Bekanntester deutscher Philosoph der Gegenwart. Seit mehr als fünfzig Jahren prägt Jürgen Habermas das intellektuelle Leben Deutschlands und darüber hinaus. Mit seinem Werk nimmt er entscheidenden Einfluss auf die Wissenschaften, auf Politik und aktuelle gesellschaftliche Diskussionen. Neben einem Überblick zur Biografie stellt das Handbuch Habermas intellektuelle Kontexte, wie z. B. die Frankfurter Schule, vor und beleuchtet die wichtigsten Stationen seines komplexen Werkes. Der Schlussteil informiert über Begriffe und Konzepte, die sich durch das gesamte Werk ziehen.

Jürgen Habermas is one of the most influential philosophers of our time. The Habermas Handbook offers a comprehensive overview and an in-depth analysis of Habermas's work. Habermas scholars elucidate his thought, providing essential insight into his key concepts and his influence across politics, law, the social sciences, and public life.

The deliberative model of politics has recently been criticized for not being very well equipped to conceptualize current developments such as the misinterpretation of political difference, the digital turn, and public protests. A first critique is that this model assumes a conception of public spheres that is too idealistic. A second objection is that it misconceives the relationship between empirical reality and normativity. Third, it is assumed that deliberative democracy offers an antiquated notion of a shared ‘we’ of political actors (...) and because of this, fourth, fails to take into consideration the ‘digital turn’, in particular the de-personalizing effects of social media that have led to a rapid decline of the public sphere. And a fifth critique states that the deliberative model ignores the fact that politics is not, and especially protests and revolutions are not, seminar-like debates but spontaneous, chaotic and sometimes violent expressions. I will argue that all of these critiques fall short in a variety of ways. A deliberative model of politics allows us to address the tension between the ideal and the real, the ‘old media’ and the so-called digitalization of public spheres as well as peaceful discourse and violent uprisings. Especially the concept of communicative power, a notion also used by Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas, reveals the potentials for future participation in digital spaces and public places. (shrink)

The democratic world, the one in which the claim that all those affected by decisions should also be equally involved in the process of legislation on which these decisions are based prevailed, is...

A deliberative model of politics has recently been criticized for not being very well equipped to conceptualize public spheres in world society. A first critique is that this model assumes a conception of public spheres that is too idealistic, because it presupposes counterfactual conditions of communication in public discourse that do not meet empirical real word conditions. Secondly, it assumes an antiquated notion of a shared “we” of political actors. Because of this it does not take into consideration the “digital (...) turn” and the ego-centering and depersonalizing effects of social media like Facebook, twitter, and blogs, which have led to a rapid decline of the public sphere. And a third critique states that the deliberative model ignores the fact that politics, and especially protests and revolutions, are not seminar-like debates but spontaneous, chaotic and sometimes violent expressions. So it is not just unreceptive for the “digital space” but also for gathering and protesting in real public places surrounded by military troops. I will argue that all of these critiques fall short. A deliberative model of politics allows us to address the tension between the ideal and the real, the “old media” and the so-called digitalization of public spheres as well as peaceful discourse and violent uprisings. Especially the concept of communicative power, a notion also used by Hannah Arendt, reveals the potential for future participation in digital spaces and public places. (shrink)

Over the last years, the debate over global justice has moved beyond the divide between statist and cosmopolitan, as well as ideal and non-ideal approaches. Rather, a turn to empirical realities has taken place, claiming that normative political philosophy and theory need to address empirical facts about global poverty and wealth. The talk argues that some aspects of the earlier “Critical Theory” and its notions of negativity, praxis, and communicative power allow for a non-empiristic link between normative theory and a (...) well-informed social science analysis that is based on experienced injustice. The analysis of border politics and housing politics will serve as an example for a critical theory of global injustice that addresses regressive as well as emancipative developments in society. (shrink)

Over the last years, the debate over global justice has moved beyond the divide between statist and cosmopolitan, as well as ideal and non-ideal approaches. Rather, a turn to empirical realities has taken place, claiming that normative political philosophy and theory need to address empirical facts about global poverty and wealth. The talk argues that some aspects of the earlier “Critical Theory” and its notions of negativity, praxis, and communicative power allow for a non-empiristic link between normative theory and a (...) well-informed social science analysis that is based on experienced injustice. The analysis of border politics and housing politics will serve as an example for a critical theory of global injustice that addresses regressive as well as emancipative developments in society. (shrink)

Housing has become a political problem in the vast majority of cities around the world, highlighting obvious injustices. The article pursues the question to what extent the existing human right to housing can be of any interest here. The practice-based approach of Charles Beitz can help against the background of some systematic supplements. A ‘negative’ approach that distinguishes forms of injustice is an important prerequisite for a substantial use of human rights. The negative approach makes it possible to uncover injustices (...) and shows the obstacles that stand in the way of a practice-based conception of human rights. The practice-based conception is, at the same time, necessary for the social analysis of the obstacles, in order to analyse human rights as well as to be able to justify human rights themselves. The current commodification of housing it is argued impedes the exercise of a practice-based conception of human rights in the way that Charles Beitz has suggested. (shrink)

Housing has become a political problem in the vast majority of cities around the world, highlighting obvious injustices. The article pursues the question to what extent the existing human right to housing can be of any interest here. The practice-based approach of Charles Beitz can help against the background of some systematic supplements. A ‘negative’ approach that distinguishes forms of injustice is an important prerequisite for a substantial use of human rights. The negative approach makes it possible to uncover injustices (...) and shows the obstacles that stand in the way of a practice-based conception of human rights. The practice-based conception is, at the same time, necessary for the social analysis of the obstacles, in order to analyse human rights as well as to be able to justify human rights themselves. The current commodification of housing it is argued impedes the exercise of a practice-based conception of human rights in the way that Charles Beitz has suggested. (shrink)

