The structure of the skeptical argument

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):827-835 (1994)
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Abstract

Much has been written about epistemological skepticism in the last ten or so years, but there remain some unanswered questions concerning the structure of what has become the canonical Cartesian skeptical argument. In this paper, I would like to take a closer look at this structure in order to determine just which epistemic principles are required by the argument.

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Citations of this work

The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):70-90.
Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.
The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism.James R. Beebe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):605-636.
Contextualism and the problem of the external world.Ram Neta - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):1–31.

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