The paper examines Simplicius's doctrine of propensities in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories and follows its application by the late thirteenth century theologian and philosopher James of Viterbo to problems relating to the causes of volition, intellection and natural change. Although he uses Aristotelian terminology and means his doctrine to conflict minimally with those of Aristotle, James's doctrine of propensities really constitutes an attempt to provide a technically rigorous dressing to his Augustinian and Boethian convictions. Central to James's procedure is (...) his rejection, following Henry of Ghent, of the principle that “everything that is moved is moved by another”. James uses Simplicius' doctrine of propensities as a means of extending the rejection of that principle, which Henry had limited to the case of the will, to cognitive operations and natural change. The result is a theory of cognition and volition that sees the soul as the principal cause of its own acts, and a theory of natural change that minimizes the causal impact of external agents. (shrink)

On trouvera ici la présentation et l’édition de deux brèves questions de l’Ermite de saint Augustin, Jacques de Viterbe. Dans la première question, Jacques s’attache à montrer en quel sens il est légitime de dire que les habitus moraux sont innés. Dans la seconde question, il défend la thèse que les habitus des principes moraux appartiennent de façon plus intime à l’âme que les habitus intellectuels. Comme le Viterbien oppose sa position à celle de Thomas d’Aquin, on tente dans la (...) dernière partie de l’article de cerner les raisons philosophiques du désaccord entre les deux auteurs. (shrink)

This is the first book-length treatment of the philosophical thought of one of the major thinkers at the University of Paris in the late thirteenth century. The book examines all major areas of James’s philosophical thought, exploring his connections with other important masters of the time and highlighting his originality in the context of late medieval philosophy.

The author’s purpose is to understand the role divine ideas play as causal principles in Aquinas’s philosophy. His contention is that, although Thomas’s doctrine of ideas is perhaps not the key to an understanding of his metaphysics, it is certainly “ a key to such an understanding” .The book is divided into six chapters. The first chapter seeks to provide a general definition of divine ideas according to Aquinas. Divine ideas are exemplar causes in the likeness of which God produces (...) creatures. Ideas in the strict sense belong to God’s practical or actually practical knowledge. The causality exercised by exemplars is that of formal causality, but because they are productive of things, they entail efficient and final causality, as well. In chapter 2, Doolan examines Thomas’s arguments in favor of the existence of divine ideas. Chapter 3 deals with the question of the multiplicity of divine ideas. Doolan first establishes, against Gilson and others, that Aquinas did indeed hold that there was a multiplicity of divine ideas. He then shows how Aquinas was able to reconcile the diversity of ideas with God’s simplicity. The gist of the solution involves viewing ideas as nonbeings relative to God, who is, of course, ipsum esse. Now the only way non-beings can enter into God is in. (shrink)

This paper examines Claude Tresmontant's attempt to provide a philosophical argument in favour of God's existence using the results of modern science. Like many contemporary theists, Tresmontant believes that discoveries in the field of astrophysics, rightly interpreted, lead to the postulation of a deity. This paper challenges the philosophical presuppositions of Tresmontant's argument and the thesis that current cosmological theories can be used to construct a valid proof of the existence of God.

This paper examines Claude Tresmontant's attempt to provide a philosophical argument in favour of God's existence using the results of modern science. Like many contemporary theists, Tresmontant believes that discoveries in the field of astrophysics, rightly interpreted, lead to the postulation of a deity. This paper challenges the philosophical presuppositions of Tresmontant's argument and the thesis that current cosmological theories can be used to construct a valid proof of the existence of God.

Vers la fin des années cinquante, un jeune érudit jésuite publia un article intitulé «Are Apeiria and Aoristia Synonyms?» qui allait être le premier d'une longue série de travaux portant sur une problématique à laquelle il s'attaquait en véritable pionnier: la doctrine de l'infinité divine dans l'Antiquité et au Moyen Âge. Certes, les historiens s'étaient déjà intéressés quelque peu à cette question, mais ils l'avaient fait sans une conscience claire de sa complexité. Force était donc de reprendre la problématique à (...) nouveaux frais. C'est ce que fit Leo Sweeney, qui publiera, sur une carrière de plus de trentecinq ans, une quantité impressionnante d'articles étudiant les conditions de l'émergence de l'infinité divine au Moyen Âge, ainsi que la conception de l'infíni chez les grandes fígures de l'Antiquité et du christianisme médiéval. Ce sont ces articles, dont certains ont fait l'objet de profonds remaniements, et auxquels viennent s'ajouter deux travaux inédits, qu'a réunis l'éditeur Peter Lang dans un ouvrage de près de six cents pages, dont il faut bien dire qu'il constitue une manière d'événement dans le monde des études anciennes et médiévales. (shrink)

Au cours de la première moitié du XIIIe siècle commence à progresser le concept de l'infinité divine dans la théologie chrétienne, une évolution illustrée par des documents originaux.

