Populism is widely thought to be in tension with liberal democracy. This article clarifies what exactly is problematic about populism from a liberal–democratic point of view and goes on to develop normative standards that allow us to distinguish between more and less legitimate forms of populism. The point of this exercise is not to dismiss populism in toto; the article strives for a more subtle result, namely, to show that liberal democracy can accommodate populism provided that the latter conforms to (...) particular discursive norms. What the article calls a ‘liberal ethics of populism’ turns out to be closely bound up with a broader ethics of peoplehood, understood as a way of articulating who ‘the people’ are in a way that is compatible with liberal–democratic principles of political justification. Such an ethics, concludes the article, inevitably has a much wider audience than populist political actors: its addressees are all those who seek legitimately to exercise power in the name of the people. (shrink)

Populist movements have become key players in European politics. These movements are readily criticized by journalists or political rivals, yet none of the common objections to populism seems to arrest their success. This article turns to normative political theory to cultivate sensitivity to problems arising from some existing arguments against populism, and to explore possible alternatives. It offers a critical reading of prototypical liberal and conservative arguments against populism, and proposes that the principles of solidarity and procedure provide good grounds (...) for a sustainable critique of populism. (shrink)

Popular sovereignty requires that citizens perceive themselves as being able to act and implement decisions, and that they are de facto causally connected to mechanisms of decision making. I argue that the two most common understandings of the exercise of popular sovereignty—which center on direct decision making by the people as a whole and the indirect exercise of democratic agency by elected representatives, respectively—are inadequate in this respect, and go on to suggest a complementary account that stresses the central role (...) of internally democratic and participatory political parties in actualising popular sovereignty, drawing on the democratic theory of Hans Kelsen. (shrink)

Populism is widely thought to be in tension with liberal democracy. This article clarifies what exactly is problematic about populism from a liberal–democratic point of view and goes on to develop...

In recent times, representation theory has become one of the most productive and interesting sub-fields in democratic theory. Arguably, the most important theoretical innovation are the so-called ‘constructivist’ approaches to political representation. These approaches play a central role in Creating Political Presence: The New Politics of Democratic Representation and The Constructivist Turn in Political Representation, two impressive volumes that take stock of the state of the art in representation theory. I discuss the two volumes by focusing on three broader and (...) interconnected themes: the problem that constructivism is meant to respond to, the tendency of representation theorists to expand the possibilities of representation as broadly as possible, and the normative aspects of political representation and how constructivists deal with them. (shrink)

In recent times, representation theory has become one of the most productive and interesting sub-fields in democratic theory. Arguably, the most important theoretical innovation are the so-called ‘constructivist’ approaches to political representation. These approaches play a central role in Creating Political Presence: The New Politics of Democratic Representation and The Constructivist Turn in Political Representation, two impressive volumes that take stock of the state of the art in representation theory. I discuss the two volumes by focusing on three broader and (...) interconnected themes: the problem that constructivism is meant to respond to, the tendency of representation theorists to expand the possibilities of representation as broadly as possible, and the normative aspects of political representation and how constructivists deal with them. (shrink)

What, if anything, is problematic about gentrification? This article addresses this question from the perspective of normative political theory. We argue that gentrification is problematic insofar as it involves a violation of city-dwellers’ occupancy rights. We distinguish these rights from other forms of territorial rights and discuss the different implications of the argument for urban governance. If we agree on the ultimate importance of being able to pursue one’s located life plans, the argument goes, we must also agree on limiting (...) the impact of gentrification on peoples’ lives. Limiting gentrification’s impact, however, does not entail halting processes of gentrification once and for all. (shrink)

Solidarity can be conceived in multiple ways. This article probes possible underlying ontological and normative assumptions of solidarity. In order to conceptually clarify the notion of solidarity, we distinguish between five types of solidarity. We suggest that solidarity is either grounded in the Enlightenment ideas of liberty, or a category of loyalty and allegiance. If the former is the case, solidarity can be justified on rational grounds. If the latter is the case, it is contingent on narratives of historical continuity (...) and a non-rational sense of belonging. Moreover, we show that different types of solidarity can be derived from Anglo-Saxon and continental thought, which hints at different conceptions of community. (shrink)

