Lucy Allais presents an original interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism. She argues that his distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear to us has both epistemological and metaphysical components. Kant is committed to a genuine idealism about things as they appear to us, but this is not a phenomenalist idealism. He is committed to the claim that there is an aspect of reality that grounds mind-dependent spatio-temporal objects, and which we cannot cognize, but he does not assert (...) the existence of distinct non-spatio-temporal objects. On Allais's account, we cannot understand Kant's idealism without a clear account of his notion of intuition and of the role of intuition in cognition: she understands Kantian intuitions as representations that give us acquaintance with the objects of thought. This enables us to make sense of Kant's central argument for his idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and to see why he takes the complete idealist position to be established there. (shrink)

If the history of the Gettier Problem has taught us anything, it is to be skeptical regarding purported solutions. Nevertheless, in “Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved” (2011), that is precisely what John Turri offers us. For nearly fifty years, epistemologists have been chasing a solution for the Gettier Problem but with little to no success. If Turri is right, if he has actually solved the Gettier Problem, then he has done something that is absolutely groundbreaking and really quite remarkable. (...) Regrettably, however, while Turri’s account is both intuitive and elegant—improving upon many seminal projects within contemporary epistemology—I argue in this paper that any success against Gettier counterexamples it affords is merely fleeting. Straightforwardly, this is done in two sections. In §1, I briefly sketch Turri’s proposed solution to the Gettier Problem. Then, in §2, I level a counterexample against it. Unfortunately for Turri and his solution, in this paper we will see history repeat itself. (shrink)

Most metaphysicians agree that powers can exist without being manifested. The main goal of this paper is to show that adherents of an unrestricted version of Dispositional Monism cannot provide a plausible metaphysical account of the difference between a situation in which a power-instance is not manifested and a situation in which a manifestation of that power-instance actually occurs unless they undermine their own view. To this end, two kinds of manifestation-relation are introduced and it is argued that (...) dispositional monists should appeal to the former in order to offer the required account. After defending the introduction of token-level-manifestation-relations against objections to their metaphysical robustness and explanatory non-redundancy, it is finally argued that their existence is incompatible with the core tenet of an unrestricted form of Dispositional Monism because they cannot be powers. (shrink)

In the paper two forms of human dealing with the notion of the sacred are compared — manifestation and proclamation. Author suggests that proclamation is a characteristic for modern monotheistic religions based on the Old Testament theology. In particular, a vivid example of proclamation is a teaching of Jesus Christ, as presented in synoptic Gospels. In Ricouer’s view, a decline of the sacred in modern Western civilization is connected with an unjustified absolutization of the scientific and technical achievements and (...) must be overcome in the course of the further social development. (shrink)

In this book, Yael Greenberg discusses and clarifies a number of controversial issues and phenomena in the generic literature, including the existence of ...

This paper provides a principled and elegant solution to the Gettier problem. The key move is to draw a general metaphysical distinction and conscript it for epistemological purposes. Section 1 introduces the Gettier problem. Sections 2–5 discuss instructively wrong or incomplete previous proposals. Section 6 presents my solution and explains its virtues. Section 7 answers the most common objection.

He further argues that it is necessary to rethink traditional conceptions of argument, and to find a position that avoids the limitations of both the highly abstract approach of formal logic and the highly contextualized approaches of rhetoric and communication theory.".

Dispositions can combine as vector sums. Recent authors on dispositions, such as George Molnar and Stephen Mumford, have responded to this feature of dispositions by introducing a distinction between effects and contributions to effects, and by identifying disposition-manifestations with the latter. But some have been sceptical of the reality or knowability of component vectors; Jennifer McKitrick (forthcoming) presses these concerns against the conception of manifestations as contributions to effects. In this paper, I aim to respond to McKitrick's arguments and to (...) defend the metaphysical and epistemological propriety of component vectors. My strategy appeals to varying kinematic frames of reference. By transforming to the appropriate non-inertial frame, component acceleration vectors can be transformed into resultant acceleration vectors, and in such frames they become directly observable. Being a component acceleration vector and being a resultant acceleration vector are both frame-dependent properties of properties; they are not to be thought of as intrinsic or fundamental properties of an acceleration vector, but as artefacts of our frame-dependent notation for representing vector quantities. To conclude the paper, I defend the view proposed against two styles of objection. The first objection resurrects scepticism about component vectors as scepticism about fundamental component vectors. The second objection questions the need for reference frames in the explanation by invoking a 'counterfactual' theory of contributions. (shrink)

