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  1. Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
    Recasting important questions about truth and objectivity in new and helpful terms, his book will become a focus in the contemporary debates over realism, and ...
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    Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
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  3. Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
  4. The Reason's Proper Study: Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics.Crispin Wright & Bob Hale - 2001 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Here, Bob Hale and Crispin Wright assemble the key writings that lead to their distinctive neo-Fregean approach to the philosophy of mathematics. In addition to fourteen previously published papers, the volume features a new paper on the Julius Caesar problem; a substantial new introduction mapping out the program and the contributions made to it by the various papers; a section explaining which issues most require further attention; and bibliographies of references and further useful sources. It will be recognized as the (...)
  5. Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Aberdeen University Press.
  6.  33
    Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.
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  7. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Critical Philosophy 1 (1):97.
  8. Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics.Crispin Wright - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
  9. Realism, Meaning and Truth.Crispin Wright - 1987 - Blackwell.
  10. (Anti-)sceptics simple and subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
  11. Comment on Paul Boghossian, "What is inference".Crispin Wright - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):27-37.
    This is a response to Paul Boghossian’s paper: What is inference?. The paper and the abstract originate from a symposium at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA in San Diego in April 2011. John Broome was a co-commentator.
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  12. Facts and Certainty.Crispin Wright - 1985 - In Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 71: 1985. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press. pp. 429-472.
  13. On the coherence of vague predicates.Crispin Wright - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):325--65.
  14. On being in a quandary. Relativism vagueness logical revisionism.Crispin Wright - 2001 - Mind 110 (1):45--98.
    This paper addresses three problems: the problem of formulating a coherent relativism, the Sorites paradox and a seldom noticed difficulty in the best intuitionistic case for the revision of classical logic. A response to the latter is proposed which, generalised, contributes towards the solution of the other two. The key to this response is a generalised conception of indeterminacy as a specific kind of intellectual bafflement-Quandary. Intuitionistic revisions of classical logic are merited wherever a subject matter is conceived both as (...)
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  15. The perils of dogmatism.Crispin Wright - 2007 - In Nuccetelli & Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    "Dogmatism" is a term renovated by James Pryor [2000] to stand for a certain kind of neo-Moorean response to Scepticism and an associated conception of the architecture of basic perceptual warrant. Pryor runs the response only for (some kinds of) perceptual knowledge but here I will be concerned with its general structure and potential as a possible global anti-sceptical strategy. Something like it is arguably also present in recent writings of Burge 1 and Peacocke.2 If the global strategy could succeed, (...)
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  16. Cogency and question-begging: Some reflections on McKinsey's paradox and Putnam's proof.Crispin Wright - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):140-63.
  17. Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon.Crispin Wright - 1991 - Mind 100 (1):87-116.
  18. Scepticism and dreaming: Imploding the demon.Crispin Wright - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):205.
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    Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.Crispin Wright (ed.) - 2001 - Harvard University Press.
    This volume, published on the fiftieth anniversary of Wittgenstein's death, brings together thirteen of Crispin Wright's most influential essays on Wittgenstein ...
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  20. Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy.Crispin Wright - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 101-122.
  21. The Reason's Proper Study: Essays toward a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2006 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):291-294.
     
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  22.  59
    Alethic Pluralism, Deflationism, and Faultless Disagreement.Crispin Wright - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):432-448.
    One of the most important “folk” anti-realist thoughts about certain areas of our thought and discourse—basic taste, for instance, or comedy—is that their lack of objectivity crystallises in the possibility of “faultless disagreements”: situations where one party accepts P, another rejects P, and neither is guilty of any kind of mistake of substance or shortcoming of cognitive process. On close inspection, however, it proves challenging to make coherent sense of this idea, and a majority of theorists have come to reject (...)
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  23. Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed.Crispin Wright - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 24 (sup1):31-74.
    Every student of English-speaking analytical metaphysics is taught that the early twentieth century philosophical debate about truth confronted the correspondence theory, supported by Russell, Moore, the early Wittgenstein and, later, J.L. Austin, with the coherence theory advocated by the British Idealists. Sometimes the pragmatist conception of truth deriving from Dewey, William James, and C.S. Peirce is regarded as a third player. And as befits a debate at the dawn of analytical philosophy, the matter in dispute is normally taken to have (...)
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    Moral values, projection, and secondary qualities.Crispin Wright - 1988 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 62 (1):1-26.
  25. Further reflections on the sorites paradox.Crispin Wright - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):227-290.