Recent developments in Hungary and Poland have made democratic backsliding a major issue of concern within the European Union. This article focuses on the secondary agents that facilitate democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland: the European People’s Party, which has continually protected the Hungarian Fidesz government from EU sanctions, and the Hungarian ruling party Fidesz, which repeatedly promised to block any EU-level sanctions against Poland in the Council. The article analyses these agents’ behaviour as an instance of transnational complicity and (...) passes a tentative judgment as to which of the two cases is normatively more problematic. The analysis has implications for possible countervailing responses to democratic backsliding within EU member states. (shrink)

This short piece discusses Hélène Landemore’s proposal of an ‘open democracy’, as outlined in her recent book _Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First Century_. Acknowledging the value of Landemore’s radical and ambitious proposals, I draw attention to a number of shortcomings and blind spots that have to do with how the case for an ‘open democracy’ is made: through an unduly brief and dismissive treatment of political parties; a methodological insensitivity to empirical variations of democratic performance and citizens’ (...) evaluations of the latter; a failure to distinguish between higher and ordinary law-making in the discussion of the central Icelandic case; and, finally, a surprising concession that realising an open democracy is all but infeasible in established constitutional democracies. If open democracy is to be an attractive ideal, these issues must arguably be addressed. (shrink)

In recent times, it has become increasingly common that elected parties and leaders systematically undermine democracy and the rule of law. This phenomenon is often framed with the term democratic backsliding or democratic regression. This article deals with the relatively little-studied topic of resistance to democratic regressions. Chief amongst the things it discusses is the rather central ethical issue of whether resisters may themselves, in their attempts to prevent a further erosion of democracy, transgress democratic norms. But the argument advanced (...) in the article is not merely about the ethics of resistance. It begins, perhaps unconventionally, by addressing the affective dimension of resistance to democratic regressions, looking in particular at the powerful feelings of anger and despair that pro-democratic citizens living under a regressive government are likely to experience. As the article argues, these feelings have not only motivational but also epistemic potential, which must be adequately theorized in order to understand how resisters can respond to the ethical challenges facing them. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen was one of the most important legal thinkers of the 20th century, and he is known for mounting an elaborate defense of liberal party democracy at a time when the latter was hardly the most popular form of regime. This article examines how Kelsen responded to two major political movements he experienced in his intellectual prime: political Catholicism, which he was confronted with in interwar Austria, and Christian Democracy, which became a hegemonic political force in Western Europe after (...) World War II, when Kelsen was already in exile. The article reconstructs Kelsen's complex critique of these two religious movements and ends by reflecting on what we can learn from his arguments about current attempts to revive Christian political thought. (shrink)

Voting is often said to be irrational because of the incredibly small likelihood that an individual voter’s ballot will be pivotal in favour of her preferred candidate or party. A persuasive respon...

Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give (...) an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Pruss proves the validity of the rule beta-2 relative to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals, which is a significant step forward in the debate about the consequence argument. Yet, we believe there remain intuitive counter-examples to beta-2 formulated with the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. We offer a novel and two-dimensional formulation of the Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals and prove the validity of a new transfer rule according to which a new version of the consequence argument can (...) be formulated. This new transfer rule is immune to the counter-examples involving the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. However, we show that counter-examples to this new rule can also be generated, demanding that the Lewisian semantics be generalized for higher dimensions where counter-examples can always be generated. (shrink)

