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  1. The Phenomenal Use of 'Look'.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass.
    The article provides the state of the art on the debate about whether the logical form of ‘look’ statements commits us to any particular theory of perceptual experience. The debate began with Frank Jackson’s (1977) argument that ‘look’ statements commit us to a sense-datum theory of perception. Thinkers from different camps have since then offered various rejoinders to Jackson’s argument. Others have provided novel arguments from considerations of the semantics of ‘look’ to particular theories of perception. The article closes with (...)
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  2. An Argument Against Papineau’s Qualitative View of Sensory Experience.Adam Pautz - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind.
    In his excellent book *The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience* (2021), David Papineau argues against standard theories of sensory experience: the sense datum view, representationalism, naïve realism, and so on. The only view left standing is his own “qualitative view”. On Papineau’s physicalist version, all experiences are nothing but neural states, and the only features essentially involved in experience are intrinsic neural properties (29-30, 95-97). In my book *Perception* (2021), I developed an argument from spatial experience against this kind of view (...)
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  3. The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane & Craig French - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Problem of Perception is a pervasive and traditional problem about our ordinary conception of perceptual experience. The problem is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perceptual experience be what we ordinarily understand it to be: something that enables direct perception of the world? These possibilities of error challenge the intelligibility of our ordinary conception of perceptual experience; the major theories of experience are responses to this challenge.
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  4. The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):524-546.
    According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
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  5. Reid's Doxastic Theory of Perception.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    Reid endorsed a doxastic theory of perception, on which beliefs are constituents of perceptual experiences. This theory faces the problem of known illusions: we can perceive that p while believing that not-p. Some scholars argue that the problem of known illusions and other problems entail that Reid’s view cannot be charitably interpreted as a doxastic theory. This paper explores Reid’s theoretical commitments with respect to belief acquisition and uses textual evidence to show that his theory is genuinely doxastic. It then (...)
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  6. Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.
    According to a classic but nowadays discarded philosophical theory, perceptual experience is a complex of nonconceptual sensory states and full-blown propositional beliefs. This classical dual-component theory of experience is often taken to be obsolete. In particular, there seem to be cases in which perceptual experience and belief conflict: cases of known illusions, wherein subjects have beliefs contrary to the contents of their experiences. Modern dual-component theories reject the belief requirement and instead hold that perceptual experience is a complex of nonconceptual (...)
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  7. XV—Epistemic Charge.Susanna Siegel - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):277-306.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 277-306, December 2015.
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  8. Are Color Experiences Representational?Todd Ganson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
    The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. (...)
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  9. Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience.Santiago Echeverri - 2011 - In David Lauer, Christophe Laudou, Robin Celikates & Georg W. Bertram (eds.), Expérience Et Réflexivité: Perspectives au-Delà de L’Empirisme Et de L’Idéalisme. L'harmattan.
    Any theory of perceptual experience should elucidate the way humans exploit it in activities proper to responsible agents, like justifying and revising their beliefs. In this paper I examine the hypothesis that this capacity requires the positing of a perceptual awareness involving a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts. I conclude that this hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for empirical rationality. This leaves open the possibility to introduce a doxastic account, according to which the epistemic function of perception is (...)
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  10. Die Struktur des Wahrnehmungserlebnisses im Spannungsfeld zwischen phänomenologischen und epistemischen Aspekten.Wolfgang Huemer - 2011 - XXII. Deutscher Kongress Für Philosophie, 11. - 15. September 2011, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
    Die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung der letzten Jahrzehnte ist stark geprägt von der Begrifflichkeitsdebatte. Dabei ist allerdings eine dialektische Pattstellung zu erkennen: während die Begrifflichkeitsthese für gewöhnlich mit der epistemischen Rolle er Wahrnehmung begründet wird, verweisen Argumente für die Nichtbegrifflichkeitsthese zumeist auf die qualitative Reichhaltigkeit und die erlebnismäßig gegebenen, also phänomenologischen Aspekte der Wahrnehmung. Um diese Pattstellung zu überwinden, skizziere ich in diesem Beitrag Überlegungen für ein Argument für die Begrifflichkeitsthese, das wesentliche auf den phänomenologischen Aspekten der Wahrnehmung beruht.
