This chapter argues that smell and flavour perception present distinctive challenges for phenomenological reflection, but that these difficulties can be addressed through a ‘gestaltist’ approach to perceptual organisation. I argue that the ‘chemical’ senses do not generally allow immediate access to ordinary objects like roses and apples, but rather to odours and flavours, the diffuse nature of which make it hard to get a grip on the associated perceptual phenomenology. Drawing on the work of gestalt psychologists and phenomenologists, I outline (...) a modality-neutral approach that emphasises the irreducibly structured nature of perceptual experience and is especially useful for thinking about experiences that are not targeted at ordinary physical objects. Such an approach can clarify and explain nebulous aspects of perceptual experience, illuminating elements of our smell and flavour experiences that may be indeterminate. (shrink)
This article comprehensively examines how information processing relates to attention and consciousness. We argue that no current theoretical framework investigating consciousness has a satisfactory and holistic account of their informational relationship. Our key theoretical contribution is showing how the dissociation between consciousness and attention must be understood in informational terms in order to make the debate scientifically sound. No current theories clarify the difference between attention and consciousness in terms of information. We conclude with two proposals to advance the debate. (...) First, neurobiological homeostatic processes need to be more explicitly associated with conscious information processing, since information processed through attention is algorithmic, rather than being homeostatic. Second, to understand subjectivity in informational terms, we must define information uniqueness in consciousness (e.g., irreproducible information, biologically encrypted information). These approaches could help cognitive scientists better understand conflicting accounts of the neural correlates of consciousness and work toward a more unified theoretical framework. (shrink)
Les articles de ce recueil, réunis par des membres du Centre de Recherche en Poétique, Histoire Littéraire et Linguistique (EA 3003) de l'Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, explorent les notions de perception, perspective et perspicacité dans plusieurs champs de recherche (linguistique, littérature, histoire des idées, philosophie et arts) et à diverses époques, du Moyen Age à la modernité. De l'univers sonore médiéval à l'esthétique de Debussy, de la linguistique populaire à l'étude linguistique des relations entre perception, cognition (...) et syntaxe, de Prévost à Proust en passant par Mark Twain ou Virginia Woolf, de la peinture américaine de Thomas Cole aux oeuvres vidéographiques contemporaines, cet ouvrage, tel un kaléidoscope, offre une myriade de perspectives sur la façon dont de simples locuteurs, des écrivains, des artistes ou des philosophes s'efforcent d'appréhender le monde. Les auteurs mettent en évidence les multiples stratégies rhétoriques, narratives ou esthétiques, entre autres, destinées à combler les failles d'une vision trop empirique ou à briser ou brouiller de façon perverse les écrans qui font obstacle à notre perception. Celle-ci survient parfois au terme d'une longue initiation, ou elle ne survient pas, tant il paraît difficile de jeter un regard surplombant sur un monde labile et opaque. La perception n'en demeure pas moins un catalyseur de la création, et aussi de la réception, voire de la re-création par un lecteur / spectateur perspicace qui aime être surpris de voir plus loin que son horizon d'attente. (shrink)
Le sens dépend-il de la sensibilité? De quelle manière ou en quel sens? La phénoménologie reconnaît au sens une part de sensibilité, contre la thèse de son autonomie. Le sens ne serait pas un phénomène de connaissance, ni un phénomène de langage, mais un phénomène sensible : un contenu de perception, propre au rapport que le corps sentant entretient au monde senti. Nos discours, nos actes et nos existences perdraient alors leur sens à mesure qu’ils s’autonomisent et se trouvent partiellement (...) privés de leur dimension sensible, corporelle et mondaine. Mais cette thèse ne s’impose pas d’un seul tenant dans l’histoire de la phénoménologie. De l’autonomie à la sensibilité et de la sensibilité à l’autonomie, l’analyse phénoménologique du sens implique chaque fois des régressions qui, en retour, ouvrent de nouvelles avancées. C’est ce mouvement que cet ouvrage se propose de retracer, de Husserl à la phénoménologie française, via les principales conceptions du sens qui s’y trouvent développées. (shrink)