Focused on city-scale automation, and using self-driving cars (SDCs) as a case study, this article reflects on the role of AI—and in particular, computer vision systems used for mapping and navigation—as a catalyst for urban transformation. Urban research commonly presents AI and cities as having a one-way cause-and-effect relationship, giving undue weight to AI’s impact on cities and overlooking the role of cities in shaping AI. Working at the intersection of data science and social research, this paper aims to counter (...) this trend by exploring the reverse perspective: how do cities affect the development, and expose the present limits, of SDCs? The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, by comparing urban and nonurban environments and thoroughly examining the relationship between computer vision and city-specific sociality and form, it defines machine autonomy/automation as a function of the sociotechnical milieu in which an AI system operates. Second, and related, the paper problematizes the notion of SDCs as autonomous technologies and the role it plays in envisioning contending policy arrangements and technical solutions for achieving full driving automation. Finally, the article offers insight into a materialist and spatialized understanding of AI—namely, not as an abstract quality susceptible to replication within discrete machines, but rather as a distributed property emerging through embodied interactions among a multiplicity of agents (human, non-human, and technological) within/with their environments. (shrink)

In a recent article, P. Roger Turner and Justin Capes argue that no one is, or ever was, even partly morally responsible for certain world-indexed truths. Here we present our reasons for thinking that their argument is unsound: It depends on the premise that possible worlds are maximally consistent states of affairs, which is, under plausible assumptions concerning states of affairs, demonstrably false. Our argument to show this is based on Bertrand Russell’s original ‘paradox of propositions’. We should then opt (...) for a different approach to explain world-indexed truths whose upshot is that we may be morally responsible for some of them. The result to the effect that there are no maximally consistent states of affairs is independently interesting though, since this notion motivates an account of the nature of possible worlds in the metaphysics of modality. We also register in this article, independently of our response to Turner and Capes, and in the spirit of Russell’s aforementioned paradox and many other versions thereof, a proof of the claim that there is no set of all true propositions one can render false. (shrink)

Self-driving cars currently face a lot of technological problems that need to be solved before the cars can be widely used. However, they also face ethical problems, among which the question of crash-optimization algorithms is most prominently discussed. Reviewing current debates about whether we should use the ethics of the Trolley Dilemma as a guide towards designing self-driving cars will provide us with insights about what exactly ethical research does. It will result in the view that although we need the (...) ethics of the Trolley Dilemma as important input for self-driving cars, the route towards simply implementing it into automated cars is blocked. (shrink)

It is a widely held principle that no one is able to do something that would require the past to have been different from how it actually is. This principle of the fixity of the past has been presented in numerous ways, playing a crucial role in arguments for logical and theological fatalism, and for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the ability to do otherwise. I will argue that, assuming bivalence, this principle is in conflict with standard views about (...) knowledge and the semantics for ‘actually’. I also consider many possible responses to the argument. (shrink)

This chapter tries to answer the following question: How should we conceive of the method of mathematics, if we take a naturalist stance? The problem arises since mathematical knowledge is regarded as the paradigm of certain knowledge, because mathematics is based on the axiomatic method. Moreover, natural science is deeply mathematized, and science is crucial for any naturalist perspective. But mathematics seems to provide a counterexample both to methodological and ontological naturalism. To face this problem, some authors tried to naturalize (...) mathematics by relying on evolutionism. But several difficulties arise when we try to do this. This chapter suggests that, in order to naturalize mathematics, it is better to take the method of mathematics to be the analytic method, rather than the axiomatic method, and thus conceive of mathematical knowledge as plausible knowledge. (shrink)

There are three main accounts of scientific progress: 1) the epistemic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when there is an increase in knowledge; 2) the semantic account, according to which progress is made when the number of truths increases; 3) the problem-solving account, according to which progress is made when the number of problems that we are able to solve increases. Each of these accounts has received several criticisms in the last decades. Nevertheless, some authors (...) think that the epistemic account is to be preferred if one takes a realist stance. Recently, Dellsén proposed the noetic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when scientists achieve increased understanding of a phenomenon. Dellsén claims that the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of scientific progress than the epistemic account. This paper aims precisely at assessing whether the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of progress than the epistemic account. (shrink)

