- Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.Timothy Bowen - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
|
|
Hyperintensional Ω-Logic.Hasen Khudairi - 2019 - In Matteo Vincenzo D'Alfonso & Don Berkich (eds.), On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence. Springer Verlag. pp. 65-82.details
|
|
Reflective Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (3):305-325.details
|
|
Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.details
|
|
Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
|
|
How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.details
|
|
The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.details
|
|
Defeating looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Synthese 195 (7):2985-3012.details
|
|
Looks and Perceptual Justification.Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):110-133.details
|
|
Underdetermination and closure: Thoughts on two sceptical arguments.Martin Smith - 2022 - In Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (ed.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.details
|
|
Common Sense and Ordinary Language: Wittgenstein and Austin.Krista Lawlor - 2020 - In Rik Peels & René van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Articulating the A Priori-A Posteriori Distinction.Albert Casullo - 2014 - In Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification. Oup Usa. pp. 289-327.details
|
|
Seeing White and Wrong: Reid on the Role of Sensations in Perception, with a Focus on Color Perception.Lucas Thorpe - 2015 - In Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford University Press. pp. 100-123.details
|
|
Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification.Tristram McPherson - 2015 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 10. Oxford University Press. pp. 104-133.details
|
|
Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.details
|
|
How Can Constitutivism Account for the Persistence of Deep Disagreements?Enrico Galli - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.details
|
|
Phenomenal conservatism and the problem of reflective awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.details
|
|
Ornelas, Jorge; Cíntora, Armando (eds.). Dudas filosóficas. Ensayos sobre escepticismo antiguo, moderno y contemporáneo. México, Barcelona: UAM-Gedisa, 2014. 424 pp. [REVIEW]Vicente Raga Rosaleny - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (157):282-287.details
|
|
Reverse-Engineering Risk.Angela O’Sullivan & Lilith Mace - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-26.details
|
|
Not enough there there evidence, reasons, and language independence.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):477-528.details
|
|
Forms of Luminosity.Hasen Khudairi - 2017details
|
|
Some concerns about the idea of basic moral certainty: A critical response to Samuel Laves.Jordi Fairhurst - 2023 - Philosophical Investigations 47 (1):119-136.details
|
|
Cognitive Projects and the Trustworthiness of Positive Truth.Matteo Zicchetti - 2022 - Erkenntnis (8).details
|
|
Closure, deduction and hinge commitments.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3533-3551.details
|
|
Possibility, Necessity and Probability: A Meditation on Underdetermination and Justification. [REVIEW]Elia Zardini - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):639-667.details
|
|
Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Luca Zanetti - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):33-54.details
|
|
Abstraction without exceptions.Luca Zanetti - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3197-3216.details
|
|
Beyond Authority: Hinge Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity.Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2261-2283.details
|
|
Logical Non‐Cognitivism.Crispin Wright - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):425-450.details
|
|
Intuition, entitlement and the epistemology of logical laws.Crispin Wright - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):155–175.details
|
|
Frictional coherentism? A comment on chapter 10 of Ernest Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge.Crispin Wright - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):29-41.details
|
|
Contextualism and scepticism: Even-handedness, factivity and surreptitiously raising standards.Crispin Wright - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):236–262.details
|
|
Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch's Analogy.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (4):226-235.details
|
|
The Self-Effacement Gambit.Jack Woods - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):113-139.details
|
|
Moorean responses to skepticism: a defense. [REVIEW]Tim Willenken - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.details
|
|
Memory, belief and time.Brian Weatherson - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):692-715.details
|
|
On G.E. Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’.James Owen Weatherall - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
|
|
Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.details
|
|
Deficiency Arguments Against Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Indefeasibility.Lisa Warenski - 2015 - Philosophical Studies:1-12.details
|
|
Deficiency arguments against empiricism and the question of empirical indefeasibility.Lisa Warenski - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1675-1686.details
|
|
Skeptical Conclusions.Linton Wang & Oliver Tai - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):177-204.details
|
|
Moore’s proof, theory-ladenness of perception, and many proofs.Mark Walker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2163-2183.details
|
|
Epistemic Permissiveness and the Problem of Philosophical Disagreement.Mark Walker - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (2):285-309.details
|
|
Truth and Justification: A Difference that Makes a Difference.Giorgio Volpe - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):217-232.details
|
|
Cornerstones: You’d better believe them.Giorgio Volpe - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):1-23.details
|
|
Contrastive Hinge Epistemology.Giorgio Volpe - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1222-1249.details
|
|
Wittgenstein, Quasi-Fideism, and Scepticism.Robert Vinten - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):1-12.details
|
|
Caught in the Language-Game.Nuno Venturinha - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):1043-1055.details
|
|
What hinge epistemology and Bayesian epistemology can learn from each other.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-21.details
|
|