other categories in the network. (shrink)

Tan and Moghaddam’s ‘reflexive positioning’ expansion of Harré’s positioning theory provokes consideration of psychological factors underlying the discursive production of selves. However, it understates the issue, why do people appropriate particular positions, hearable in utterances, as applicable to themselves. Some of the theoretical ambiguities dissipate when positioning is approached from a personal-constructs perspective , which draws attention to personal construction of selves, as distinct from social construction, and describes the dynamics of individual continuity, though understating the concrete contextuality (...) of personal becoming. The present essay considers the compatibility of the personal constructs approach with Harré’s positioning theory. (shrink)

Kelly suggested that it was useful to consider anyone as functioning as a scientist, in the business of applying theories, making hypotheses and predictions and testing them out in the practice of everyday life. One of Charles Peirce’s major contributions was to develop the disciplines of logic and the philosophy of science. We can deepen and enrich our understanding of Kelly’s vision by looking at what Peirce has to say about the process of science. For Peirce, the essence of science (...) was the application of the laws of inference. He developed a much broader concept of logic, elaborating the processes of deduction and induction and adding to these the logic of hypothetical inference, or ‘abduction’, even as Kelly broadened it further in his “departure from classical logic”. Examining the implications of these three forms of inference allows us to elaborate the dynamics involved in the process of construing, ordinacy and the cycles of experience, creativity and decision making. This is the second of a three part series examining the relationship between the work of Peirce and Kelly. The third will include a look at phenomenology, bipolarity, the self, dialogical process and sociological considerations. (shrink)

Niccolò Machiavelli is credited with inspiring the MACH IV personality assessment instrument, which has been adopted widely in management, both public and private. The personality this instrument maps is manipulative, deceitful, immoral, and self-centred. The instrument emerged in 1970 and created a minor industry. There are at least eighty empirical studies in management that involved more than 14,000 subjects. Richard Christie, who created the scale, has said that it is derived from the works of Machiavelli. In a standard debriefing after (...) completing this scale, respondents would be told it concerns the Machiavellian personality. We argue that the Machiavellian personality in MACH IV has little, if anything, to do with Machiavelli, either the man or his works. If Machiavelli is alleged to be relevant to management, we argue that this personality assessment instrument does not demonstrate such relevance. To advance this case we first describe the development of the instrument, identifying some of the assumptions upon which it rests; then we assess each of its twenty items against Machiavelli’s texts. Wefind fewer than half of the items have even a tenuous connection with Machiavelli’s works, yet the instrument bears his name. Against this spurious Machiavelli we juxtapose another twenty passages from The Prince, showing a much more complex and subtle thinker than the one-dimensional cipher in the MACH IV scale. Machiavelli studies have done much to dispel the cloud of mythology around the man and his reputation, and we hope to do the same to MACHIV. In the name of intellectual honesty and sound scholarship, we urge management scholars to take note of this distortion of Machiavelli, and where possible address it, and that users of the MACH IV scale distinguish the man, Machiavelli, and his works from this instrument. (shrink)

In the modern day, it is understood that the role of the teacher comprises aspects of therapy directed towards the child. But to what extent should this relationship be developed, and what are its concomitant responsibilities? This book offers a challenging philosophical approach to the inherent problems and tensions involved with these issues.

It has been argued that there can be no person‐regarding reasons for practising genetic therapy, since it affects identity and causes to exist an individual who would not otherwise have existed. And there can be no such reasons for causing somebody to exist because existing cannot be better for an individual than never existing. In the present paper, both of these claims are denied. It is contended, first, that in practically all significant cases genetic therapy will not affect (...) the identity of beings of our kind. This is so irrespective of whether, essentially, we are beings with minds or beings of a certain biological species, the human one. Second, it is contended that, even if genetic therapy were to affect our identity, there could be person‐regarding reasons for conducting it, for existence can be better than non‐existence for the individual. (shrink)

It has been argued for example by Ingmar Persson, that genetic therapy performed on a conceptus does not alter the identity of the person that develops from it, even if we are essentially persons. If this claim is true then there can be person-regarding reasons for performing genetic therapy on a conceptus. Here it is argued that such person-regarding reasons obtain only if we are not essentially persons but essentially animals. This conclusion requires the defeat of the origination (...) theory, which says that personal identity is determined by the identity of the foetus from which one originates. It is argued that the origination theory is false in the special case relevant to performing genetic therapy on a conceptus for person-regarding reasons. (shrink)

This book introduces therapy as a socially constructed process, helping you develop as a more socially and culturally aware practitioner.

