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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Transmission of Justification and Warrant.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2013 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Problems for Credulism.James Pryor - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 89–131.details
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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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The Case for Closure.John Hawthorne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 26-43.details
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The Case Against Closure.Fred I. Dretske - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 13--25.details
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Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.details
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Justification without awareness: a defense of epistemic externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).details
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Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Open knowledge and changing the subject.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1047-1071.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
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Is justification transmissible through deduction?Irving Thalberg - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 25 (5):347 - 356.details
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Skepticism, relevant alternatives, and deductive closure.G. C. Stine - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (4):249--261.details
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Replies to Comesaña and Yablo.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1073-1090.details
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Epistemic closure under deductive inference: what is it and can we afford it?Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.details
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Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3065-3077.details
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Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.details
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A Case Against Closure.Doris Olin - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):235-247.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.details
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Easy Knowledge.Peter J. Markie - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):406-416.details
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Easy knowledge.Peter J. Markie - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):406–416.details
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``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Knowledge: Undefeated justified true belief.Keith Lehrer & Thomas Paxson - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):225-237.details
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Single premise deduction and risk.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173.details
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Closure principles.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.details
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The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Hilary Kornblith & Richard Foley - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):131.details
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Skepticism and Closure.Peter Klein - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213-236.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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The theory of epistemic rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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In defence of closure.Richard Feldman - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):487-494.details
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Cretan Deductions.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser & John Hawthorne - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):163-178.details
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The Structure of Sceptical Arguments.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):37 - 52.details
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Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.details
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Evidentialism and skeptical arguments.Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):337-352.details
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Epistemic Closure and Epistemological Optimism.Claudio de Almeida - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):113-131.details
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Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility.Claudio de Almeida - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):197-215.details
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Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.details
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Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.details
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The structure of the skeptical argument.Anthony Brueckner - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):827-835.details
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