La philosophie est aujourd'hui possible, dans la plénitude de son ambition. La philosophie elle-même, telle que l'entendait Platon.Ce qui a entraîné son éclipse au XIXe siècle, c'est qu'elle s'est identifiée, « suturée », tour à tour à un seul des champs où se pose, par-delà le savoir, une vérité : le scientifique (positivisme), le politique (marxisme), puis, avec Nietzche et plus encore Heidegger, le poème.

In this paper, we review a general technique for converting the standard Lagrangian description of a classical system into a formulation that puts time on an equal footing with the system's degrees of freedom. We show how the resulting framework anticipates key features of special relativity, including the signature of the Minkowski metric tensor and the special role played by theories that are invariant under a generalized notion of Lorentz transformations. We then use this technique to revisit a classification of (...) classical particle-types that mirrors Wigner's classification of quantum particle-types in terms of irreducible representations of the Poincaré group, including the cases of massive particles, massless particles, and tachyons. Along the way, we see gauge invariance naturally emerge in the context of classical massless particles with nonzero spin, as well as study the massless limit of a massive particle and derive a classical-particle version of the Higgs mechanism. (shrink)

Manifest Activity presents and critically examines the model of human power, the will, our capacities for purposeful conduct, and the place of our agency in the natural world of one of the most important and traditionally under-appreciated philosophers of the 18th century: Thomas Reid. For Reid, contrary to the view of many of his predecessors, it is simply manifest that we are active with respect to our behaviours; it is manifest, he thinks, that our actions are not merely remote products (...) of forces that lie outside of our control. Reid holds, instead, that actions are all and only those events that spring from active power and he produces insightful and imaginative arguments for the claim that only a creature with a mind is capable of having active power. He believes that only human beings, and creatures 'above us', are capable of directing events towards ends, of endowing them with purpose or direction, the distinctive feature of action. However, he also holds that all events, and not merely human actions, are products of active power, power possessed either by human beings or by God. This collection of theses leads Reid to the view that human behaviour and the progress of nature are both essentially teleological. Patterns in nature are the products of laws of which God is the author; patterns in human conduct are the products of character and the laws that individuals set for themselves. Manifest Activity examines Reid's arguments for this view and the view's implications for the nature of character, motivation and the special kind of causation involved in the production of human behavior. (shrink)

Manifestly covariant quantum theory with invariant evolution parameter is a parametrized relativistic dynamical theory. The study of parameterized relativistic dynamics (PRD) helps us understand the consequences of changing key assumptions of quantum field theory (QFT). QFT has been very successful at explaining physical observations and is the basis of the conventional paradigm, which includes the Standard Model of electroweak and strong interactions. Despite its record of success, some phenomena are anomalies that may require a modification of the Standard Model. The (...) anomalies include neutrino oscillations, non-locality, and gravity.The two key QFT assumptions that are altered in PRD are the following: fields depend on space and time; and interactions between fields are local. Locality and non-locality refer to the correlation of particles with space-like separation. A local theory does not allow the existence of greater than light speed correlations, while a non-local theory does. PRD is a non-local theory that allows fields to depend on space, time and an invariant evolution parameter. A formulation of PRD is presented together with applications that can be directly compared to results from the conventional paradigm. (shrink)

I argue that the standard anti-realist argument from manifestability to intuitionistic logic is either unsound or invalid. Strong interpretations of the manifestability of understanding are falsified by the existence of blindspots for knowledge. Weaker interpretations are either too weak, or gerrymandered and ad hoc. Either way, they present no threat to classical logic.

