La estética analítica hizo suyo, entre otros, el problema de la definición del arte y halló en el concepto dantiano de artworld una alternativa de solución eficiente. Motivador de subsecuentes propuestas, el costado más contextualista del programa de Arthur Danto debe aún enfrentar el reclamo de una supuesta falta de especificidad. Este escrito busca poner en diálogo dicho aporte teórico con los desarrollos hechos por Nelson Goodman en torno al arte a fin de aportar elementos de efectiva visibilidad frente a (...) tal reclamo. Al hacerlo, se prevé analizar la diferencia introducida por este último a propósito de la ejecución y la implementación como instancias configuradoras de lo artístico de espesor y relevancia para su lectura funcionalista. La articulación de un bloque explicativo afin a ambos planteos supone, así, una alternativa novedosa para el área teórica en que se inserta al tiempo que otorga una ventaja considerable frente al marco contextualista del tratamiento del problema. Analytic aesthetic addressed the problem of the definition of art and found an al ternative efficient solution in the Dantian concept of artworld. Nevertheless, the contextualist side of the Danto's program must face the claim of a certain lack of specificity. This paper seeks to link that with the developments made by Goodman around art in order to provide effective visible elements to such claim. In doing so, it is expected to analyze the difference between execution and implementation as central instances of artmaking according to his functionalist reading. The relation between both accounts represents, thus, an innovation over the theoretical area in which is inserted as much as a considerable advantage over the contextualist treatment of the problem. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe role of exemplification and exemplars is receiving increasing attention in educational theory. Usually, this is connected to emulation models in character and moral education. Exemplars in this framework are those who show us how to act and what to do, and inspire us emotionally to improve. In Hannah Arendt’s unfinished work on judgement, the exemplar plays a different role. Instead of functioning as an inspiration for behavioural change, the exemplar inspires thinking. In Men in Dark Times and the lecture (...) series ‘Some questions of moral philosophy’, we find a collection of texts describing in detail some of the intellectual inspirations for Arendt’s work on exemplarity and judgement. In this paper, I will use an exploration of these texts as a starting point for considering the role of exemplarity in the development of educational judgement. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper explores the role of exemplarity in education through a conceptualisation of two different dimensions of exemplarity in educational practice. Pedagogical exemplarity, which relates to the pedagogical and ethical dimension of educational practice. In other words, this dimension explores the educational moments when someone takes up an exemplary function in educational practice. Didactical exemplarity, which relates to the exemplary function of subject matter or educational content. In other words, this dimension explores the educational moments when something takes up an (...) exemplary function in educational practice. Through an initial conceptual exploration of these two dimensions, via the works of Linda Zagzebski and Martin Wagenschein, the paper sets out to lay the foundation for a deeper understanding of the role of exemplarity in education. (shrink)

A question of recent interest in epistemology and philosophy of mind is how belief and credence relate to each other. A number of philosophers argue for a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On the belief-first view, what it is to have a credence just is to have a particular kind of belief, that is, a belief whose content involves probabilities or epistemic modals. Here, I argue against the belief-first view: specifically, I argue that it cannot account (...) for agents who have credences in propositions they barely comprehend. I conclude that, however credences differ from beliefs, they do not differ in virtue of adding additional content to the believed proposition. (shrink)

Is art epistemically valuable? Catherine Z. Elgin answers this question in the affirmative. She argues for the epistemic value of art on the basis of her innovative epistemological theory, in which the focus is shifted from knowledge and truth to a non-factive account of understanding. After an exposition and critique of her view, as she develops it in her most recent book “True Enough” (MIT-Press, 2017), I will build on some of her ideas in order to strengthen her account.