- Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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What can we Learn from Buridan's Ass?Ruth Weintraub - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):281-301.details
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Problems for Wright's entitlement theory.Luca Moretti - 2021 - In Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Leiden: Brill. pp. 121-138.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Two notions of epistemic normativity.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2009 - Theoria 75 (3):161-178.details
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The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.details
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Basic questions.Peter Carruthers - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):130-147.details
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Getting It Right By Accident.Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):72-105.details
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Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.details
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Methodological naturalism and epistemic internalism.Gregory Wheeler & Luís Moniz Pereira - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):315-328.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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Distant Peers.Mark Vorobej - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (5):708-722.details
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Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness.Han van Wietmarschen - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):395-425.details
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Skepticism and the Liberal/Conservative Conceptions of Perceptual Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):45-61.details
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Entitlement and the Epistemic Status of Cornerstone Beliefs.Hamid Vahid - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):126-137.details
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Knowledge and varieties of epistemic luck.Hamid Vahi - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):351–362.details
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Knowledge and Varieties of Epistemic Luck.Hamid Vahi - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):351-362.details
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No practical reasons for belief: the epistemic significance of practical considerations.Hamid Vahid - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-18.details
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Aiming at Truth: Doxastic vs. Epistemic Goals.Hamid Vahid - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):303-335.details
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Deontological Conservatism and Perceptual Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):206-224.details
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Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.details
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There are no epistemic norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-24.details
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Truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):599-618.details
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Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-555.details
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Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.details
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Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.details
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Can performance epistemology explain higher epistemic value?Kurt L. Sylvan - 2017 - Synthese 197 (12):5335-5356.details
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Stance empiricism and epistemic reason.Jonathan Reid Surovell - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):709-733.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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An Instrumentalist Explanation of Pragmatic Encroachment.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Advancing the rationality debate.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):701-717.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement.Paul Simard Smith & Michael Patrick Lynch - 2020 - Topoi 40 (5):971-982.details
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Getting a little closure for closure.James Simpson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12331-12361.details
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Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
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Reasons and Promotion.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):98-122.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3791-3809.details
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The prima/ultima facie justification distinction in epistemology.Thomas D. Senor - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):551-566.details
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Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust.Jonathan C. Rutledge - 2018 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 2 (1):84-94.details
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Equal treatment for belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.details
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Against the New Evidentialists.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.details
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Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs (4):763-784.details
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Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.details
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Highlights of recent epistemology.James Pryor - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):95--124.details
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Desiring the truth and nothing but the truth.Christian Piller - 2009 - Noûs 43 (2):193-213.details
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Entitlement, value and rationality.Nikolaj Jang Pedersen - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):443-457.details
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II—What Should ‘Impostor Syndrome’ Be?Sarah K. Paul - 2019 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 93 (1):227-245.details
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Disagreement and the value of self-trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.details
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From Skepticism to Paralysis.Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2012 - Ancient Philosophy 32 (2):369-392.details
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Moral Enhancement Is Irrational.Stephen Napier - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):653-665.details
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