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  1. A Reformulation of Ayer's Verification Theory of Meaning.Vincent Perth Kenworthy - manuscript
    The verification theory of meaning as originally put forth by Ayer suffered from the problem that according to its criterion, any statement, including “green ideas sleep furiously", was meaningful. This problem did not go away with the reformulation put forth by Wright. This article proposes a different criterion which aims to preserve the notion of “verifiability in principle" which Ayer claimed separated the meaningful from the meaningless. The status of the verification theory as verifiable according to its own standards is (...)
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  2. Relevance and Verification.Ben Blumson - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3):457-480.
    A. J. Ayer’s empiricist criterion of meaning was supposed to have sorted all statements into nonsense on the one hand, and tautologies or genuinely factual statements on the other. Unfortunately for Ayer, it follows from classical logic that his criterion is trivial—it classifies all statements as either tautologies or genuinely factual, but none as nonsense. However, in this paper, I argue that Ayer’s criterion of meaning can be defended from classical proofs of its triviality by the adoption of a relevant (...)
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  3. Introduction to Positivism and the External Real World and Positivism and Realism.Michael Shaffer - 2020 - In Positivism and the External Real World and Positivism and Realism.
  4. Bilateralist Detours: From Intuitionist to Classical Logic and Back.Nils Kürbis - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 60 (239):301-316.
    There is widespread agreement that while on a Dummettian theory of meaning the justified logic is intuitionist, as its constants are governed by harmonious rules of inference, the situation is reversed on Huw Price's bilateralist account, where meanings are specified in terms of primitive speech acts assertion and denial. In bilateral logics, the rules for classical negation are in harmony. However, as it is possible to construct an intuitionist bilateral logic with harmonious rules, there is no formal argument against intuitionism (...)
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  5. Evolution of Quine’s Thinking on the Thesis of Underdetermination and Scott Soames’s Accusation of Paradoxicality.M. Ashraf Adeel - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):56-69.
    Scott Soames argues that interpreted in the light of Quine's holistic verificationism, Quine's thesis of underdetermination leads to a contradiction. It is contended here that if we pay proper attention to the evolution of Quine's thinking on the subject, particularly his criterion of theory individuation, Quine's thesis of underdetermination escapes Soames' charge of paradoxicality.
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  6. What is Wrong with Classical Negation?Nils Kürbis - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92 (1):51-86.
    The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I (...)
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  7. Negation. A Problem for the Proof-Theoretic Justification of Deduction.Nils Kürbis - 2015
    This is only a very short essay on negation and harmony in philosophical logic. If you buy it anyway, you'll help me pay the bills and I'll be able to write longer things.
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  8. Analytic Philosophy (Alternative Title 'Analytic Atheism?').Charles Pigden - 2013 - In Stephen Bullivant & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism. Oxford University Press. pp. 307-319.
    Most analytic philosophers are atheists, but is there a deep connection between analytic philosophy and atheism? The paper argues a) that the founding fathers of analytic philosophy were mostly teenage atheists before they became philosophers; b) that analytic philosophy was invented partly because it was realized that the God-substitute provided by the previously fashionable philosophy - Absolute Idealism – could not cut the spiritual mustard; c) that analytic philosophy developed an unhealthy obsession with meaninglessness which led to a new kind (...)
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  9. How Fundamental is the Fundamental Assumption?Nils Kurbis - 2012 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):5-19.
    The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of (...)
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  10. On Michael Dummett’s Anti-realism and Verificationist View. (In Persian).Ali Hossein Khani - 2010 - Metaphysik 2 (7):63-78.
  11. Solipsism and the Solitary Language User.Irwin Goldstein - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (1):35-47.
    A person skeptical about other minds supposes it is possible in principle that there are no minds other than his. A person skeptical about an external world thinks it is possible there is no world external to him. Some philosophers think a person can refute the skeptic and prove that his world is not the solitary scenario the skeptic supposes might be realized. In this paper I examine one argument that some people think refutes solipsism. The argument, from Wittgenstein, is (...)
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  12. Pluralism and the Logical Basis of Metaphysics.N. Kurbis - 2007 - In Logica Yearbook.
    I argue for a kind of logical pluralism on the basis of a difficulty with defining the meaning of negation in the framework of Dummett's and Prawitz' proof-theoretic semantics.
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  13. Verifikation, Manifestation und Verstehen: Bemerkungen zum Manifestationsargument.Thorsten Sander - 2006 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 113:336-358.
    Dem "Manifestationsargument" zufolge steht eine realistische Semantik der Wahrheitsbedingungen im Widerspruch zu dem Gedanken, dass das Verstehen von Sätzen eine Fähigkeit ist, die sich im Handeln manifestieren können muss. – Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass sowohl Realisten als auch Anti-Realisten die These aufzugeben haben, dass das Verstehen eines Satzes im Erfassen der jeweiligen Wahrheitsbedingungenbesteht. Die realistische Annahme der Existenz verifikationstranszendenter Wahrheiten steht – unabhängig vom Manifestationsprinzip – im Widerspruch zu einer wahrheitskonditionalen Semantik. Die von heutigen Anti-Realisten vertretenen Theorien des Verstehens sind (...)
