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  1. Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition.Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of the (...)
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  2. Reasonable Religious Disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Louise Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oxford University Press. pp. 194-214.
  3. Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
    My conclusion will be that, more often than we might have thought, suspension of judgment is the epistemically proper attitude. It follows that in such cases we lack reasonable belief and so, at least on standard conceptions, knowledge. This is a kind of contingent real-world skepticism that has not received the attention it deserves. I hope that this paper will help to bring this issue to life.
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  4. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This book is a collection of essays, mostly jointly authored, that support and apply evidentialism.
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  5.  16
    Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Disagreement is common: even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This volume examines the epistemology of disagreement. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: but this will be the first book focusing on the general epistemic issues arising from informed (...)
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  6. The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
    In this paper I will address a few of the many questions that fall under the general heading of “the ethics of belief.” In section I I will discuss the adequacy of what has come to be known as the “deontological conception of epistemic justification” in the light of our apparent lack of voluntary control over what we believe. In section II I’ll defend an evidentialist view about what we ought to believe. And in section III I will briefly discuss (...)
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  7.  26
    Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Disagreement is common: even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This volume examines the epistemology of disagreement. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: but this will be the first book focusing on the general epistemic issues arising from informed (...)
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  8. Epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2003 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (2):429-429.
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  9. Respecting the Evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.
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  10. Internalism Defended.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2001 - In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Blackwell. pp. 1 - 18.
  11.  20
    Knowledge and Lotteries.Richard Feldman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):211-226.
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  12. Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to abandon evidentialism and (...)
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  13. Internalism Defended.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.
  14. Evidence.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
     
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  15. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):147-149.
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  16.  42
    The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
    In this paper I will address a few of the many questions that fall under the general heading of “the ethics of belief.” In section I I will discuss the adequacy of what has come to be known as the “deontological conception of epistemic justification” in the light of our apparent lack of voluntary control over what we believe. In section II I’ll defend an evidentialist view about what we ought to believe. And in section III I will briefly discuss (...)
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  17. Reliability and Justification.Richard Feldman - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):159-174.
    According to a simple version of the reliability theory of epistemic justification, a belief is justified if and only if the process leading to that belief is reliable. The idea behind this theory is simple and attractive. There are a variety of mental or cognitive processes that result in beliefs. Some of these processes are reliable—they generally yield true beliefs—and the beliefs they produce are justified. Other processes are unreliable and the beliefs they produce are unjustified. So, for example, reliable (...)
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  18. Contextualism and Skepticism.Richard Feldman - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:91-114.
    In the good old days, a large part of the debate about skepticism focused on the quality of the reasons we have for believing propositions of various types. Skeptics about knowledge in a given domain argued that our reasons for believing propositions in that domain were not good enough to give us knowledge; opponents of skepticism argued that they were. The different conclusions drawn by skeptics and non-skeptics could come either from differences in their views about the standards or conditions (...)
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  19. Epistemic Obligations.Richard Feldman - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:235-256.
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  20. Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation.Richard Feldman - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford University Press. pp. 77--92.
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  21. Having Evidence.Richard Feldman - 1988 - In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 83--104.
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  22. Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions.Richard Feldman - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (1):61 - 85.
  23. Subjective and Objective Justification in Ethics and Epistemology.Richard Feldman - 1988 - The Monist 71 (3):405-419.
    A view widely held by epistemologists is that there is a distinction between subjective and objective epistemic justification, analogous to the commonly drawn distinction between subjective and objective justification in ethics. Richard Brandt offers a clear statement of this line of thought.
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  24. An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples.Richard Feldman - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):68 – 69.
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  25. Modest Deontologism in Epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.
    Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If deonotologism is true, and people have justified beliefs, then the deontological sentences can be true. However, some say, these deontological sentences can be true only if people have a kind of freedom or control over their beliefs that they do not in (...)
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  26. In Defence of Closure.Richard Feldman - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):487-494.
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  27. Replies.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
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  28.  94
    Deep Disagreement, Rational Resolutions, and Critical Thinking.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):12-23.
    According to Robert Fogelin, deep disagreements are disagreements about fundamental principles. He argues that deep disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. In this paper I argue against this thesis. A key part of the response depends upon the claim that disagreements can be rationally resolved not only by one participant rationally coming around to the other's point of view, but also by both of them rationally suspending judgment about the disputed proposition. I also claim that suspension of judgment may be the (...)
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  29.  18
    Contextualism and Skepticism.Richard Feldman - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):91-114.
  30. Fallibilism and Knowing That One Knows.Richard Feldman - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (2):266-282.
  31. Good Arguments.Richard Feldman - 1994 - In Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 159--188.
     
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  32. Typing Problems.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):98-105.
    Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved.
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  33.  85
    Justification is Internal.Richard Feldman - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 270--84.
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  34. An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples.Richard Feldman - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  35. Clifford's Principle and James's Options.Richard Feldman - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):19 – 33.
    In this paper I discuss William J. Clifford's principle, "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" and an objection to it based on William James's contention that "Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds." I argue that on one central way of understanding the key terms, there are no genuine options (...)
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  36. Plantinga on Exclusivism.Richard Feldman - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (1):85-90.
  37.  64
    Authoritarian Epistemology.Richard Feldman - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):147-169.
  38.  35
    Review EssayHuman Knowledge and Human Nature: A New Introduction to an Ancient Debate.Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis.Richard Feldman, Peter Carruthers & Edward Craig - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):205.
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  39.  61
    12 Freedom and Contextualism.Richard Feldman - 2004 - In M. O.’Rourke J. K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press. pp. 255.
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  40. Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection.Richard Feldman - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):218-27.
    A tempting argument for human rationality goes like this: it is more conducive to survival to have true beliefs than false beliefs, so it is more conducive to survival to use reliable belief-forming strategies than unreliable ones. But reliable strategies are rational strategies, so there is a selective advantage to using rational strategies. Since we have evolved, we must use rational strategies. In this paper I argue that some criticisms of this argument offered by Stephen Stich fail because they rely (...)
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  41.  83
    Comments on DeRose's “Single Scoreboard Semantics”.Richard Feldman - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):23-33.
  42.  78
    Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (Book Review).Richard Feldman - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (4):552-556.
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  43. Bonjour and Sosa on Internalism, Externalism and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW]Richard Feldman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):695-712.
  44.  1
    Reason and Argument: Pearson New International Edition.Richard Feldman - 1993 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall.
    This text presents a clear and philosophically sound method for identifying, interpreting, and evaluating arguments as they appear in non-technical sources. It focuses on a more functional, real-world goal of argument analysis as a tool for figuring out what is reasonable to believe rather than as an instrument of persuasion. Methods are illustrated by applying them to arguments about different topics as they appear in a variety of contexts - e.g., newspaper editorials and columns, short essays, informal reports of scientific (...)
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  45.  41
    Foundational Justification.Richard Feldman - 2004 - In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. pp. 2004--42.
  46.  11
    The Good, the Right, Life And Death: Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman.Kris McDaniel, Jason R. Raibley, Richard Feldman & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.) - 2005 - Ashgate.
    This is an edited collection containing papers on intrinsic value, consequentialism, the evil of death, among others.
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  47.  71
    Foundational Beliefs and Empirical Possibilities.Richard Feldman - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):132–148.
  48.  53
    Roderick Chisholm.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  49.  83
    Some Virtues of Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):95-108.
    O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemológicas de uma forma que (...)
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  50.  11
    Proper Functionalism. [REVIEW]Richard Feldman - 1993 - Noûs 27 (1):34.
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