In the ethics of algorithms, a specifically epistemological analysis is rarely undertaken in order to gain a critique (or a defense) of the handling of or trust in medical black box algorithms (BBAs). This article aims to begin to fill this research gap. Specifically, the thesis is examined according to which such algorithms are regarded as epistemic authorities (EAs) and that the results of a medical algorithm must completely replace other convictions that patients have (preemptionism). If this were true, it (...) would be a reason to distrust medical BBAs. First, the author describes what EAs are and why BBAs can be considered EAs. Then, preemptionism will be outlined and criticized as an answer to the question of how to deal with an EA. The discussion leads to some requirements for dealing with a BBA as an EA. (shrink)

Purpose This study aims to explore whether face recognition technology – as it is intensely used by state and local police departments and law enforcement agencies – is racism free or, on the contrary, is affected by racial biases and/or racist prejudices, thus reinforcing overall racial discrimination. Design/methodology/approach The study investigates the causal pathways through which face recognition technology may reinforce the racial disproportion in enforcement; it also inquires whether it further discriminates black people by making them experience more racial (...) discrimination and self-identify more decisively as black – two conditions that are shown to be harmful in various respects. Findings This study shows that face recognition technology, as it is produced, implemented and used in Western societies, reinforces existing racial disparities in stop, investigation, arrest and incarceration rates because of racist prejudices and even contributes to strengthen the unhealthy effects of racism on historically disadvantaged racial groups, like black people. Practical implications The findings hope to make law enforcement agencies and software companies aware that they must take adequate action against the racially discriminative effects of the use of face recognition technology. Social implications This study highlights that no implementation of an allegedly racism-free biometric technology is safe from the risk of racially discriminating, simply because each implementation leans against our society, which is affected by racism in many persisting ways. Originality/value While the ethical survey of biometric technologies is traditionally framed in the discourse of universal rights, this study explores an issue that has not been deeply scrutinized so far, that is, how face recognition technology differently affects distinct racial groups and how it contributes to racial discrimination. (shrink)

In response to the many social impacts of automated mobility, in September 2020 the European Commission published Ethics of Connected and Automated Vehicles, a report in which recommendations on road safety, privacy, fairness, explainability, and responsibility are drawn from a set of eight overarching principles. This paper presents the results of an interdisciplinary research where philosophers and engineers joined efforts to operationalize the guidelines advanced in the report. To this aim, we endorse a function-based working approach to support the implementation (...) of values and recommendations into the design of automated vehicle technologies. Based on this, we develop methodological tools to tackle issues related to personal autonomy, explainability, and privacy as domains that most urgently require fine-grained guidance due to the associated ethical risks. Even though each tool still requires further inquiry, we believe that our work might already prove the productivity of the function-based approach and foster its adoption in the CAV scientific community. (shrink)

Resumen En este artículo se reflexiona sobre la relación entre literatura y enfermedad, concentrando la atención en la perspectiva de Kierkegaard y de Kafka. Después de analizar la postura kierkegaardiana se pasa a la kafkiana y, finalmente, se comparan los resultados obtenidos. De este modo, se pueden apreciar las diferencias entre los dos planteamientos y, sucesivamente, utilizar los elementos en común para esbozar unas características interesantes sobre la relación entre literatura y enfermedad en los siglos XIX y XX en el (...) contexto de influencia alemana. Esto nos lleva a reflexionar sobre las conexiones causales entre la enfermedad y la literatura, y sobre el contexto social o íntimo en el cual estas se desarrollan.I analyze the topic of sickness in relation to 19th and 20th Century Literature in the Germanophile area. In particular, I examine Kierkegaard's and Kafka's perspectives. In the case of Kierkegaard, he principally wrote about sickness in his diaries, and in two important books: The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death. However, Kafka wrote about the same theme in all his diaries. Therefore, in this study, I will compare the different perspectives of these two authors in relation to both sickness and literature. Through this, I will attempt to extract any key aspects that can be used for identifying a more general relation between sickness and literature in the 19th and 20th Centuries. To achieve this aim, I will firstly scrutinize Kierkegaard's posture, and then Kafka's posture. Following this, I will compare the findings to draw general conclusions. (shrink)