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  14. In Defense of (Some) Verificationism: Verificationism and Game-Theoretical Semantics.Louise Vigeam - 2003 - In Jaroslav Peregrin (ed.), Meaning: The Dynamic Turn. Elsevier Science. pp. 12--259.
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  15. Compact Entailment and Wright's Verification Principle.Byeong-Uk Yi - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):413-421.
  16. Prawitz's Version of Verificationism.Lars Bergström - 1998 - Theoria 64 (2-3):139-156.
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  17. Quantum Mechanical Unbounded Operators and Constructive Mathematics – a Rejoinder to Bridges.Geoffrey Hellman - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (2):121-127.
    As argued in Hellman (1993), the theorem of Pour-El and Richards (1983) can be seen by the classicist as limiting constructivist efforts to recover the mathematics for quantum mechanics. Although Bridges (1995) may be right that the constructivist would work with a different definition of 'closed operator', this does not affect my point that neither the classical unbounded operators standardly recognized in quantum mechanics nor their restrictions to constructive arguments are recognizable as objects by the constructivist. Constructive substitutes that may (...)
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  18. Review of P. Frascolla, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics[REVIEW]Victor Rodych - 1995 - Philosophia Mathematica 3 (3).
  19. Whatever Happened to the Positivist Theory of Meaning.Joseph Agassi - 1987 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 18 (1-2):22-29.
    It is getting increasingly difficult to comprehend the history of ideas of the Vienna Circle and only a clear and critical exposition of it will save it from total oblivion; an apologetic presentation will not be understood. Now that the positivist theory of meaning is no longer accepted, only an honest presentation of this fact will enable us to comprehend it and its transformations. An analysis of a paper by Otto Neurath illustrates this: Neurath's inability to present fairly his critics' (...)
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  20. Verificationism and the Manifestations of Meaning.Anthony Appiah & Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59 (1):17 - 52.
  21. Verificationism and Theories of Space-Time.Richard Swinburne - 1983 - In Space, Time and Causality. Reidel. pp. 63-78.
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  22. Peirce on Meaning.Robert Almeder - 1979 - Synthese 41 (1):1 - 24.
    More often than not, the attractive features of Peirce's theory of meaning have been overlooked because of the temptation on the part of many philosophers to dismiss Peirce as a beknighted forerunner of a narrow form of verificationism frequently identified with the view of the ...
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  23. Meaning, Bivalence, and Verificationism.J. H. McDowell - 1976 - In Gareth Evans & John Henry McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Clarendon Press. pp. 42--66.
  24. Philosophy of Language and Philosophy of Science.Hilary Putnam - 1974 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1974:603 - 610.
  25. Verification In Metaphysics.Peter M. Burkholder - 1972 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 21:101-113.
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  26. Cognitive Meaning and Cognitive Use.David Rynin - 1966 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 9 (1-4):109 – 131.
    In the first part of this paper the author restates arguments made earlier against well-known criticisms of a logical nature leveled (by C. Hempel and others) against the so-called verifiability principle, which purport to show that it is at once both too restrictive and too permissive: including as cognitively meaningful, statements intuitively lacking this property, and excluding others that are generally admitted to possess it. The author claims to show that the charge that the verifiability principle is unduly permissive will (...)
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  27. Meaning, Truth, and Pragmatism.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (39):171-176.
  28. When Are Statements Empirical?J. W. N. Watkins - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (40):287-308.
  29. Verifiability.F. Waismann - 1951 - In Gilbert Ryle & Antony Flew (eds.), Journal of Symbolic Logic. Blackwell. pp. 117--44.
  30. Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd Ed.Alfred J. Ayer - 1946 - New York: Dover.
  31. Verification, Meaning, and Truth.Felix Kaufmann - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (2):267-284.
  32. Verifiability and the External World.Frederick L. Will - 1940 - Philosophy of Science 7 (2):182-191.
  33. Experience and Prediction: An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge.Hans Reichenbach - 1938 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.
    First published in 1949 expressly to introduce logical positivism to English speakers. Reichenbach, with Rudolph Carnap, founded logical positivism, a form of epistemofogy that privileged scientific over metaphysical truths.
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  34. Language, Truth, and Logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
  35. On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1934 - Analysis 2 (4):49 - 59.
  36. A Bird's-Eye View.Dickinson S. Miller - 1928 - Journal of Philosophy 25 (14):378-383.
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  37. Verificationism in the Tractatus?Diego Marconi - unknown
    In the following, I will mean by ‘verificationism’ the doctrine according to which understanding a sentence entails that one knows how to verify it, i.e. how to determine its truth value. It is not the only possible meaning of ‘verificationism’, nor perhaps the most common. However, it is with reference to this sense of ‘verificationism’ that I am going to ask the question whether the Tractatus is committed to verificationism.
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