This paper explores the origins of the term "causa sine qua non" used by Durand de Saint-Pourçain to describe the role of material things in knowledge. I show that its technical meaning comes from the Stoics and was transmitted to the Middle Ages by Boethius' commentary on Cicero's Topics. The expression "sine qua non" here does not have the ordinary and restricted meaning of "indispensable", "necessary condition", which can also apply to direct, per se causes of an (...) effect. In the present context, sine qua non causes do not act on the effect in question, either as concomitant, secondary, or instrumental causes, or as remote causes. They act only on that which hinders the actualization of a potentiality, in order to remove that obstacle. For example, the removal of a support that prevented something from falling does not act on that thing, nor does it add anything to its tendency to fall; it simply enables that thing to exercise its own actualization. Similarly, in cognitive processes, external things do not impose anything on the soul, but simply give it the opportunity to actualize its faculties of its own accord. I situate Durand's use of this form of causality in the context of late 13th/early 14th century theories of cognition, among several other attempts to find an alternative theory to the standard Aristotelian model and to maintain the pure activity of the soul with respect to the body. (shrink)

The Dominican theologian Durand of Saint-Pourçain (ca. 1275–1334), breaking from the wide consensus, made a two-pronged attack on concurrentism (i.e., the theory according to which God does more than conserving creatures in existence and co-causes all their actions). On the one hand, he shows that the concurrentist position leads to the unacceptable consequence that God is the direct cause of man’s evil actions. On the other hand, he attacks the metaphysical foundations of concurrentism, first in the version (...) offered by Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, and then in a more general way. Against Thomas and Giles, he challenges Neoplatonic assumptions about causality and being. More generally, he establishes that God’s action and a creature’s action can be neither identical nor different, and thus cannot both be direct causes of the same effect. Without claiming that Durand’s series of objections are definitely unanswerable, we may at least observe that they have generally been underestimated (which earned him the lowly role of the mere foil of the concurrentist view in the history of philosophy) and are able to do considerable damage to concurrentism. (shrink)

According to Franz Brentano, every mental act includes a representation of itself. Hence, Brentano can be described as maintaining that: reflexivity, when it occurs, is included as a part in mental acts; and reflexivity always occurs. Brentano’s way of understanding the inclusion of reflexivity in mental acts entails double intentionality in mental acts. The aim of this paper is to show that the conjunction of and is not uncommon in the history of philosophy. To that end, the theories of two (...) medieval thinkers, namely, Walter Chatton and Durand of Saint-Pourçain, are presented. The repeated conjunction of and paves the way for a more general distinction than that between subjectivist and objectivist theories of reflexivity, namely, one between automatic theories of reflexivity and apperceptive theories of reflexivity. (shrink)

This article presents the theories of some of the main professors at the University of Salamanca of the second half of the XVIth century about the way in which all the perfections of the creatures are present in God. It will be shown that there is a subjacent difficulty along the development of the ideas of these authors that consists in the harmonization of two thesis apparently opposed to each other, namely, the infinity of God’s perfection and the existence of (...) other perfections than that. To do so, in the first place, the study presents the historical context; secondly, it shows the sense of the difficulty or “aporia”; thirdly, it explains their ideas concerning the usual concepts of pure and mixed perfections and of formal and eminent modes of possessing a perfection; finally, it shows the way in which they deal with a question that obliges to face the problem in a radical way, criticizing the solution by Durand de Saint Pourçain. (shrink)