The Ecological Brain is the first book of its kind, using complexity science to integrate the seemingly disparate fields of ecological psychology and neuroscience. The book develops a unique framework for unifying investigations and explanations of mind that span brain, body, and environment: the NeuroEcological Nexus Theory (NExT). Beginning with an introduction to the history of the fields, the author provides an assessment of why ecological psychology and neuroscience are commonly viewed as irreconcilable methods for investigating and explaining cognition, intelligent (...) behavior, and the systems that realize them. The book then progresses to its central aim: presenting a unified investigative and explanatory framework offering concepts, methods, and theories applicable across neural and ecological scales of investigation. By combining the core principles of ecological psychology, neural population dynamics, and synergetics under a unified complexity science approach, NExT offers a compressive investigative framework to explain and understand neural, bodily, and environmental contributions to perception-action and other forms of intelligent behavior and thought. The book progresses the conversation around the role of brains in ecological psychology, as well as bodies and environments in neuroscience. It is essential reading for all students of ecological psychology, perception, cognitive sciences and neuroscience, as well as anyone interested in the history and philosophy of the brain/mind sciences and their state-of-the-art methods and theories. (shrink)
En décrivant le phénomène de la perception, la phénoménologie entreprend de remonter du monde où nous nous trouvons vers la source de l'apparaître, vers la conscience intentionnelle qui anime une matière sensible pure. Mais comment alors est-il possible de rendre compte de la donation de cette matière première? Une première voie consiste à se satisfaire d'une conception transcendantale de la chair qui permet un sentir pur. Une deuxième voie propose de remonter en-deçà, en direction d'un événement grâce auquel il y (...) aurait du sensible. La chair a alors pour fonction d'assurer le passage entre cette première donne du sensible et le monde tel que nous le constituons. Cette deuxième voie semble aujourd'hui privilégiée. Mais elle pose la question de savoir comment articuler les deux sens de la chair, événementiel et expressif, afin d'en éviter la déchirure. L'exploration du corps érotique permet-elle de réconcilier la chair avec elle-même pour ainsi nous livrer le secret de notre condition sensible? Telle est l'interrogation qui guide cet ouvrage, qui s'appuie sur les ressources offertes par la phénoménologie jusque dans ses développements les plus contemporains pour en éclairer les enjeux."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)
This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Christopher S. Hill argues that perceptual experience constitutively involves representations of worldly items, and that the relevant form of representation can be explained in broadly biological terms. He then maintains that the representational contents of perceptual experiences are perceptual appearances, interpreted (...) as relational, viewpoint-dependent properties of external objects. There is also a complementary explanation of how the objects that possess these properties are represented. Hill maintains that perceptual phenomenology can be explained reductively in terms of the representational contents of experiences, and uses this doctrine to undercut the traditional arguments for dualism. This treatment of perceptual phenomenology is expanded to encompass cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of moods and emotions, and the phenomenology of pain. Hill also offers accounts of the various forms of consciousness that perceptual experiences can possess. One aim is to argue that phenomenology is metaphysically independent of these forms of consciousness, and another is to de-mystify the form known as phenomenal consciousness. The book concludes by discussing the relations of various kinds that perceptual experiences bear to higher-level cognitive states, including relations of format, content, and justification or support. (shrink)
Từ hồi đại phu Chèo Bẻo cuối xóm già ngẫn, nhớ nhớ quên quên, mất khả năng khám chữa bệnh, cơ bản tình hình sức khỏe xóm chim xuống dốc. Nhiều chuyện kỳ quái xảy ra chỉ vì cái sự đi xuống của sức khỏe vật lý lẫn tinh thần của chúng chim trong xóm.
Dưới đây là bức ảnh cho thấy bầu không khí trầm mặc, giàu suy tư, trong một cuộc thảo luận triết học về sự tồn tại, nhận thức luận về bản thể, và tất nhiên không thể bỏ qua một trụ cột suy tư: đạo đức tiêu hóa.