The world-view to which the long arc of modern philosophy since Descartes bends is Materialism With A Bad Conscience, a Materialism continually bedeviled by the need to deal with apparently irreducible mental items. I believe this world-view to be the offspring of an introjective error; in effect, the mentalization of sensible form, finality and value. Hence the characteristic modernist accusation is that when we take sensible form, finality and value to be genuine features of the manifest we are thereby "projecting" (...) aspects of our mental life onto an environment devoid of these features. David Hume went furthest in this Projectivist direction arguing that indeed even the very notion of an efficient cause was a projection of our habitual expectations that the regularly observed consequences of certain classes of events would continue. So far from these expectations constituting a practical knowledge of efficient causes, acquired over immense periods of time in the life of our species as it adapted to and with its complex causal environment, those expectations are merely appearances which we mistake for a mind-independent relation among the things themselves. Thus the manifest is traded in for the "manifest image of the world," an image interposed between a subject and deracinated environment. (shrink)

According to a standard characterization of dispositions, when a disposition is activated by a stimulus, a manifestation of that disposition typically occurs. For example, when flammable gasoline encounters a spark in an oxygen-rich environment, the manifestation of flammability—combustion—occurs. In the dispositions/powers literature, it is common to assume that a manifestation is an effect of a disposition being activated. (I use “disposition” and “power” interchangeably). I address two questions in this chapter: Could all manifestations be effects that involve (...) things acquiring only dispositional properties? And, is thinking of manifestations as contributions to effects preferable to thinking of them as effects? I defend negative responses to both questions. If all properties are dispositional, as the pandispositionalists claim, then any time the activation of a disposition results is something acquiring a new property, it results in something acquiring another disposition. Some worry that a vicious regress ensues (Swinburne, 1980; Bird, 2007a, 2007b: 132-46). While I believe that regress arguments can be addressed, my worry is that, on the pandispositionalist view, manifestations become unobservable. Thinking of manifestations as effects is problematic in cases where what actually occurs is not the kind of effect that the power is a power for, but rather a complex interaction of various powers. Because of this, some prefer to think of manifestations as contributions to effects (Molnar, 2003: 194-8; Mumford, 2009). I argue against this proposal on the ground that it introduces mysterious new entities into our ontology. In the end, the most plausible view is that a single kind of power can have different kinds of effects, some of which involve the instantiation of non-dispositional properties. I proceed as follows. In the first section of this chapter, I show that the philosophical concept of a manifestation is the concept of an effect. In the second section, I argue against the claim that all manifestations involve instantiations of only dispositional properties. In the third section, I argue against the view that manifestations are contributions rather than effects. (shrink)

Electrifying, provocative, and controversial when first published thirty years ago, Donna Haraway's "Cyborg Manifesto" is even more relevant today, when the divisions that she so eloquently challenges--of human and machine but also of gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and location--are increasingly complex. The subsequent "Companion Species Manifesto," which further questions the human-nonhuman disjunction, is no less urgently needed in our time of environmental crisis and profound polarization.Manifestly Haraway brings together these momentous manifestos to expose the continuity and ramifying force of (...) Haraway's thought, whose significance emerges with engaging immediacy in a sustained conversation between the author and her long-term friend and colleague Cary Wolfe. Reading cyborgs and companion species through and with each other, Haraway and Wolfe join in a wide-ranging exchange on the history and meaning of the manifestos in the context of biopolitics, feminism, Marxism, human-nonhuman relationships, making kin, literary tropes, material semiotics, the negative way of knowing, secular Catholicism, and more.The conversation ends by revealing the early stages of Haraway's "Chthulucene Manifesto," in tension with the teleologies of the doleful Anthropocene and the exterminationist Capitalocene. Deeply dedicated to a diverse and robust earthly flourishing, Manifestly Haraway promises to reignite needed discussion in and out of the academy about biologies, technologies, histories, and still possible futures. (shrink)

The article aims to frame the issue of authenticity regarding street artworks. By introducing and analyzing the concept of artification, which refers to the situation when non-art is modified by art, I argue that street art manifests its authenticity through transforming the space around particular artworks. This transformation amounts to two facts: sanctioning certain practices which change our perception of the urban environment, and creating new aesthetic objects which are art-like.