This article argues that Clauberg defends the theory of concurrentism concerning the relationship between divine and secondary causality. It does so by examining Clauberg's theory of corporeal causation in light of his doctrines of cause in general and of corporeal substance. Clauberg's work represents one of the first attempts to reconcile Cartesian physics with the traditional doctrine in theology, according to which both God and created substances are true and immediate causes of all natural effects, in opposition to the occasionalist (...) trend which would soon develop in the Cartesian school as well as to the conservationist alternative of Durand de Saint-Pourçain. -/- Cet article soutient que Clauberg défend la théorie du concurrentisme sur la relation entre la causalité divine et la causalité seconde. Il le fait en examinant la théorie de la causalité corporelle de Clauberg à la lumière de ses doctrines de la cause en général et de la substance corporelle. L'œuvre de Clauberg représente l’une des premières tentatives de réconcilier la physique cartésienne avec la doctrine théologique traditionelle, selon laquelle Dieu et les substances créées sont des causes vrais et immédiates de tout effet naturel, en opposition au courant occasionnaliste qui se développera bientôt dans l'école cartésienne ainsi qu'à l'alternative conservationniste de Durand de Saint-Pourçain. (shrink)

Cet article reprend sur de nouveaux frais la question de la carrière académique de Francis Caracciolo, et de son importance dans le milieu de Durand de Saint-Pourçain et de ses contemporains. Il confirme que Caracciolo était bien la personne visée par la désignation « cancellarius » dans les textes théologiques parisiens de la seconde décennie du xiv e siècle, y compris les Notabilia Cancellarii ; la thèse de Harclay s’en trouve réfutée. L’article rejette également l’attribution à Caracciolo (...) de deux Quodlibeta dans le ms. Vat. lat. 932 tout en envisageant la possibilité que Radulphus de Hotot en soit l’auteur. (shrink)

Durand of Saint-Pourçain's earliest treatment of cognitive habits is contained in his Sentences Commentary, Book 3, Distinction 23. In the first two questions, he discusses the ontological status of habits and their causal role, establishing his own unique view alongside the views of Godfrey of Fontaines and Hervaeus Natalis. What follows is the Latin text and an English translation of Durand's Sentences (A/B) III, d. 23, qq. 1-2.

In this article I argue that although the prevailing interpretation within the Thomistic contemporary critical literature, claiming the inaccessibility of God’s quid sit, is faithful both to Saint Thomas and to John Capreolus’s account of Aquinas’s doctrine, it is far from being uncontroversial in the first steps of the history of Thomism. A central step in this history is marked by the Parisian Condemnation of 1277, which is at the origin of relevant debate within the Dominican Order on the (...) question of the knowledge of God’s quid sit. Aquinas’s contemporaries, indeed, interpreted the condemnation of Proposition 214 as a measure taken against Saint Thomas’s negative theology, as confirmed by John Capreolus’s testimony. Capreolus defends Aquinas, claiming that Saint Thomas’s doctrine is not a radical negative theology; in spite of this, he maintains that we cannot know God’s quiddity. In the following history of the debate, however, two influential representatives of the Dominican Order, Tommaso de Vio and Francesco Silvestri will affirm the accessibility of God’s quid sit, restoring an old doctrine by Durand of Saint Pourçain and Hervé of Nédellec. (shrink)

This contribution consists of an edition, and an introductory study, of the questio “Utrum sit necesse ponere intellectum agentem”, dated to 1315-1320, by the Italian Averroist Maino of Milan. The study shows that while Maino defended the existence of the agent intellect in the face of the criticisms of Durand of Saint-Pourçain, he also subscribed to central features of Durand’s noetics, which he struggled to reconcile with his Aristotelian and Averroist convictions.

We are affected by the world: when I place my hand next to the fire, it becomes hot, and when I plunge it into the bucket of ice water, it becomes cold. What goes for physical changes also goes for at least some mental changes: when Felix the Cat leaps upon my lap, my lap not only becomes warm, but I also feel this warmth, and when he purrs, I hear his purr. It seems obvious, in other words, that perception (...) (at least, and at least under ordinary conditions) is a matter of being affected by the agency of perceptible objects. Call this doctrine affectionism. Durand of St.-Pourçain rejects affectionism. The paper has three parts. In the first part, I sketch, briefly, what motivates Durand to reject affectionism. In the second part, I will take up the affectionist doctrine as defended by Durand's older contemporary at Paris, Godfrey of Fontaines, who holds that the object of all our mental acts (not just perceptions, but also thoughts and desires) is the efficient cause of those acts, or, in other words, all mental acts (not just perception) come about owing to the affection of the relevant mental faculty by the agency of the object. As it turns out, Godfrey develops a celebrated argument against the thesis that the object is not the efficient cause but a mere sine qua non cause. Hence his position offers a challenge to Durand's position, a challenge, I argue in the third part, Durand meets. (shrink)

