Synthese 199 (3-4):10389-10413 (2021)

Pedro Merlussi
Universidade Federal do ABC
Fabio Lampert
University of Greifswald
In a recent article, P. Roger Turner and Justin Capes argue that no one is, or ever was, even partly morally responsible for certain world-indexed truths. Here we present our reasons for thinking that their argument is unsound: It depends on the premise that possible worlds are maximally consistent states of affairs, which is, under plausible assumptions concerning states of affairs, demonstrably false. Our argument to show this is based on Bertrand Russell’s original ‘paradox of propositions’. We should then opt for a different approach to explain world-indexed truths whose upshot is that we may be morally responsible for some of them. The result to the effect that there are no maximally consistent states of affairs is independently interesting though, since this notion motivates an account of the nature of possible worlds in the metaphysics of modality. We also register in this article, independently of our response to Turner and Capes, and in the spirit of Russell’s aforementioned paradox and many other versions thereof, a proof of the claim that there is no set of all true propositions one can render false.
Keywords free will  Moral Responsibility  Possible Worlds  Incompatibilism  States of Affairs  Paradox of Propositions  Direct Argument  Consequence Argument  Propositions  Paradox  Determinism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-021-03252-y
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
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Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
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Citations of this work BETA

Revisiting McKay and Johnson's Counterexample to Beta.Pedro Merlussi - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations:1-15.

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