In resisting attempts to explain the unity of a whole in terms of a multiplicity of interacting parts, quantum mechanics calls for an explanatory concept that proceeds in the opposite direction: from unity to multiplicity. Being part of the Scientific Image of the world, the theory concerns the process by which (the physical aspect of) what Sellars called the Manifest Image of the world comes into being. This process consists in the progressive differentiation of an intrinsically undifferentiated entity. By entering (...) into reflexive spatial relations, this entity gives rise to (i) what looks like a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality of the relations is not taken into account, and (ii) what looks like a substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is reified. If there is a distinctly quantum domain, it is a non-spatial and non-temporal dimension across which the transition from the unity of this entity to the multiplicity of the world takes place. Instead of being constituents of the physical world, subatomic particles, atoms, and molecules are instrumental in its manifestation. These conclusions are based on the following interpretive principle and its more direct consequences: whenever the calculation of probabilities calls for the addition of amplitudes, the distinctions we make between the alternatives lack objective reality. Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between regions of space, this principle implies that, owing to the indefiniteness of positions, the spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete: the existence of a real-valued spatiotemporal background is an unrealistic idealization. This guarantees the existence of observables whose values are real per se, as against “real by virtue of being indicated by the values of observables that are real per se.” Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between things, it implies that, intrinsically, all fundamental particles are numerically identical and thus identifiable with the aforementioned undifferentiated entity. (shrink)

McFetridge (in Logical necessity and other essays . London: Blackwell, 1990 ) suggests that to treat a proposition as logically necessary—to believe a proposition logically necessary, and to manifest that belief—is a matter of preparedness to deploy that proposition as a premise in reasoning from any supposition. We consider whether a suggestion in that spirit can be generalized to cover all cases of absolute necessity, both logical and non-logical, and we conclude that it can. In Sect. 2, we explain the (...) significance that such an account of manifestation of belief in absolute necessity has for the prospects of a non-realist theory of modality. In Sect. 3, we offer a sympathetic articulation of the detail that underlies the McFetridge conception of belief in logical necessity. In Sects. 4 and 5, we show that the conception so articulated will not generalize to encompass all cases of belief in absolute necessity and proceed to offer a remedy. Our proposal is based upon a distinction between two kinds of suppositional act: A-supposing and C-supposing (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we then explain and defend our central thesis: (roughly) that (manifestation of) belief in absolute necessity is a matter of preparedness to deploy as a premise in reasoning under any C-supposition. Finally, we indicate that there is some promise in the parallel thesis that manifestation of the treatment of a proposition as a priori is a matter of preparedness to deploy as a premise in reasoning under any A-supposition (Sect. 8). (shrink)

Exemplification is the relation of an example to whatever it is an example of. Goodman maintains that exemplification is a symptom of the aesthetic: although not a necessary condition, it is an indicator that symbol is functioning aesthetically. I argue that exemplification is as important in science as it is in art. It is the vehicle by which experiments make aspects of nature manifest. I suggest that the difference between exemplars in the arts and the sciences lies in the way (...) they exemplify. Density and repleteness are characteristic of aesthetic exemplars but not of scientific ones. (shrink)

Au terme d'une longue recherche en quête du sens de l'art et de son mystère au coeur de nos vies, ce bref essai voudrait revenir sur le point central de jointure entre apparence et apparition qu'on peut désigner sous l'expression de manifestation esthétique. Interrogation ultime que soulève tout grand créateur d'une oeuvre d'art digne de ce nom, à savoir porteuse d'un contenu de vérité authentique. Ainsi du doute de Cézanne hanté au dire de Merleau-Ponty par le soupçon de l'échec (...) de la peinture à conjurer l'illusion des images - ou encore de l'angoisse de Schoenberg à la poursuite d'une musique qui soit espérance messianique (ce que J S Bach déjà avait poursuivi au sommet toute sa vie). Question éminemment philosophique méditée depuis toujours par les plus grands penseurs. Ainsi, au confluent du néo-platonisme et du christianisme, la lecture augustinienne de Plotin ; en plein âge baroque, l'analyse kantienne décisive du sublime au principe de l'imagination esthétique, et, à l'aurore de notre modernité du XXe siècle, l'invocation de Walter Benjamin à "l'aura, l'unique apparaître d'un lointain". (shrink)

Benedetto Croce reageert op het fascistisch manifest van Gentile en laat niet alleen zien dat dat manifest net als het fascisme zelf een incoherente en bizarre mengelmoes is, maar roept ook op tot een behoud van de traditionele, humanistische waarden.