What’s the difference between those psychological posits that are ‘me” and those that are not? Distinguishing between these psychological kinds is important in many domains, but an account of what the distinction consists in is challenging. I argue for Psychological Constructionism: those psychological posits that correspond to the kinds within folk psychology are personal, and those that don’t, aren’t. I suggest that only constructionism can answer a fundamental challenge in characterizing the personal level – the plurality problem. The (...) things that plausibly qualify as personal are motley. Other attempts at accounting for the personal level either cannot accommodate this plurality, or cannot explain what unifies the personal. Given arguments others have given for a pluralistic conception of folk psychology, constructionism explains and predicts this plurality in a systematic and unified way, thereby solving the plurality problem. (shrink)

I have outlined two ways of defending the claim that there are so‐called person‐regarding reasons for practising gene therapy on human conceptuses. One is metaphysical and concerns our nature and identity. The upshot of it is that, in cases of most interest, this therapy does not affect our identity, by bringing into existence anyone of our kind who would not otherwise have existed. The other defence is value theoretical and claims that even if genetic therapy were to (...) affect the identity of beings our kind, there could still be person‐regarding reasons for performing it, since we can be benefited and harmed by being caused to exist or not to exist. Robert Elliot has attacked both of these lines, and my present objective is to show how his criticisms can be deflected. (shrink)

This paper makes attempts to argue that language inevitably affects emotions, and philosophical therapy is possible through deconstruction of language; here the horizon of language is extended not only to its traditional usage, but also as thoughts. Emotions are perceived through our conditioned thoughts and hence by an analysis of the latter, the former will become clearer. The paper is a literature review of a few books by Jiddu Krishnamurti, a contemporary Indian Philosopher; and a book on Buddhist logic. (...) Since the paper is a literature review, it does not have any practical claim to support the points and hence is a speculative approach towards therapy. The paper also does not extend its claims to psychological views on language, rather restricts itself to purely philosophical approach. (shrink)

Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are building a new habitat (infosphere) in which future generations, living in advanced information societies, will spend an increasing amount of time. This paper introduces a series of articles that explore what constitutes a personal identity online (PIO) and how, as well as to what extent, individuals can learn to create, manage and perceive their PIOs in order to facilitate a healthy and rewarding online experience (onlife).

The recent publication of The New Wittgenstein signals the arrival of a distinctive "therapeutic" reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein"s philosophical enterprise. As announced in its Preface, this collection presents the "nonsense" of philosophy as the subject of Wittgenstein"s therapeutic work. The simple, plain nonsense of many philosophical remarks is revealed under the scrutiny of Wittgenstein"s investigations, according to this interpretation, leading us to see that such remarks "fail to make any claim at all" (Crary 6). This view of Wittgenstein"s use of (...) "nonsense" as a term of criticism begins with the work of Stanley Cavell, on this account, and has extended more recently to work on a wide area of Wittgenstein"s concerns, elevating "nonsense" to a central position in his philosophy. This paper argues that, in at least one case of Wittgenstein"s talk of nonsense, this "therapeutic reading" (Crary 7) oversimplifies the subtlety of Wittgenstein"s writing. Indeed, one of the most prominent cases of "nonsense" in the later Wittgenstein concerns the remark "I know I am in pain". Though Wittgenstein repeatedly treats this remark as nonsense, this treatment is not final in his philosophy of psychology. Rather, though his rich discussion in the later manuscripts of the indeterminacy of psychological judgments, the relation of these judgments to knowledge, and the role of first-person psychological descriptions, Wittgenstein is able to find what sense a remark such as "I know I am in pain" might perhaps have. "I know I am in pain" may be called nonsense, but this is not the last word on the matter in Wittgenstein"s text: as Cavell says, ""it makes no sense to say these things" (in the way we think it does)" (Cavell 70). Wittgenstein is able to find what sense our remarks of first person psychological knowledge might have, contrary to what the therapeutic reading in The New Wittgenstein would have us suppose. Therefore, at least in one case, the therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein goes wrong. (shrink)

In this paper, we apply the perspective of intra-organismal ecology by investigating a family of ecological models suitable to describe a gene therapy to a particular metabolic disorder, the adenosine deaminase deficiency (ADA-SCID). The gene therapy is modeled as the prospective ecological invasion of an organ (here, bone marrow) by genetically modified stem cells, which then operate niche construction in the cellular environment by releasing an enzyme they synthesize. We show that depending on the chosen order (a choice (...) that cannot be made on \textit{a priori} assumptions), different kinds of dynamics are expected, possibly leading to different therapeutic strategies. This drives us to discuss several features of the extension of ecology to intra-organismal ecology. (shrink)

This essay is about the United States Supreme Court's discursive creation of two kinds of persons, one corporate the other criminal, during its 1886 term. The aim is to contrast the Supreme Court's construction of corporate personhood in County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad with its view of the criminal's body in Ex parte Royall, a habeas corpus case. The Court's purpose in deciding these two cases was to design a way to disperse newly emergent and conflicting interests (...) in particular directions within the judicial apparatus. The result is that both criminal and corporate bodies come to be understood through discourse, not outside of it. So the body which is being introduced can be described as a discursive body, not as an anatomical given. (shrink)