Résumé — Alors que, pour Thomas d’Aquin et Gilles de Rome, Dieu peut ajouter à la création une série infinie d’espèces de perfection croissante sans compromettre sa transcendance et sans contrevenir aux lois de la logique, Henri de Gand et Godefroid de Fontaines développent des arguments puissants contre cette même idée, arguant notamment que la production d’une telle série impliquerait une infinité en acte d’idées en Dieu. L’article montre comment, dans son Quodlibet I, q. 2 où il expose et critique (...) systématiquement les arguments de Godefroid et d’Henri, Jacques de Viterbe renoue avec une position proche de celle de Thomas et Gilles.— While Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome believed that God could produce an infinite number of increasingly more perfect creatures without threatening his transcendence or breaching the laws of logic, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines argued against that belief, holding that such an ability on God’s part would entail the existence of an actual infinity of ideas in the divine intellect. One author who was to be influenced by Henry’s arguments was Godfrey of Fontaines whose views James of Viterbo refutes in Quodlibet I, q. 2. The article examines the detail of James’s arguments against Godfrey and in favor of the view, much like Thomas’ and Giles’, that God can add to the total amount of perfection in creation. (shrink)

This contribution consists of an edition, and an introductory study, of the questio “Utrum sit necesse ponere intellectum agentem”, dated to 1315-1320, by the Italian Averroist Maino of Milan. The study shows that while Maino defended the existence of the agent intellect in the face of the criticisms of Durand of Saint-Pourçain, he also subscribed to central features of Durand’s noetics, which he struggled to reconcile with his Aristotelian and Averroist convictions.

The following paper offers a brief discussion of Simplicius’ intriguing concept of “propensity” (epitedeiotes), an attempt to account for particularized qualities in terms congenial to a Neoplatonist. For although claiming to follow Aristotle, Simplicius ultimately explains the existence of particularized qualities in termsof a metaphysic of participation. Although his doctrine does not seem not have enjoyed much popularity in Late Antiquity, it will be adopted and expanded upon both late 13th century scholastic authors such as James of Viterbo who see (...) Simplicius’ theory as offering a philosophically rigorous equivalent to Augustinian seminal reasons. (shrink)

The short anonymous work known as the Constitution of the Athenians has long since fascinated scholars. Written sometime in the 5th century, during or just before the Peloponnesian War, it offers a scathing attack on Athenian democratic institutions. Its author is unknown but has traditionally been called the "Old Oligarch" in reference to his obvious political convictions. But the pamphlet's interest lies not so much in its critique of Athenian democracy as in the connection the author sees between these institutions (...) and Athens' imperialist policies in the Aegean. (shrink)

The short anonymous work known as the Constitution of the Athenians has long since fascinated scholars. Written sometime in the 5th century, during or just before the Peloponnesian War, it offers a scathing attack on Athenian democratic institutions. Its author is unknown but has traditionally been called the "Old Oligarch" in reference to his obvious political convictions. But the pamphlet's interest lies not so much in its critique of Athenian democracy as in the connection the author sees between these institutions (...) and Athens' imperialist policies in the Aegean. (shrink)

This paper examines Siger of Brabant’s doctrine of universals in light of Siger’s critical discussion of two highly influential philosophers on the issue of universals in the Middle Ages, Avicenna and Albert the Great. Although Siger unequivocally rejects Albert ’s views on universals – rightly so, given Albert ’s commitment to a rather robust form of realism –, he is far less hostile to Avicenna’s ideas on the subject than he is to Albert ’s. The paper examines Siger’s contrasting attitudes (...) to both authors, highlights Siger’s perspicuity as a reader and interpreter of the works of other philosophers, and shows how Siger uses the doctrines of Albert and Avicenna to sharpen his own position. (shrink)

Este artigo analisa diversos textos da obra de Tomás de Aquino relativos aos temas do conhecimento divino e das ideias divinas com o intuito de mostrar como duas interpretações sustentadas por comentadores recentes da obra tomásica não se mantêm diante da análise rigorosa dos textos. Uma primeira e menos radical interpretação sustenta haver ideias práticas distintas de cada coisa particular, enquanto que, de acordo com uma interpretação ainda mais forte, ideias em sentido estrito pertencem primordialmente a coisas singulares. O objetivo (...) deste artigo é mostrar que, embora Tomás sustente que Deus conhece todas as coisas, inclusive os particulares, a doutrina das ideias, tal como Tomás a concebe, tem limites muito estreitos, não permitindo o pleno desenvolvimento de suas convicções de cunho aristotélico concernentes à cognoscibilidade dos particulares. (shrink)

Édition d’un quodlibet anonyme du ms. 667 de l’Université de Prague, portant sur l’immortalité de l’âme, le moment de la création, l’infinité de la substance divine et le péché originel, qui constitue un intéressant témoin des discussions dans les milieux théologiques de l’Université de Paris dans les années 1240.