Throughout scattered passages in Quodlibeta Avenionensia and the comments on Liber Sententiarum we can reconstruct the hardly explored core of some metaphysics of the transcendentals in the thought of Durandus of Saint-Pourçain. Bonum: an extrinsic denomination of the entity diverted from the distinctions of negotiantis et ratiocinantis reason, which would redefine evil as disconvenientia, without dismissing its definition as privation of good. The relative being of truth as the relationship of the thing with itself according to its intellective (...) being and its effective real being, or the characterization of the transcendental unum as convenience of the esse individuum to that which exists per illud quod est with explicit veto on the condition of separable accident, outline an original collage, with diverse doctrinal elements, which condemns the dimension of absolute res or the positive formal matrix of the transcendentals. (shrink)

L’œuvre édifiante de Kierkegaard demeure objet de perplexité, tout particulièrement pour les lecteurs venant à elle depuis la philosophie. Que signifie l’« édifiant»s’il n’est pas encore le religieux, mais sa préparation dans l’éthique, et s’il n’est déjà plus simplement le spéculatif, mais le retournement de celui-ci contre lui-même à la lumière de l’Écriture sainte? En quoi consiste sa contribution essentielle à la philosophie? Cet article se propose de montrer que les Discours édifiants de 1843-1844 conduisent une méditation du temps et (...) de l’éternité qui demeure unique au sein de l’œuvre kierkegaardienne. Tout en approfondissant la catégorie de l’esprit, forgée par les pseudonymes, les Discours développent les catégories singulières de l’attente et de la patience. Ils offrent une description bouleversante de l’expérience du temps et cherchent à en opérer la transfiguration par l’acte de (se) comprendre. Par là, c’est l’éternité d’une Parole qui pénètre dans l’existence encore sujette au temps. Voué à la tâche de préparer l’intériorité en vue du religieux, l’édifiant apparaît comme le sérieux de la philosophie elle-même. (shrink)

For several centuries prior to the founding of the Theosophical Society in 1875, individual 'theosophers' in Britain and Europe were quietly in touch with one another all seekers of the inward way. Theosophic Correspondence (1792 1797) is a series of inspiring letters, personal and philosophic, exchanged during the climactic days of the French Revolution between Kirchberger, member of the Sovereign Council at Berne, Switzerland, and Saint-Martin, whom Kirchberger regarded as 'the most eminent writer . . . and most profound (...) of his age'. (shrink)

C'est au croisement des personnalités et des événements que se structure progressivement une culture stratégique. Qu'en est-il de celle de la France, nation bâtie "à coups d'épée"? Quelles expériences l'ont forgée, quelles philosophies la sous-tendent? Telles sont les questions fondamentales auxquelles répond cet ouvrage. Car la stratégie militaire française constitue un objet d'étude à la fois bien et mal connu. Connu puisqu'inscrit dans une histoire intimement liée à la construction d'une identité nationale et internationale dont on constate aujourd'hui encore sur (...) les champs de guerre toute la vivacité. Mal connu cependant lorsqu'il s'agit d'en examiner les fondements idéels et culturels. Cette méconnaissance est liée à la complexité même de toute stratégie. Loin d'être un simple art des moyens, elle produit des concepts, doctrines ou représentations de la guerre qui résultent d'expériences militaires spécifiques mais qui trouvent leurs racines dans des conditions philosophiques à l'oeuvre dans la construction de toute stratégie. La stratégie militaire française constitue un fascinant terrain d'étude : cette indispensable histoire philosophique de la pensée stratégique française — du XVIIIème siècle à nos jours — en est le reflet. Ce premier tome traite de la stratégie continentale. Un second tome à paraître traitera de la stratégie africaine. (shrink)

Présente le parcours philosophique de Merleau-Ponty tant dans sa formation que dans ses objectifs. Ses références : Descartes, Leibniz, Gabriel Marcel. Ses concepts opératoires : le concret, l'incarnation, l'intentionnalité, les chiasmes.