In this analysis I apply a Foucauldian approach to ethics to examine the politically prescribed moral and ethical character required of carers of aged persons at home in Australia and the role of nurses in shaping these behaviours. The work that spousal carers provide, although often founded on love and/or obligation, has been formalized through a variety of policy initiatives and technologies that serve to construct the moral approach they must adopt. This shaping of conduct at the most (...) class='Hi'>personal level takes place through the application of codes of behaviour policed largely by nurses. These codes redefine the mode of coexistence between an aged husband and wife and propose a new form of relationship that is derived from and supports policies of the deinstitutionalization of care services for elderly persons. In this way modern carer policy has drawn on knowledge and governance of the self to produce a morality of caring that is both authoritative and scientific. (shrink)

Interpersonal sensitivity, particularly threat of potential exclusion, is a critical condition in borderline personality disorder (BPD) which impairs patients’ social adjustment. Current evidence-based treatments include group components, such as mentalization-based group therapy (MBT-G), in order to improve interpersonal functioning. These treatments additionally focus on the therapeutic alliance since it was discovered to be a robust predictor of treatment outcome. However, alliance is a multidimensional factor of group therapy, which includes the fellow patients, and may thus be negatively affected (...) by the exclusion-proneness of BPD patients. The aim of this pilot study was to examine the predictive value of threat of social exclusion for the therapeutic alliance in MBT-G. In the first part of the study, social exclusion was experimentally induced in 23 BPD inpatients and 28 healthy subjects using the Cyberball paradigm, a virtual ball tossing game. The evoked level of threat was measured with the Need-Threat Scale (NTS) which captures four dimensions of fundamental human needs, i. e. the need for belongingness, for self-esteem, for control, and for a meaningful existence. In the second part of the study, therapeutic alliance was measured on three dimensions, the therapists, the fellow patients and the group as a whole, using the Group-Questionnaire (GQ-D). BPD patients scored higher in their level of threat according to the NTS in both, the inclusion and the exclusion condition. The level of threat after exclusion predicted impairments of the therapeutic alliance in MBT-G. It was associated with more negative relationships, lower positive bonding and a lower positive working alliance with the fellow patients and lower positive bonding to the group as a whole whilst no negative prediction of the alliance to the therapists was found. Consequently, our translational study design has shown that Cyberball is an appropriate tool to use as an approach for clinical questions. We further conclude that exclusion-proneness in BPD is a critical feature with respect to alliance in group treatments. In order to neutralize BPD patients’ exclusion bias, therapists may be advised to provide an “inclusive stance”, especially in initial sessions. It is also recommendable to strengthen patient to patient relations. (shrink)

Although it is not yet officially recognized as a clinical entity which is diagnosable, Internet Gaming Disorder (IGD) has been included in section III for further study in the DSM-5 by the American Psychiatric Association (APA, 2013). This is important because there is increasing evidence that people of all ages, in particular teens and young adults, are facing very real and sometimes very severe consequences in daily life resulting from an addictive use of online games. This article summarizes general aspects (...) of IGD including diagnostic criteria and arguments for the classification as an addictive disorder including evidence from neurobiological studies. Based on previous theoretical considerations and empirical findings, this paper examines the use of one recently proposed model, the Interaction of Person-Affect-Cognition-Execution (I-PACE) model, for inspiring future research and for developing new treatment protocols for IGD. The I-PACE model is a theoretical framework that explains symptoms of Internet addiction by looking at interactions between predisposing factors, moderators, and mediators in combination with reduced executive functioning and diminished decision making. Finally, the paper discusses how current treatment protocols focusing on Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Internet addiction (CBT-IA) fit with the processes hypothesized in the I-PACE model. (shrink)

Humans have long wondered whether they can survive the death of their physical bodies. Some people now look to technology as a means by which this might occur, using terms such 'whole brain emulation', 'mind uploading', and 'substrate independent minds' to describe a set of hypothetical procedures for transferring or emulating the functioning of a human mind on a synthetic substrate. There has been much debate about the philosophical implications of such procedures for personal survival. Most participants to that (...) debate assume that the continuation of identity is an objective fact that can be revealed by scientific enquiry or rational debate. We bring into this debate a perspective that has so far been neglected: that personal identities are in large part social constructs. Consequently, to enable a particular identity to survive the transference process, it is not sufficient to settle age-old philosophical questions about the nature of identity. It is also necessary to maintain certain networks of interaction between the synthetic person and its social environment, and sustain a collective belief in the persistence of identity. We defend this position by using the example of the Dalai Lama in Tibetan Buddhist tradition and identify technological procedures that could increase the credibility of personal continuity between biological and artificial substrates. (shrink)

Insightful ideals on the subtle and dynamic relation between the person and the environment have been expressed by Vygotsky, Lewin, Bronfenbrenner and Stern. Carefully following their intricate dialogue reveals that their ideas are mutually enriching. The present essay aims to revitalize this intricate dialogue, and to show how it converges to supply rich meaning to the concept of personal space-time totality. With a view to an empirical study of the personal space-time totality, a four-phase inquiry is proposed, which (...) is essentially a refined co-construction between the subject and the researcher. It is suggested that such a co-construction can be meaningfully integrated into research areas such as autobiographical and narrative studies, commonsense psychology, and optimal human development. (shrink)