Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329 (2002)
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Abstract

The dominant response to this problem of the criterion focuses on the alleged requirement that we need to know a belief source is reliable in order for us to acquire knowledge by that source. Let us call this requirement, “The KR principle”

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Citations of this work

Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.
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Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.

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References found in this work

The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
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How to be a fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Noûs 11 (4):421-430.

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