The possibilities of unconscious perception and unconscious bias prompt parallel debates about unconscious mental content. This chapter argues that claims within these debates alleging the existence of unconscious content are made fraught by ambiguity and confusion with respect to the two central concepts they involve: consciousness and content. Borrowing conceptual resources from the debate about unconscious perception, the chapter distills the two conceptual puzzles concerning each of these notions and establishes philosophical strategies for their resolution. It then argues that empirical (...) evidence for unconscious bias falls victim to these same puzzles, but that progress can be made by adopting similar philosophical strategies. Throughout, the chapter highlights paths forward in both debates, illustrates how they serve as fruitful domains in which to study the relationship between philosophy and empirical science, and uses their combined study to further understanding of a general theory of unconscious content. (shrink)
I argue that beliefs based on irresponsibly formed experiences — whose causes were not appropriately regulated by the subject — are doxastically unjustified. Only this position, I claim, accounts for the higher epistemic standard required of perceptual experts. Section I defends this standard and applies it to a pair of cases in which either an expert umpire or a complete novice judge a force play in baseball. I argue that when the latter, but not the former, fails to follow rules (...) about perceiving force plays, their resulting belief is justified. Section II shows that this difference can be explained by the fact that the novice, but not the expert, formed her experience responsibly. Section III shows that alternative explanations of the expert’s unjustified belief — from defeat, reliability, and inference — fail. Section IV shows that the epistemic relevance of responsible experience formation has broad implications for the epistemology of perceptual beliefs. (shrink)
In contrast to mainstream accounts which explain the aesthetic experience of people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in terms of cognitive abilities, this paper suggests as an alternative explanation the “emotional abilities approach”. We present an example of a person with ASD who is able to exercise a variety of emotional abilities in aesthetic contexts but who has difficulties exhibiting their equivalents in interpersonal relations. Using an autobiographical account, we demonstrate first that there is at least one precedent where a (...) person with ASD can exercise a series of emotional abilities when engaging with art works. Second, we offer also an explanation about why aesthetic contexts might enable this person to exercise emotional abilities which in interpersonal contexts seem to be blocked. (shrink)
The mainstream view in contemporary analytic philosophy is that perception is primarily in the business of representing the mind-independent world as it is. My dissertation explores an alternative conception: that the goal of perception is to guide successful action and that perceptions do not need to track mind-independent properties to play this action-guiding role. I focus on two types of perception: color perception and pain perception. I start with the former and advocate a pragmatist, empirically-guided approach which begins by inquiring (...) into the function of color vision. After arguing that none of the extant philosophical views of color are satisfactory, I answer the function question by focusing on systematic color perceptual phenomena investigated by psychophysicists. I argue that the human color visual system is an enhancement system: that is, its job is to help us better discriminate, track, and recognize meaningful objects, properties, and relations. I then build on this idea using the notion of ‘competence-embeddedness.’ I propose that color vision is embedded in a network of competences: the aim of color vision is to help organisms manifest these competences, and color experiences are correct when they result from competence-enhancing processing. The framework is explanatorily robust. For example, it allows me to conceptualize many textbook color illusions as special cases of successful color perception where the demands of the relevant competences clash. Finally, I use the notion of ‘competence-embeddedness’ to develop a new account of pain. I argue that the pain system is not a bodily disturbance detector, but a sophisticated, context-responsive security system whose primary goal is to help organisms manifest important behavioral and cognitive competences. (shrink)
The approximate number system (ANS) enables organisms to represent the approximate number of items in an observed collection, quickly and independently of natural language. Recently, it has been proposed that the ANS goes beyond representing natural numbers by extracting and representing rational numbers (Clarke & Beck 2021a). Prior work has demonstrated that adults and children discriminate ratios in an approximate and ratio-dependent manner, consistent with the hallmarks of the ANS. Here, we use a well-known “connectedness illusion” to provide evidence that (...) these ratio-dependent ratio discriminations are (a) based on the perceived number of items in seen displays (and not just non-numerical confounds), (b) are not dependent on verbal working memory, or explicit counting routines, and (c) may involve representations with a part-whole (or subset-superset) format, like a fraction, rather than a part-part format, like a ratio. These results support and refine the hypothesis that the ANS represents full-blown rational numbers. (shrink)
The distinction between perception and cognition frames countless debates in philosophy and cognitive science. But what, if anything, does this distinction actually amount to? In this introductory article, we summarize recent work on this question. We first briefly consider the possibility that a perception-cognition border should be eliminated from our scientific ontology, and then introduce and critically examine five positive approaches to marking a perception–cognition border, framed in terms of phenomenology, revisability, modularity, format, and stimulus-dependence.