In this paper I critically evaluate the value neutrality thesis regarding technology, and find it wanting. I then introduce the various ways in which artifacts can come to influence moral value, and our evaluation of moral situations and actions. Here, following van de Poel and Kroes, I introduce the idea of value sensitive design. Specifically, I show how by virtue of their designed properties, artifacts may come to embody values. Such accounts, however, have several shortcomings. In agreement with Michael Klenk, (...) I raise epistemic and metaphysical issues with respect to designed properties embodying value. The concept of an affordance, borrowed from ecological psychology, provides a more philosophically fruitful grounding to the potential way(s) in which artifacts might embody values. This is due to the way in which it incorporates key insights from perception more generally, and how we go about determining possibilities for action in our environment specifically. The affordance account as it is presented by Klenk, however, is insufficient. I therefore argue that we understand affordances based on whether they are meaningful, and, secondly, that we grade them based on their force. (shrink)

La complessità dei rapporti tra oggetto mentale, realtà storica e rappresentazione storiografica appare evidente, quando taluni film di fantascienza ripropongono discussioni teoriche, alcune delle quali dal forte sapore medievale, in atmosfere medievali collocate nel futuro.

:Brain–computer interfaces are driven essentially by algorithms; however, the ethical role of such algorithms has so far been neglected in the ethical assessment of BCIs. The goal of this article is therefore twofold: First, it aims to offer insights into whether the problems related to the ethics of BCIs can be better grasped with the help of already existing work on the ethics of algorithms. As a second goal, the article explores what kinds of solutions are available in that body (...) of scholarship, and how these solutions relate to some of the ethical questions around BCIs. In short, the article asks what lessons can be learned about the ethics of BCIs from looking at the ethics of algorithms. To achieve these goals, the article proceeds as follows. First, a brief introduction into the algorithmic background of BCIs is given. Second, the debate about epistemic concerns and the ethics of algorithms is sketched. Finally, this debate is transferred to the ethics of BCIs. (shrink)

Van Inwagen's General Composition Question (GCQ) asks what conditions on an object and its constituents make the object a whole that these constituents compose, as opposed to an object linked to the constituents by a relation other than composition. The answer is traditionally expected to cite no mereological terms, to hold of metaphysical necessity and to be such that no defeating scenarios can be conceived (e.g., a scenario in which the conditions are met but the constituents fail to genuinely compose (...) the object). While not all writers agree on setting these high expectations on the principles that constitute answers to the GCQ (Hawley 2006), there is a yet unsettled issue concerning the principles’ naturalistic accreditation: Could putative principles be constrained and informed by advanced physical knowledge? Arguing positively, we outline two styles of principles worthy of naturalistic authority. In an explorative spirit, we notice that each style incurs certain costs. First, the principle in question may fail some of the above expectations set in an aprioristic context. Second, it may require a specific meta-theoretic understanding of what it takes to achieve naturalistic accreditation. Finally, it may address the GCQ “piecemeal” and fail to generalize to objects of all physical sorts.1. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The article deals with the early career of the literary critic Alberto Asor Rosa, one of the founders of the operaismo movement, a Marxist tendency advocating the management of factories by workers through bottom-up councils. It outlines the role he assigned to literature and culture, investigating his criticism first against the non-revolutionary cultural politics of the Italian Communist Party, notoriously through his book Scrittori e popolo and his writings for the periodical classe operaia, then identifying a transition from a (...) destructive approach against any culture based on values to the use of cultural disciplines purely as techniques. The article posits that this instrumental understanding of culture depended on Asor Rosa’s political choice to take the perspective of the working class, in order to use culture itself for social analysis. In the second half of the decade, contributing to the periodicals Angelus novus and Contropiano, he still considered culture ineffective as a way towards revolution, but he began to value the great works of ʻbourgeois’ literature for their ability to penetrate the middle-class spirit and undermine capitalist society. The article concludes that, despite his changing idea of culture, Asor Rosa’s opinions on the intellectual’s task fit the traditional concept of it. (shrink)