The world-view to which the long arc of modern philosophy since Descartes bends is Materialism With A Bad Conscience, a Materialism continually bedeviled by the need to deal with apparently irreducible mental items. I believe this world-view to be the offspring of an introjective error; in effect, the mentalization of sensible form, finality and value. Hence the characteristic modernist accusation is that when we take sensible form, finality and value to be genuine features of the manifest we are thereby "projecting" (...) aspects of our mental life onto an environment devoid of these features. David Hume went furthest in this Projectivist direction arguing that indeed even the very notion of an efficient cause was a projection of our habitual expectations that the regularly observed consequences of certain classes of events would continue. So far from these expectations constituting a practical knowledge of efficient causes, acquired over immense periods of time in the life of our species as it adapted to and with its complex causal environment, those expectations are merely appearances which we mistake for a mind-independent relation among the things themselves. Thus the manifest is traded in for the "manifest image of the world," an image interposed between a subject and deracinated environment. (shrink)

Explores a postmodern criticism of P. S. Churchland's claims regarding materialism. Materialism is classically understood to be the philosophical position which holds that matter is the fundamental reality of the world, and so neurobiological explanations can be said to be materialistic. Neurobiological explanations of behavior are used increasingly in the place of psychological explanations. This trend is indicative of the rise in popularity of materialism. Churchland is one of the intellectual leaders in the modern manifestation of materialism. She is (...) a self-proclaimed materialist and "neurophilosopher." In order for Churchland to maintain her materialist position, she must assume a transparency in scientific method, an assumption which is a legacy of Enlightenment philosophy. However, many postmodern philosophers including M. Heidegger and H. G. Gadamer have questioned this assumed transparency of method. The implications of this postmodern philosophy for the current materialistic trends in psychology are discussed. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Most readers of Sellars' philosophy learn about a Manifest-Scientific Image distinction, and because apparently nothing significant hinges on what at first sight seems just a neologistic labeling of a familiar distinction, it is henceforth wrongly associated with a pre-systematic commonsense/scientific framework distinction. The Manifest Image is not identical to the commonsense framework; nor is the Scientific Image identical to the scientific framework. In this paper I will concern myself only with arguing that the Manifest Image is not identical to the (...) commonsense framework. (shrink)

Five fundamental manifestations of symmetry in physics—reproducibility as symmetry, predictability as symmetry, symmetry of evolution of isolated physical systems, symmetry of states of physical systems, and gauge symmetry—are investigated for their essential meaning and physical significance. The approach is conceptual, to the complete exclusion of mathematical formalism.

Virtue Epistemology appealingly characterizes knowledge as a kind of achievement, attributable to the exercise of cognitive virtues. But a more thorough understanding of the nature and value of achievements more broadly casts doubt on the view. In particular, it is argued that virtue epistemology’s answer to the Meno question is not as impressive as it purports to be, and that the favored analysis of ability is both problematic and irrelevant. However, considerations about achievements illuminate the best direction for the development (...) of virtue epistemology. The key, it is argued, is developing the notion of manifestation as the distinguishing feature of both knowledge and achievements. (shrink)

Dummett’s Manifestation Argument against realism attempts to show that a realist conception of meaning cannot explain the understanding of truth-conditions transcendent to evidence. In this work the general structure of the argument is discussed along with several objections to it. This examination finds that the anti-realist is committed to a deflationary conception of the normative character of meaning that is unpalatable. This essay contends that the argument in its present form cannot have the metaphysical consequences it claims (at least (...) not without begging the question). (shrink)