At the intersection of aesthetics and the philosophy of perception lies a problem about representational images. When you look at Vermeer's View of Delft, do you in fact get to see Delft? It would be nice if we could answer in the affirmative, as it would so neatly explain many of our practices in engaging with images. Be it in churches, advertising, or psychology labs, we typically use images as substitutes for the immediate perception of things. Here is what I (...) claim: Images make it possible to see the objects they represent, and they do so because they can function in vision as perceptual mediators. A perceptual mediator is an object of perception by means of which we can perceive something wholly distinct from it. I show that, while such perceptual mediators may be exceptional in vision, in other sensory modalities they occur universally. Our sensory lives would be impoverished without the possibility of perceiving things mediately. In Chapter 1 I identify a fundamental dispute about images. The dispute is about whether images represent by making absent scenes appear to a viewer, or by merely copying the way an object or event looks. Many philosophers favour the idea that images merely copy how things look. In Chapter 2 I explain my dissatisfaction with the copy view. I lay out my main positive proposal in Chapter 3. How does the idea that images make absent objects visible fit with our current concept of perception? I formulate my answer through a study of the other sensory modalities. In audition, it is no mystery that sounds can make other things heard. My arguments forge a connection between images and sounds that has not been explored in recent work on representation or perception. I show how it offers an attractive solution to our problem. In Chapter 4, I argue that moreover, we may regard mediate perception as a purely sensory mode of perception. There is no need to rely on non-sensory or quasi-sensory effects of thought or cognition. Instead, coming to see a painted surface as an image consists in no more than discovering a previously unseen aspect of our visible surroundings. In Chapter 5 I consider at a more general level how visual images contribute to visual perception. Overall, I establish how visual representation has a structural place in our visual world. (shrink)
L'homme mène son existence dans un univers sensoriel et un univers de sens. Quelles significations prennent les perceptions sensorielles dans la vie sociale et culturelle? Cet ouvrage à plusieurs voix étudie les sens dans différentes circonstances de la vie collective : chamanisme, maladie, racisme, sexualité, rencontre, vie quotidienne, musique, etc. Le Brésil, la Mongolie, le Burkina-Faso, l'Inde, le Mexique, le Sénégal, la société touarègue... et bien entendu l'Europe. Anthropologie et ethnologie sont ici sollicitées dans ces études des relations symboliques entre (...) les sens et le sens. (shrink)
In this work, we introduce what we believe to be a more sensitive variation of the Metaproblem of consciousness, structured by philosopher Keith Frankish (2017): the Illusion Problem. To do so, we explore the process that leads us to treat each and every quale as an illusion, in addition to showing how qualia are present in most supposedly physicalist theories, which we will later call “Closeted Dualism”. We also emphasize that the illusionist theory is already widely used or considered by (...) philosophers who seek a scientifically plausible way out of the problems of consciousness. Once done, the reader will be ready for the more “technical” part of this article, in which we explore and defend the main concepts and mechanisms of Illusionism. (shrink)
Seeing total darkness is a peculiar perceptual state: in it, the subject is visually aware of something while seeming to fail to be aware of anything. Recent treatments of the topic (Sorensen 2008, Soteriou 2000) leave this particular puzzle unsolved. Here, I attempt a solution. Following Dretske, I begin by suggesting that the perceptual report ‘S sees (total) darkness’ is ambiguous between two distinct kinds of perceptual states: epistemic and non-epistemic. This will lead to an examination of the metaphysics of (...) what is supposed to be seen. I show, on the one hand, the difficulty of reducing the perception of total darkness to the perception of a particular instantiation of a property, and on the other, that it has important similarities with the perception of (non-particular) ‘stuff’. I propose, finally, that the solution to the puzzle might involve postulating a novel ontological status for total darkness: that of a ‘concrete universal’. Potential implications of interest for particularism and for naïve realism are suggested. (shrink)
Sehen, Horen, Riechen, Schmecken, Tasten: Die Autorin fragt nach Entstehung, Begrundung und Folgen dieser tradierten Ordnung der Sinne. Sie fragt auch nach den abweichenden Varianten, die von der antiken Idee des Korpers als ganzheitliches Sensorium uber die hoheren Sinne des Mittelalters bis zu den sinnlichen Vermogen der Aufklarung, wie Einbildungskraft und Dichtungsvermogen, reichen. Im 18. Jahrhundert verstarkte sich zusammen mit der anthropologischen Aufwertung der Sinnlichkeit der Impuls zur Uberschreitung der Funfzahl der Sinne und zur Umordnung der uberkommenen Hierarchie. An Textbeispielen (...) von Platon, Ovid und Goethe untersucht die Autorin uberdies Zusammenhange, aber auch Widerspruche, die zwischen der europaischen Liebeskultur und der Bewertung von Auge und Ohr als hohere, von Geschmack, Geruch und Tasten als niedere Sinne bestehen. (shrink)