  26. A plurality of pluralisms.Crispin Wright - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 123.
  27. Rule-Following and Meaning.Alexander Miller & Crispin Wright (eds.) - 2002 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    The rule-following debate, in its concern with the metaphysics and epistemology of linguistic meaning and mental content, goes to the heart of the most fundamental questions of contemporary philosophy of mind and language. This volume gathers together the most important contributions to the topic, including papers by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Graeme Forbes, Warren Goldfarb, Paul Horwich, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Ruth Millikan, Philip Pettit, George Wilson, and José Zalabardo. This debate has centred on Saul Kripke's reading of the rule-following (...)
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  28. Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy, and Intention.Crispin Wright - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (11):622-634.
  29. The Perils of Dogmatism.Crispin Wright - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press.
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  30. Wittgensteinian certainties.Crispin Wright - 2004 - In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge. pp. 22--55.
  31. Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb.Crispin Wright - 2006 - In Patrick Greenough & Michael Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Clarendon Press. pp. 38--60.
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  32. Rule-following without Reasons: Wittgenstein’s Quietism and the Constitutive Question.Crispin Wright - 2007 - Ratio 20 (4):481–502.
    This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct issues about (...)
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    Implicit definition and the a priori.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2000 - In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press. pp. 286--319.
  34. On quantifying into predicate position: Steps towards a new (tralist) perspective.Crispin Wright - 2007 - In Mary Leng, Alexander Paseau & Michael Potter (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 150--74.
  35. Truth in ethics.Crispin Wright - 1995 - Ratio 8 (3):209-226.
  36. IV*—On Putnam's Proof that We are not Brains-in-a-Vat1.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1):67-94.
    Crispin Wright; IV*—On Putnam's Proof that We are not Brains-in-a-Vat1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 67–94, h.
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  37. The metaontology of abstraction.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 178-212.
  38. Intuition, entitlement and the epistemology of logical laws.Crispin Wright - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):155–175.
    The essay addresses the well‐known idea that there has to be a place for intuition, thought of as a kind of non‐inferential rational insight, in the epistemology of basic logic if our knowledge of its principles is non‐empirical and is to allow of any finite, non‐circular reconstruction. It is argued that the error in this idea consists in its overlooking the possibility that there is, properly speaking, no knowledge of the validity of principles of basic logic. When certain important distinctions (...)
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    Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
  40. On the philosophical significance of Frege's theorem.Crispin Wright - 1997 - In Richard G. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. Oxford University Press. pp. 201--44.
     
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  41. Kripke's account of the argument against private language.Crispin Wright - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (12):759-78.
  42. Relativism about truth itself: Haphazard thoughts about the very idea.Crispin Wright - 2008 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 157.
  43. On Epistemic Entitlement.Crispin Wright & Martin Davies - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78:167-245.
    [Crispin Wright] Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. 'Entitlement', as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counter-exemplifies that identification. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently (...)
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    Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
    The essays in this companion volume prefigure, elaborate, or defend the proposals put forward in that landmark work.
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  45. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language.Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.) - 1997 - Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
    This volume provides a survey of contemporary philosophy of language. As well as providing a synoptic view of the key issues, figures, concepts and debates, each essay makes new and original contributions to ongoing debate.
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  46. Is Hume's principle analytic?Crispin Wright - 2001 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1):307-333.
    This paper is a reply to George Boolos's three papers (Boolos (1987a, 1987b, 1990a)) concerned with the status of Hume's Principle. Five independent worries of Boolos concerning the status of Hume's Principle as an analytic truth are identified and discussed. Firstly, the ontogical concern about the commitments of Hume's Principle. Secondly, whether Hume's Principle is in fact consistent and whether the commitment to the universal number by adopting Hume's Principle might be problematic. Also the so-called `surplus content' worry is discussed, (...)
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  47. Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi‐Realism. Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, Delivered in Oxford on June 2, 1987.Crispin Wright - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):25-49.
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  48. Realism, Meaning and Truth.Crispin Wright - 1987 - Mind 96 (383):415-418.
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  49. Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed.Crispin Wright - 1999 - In Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.), Truth. Oxford University Press.
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  50. Fear of relativism? [REVIEW]Crispin Wright - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):379 - 390.
    §1 To many in or on the edges of the Academy, ”Relativism” is a word with overtones of sinister iconoclasm, representing a kind of intellectual and ethical free-for-all in which the traditional investigative virtues of clarity, rigour, objectivity, consistency and the unbiased pursuit of truth are dismissed as illusory and the great scientific constructions of the last two hundred years, together with our deepest moral convictions, rated merely as ‘our way of seeing’ the world, more elaborate and organised but otherwise (...)
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