P. Kyle Stanford - The Manifest Connection: Causation, Meaning, and David Hume - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.3 339-360 The Manifest Connection: Causation, Meaning, and David Hume P. Kyle Stanford 1. Introduction exciting recent hume scholarship has challenged the traditional view that Hume's theory of meaning leads him to deny the very intelligibility or coherence of supposing that there are objective causal powers or intrinsic necessary connections between causally related entities. Influential (...) recent interpretations have variously held that Hume himself accepted the existence of such powers and connections, that he was genuinely agnostic about them, or that he denied their existence while nonetheless holding it to be a perfectly coherent possibility, indeed one that we routinely think actual. In this paper I will argue against all three of these lines of interpretation and in favor of what I consider a neglected alternative: that Hume rejects the existence of objective necessary connections or causal powers as literally incoherent or meaningless, but on subtle and sophisticated semantic grounds, rather than simplistic ones. I find support for this semantic reading and against the alternatives not only in passages whose significance to the debate is widely appreciated, but also in Hume's discussions "Of Liberty and Necessity" and "Of the Immateriality of the Soul." The.. (shrink)

In this paper, we will discuss what is called the “Manifestation Challenge” to semantic realism, which was originally developed by Michael Dummett and has been further refined by Crispin Wright. According to this challenge, semantic realism has to meet the requirement that knowledge of meaning must be publically manifested in linguistic behaviour. In this regard, we will introduce and evaluate John McDowell’s response to this anti-realistic challenge, which was put forward to show that the challenge cannot undermine realism. According (...) to McDowell, knowledge of undecidable sentences’ truth-conditions can be properly manifested in our ordinary practice of asserting such sentences under certain circumstances, and any further requirement will be redundant. Wright’s further objection to McDowell’s response will be also discussed and it will be argued that this objection fails to raise any serious problem for McDowell’s response and that it is an implausible objection in general. (shrink)

Dans le "Manifeste au Service du Personnalisme" d'Emmanuel Mounier, le philosophe français expose les principes fondamentaux du personnalisme. L'ouvrage défend la primauté de la personne humaine dans la société et explore comment le personnalisme peut influencer la politique, l'économie et la culture. Mounier appelle à une réflexion approfondie sur la dignité et la responsabilité individuelles, cherchant à promouvoir une société où chaque personne est reconnue et respectée dans sa singularité. Ce manifeste offre une vision philosophique engagée en faveur de la (...) place centrale de l'individu au sein de la communauté. (shrink)

Few philosophers endorse a virtue theory of praiseworthiness. The widespread aversion to any virtue theory of moral worth rests chiefly on a skeptical argument that emphasizes the fact that praiseworthy acts can be performed by people who lack the relevant virtue. This chapter studies this skeptical argument closely. It concludes that the skeptical argument's core premise has been misleadingly characterized. Once the core premise has been clarified, the virtue theory appears to escape the grip of the skeptical argument.

This article outlines a realist theory of aesthetic properties as higher-order manifest properties and defends it from several objections, including a possible conflict with contextualist approaches to the aesthetic properties of works of art.

Globalization challenges the state-centric realist view of space and authority within International Relations. Using multifaceted concepts of territoriality and non-territoriality, this article goes into three versions of current territorial fragmentation or connectivity – deterritorialization, extraterritorialization and reterritorialization. They are to enable us to reveal the proliferation of globally relevant social and power dynamics above, below and within the state domain. At the same time, they are to illuminate the ambivalent role of states played in an era of global interconnectedness.