Populism and Civil Society: The Challenge to Democratic Constitutionalism (2022) by Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen is an important book that addresses a widespread and ominous phenomenon around the world: The challenge of populism. This book forms a symposium by renowned authors which gathers commentaries on Arato and Cohen’s book. From different points of view, comments, suggestions and queries are put forward, to which the authors respond. The authors’ illuminating rejoinders not only present some of their arguments in a new (...) light but also arrive at a clarifying interpretation of their approach. (shrink)

This article seeks to explain some of the ramifications of globalization processes for the pressing problem of increasing global poverty. It distinguishes two competing approaches to explaining the causes of poverty-related injustice and justifying conceptions of obligations towards the poor. A first approach, the assistance approach, is mainly directed at identifying inappropriate worldwide income and asset distribution; the other, the causal approach focuses on the effects international regulations have on people’s lives. This article explains that both approaches depend on the (...) interpretation of the current state of economic and political interdependence. It is argued that both conceptions have their pitfalls, but that from a theoretical as well as pragmatic point of view, it makes sense to defend an ‘integrated’ perspective that also takes into account the responsibility of non-state actors. (shrink)

What is critical theory – and what is it not? This essay attempts a new answer to this old question and examines which normative convictions immanent to social reality can be used to describe, analyse and criticise contemporary, global forms of domination that form blockades of social and political participation. The analysis proceeds in a double step, referring both to the critique of society and to the critique of theory that describes society. The basis of this parallel swing is an (...) analysis in which the author makes revisions to Jürgen Habermas’s colonisation thesis and uses the example of housing to show how these revisions which refer to the global perspective, the demarcation between system and lifeworld, the language of critique and, finally, the theoretical mode of an inherent dialectical critique make possible an analysis of the financial and economic sectors as well as everyday interactions. Reading Habermas more dialectically than he probably would himself also allows the identification of potentials for transforming relations of oppression. (shrink)

The paper argues that the current global market is organized by a system of transnational law whose development is best characterized as ambivalent. On the one side, legal juridification can lead to a hegemonic system of international law that lacks legitimacy, paradoxically creates extralegal spheres, promotes the ‘privatization’ of political areas, and, thereby, reduces the competences of states. On the other side, legal codification can also function as an engine of transnational democratization and as a barrier to an unhampered growth (...) of transnational administrative and executive power. Scholarship on the idea of legitimacy in law and transnational governance in political and legal theory has to reflect these aspects of juridification on a world scale. Most approaches to the issue, however, have serious flaws: they neither offer an adequate empirical diagnosis of the de-embedding of international economic and legal processes, nor do they provide convincing proposals as to how such processes could be domesticated. Against this background, the paper lays out a critical analysis of legal codification processes as well as proposing an account of democratic governance, based on a realistic conception of deliberative democracy. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 66 Heft: 3 Seiten: 387-391.

The article is a review of Hauke Brunkhorst’s book on a _Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions_. The author addresses three points: Hauke Brunkhorst’s notion of history, and of what remains unseen; the dialectics of evolution and revolution, and whether the approach is sufficiently dialectic, according to its own promise; and the implicit notion of critique.

In his latest book, Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie, Jürgen Habermas attempts nothing less than a reconceptualisation of the history of human reason. Why, according to the central question that runs through the book like a red thread, can we, in the face of all social adversities and psychological obstacles, still be morally motivated to stand up for overcoming injustice in the world? This almost classic question about what I can hope for undoubtedly bears Kantian traits. And yet Habermas clearly (...) goes beyond Kant. We argue that this becomes visible, first, in his post-metaphysical conception of motivation, which links individual and collective moral learning processes. The enormous explosive power of this conception comes into its own, secondly, especially against the background of some additional assumptions (trust, grief, open future). Nevertheless, thirdly, the question arises to what extent the Habermasian narrative of progress does not have a blind spot because it is in some sense not dialectical enough. The negative side of reason, which Adorno and Benjamin emphasised, are not included in the progress narrative, or only indirectly, which makes the conception of moral motivation seem weaker than it ought to be. (shrink)

In his article “A Global Resources Dividend” Thomas Pogge argues that all inhabitants of the world have an equal claim to use the world’s natural resources. Pogge suggests a Global Resource Dividend (GRD) which is tobe used for raising the minimum living standard of the world’s poorest people. Pogge’s proposal has been criticized on three different levels. First, it has been objected that from a normative point of view the moral justification of the GRD is not convincing. Second, he has (...) been criticized for the empirical assumptions that underlie his analysis of worldwide poverty. And third, the proposal has been rejected, because of problems involved in the realization of the GRD. In this article all three objections are answered and it is argued for a democratic legitimation of the GRD. (shrink)

In his article “A Global Resources Dividend” Thomas Pogge argues that all inhabitants of the world have an equal claim to use the world’s natural resources. Pogge suggests a Global Resource Dividend (GRD) which is tobe used for raising the minimum living standard of the world’s poorest people. Pogge’s proposal has been criticized on three different levels. First, it has been objected that from a normative point of view the moral justification of the GRD is not convincing. Second, he has (...) been criticized for the empirical assumptions that underlie his analysis of worldwide poverty. And third, the proposal has been rejected, because of problems involved in the realization of the GRD. In this article all three objections are answered and it is argued for a democratic legitimation of the GRD. (shrink)