Die anstehenden Reformen des Medizinstudiums nach den Vorgaben des Masterplans 2020 sehen eine kompetenzorientierte Neustrukturierung des Medizinstudiums vor. Dieser Artikel zielt darauf ab, Perspektiven aufzuzeigen, wie der Ethik-Unterricht im Medizinstudium noch stärker kompetenzorientiert ausgerichtet werden kann. Er verfolgt damit das Ziel, den Kompetenzbegriff für die Medizinethik greifbarer und für die Gestaltung der Medizinethik-Lehre nutzbar zu machen. Kompetenzen verstehen wir als Handlungsdispositionen, die zur Problemlösung befähigen. Durch Übertragung des Konzepts der moralischen Intelligenz auf das moralische Handeln von Ärzt:innen in der Patient:innenversorgung (...) spezifizieren wir fünf ethisch-moralische Kompetenzen, die für moralisch angemessenes, ethisch reflektiertes professionelles Handeln angehender Ärzt:innen angelegt sein müssen: 1.) die Fähigkeit zur Ausgestaltung eines professionellen moralischen Kompasses, 2.) die Ausrichtungsbereitschaft an professionsethischen Normen und Werten, 3.) die Fähigkeit zur Wahrnehmung moralischer Dimensionen ärztlichen Handelns, 4.) die Fähigkeit zum moralischen Urteilen anhand ethischer Überlegungen über das richtige Handeln und 5.) die Realisierungsbereitschaft ethisch begründeten Handelns. Wir illustrieren ihre Bedeutung für die Medizinethik-Lehre am Beispiel des Unterrichts zur Ethik der Patient:innenversorgung im Medizinstudium. Unsere Konzeptualisierung ethisch-moralischer Kompetenzen kann dazu verwendet werden, konkrete Lehrangebote kompetenzorientiert auszugestalten. Unser Vorgehen kann analog auf andere Bereiche der Lehre von Ethik im Gesundheitswesen übertragen werden. (shrink)

Definition of the problemThe upcoming reforms according to the specifications of the Master Plan 2020 provide for a competency-oriented restructuring of medical studies. This article aims to develop perspectives on how teaching ethics in medical studies can be more strongly oriented at building competencies. In this way, it pursues the goal of making the concept of competency more tangible for medical ethics and usable for the design of medical ethics education.ArgumentsWe understand competencies as dispositions for actions that enable problem solving. (...) By transferring the concept of moral intelligence to the moral actions of physicians in patient care, we specify five ethical–moral competencies that must be present for morally appropriate, ethically reflected actions by future physicians: (1) the ability to form a professional moral compass, (2) the willingness to align oneself with professional ethical norms and values, (3) the ability to perceive moral dimensions of medical action, (4) the ability to make moral judgments based on ethical considerations about the right action, and (5) the willingness to realize ethically justified action. We illustrate their importance for teaching medical ethics using the example of teaching clinical ethics in medical studies.ConclusionOur conceptualization of moral–ethical competencies can be used to design concrete courses in a competency-oriented way. Our approach could be applied analogously to other areas of teaching ethics in health care. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the question of whether nanotechnology is giving rise to new ethical problems rather than merely to new instances of old ethical problems. Firstly, I demonstrate how important it is to make a general distinction between new ethical problems and new instances of old problems. Secondly, I propose one possible way of interpreting the distinction and offer a definition of a “new ethical problem”. Thirdly, I examine whether there is good reason to claim that nanotechnology (...) is giving or will give rise to new ethical problems. My conclusion is that there are no new ethical problems in nanotechnology but merely new occurrences of certain well-known types of ethical problems. Fourthly, I consider three arguments by van de Poel (NanoEthics 2:25–28, 2008) which contradict my conclusion. I argue that my negative conclusion is consistent with the claim that certain ethical issues arising in nanotechnology may require new normative standards or new analytical tools. I conclude that it is likely that a number of ethical issues arising in nanotechnology will have a considerable impact on our ethical theories and values – and that ethical reflection on nanotechnology will be one of the mother lodes of future ethical research – in spite of the fact that no ethical problem in nanoethics will actually be “new”. (shrink)