Cinema is not only a space in which directors act with the aim of making art, but they also reflect their own testimonies and political perspectives; this study, which claims to be related to representation strategies that contain various interests and desires; It is of the opinion that different ideological approaches are reflected on the screen by political and cultural elites in line with the construction, legitimacy and movement of identities and images. In this study, which examines the Türkiye’nin Kalbi (...) Ankara movie, which was shot in the intense socio-political atmosphere of the 1930s and was shot to tell Turkey's nationalization process and modernization experience through the capital Ankara; the manifestation of the Turkish nation-building process in cinema is discussed through the relationship between nationalism and cinema. (shrink)

Dem "Manifestationsargument" zufolge steht eine realistische Semantik der Wahrheitsbedingungen im Widerspruch zu dem Gedanken, dass das Verstehen von Sätzen eine Fähigkeit ist, die sich im Handeln manifestieren können muss. – Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass sowohl Realisten als auch Anti-Realisten die These aufzugeben haben, dass das Verstehen eines Satzes im Erfassen der jeweiligen Wahrheitsbedingungenbesteht. Die realistische Annahme der Existenz verifikationstranszendenter Wahrheiten steht – unabhängig vom Manifestationsprinzip – im Widerspruch zu einer wahrheitskonditionalen Semantik. Die von heutigen Anti-Realisten vertretenen Theorien des Verstehens sind (...) allerdings einem ähnlichen Einwand ausgesetzt, insofern sie gleichfalls nicht unsere Fähigkeit, unentscheidbare Sätze zu verstehen, erklären können. (shrink)

This manuscript focuses on a problem for Millian Russellianism raised by Fine : “[Assuming] that we are in possession of the information that a Fs and the information that a Gs, it appears that we are sometimes justified in putting this information ‘together’ and inferring that a both Fs and Gs. But how?” It will be my goal to determine a Millian-Russellian solution to this problem. I will first examine Nathan Salmon’s Millian-Russellian solution, which appeals to a non-semantic and subjective (...) notion of coordination defined in terms of guises. I will object that in order to convincingly solve a specific version of Fine’s problem, identity conditions for guises must be provided. On the other hand, the most plausible way to individuate guises is by means of the equivalence classes of coordination itself. But, if so, the guise-based strategy to solve Fine’s problem risks being circular; in addition, there are serious doubts that coordination is transitive. An alternative Millian-Russellian solution to Fine’s problem will then be explored, which gives up guises and employs, instead, a non-semantic and subjective relation of coordination not defined in terms of guises, along with occurrences of Russellian propositions of a special sort, for which identity conditions will be provided and via which token attitude states intuitively more fine-grained than guises will be individuated. (shrink)

Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for positive states of affairs to be located in the future not the past, and for negative states of affairs to be located in the past not the future. Three explanations for future-bias have been posited: the temporal metaphysics explanation, the practical irrelevance explanation, and the three mechanisms explanation. Understanding what explains future-bias is important not only for better understanding the phenomenon itself, but also because many philosophers think that which explanation is (...) the correct one has implications for our evaluation of the normative status of future-bias. In this paper we focus on the connection between future-bias and the temporal value asymmetry. The latter refers to the fact that people tend to assign more value to a state of affairs when it is located in the future, as opposed to being equidistant in the past. All three candidate explanations offered for future-bias proceed by explaining the temporal value asymmetry, and then supposing that future-bias is simply a manifestation of that asymmetry. Recently, however, it has been argued that the conditions under which people display the temporal value asymmetry and future-bias are different, and that this is reason to doubt that the latter is a manifestation of the former. In this paper we empirically test one response to this argument against the manifestation thesis—the simulation response—according to which once we control for the degree to which people can simulate the object of their preference, we find that people display future-bias and the temporal value asymmetry in the same conditions. We find no evidence in favour of the simulation response. Moreover, our results support some previous research that suggests that the temporal value asymmetry is less robust than previously thought, and this in itself casts doubt on the idea that future bias is just a manifestation of this asymmetry. (shrink)

There are striking differences between the scientific theoretical description of the world and the way it seems to us. The consequent task of relating science to ’the world we live in’ has been a problem throughout the history of science. But have we made this an impossibility by how we formulate the problem? Some say that besides the successive world-pictures of science there is the world-picture that preceded all these and continues to exist by their side, elucidated by more humanistic (...) philosophers. Wilfrid Sellars codified this conviction in his dichotomy of scientific image and manifest image. Others say that all our world-pictures are transient, evolve, conflict with and replace each other, undergo violent revolutions as well as periods of normal development, and may be incommensurable, allowing of no meaningful dialogue. All such formulations may themselves be tendentious metaphysics, full of false contrasts. Insistence on a radical separation between science and what we have apart from science, on the impossibility of accommodating science without surrender, may be a way of either idolizing or demonizing science rather than understanding it. (shrink)