For several centuries prior to the founding of the Theosophical Society in 1875, individual 'theosophers' in Britain and Europe were quietly in touch with one another all seekers of the inward way. Theosophic Correspondence (1792 1797) is a series of inspiring letters, personal and philosophic, exchanged during the climactic days of the French Revolution between Kirchberger, member of the Sovereign Council at Berne, Switzerland, and Saint-Martin, whom Kirchberger regarded as 'the most eminent writer . . . and most profound (...) of his age'. (shrink)

Sarah is a young deaf woman in revolt, refusing to speak. She marries James, an orthophonist who works in a special school for the deaf. However, what gradually emerges in the course of their relationship is the latent suffering caused by what each of the partners isn't getting. James, tired of acting as Sarah's interpreter, frustrated by the limits of what they can share, shouts out:You want to be independent of me, you want to be a person in your own (...) right, you want people not to pity you … then you [must] learn to read my lips and you [must] learn to use that little mouth of yours for something besides eating and showing me you're better than hearing girls in bed! Come on! Read my lips? What am I saying? Say what I'm saying … You always have to be dependent on someone, and you always will for the rest of your life until you learn to speak. Now come on! I want you to speak to me. Let me hear it. Speak! Speak! Speak! …. (shrink)

Peut-être l’un des mots les plus forts pour résumer les politiques mises en place pour combattre la crise du subprime aura-t-il été celui prêté à l’ancien dirigeant Mikhaël Gorbatchev. Analysant en 2008 cette profusion d’interventions publiques pour sauver des grandes banques en faillite, tandis qu’on laissait les surendettés se faire expulser..

Comment évolue depuis quelques années la démocratie en Occident? C’est au fond à cette question essentielle que sont consacrés les textes proposés ici par la section « Vie politique ». Même si la mort de Ben Laden, en mai dernier, a pu laisser penser que l’Amérique d’Obama avait retrouvé une certaine confiance en elle, le berceau de la démocratie n’en est pas...

Is ecological anxiety—sometimes called eco-anxiety—just a paralyzing affect, or can it lead to an ethical and political commitment? At first glance, it seems that this anxiety implies, by definition, a lack of knowledge, and must therefore be overcome in order to live better and be able to act again. However, I wish to argue in this article that ecological anxiety, when it is a fear for the future, is not a pathology to be rid of, but a valuable awareness. Indeed, (...) in a period of social and environmental disasters on a global scale, this affect is above all indicative of a concern for the world. The question that then arises is that of the effectiveness of practical wisdom, in the sense of Aristotelian φρόνησις [phronesis], in deliberating on issues as complex as global warming. However, it seems necessary, to overcome the paralysing anxiety, to return to the sources of a collective practical wisdom that could enable citizens to reappropriate issues that concern them directly. (shrink)

‘Incongruity is never superfluous’Thea Arbee (2016) Is the superfluous a (new) modality?11. Even if much has been written about ingredients that trigger laughter, researchers are still far from hav...

Sarah is a young deaf woman in revolt, refusing to speak. She marries James, an orthophonist who works in a special school for the deaf. However, what gradually emerges in the course of their relationship is the latent suffering caused by what each of the partners isn't getting. James, tired of acting as Sarah's interpreter, frustrated by the limits of what they can share, shouts out:You want to be independent of me, you want to be a person in your own (...) right, you want people not to pity you … then you [must] learn to read my lips and you [must] learn to use that little mouth of yours for something besides eating and showing me you're better than hearing girls in bed! Come on! Read my lips? What am I saying? Say what I'm saying … You always have to be dependent on someone, and you always will for the rest of your life until you learn to speak. Now come on! I want you to speak to me. Let me hear it. Speak! Speak! Speak! …. (shrink)