In our experience, we see more than what we see in a strict sense. We see things as identical through (and despite) multiple spatio‐temporal appearances; we recognize things as something. In this article, I address this issue by asking how temporality allows us to see more in the present than what the present actually contains. I argue that presence and absence are “available,” not just as they are perceived through our senses, but as they are encountered through time, and notably, (...) according to the relations that unify past, present, and future. To support this view, I refer to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's notion of synthesis. Specifically, I consider Heidegger's reading of the so‐called A‐Deduction, where Kant describes our relation with objects as enabled by three syntheses (i.e., apprehension, reproduction, and recognition). I reconstruct Heidegger's holistic interpretation of the threefold synthesis as an interplay of past, present, and future. I show how in such interplay, temporal dimensions are unified by relations that do not rely on perception; these “time‐relations,” which Heidegger also calls “rules,” allow us to see what we see not just as it is literally perceived, but as part of an “image” of the manifold. (shrink)

Plutarch’s account of Lucullus unsuccessfully begging his soldiers to follow him further, shortly before being forced to leave his command, is commonly read as the apex of his failure as a military leader. A close reading, however, reveals two hitherto overlooked aspects. Firstly, the story offers valuable information on late Republican military history, regarding the duration of military service before Augustus’ reform and the existence of clearly defined subgroups within the army. Secondly, the conflict between Lucullus and his soldiers allows (...) us to get a glimpse of the political debate of the time, characterised by the competing claims to Sulla’s heritage, the shift of military loyalty towards specific individuals, and above all the question of who really represented the interests of the res publica. (shrink)

Book 1 of Euclid's Elements opens with a set of unproved assumptions: definitions, postulates, and ‘common notions’. The common notions are general rules validating deductions that involve the relations of equality and congruence. The attested postulates are five in number, even if a part of the manuscript tradition adds a sixth, almost surely spurious, that in some manuscripts features as the ninth, and last, common notion. The postulates are called αἰτήματα both in the manuscripts of the Elements and in the (...) ancient exegetic tradition. It is not said, however, that this denomination is original, as it coincides with the nomen rei actae associated with the verbal form introducing the postulates themselves. Since antiquity it has been recognized that the postulates naturally split into two groups of quite different character: the first three are rules licensing basic constructions, the fourth and the fifth are assertions stating properties of particular geometric objects. I transcribe postulates 1–3 in the text established by Heiberg : ᾐτήσθω ἀπὸ παντὸς σημείου ἐπὶ πᾶν σημεῖον εὐθεῖαν γραμμὴν ἀγαγεῖνκαὶ πεπερασμένην εὐθεῖαν κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἐπ᾽ εὐθείας ἐκβαλεῖνκαὶ παντὶ κέντρῳ καὶ διαστήματι κύκλον γράϕεσθαι. (shrink)

This anthology contains selected papers from the 'Science as Culture' conference held at Lake Como, and Pavia University Italy, 15-19 September 1999. The conference, attended by about 220 individuals from thirty countries, was a joint venture of the International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group (its fifth conference) and the History of Physics and Physics Teaching Division of the European Physical Society (its eighth conference). The magnificient Villa Olmo, on the lakeshore, provided a memorable location for the presentors of the (...) 160 papers and the audience that discussed them. The conference was part of local celebrations of the bicentenary of Alessandro Volta's creation of the battery in 1799. Volta was born in Como in 1745, and for forty years from 1778 he was professor of experimental physics at Pavia University. The conference was fortunate to have had the generous financial support of the Italian government's Volta Bicentenary Fund, Lombardy region, Pavia University, Italian Research Council, and Kluwer Academic Publishers. The papers included here, have or will be, published in the journal Science & Education, the inaugural volume (1992) of which was a landmark in the history of science education publication, because it was the first journal in the field devoted to contributions from historical, philosophical and sociological scholarship. Clearly these 'foundational' disciplines inform numerous theoretical, curricular and pedagogical debates in science education. Contemporary Concerns The reseach promoted by the International and European Groups, and by the journal, is central to science education programmes in most areas of the world. (shrink)