Dans cet ouvrage, l'auteur se livre à une comparaison conceptuelle entre le principe de précaution et le principe responsabilité. Il combat la démarche tendancieuse des penseurs de la précaution qui, à l'image de Corinne Lepage, dont la conception a été reprise par le chef de l'Etat français lors du " Grenelle de l'Environnement ", assimilent précaution et responsabilité, réduisant la seconde à la première. Précaution et responsabilité ne sont en réalité absolument pas réductibles, et le principe responsabilité tel que défini (...) par Hans Jonas contient les germes d'une remise en question du mode de développement occidental, dont la notion de développement durable est actuellement le fer de lance, que le principe de précaution ne permet pas - et qu'il interdit même. Politique de Cassandre dévoile ainsi l'escroquerie politico-intellectuelle dont le principe de précaution est la manifestation, et dont le " Grenelle de l'environnement " est le dernier avatar. La responsabilité politique ne consiste à intervenir ni en aval de la catastrophe comme nous y oblige le développement techno-scientifique, ni en amont de la catastrophe et en aval des causes de cette catastrophe comme nous y incite le principe de précaution, mais en amont des causes de la catastrophe. Cet essai, à la fois philosophique, politique et poétique, tente d'allier la rigueur de la démarche intellectuelle, le souci moral de la pratique et la sensibilité humaine. (shrink)

Trust may be an important organizing idea when thinking about law. However, if trust is to be deployed usefully as an organizing idea when thinking about law, work must be done to understand what trust is, what it does and what effect it has. This article explores one aspect of interpersonal trust that may be relevant when thinking about law. The article considers how one person might manifest trust to another. In so doing, the article considers types of action that (...) are ill- and well-suited to manifesting trust. It then considers why it might be important to manifest trust. Finally, the article suggests some lines of future inquiry by pointing to how the phenomenology of trust might be significant when assessing the sorts of claims about trust that lawyers typically make. (shrink)

Der er ikke mange virkelige filosoffer i Frankrig i dag, selv om der uden tvivl er flere end andre steder.

"La philosophie hédoniste est une proposition psychologique, éthique, érotique, esthétique, bioéthique, politique... Elle propose un discours sur la nature des choses afin que tout un chacun puisse trouver sa place dans une nature, un monde, un cosmos dans la perspective d'une vie réussie - la vie réussie se définissant comme celle qu'on aimerait revivre s'il nous était possible d'en vivre une à nouveau". Michel Onfray, philosophe, a toujours placé l'hédonisme et l'athéisme au coeur de son oeuvre. Fondateur de l'Université populaire (...) de Caen puis de celle du goût à Argentan, il est aussi connu pour ses cours de contre-histoire de la philosophie, régulièrement diffusés sur France Culture. Pour défendre avec lui l'hédonisme, il invite dans cet ouvrage : Titouan Lamazou, Robert Misrahi, Jean Lambert-Wild, Gérard Garouste, l'Université populaire de Caen, Jacques Gallot, l'Université populaire du goût, Evelyne Bloch-Dano, Slow Food, Jean Lhéritier, Ernest Pignon-Ernest, Jean-Paul Enthoven, Ingrid Astier, Juliette, Bettina Rheims, Guy Bedos. (shrink)

Les Fermenta cognitionis, mais surtout les Leçons de 1833, permettent de mesurer l’ampleur et la variété thématiques de la lecture de Boehme opérée par F. von Baader. En plein accomplissement de l’idéalisme allemand, Baader trouve chez le « cordonnier de Görlitz » les munitions spéculatives nécessaires pour lui opposer un « réalisme transcendantal » puissant et pleinement chrétien. C’est dans la compréhension, ardue mais salutaire, du juste rapport de la manifestation de l’être à sa médiation intérieure, que Baader pense (...) découvrir l’apport le plus excellent de Boehme à une philosophie théologique. (shrink)