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  11. Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?Susanna Siegel - 2010 - In Bence -Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.
    This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.
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  12. In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.
    Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. (...)
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  13. Perception as Unconscious Inference.Gary Hatfield - 2002 - In Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.), Perception and the Physical World: Psychological and Philosophical Issues in Perception. John Wiley and Sons. pp. 113--143.
    In this chapter I examine past and recent theories of unconscious inference. Most theorists have ascribed inferences to perception literally, not analogically, and I focus on the literal approach. I examine three problems faced by such theories if their commitment to unconscious inferences is taken seriously. Two problems concern the cognitive resources that must be available to the visual system (or a more central system) to support the inferences in question. The third problem focuses on how the conclusions of inferences (...)
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  14. Perception and Belief.A. D. Smith - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.
    An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent.There are two main issues to address. The first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this (...)
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  15. Experience and Content: Consequences of a Continuum Theory.W. Martin Davies - 1993 - Dissertation,
    This thesis is about experiential content: what it is; what kind of account can be given of it. I am concerned with identifying and attacking one main view - I call it the inferentialist proposal. This account is central to the philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of science and perception. I claim, however, that it needs to be recast into something far more subtle and enriched, and I attempt to provide a better alternative in these pages. The inferentialist proposal (...)
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  16. Appearances Can Be Deceiving.Jack S. Crumley - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (3):233 - 251.
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  17. Perception: Belief and Experience.Anthony Pitson - 1990 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):55-76.
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  18. Perception and Belief: A Regress Problem.Paul K. Moser - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (March):120-126.
    Some philosophers, such as N. R. Hanson, have suggested that one's perceiving an object entails one's having a particular perceptual belief, and not just some belief or other, about that object. This article constructs an argument showing that such a view generates an infinite regress of required perceptual beliefs.
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  19. Creer para ver: Sobre la teoría de la creencia en Ortega / Believing for Seeing: On the Theory of Belief in Ortega.J. Carlos Gómez Muñoz - 1983 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] (18):75-96.
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  20. Seeing is Believing.John Heil - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):229-240.
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  21. Judging, Taking, and Believing: Three Candidates for the Propositional Attitude in Perception.Ronald Ruegsegger - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 1460:535-559.
    In an earlier essay I argued that perception involves an assentive propositional attitude. This essay completes the argument by examining the three most familiar propositional attitudes in order to determine which is best suited to perception. In Part I, I examine the contention of C.A. Campbell that perception involves judging, and I conclude that judging is too deliberative to be the assentive attitude in perception. On the other hand, in Part II, a study of David Armstrong’s and and George Pitcher’s (...)
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  22. The Specificity of Perception.David Kelley - 1980 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (March):401-405.
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  23. On the Distinction Between Perceptual and Ordinary Beliefs.J. Barry Maund - 1977 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (December):209-219.
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  24. Perception Without Belief.George S. Pappas - 1977 - Ratio (Misc.) 19 (December):142-161.
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  25. Appearing as Irreducible in Perception.Alan H. Goldman - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (December):147-164.
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  26. Perceptions and Perceptual Judgments.Richard E. Aquila - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (July):17-31.
  27. Is Seeing Believing?Russell B. Goodman - 1974 - Proceedings of the New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society 40 (April):45.
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  28. Sensuous Judgments.Romane Clark - 1973 - Noûs 7 (1):45-56.
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  29. A Note on the Belief Theory of Perception.Norman Melchert - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (November):427-429.
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  30. A Theory Of Perception.George Pitcher - 1971 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    Presented here in a lucid, simple style is an extended defense of a behavioral and direct-realist theory of sense perception. Originally published in 1971. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich (...)
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  31. Armstrong and Perception.C. G. Prado - 1968 - Theoria 34 (3):256-258.
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  32. Knowledge, Belief and Perceptual Experiences.R. Ziedins - 1966 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):70-88.
  33. An Examination of D M Armstrong's Theory of Perception.John O. Nelson - 1964 - American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (2):154-160.
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  34. Max Deutscher and Perception.David M. Armstrong - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):246-249.
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  35. David Armstrong and Perception.Max Deutscher - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):80-88.
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